Help was on the way for the 1st Minnesota in its desperate battle against Cadmus Wilcox’s Alabama infantry.
General Hancock ordered the 111th New York to leave its reserve position and drive toward the right, plugging the hole between the 126th New York and the 1st Minnesota. Wilcox could see the New Yorkers arrive and, looking to his right, the rest of Willard’s brigade advancing on Barksdale’s Brigade. His men could not turn the 1st Minnesota’s right flank because of blasts of canister from Thomas’ battery. Captain James Rorty’s battery had also opened on them. Scattered units from Humphrey’s division were also firing into Wilcox’s left flank. With no fresh troops coming to his aid and despite several pleas to his division commander, Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson, Wilcox believed he had no viable choice but to break off the attack, return to Emmitsburg Road, and reorganize his regiments. “[W]ith a second supporting line, the heights could have been carried,” lamented Wilcox after the war. The 1st Minnesota’s daring tactics had successfully blunted Wilcox’s penetrating charge, but the price was tremendous. More than two-thirds of the regiment’s officers and men lay dead or wounded.13
Moments after Colonel Lang discovered Wilcox’s withdrawal, an aide arrived with more ominous news: the enemy was attempting to get behind his right flank. This information, along with the presence of the 400-man 19th Maine in his front, convinced Lang to also break off the attack and withdraw.14
Of the three brigades, only Barksdale’s continued its victorious advance. The Mississippian halted his men as they approached tree-and bush-lined Plum Run. By this time the summer sun was already setting. Unbeknownst to the Mississippians, the 125th and 126th New York approached on the opposite side of Plum Run. They opened fire on the Mississippians, but Willard mistakenly believed that the men to his front were Federal troops, so he ordered his infantry to cease firing. The reprieve gave the Mississippians time to reload and prepare for the new Federal force in front of them.15
When the Mississippians opened fire, New Yorkers fell by the score. “[C]ontrary, as is evident, to the expectations of the brigade commander [Willard],” wrote Lt. Col. James Bull after the war, “the rebels in considerable force were found in the underbrush.” When he realized his mistake, Willard ordered the two regiments forward, firing as they went. The men cried out “Remember Harper’s Ferry!” as they renewed their charge. Crashing through the underbrush, and with artillery fire supporting them, they advanced with fixed bayonets. The stand by Bigelow’s battery had allowed Lt. Colonel McGilvery to cobble together a line of guns. When they opened, the concentrated cannon fire blew Barksdale’s line apart. Barksdale fell from his horse with a mortal wound and many Mississippians threw down their weapons and surrendered in the face of the sudden and ferocious Federal attack. Others ran to the rear.16
The New Yorkers charged after the fleeing Mississippians, but soon encountered artillery fire from some of E. P. Alexander’s First Corps cannon that had advanced from Seminary Ridge to the Peach Orchard. A large iron fragment smashed into Willard, carrying away most of his face and part of his head, killing him instantly. The two New York regiments halted and returned to Plum Run.17
Dense masses of blue-clad figures materialized in front of the 21st Mississippi. These men included the 39th New York of Willard’s brigade and Brig. Gen. Henry Lockwood’s brigade (Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum’s XII Corps), which had been pulled from its position on Culp’s Hill. The Confederates turned Watson’s guns to fire into the new arrivals, only to find that the artillerists had removed the rammers and friction primers before abandoning the battery.
Realizing they were in an impossible situation, the men of the 21st Mississippi began retreating. In their wake were the two recently captured Union batteries.18