Because Emmitsburg Road angled northeast, Pettigrew’s infantry reached it before Pickett’s did. Two stout fences lined the road. When the Confederates began climbing the first fence, Federal infantry, who had been holding their fire, sent a storm of lead into the vulnerable attackers. One veteran described the ordeal at Emmitsburg Road as a matter of timing and luck. The men had to “climb up to the top of the fence, tumble over it, and fall flat into the bed of the road. All the while the bullets continued to bury themselves into the bodies of the victims and the sturdy chestnut rails.”
After a few moments’ respite, the men rose and repeated the process by climbing the fence on the opposite side of the road. One Federal soldier marveled at the bravery displayed when Marshall’s men dressed ranks after traversing the second fence. The initial burst of fire was especially deadly because each Federal infantryman on the first line had two to five additional loaded guns. Some wondered how any of the Confederates survived these initial volleys. So tremendous was the gunfire that only some 1,000 of Pettigrew’s men managed to cross the road and continue toward the Federal line. The remainder hunkered down along the road and opened fire on the Federal defenders, killing and wounding many. In Pickett’s Division, a higher percentage of the attacking column advanced beyond Emmitsburg Road and up the final slope toward the crest of Cemetery Ridge.17
As his division approached Emmitsburg Road, Pickett ordered his 4,500 men to oblique to the left several hundred yards to link up with Pettigrew’s Division. The maneuver was hard enough to perform on a parade ground; it was exceedingly difficult to execute while under fire from both artillery and small arms (some fired from as close as 200–300 hundred yards). The order seems to have been performed quite well, however, though some crowding and confusion occurred in the ranks—especially when the move exposed Kemper’s right flank to artillery fire. The roughly 45-degree shift in direction also offered some of the men a better view of Pettigrew’s column. With it came the disturbing image of hundreds of men (mostly from Colonel Brockenbrough’s and Brigadier General Davis’ brigades), scampering for the rear.
Still in reasonably good form, however, Pickett’s three brigades slid past the left wing of the Federal II Corps.18 According to modern scholarship, from this point forward the entire Confederate attacking column numbered perhaps 5,500 men. Arrayed against them were roughly equal numbers of Federals holding good defensive terrain well supported by artillery. Those odds did not bode well for General Lee’s infantry.19
Seeing Kemper’s right flank dangling in the air, Brig. Gen. George Stannard boldly ordered his 13th Vermont forward into the meadow, where the men “changed front forward on the first company.” The order reformed the companies, one after the other, until they were perpendicular to the enemy flank. The maneuver was difficult to perform under the best of circumstances, yet the inexperienced Vermont soldiers pulled it off brilliantly. Some of the men in the 11th and 24th Virginia on the right of the line saw what was happening as they moved beyond the Codori house. The Virginians poured a deadly fire into the 13th Vermont as it rushed forward, but the Federals continued the realignment while the 16th Vermont formed on their left. The 14th Vermont did not participate in this movement; it held its place in line and fired into the oncoming enemy.20
The two Vermont regiments opened an enfilading fire that devastated Kemper’s flank. “Those great masses of men seemed to disappear in a moment … the ground over which we passed after striking their flank was literally covered with dead and wounded men,” recalled Col. Wheelock Veazey of the 16th Vermont. Many of Kemper’s men threw down their arms and surrendered.
Kemper had immediately moved to the right of his brigade to organize a defense against the Vermont onslaught. A few minutes later and within 100 yards of the enemy, he would fall badly wounded (some feared mortally) with a ball in the groin. Southern infantry would later fight over his captured nearly paralyzed body to ensure his removal from the field.21