Brigadier General James Archer’s 1,100-man brigade trudged toward Gettysburg on Chambersburg Pike in the van of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth’s Division. Second in line, Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis deployed his brigade on the opposite side (north) of the pike. Heth’s other two brigades under Brig. Gen. James J. Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough marched behind Davis, with Maj. Gen. W. Dorsey Pender’s Division following Heth. None of these foot soldiers expected a serious fight on what promised to be another muggy summer day.
Two brigades of Maj. Gen. John Buford’s cavalry division, slightly more than 2,700 men, stood between Gettysburg and almost 13,500 Confederates approaching from the west. Buford intended to fight a delaying action, knowing the Federal I and XI Corps were closing on the battlefield. He knew he could not stop an entire enemy division, but he could force Heth to shift from marching column into line of battle.1
Approaching Herr Ridge, Archer deployed his men into line of battle on the right (south) of Chambersburg Pike. The 5th Alabama Battalion, with 50 men from the 13th Alabama, formed the skirmish line that first encountered the dismounted 8th Illinois Cavalry of Col. William Gamble’s brigade, slowly pushing it back toward Willoughby Run. Behind the skirmish line, Archer deployed his line of battle from left to right: 7th Tennessee – 14th Tennessee – 1st Tennessee – 13th Alabama. Because of gentler terrain, the regiments on the left outdistanced those on the right, forcing Archer to order the advanced units to halt until the others caught up. One foot soldier in the 13th Alabama recalled that we “halted to reform, reload, catch our breath, and cool off a little." Willoughby Run was up ahead, clear water nearly knee-deep with “pebbles in bottom,” recalled an Alabama foot soldier. The cautious Archer halted his brigade. General Heth rode up and ordered him to test the “strength and line of battle of the enemy." Archer demurred, stating that his “brigade was [too] light to risk so far in advance of support." Unconvinced, Heth ordered Archer to continue advancing.2
Neither Archer nor any of his men knew of the rapid approach of the Iron Brigade on the opposite side of Willoughby Run. Major General James Wadsworth’s division of the I Corps approached Gettysburg from the south along Emmitsburg Road, having spent the night at Marsh Creek. Near the Codori House, the men abandoned the road and marched overland in a northwest direction toward the Lutheran Theological Seminary on the ridge that bore its name. In the van, Lysander Cutler’s brigade straddled Chambersburg Pike. The 1,800-man Iron Brigade under Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith hurried after Cutler’s men as they crossed the fields leading to Herbst Woods.3
The 2nd Wisconsin led the Iron Brigade, followed by the 7th Wisconsin, 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, and 6th Wisconsin. Lieutenant Colonel John Kress of General Wadsworth’s staff met the column as it approached the Seminary. When General Meredith could not be found and with Archer’s men swarming across Willoughby Run, Kress ordered each regiment to shift from column of fours into line of battle with two ranks, and sent them west toward the enemy. This resulted in an en echelon attack formation as the units were fed into the combat as soon as they arrived. The 6th Wisconsin formed the reserve near the seminary.4
The 2nd Wisconsin barreled toward Herbst (McPherson’s) Woods without waiting for the other regiments to form beside it. On its left, Sergeant Charles Pergel’s two-gun section of Calef’s battery continued firing at the approaching enemy.5
The left flank of Archer’s brigade line extended as far as the northern portion of Herbst Woods. The 5th Alabama Battalion, still deployed as a skirmish line, thinly extended the line north to Chambersburg Pike. The men from the battalion exchanged musket fire with the 84th and 95th New York regiments of Cutler’s brigade that occupied the McPherson farm buildings.6