Map Set 7: Along Chambersburg Pike

Map 7.1

Arriving on the battlefield shortly before noon, Col. Roy Stone’s brigade (Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Rowley’s division, I Corps) deployed near the McPherson farm buildings south of Chambersburg Pike. While Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes deployed his division on Oak Hill, Stone rearranged his three regiments. He shifted the 143rd and 149th Pennsylvania to parallel Chambersburg Pike facing north, and made sure the 150th Pennsylvania faced Maj. Gen. Harry Heth’s Division to the west. Although there was little evidence at this point that Heth was preparing another assault, the massed Confederate artillery on Herr Ridge continually barraged Stone’s men, forcing them to hunt for cover as casualties mounted. In an effort to lessen the effectiveness of the enemy fire, Stone decided to use the colors of the 149th Pennsylvania as a decoy. The color guard advanced to a position behind a pile of fence rails north of the pike. The ruse worked, tricking the Confederate artillerymen to concentrate their efforts against the Federal flags.1

Federal artillery also occupied the sector near Stone. Two sections of Calef’s battery unlimbered north of Chambersburg Pike. When he received a severe enfilading fire from Capt. Thomas Brander’s battery to the northwest and the rest of Maj. William J. Pegram’s battalion to the west, Calef shifted his guns southeast. He unlimbered them just east of Herbst Woods, a good position that offered his tubes and men protection from Pegram’s guns. From this new position Calef opened on Oak Hill. Captain Gilbert Reynolds’ battery reached Calef’s former position, found it too hot there, and crossed the road to take up a position next to Calef.2

The sight of Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson’s attack against Oak Ridge excited Stone’s inexperienced men. Some opened fire though they were too far away to be effective. Their fire caught the attention of Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel, whose North Carolina brigade formed the right flank of Rodes’ Division. Daniel’s orders were to “protect the right of the division, and to support Iverson’s right.” Daniel advanced the 2nd North Carolina battalion and 32nd and 45th North Carolina regiments southeast to confront Stone’s brigade along Chambersburg Pike, while the 43rd and 53rd North Carolina regiments swung southeast at a sharper angle to front Oak Ridge and assist Iverson.3

Stone’s two regiments along Chambersburg Pike—915 men in all—watched as the 2nd North Carolina battalion and the 45th North Carolina advanced obliquely toward them. When the two regiments reached a point about 500 yards from the Federal position, Confederate batteries on Oak Hill opened fire. The North Carolinians threw themselves to the ground to avoid the shells screaming over their heads. Colonel Stone ordered the 149th Pennsylvania to leave its position along Chambersburg Pike and advance to the unfinished railroad cut about 160 yards away. Because the cut at this point was steep, many men slid or tumbled to the bottom with a variety of cuts, bruises, and even broken bones. Those who could still walk climbed up the northern bank of the cut, took up a position there, and rested their muskets on the lip. Their orders were “to take deliberate aim at the knees of the front rank of the enemy as he came up.”4

With the short artillery barrage at an end, the North Carolinians rose and continued their attack on Chambersburg Pike and the Federal flank, not realizing that a Federal regiment occupied the unfinished railroad cut in front of them. Reaching a fence about 75 yards from the cut (which was already littered with the killed and wounded from the earlier fight), Daniel’s men finally spotted the waiting Pennsylvanians and opened fire. The volley was ineffective because, as one Federal put it, “our bodies were so well protected below the edge of the railroad cut.” The Pennsylvanians received orders to fire “as long as a man was seen moving in that field in front of us,” noted Francis Jones of the 149th Pennsylvania. One of the Confederates who escaped the carnage about to ensue recalled,“the enemy were some five or six hundred yards in front, and results showed that they had set a most deadly trap for us.”5