Canceled due to political unrest in South Vietnam. It was to have been an attack on Quang Khe naval base and Dong Hoi air base barracks.
Also canceled. Also had the same targets as Rolling Thunder 1.
By 2 March 1965 conditions in South Vietnam had stabilized to the point that Washington authorized Rolling Thunder 5 with South Vietnamese participation. USAF aircraft struck the ammunition depot at Xom Bong, and the VNAF struck the Quang Khe naval base. Rolling Thunder operations came with strict guidance. Targets were to be attacked on the specified day by the specified number of sorties, and they could not be reattacked later. Targets were clearly stated, with a limited number of alternates if bad weather covered the primary target. The navy did not participate in the opening strikes, as naval aircraft were covering the marine landings at Da Nang.
This involved attacks on targets in the southern part of North Vietnam. The USAF struck an ammunition depot at Phu Qui and the navy struck a radar installation on Tiger Island, 20 miles off the coast. Rolling Thunder 6 included the first participation by naval aircraft.
Rolling Thunder 7 began the release of weekly target packages. Washington gave the on-site commander discretion to choose the day of the attack within the specified week based on local conditions. Five targets, including barracks at Vu Con, were listed. Additionally, the participation of South Vietnamese aircraft was no longer required. Armed reconnaissance missions also began, although the numbers remained so limited as to be of little use.
Targets selected for this package consisted of radar sites providing coverage of North Vietnam, while the VNAF struck an army barracks. All targets were below the 20th parallel, except the radar station on the island of Bach Long Vi, which was 75 miles off the coast. The navy struck this radar station on 26 March, but it was not destroyed. Four aircraft were lost when it was attacked again on 29 March.
This package began concentrating on lines of communication in the southern half of North Vietnam. Strikes included attacks on the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phuong bridges. The Thanh Hoa bridge was attacked for the first time on 3 April 1965, resulting in the loss of two F-105s. This phase also resulted in the first photographs of a North Vietnamese SAM site 15 miles southeast of Hanoi.
Lines of communication remained the emphasis during this package, with strikes against bridges at Qui Vinh and Khe Khien. The number of armed reconnaissance missions increased to twenty-four missions per day.
Targeting lines of communication continued during these packages, as did North Vietnamese Army bases south of the 20th parallel.
Initiated in order to collect information and evaluate the results of Rolling Thunder.
The resumption of bombing resulted in one raid north of the 20th parallel against army barracks at Quang Suoi. The remaining missions were armed reconnaissance missions flown in specified areas.
Armed reconnaissance sorties flown during a twenty-four-hour period were increased to forty, with no more than two hundred per weekly package. The total number of sorties flown against North Vietnam in May increased to 4,000 from 3,600 during April.
Armed reconnaissance sorties increased to 260 per week.
The emphasis on transport and military targets continued as the campaign began its gradual expansion. Small numbers of targets north of the 21st parallel were struck. Restricted and prohibited areas around Hanoi and Haiphong as well as the buffer zone along the Chinese border were established. The JCS exempted Iron Hand missions from the overall sortie limitations. Total sorties flown during 1965 numbered 55,000.
After the Viet Cong announced a Christmas “truce” in South Vietnam, Secretary of State Dean Rusk proposed suspending bombing operations for twenty-four hours. It was hoped that North Vietnam would respond in kind, and bombing would then be suspended to allow for peace talks.
The campaign resumed; however, operations were limited due to poor weather during February. Armed reconnaissance sorties were restricted to below the 21st parallel.
Weather continued to cancel missions, although permission was given for missions over most of North Vietnam. The total number of sorties flown during March was eight thousand.
The initial plan proposed strikes against two types of targets: the entire POL system and major industries in the northeastern portion of North Vietnam. Planning began for eleven specific industrial targets and the POL system; however, concern in Washington delayed the attacks. Authority to attack the POL system was eventually given, though permission was not given to strike targets until 29 June 1966. Armed reconnaissance was allowed over all of North Vietnam, including Route Package VI, except for the restricted areas. The total number of sorties flown during April increased to ten thousand.
POL continued to be the primary target of this package, with the addition of several small bridges and one bypass. CINCPAC promulgated a plan of action in late July to maximize destruction of North Vietnam’s remaining elements; however, the only targets allowed by Washington for Rolling Thunder 51 were bridges. Armed reconnaissance along the northeastern rail line forced its closure for most of September and October. Sortie totals were raised to 13,000 per month.
This package expanded the target list to include power stations, cement plants, and steel works, but these targets were disallowed and removed from the list before they could be attacked. The total number of sorties flown during 1966 was 148,000.
A cease-fire was directed for Christmas and the New Year, though CINCPAC asked that it be for no longer than forty-eight hours to limit North Vietnam’s advantage.
The previous target list was continued with minor changes. Extremely bad weather precluded full-scale attacks on fixed targets and greatly reduced armed reconnaissance sorties.
In all, sixteen targets deemed vital to North Vietnamese industry were added to the target list. They included the Thai Nguyen steel works plant north of Hanoi, the Haiphong cement works, and several power stations. Estuaries and inland waterways up to the 20th parallel were listed as candidates for mining. The middle of April generally marked the end of bad weather over North Vietnam, and by 21 April all the Rolling Thunder 54 targets had been struck.
On 23 April the execute order for Rolling Thunder 55 was received. Armed reconnaissance operating areas remained constant, while the overall fixed targets increased dramatically. For the first time, selected targets were authorized for strike within the 10-mile circle around Hanoi. This included airfields at Kep and Hoa Lac, the power transformer in the center of Hanoi, and other industrial targets in the city. By 28 April all but one of the targets had been struck.
Good weather over North Vietnam permitted maximum effort against all authorized targets. Ten new targets were added, including a power plant in the center of Hanoi. Rolling Thunder 56 concentrated on the supply lines connecting Hanoi and Haiphong to Communist China, with the overall purpose of isolating Haiphong from Hanoi and both cities from the rest of North Vietnam.
A cease-fire was enforced for twenty-four hours in observance of Buddha’s birthday.
The summer of 1967 resulted in the heaviest bombing of North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder. Sixteen new targets, all in Route Package VI, were added. In a political move prior to the Stennis hearings, President Johnson added more targets to the list in August. The main effort was the continued attempts to isolate Hanoi and Haiphong, although by the end of August, Washington had again placed all targets in Hanoi on a restricted status. Sortie totals for August 1967 were 11,634. During September seventeen new targets were added to the list. In October eight more were added, and the restriction placed on targets in Hanoi was lifted. More targets were added in November, but monsoon season hindered the campaign. No new targets were added during December, but targets on the list were hit when weather permitted. Weather was the dominant factor influencing operations throughout North Vietnam in December. The total number of sorties flown during 1967 was 122,960, with another 9,740 of these against targets in Route Package VI.
Twenty-four-hour cease-fire enforced for observation of Christmas.
On 30 December South Vietnam announced a New Year cease-fire. It included a twelve-hour extension that the South Vietnamese government had added in response to an appeal made by Pope Paul VI to make 1 January 1968 a “Day of Peace.”
Weather during the first three months of 1968 curtailed operations over North Vietnam. February’s weather was the worst of any month during Rolling Thunder. There was an average of only three days per month on which strikes could be accomplished. Eight more targets were added to the list during this time. On 31 March President Johnson announced the curtailment of Rolling Thunder. Bombing was restricted to North Vietnam’s transportation system below the 19th parallel.
Sortie rates continued at the same rate as before but were restricted to Route Packages I, II, and the southern portion of III. This meant that the bombing was extremely heavy in this area, and the transportation system was heavily hit. Rolling Thunder ended on 1 November 1968.