In a lapse of judgement Sextus failed to seize the opportunity to smash his opponent’s fleet once and for all. Instead he offered sacrifice to Neptunus in thanks, and convinced himself that he had been favoured by Providence who had seen off his enemies, not once but twice.78 He swapped the red paludamentum, the cloak worn by Roman commanders, for a blue one and claimed boastfully to be the adopted son of the sea god. He hoped that his adversary would finally give up on his quest, but across the sea in Vibo a very sober Caesar had his mind firmly fixed on the forthcoming campaign and roused his infantry and expedited the repairs to his fleet.79 Agrippa concerned himself with all aspects of the refurbishment of the damaged ships down to the minutiae of the provision of materials.80 When Sextus learned about Caesar’s intensive reparations his swanky mood changed to one of alarm.81 He dispatched Menodorus with seven ships to reconnointre his opponent’s installations and ordered him to cause as much havoc as he could while there; but Sextus’ captain was still smarting from having been overlooked for the supreme naval command and began planning a different outcome. When he reached the triumvir’s shipyard he found neither Caesar nor Agrippa there – Agrippa was away procuring timber, leaving Valerius Messala in charge.82 Menodorus’ hit and run raid on the yard caused consternation, though the actual damage done was more to Agrippa’s troops’ pride than material. Menodorus had a secret plan. Since Agrippa’s appointment to the command of the fleet, he intended to defect to Caesar ‘who had done him no wrong’.83 Inviting Mindius Marcellus, a trusted friend of Caesar, to a meeting on a small island away from the shipyard, he convinced him of the sincerity of his intention. When Caesar approached Menodorus prostrated himself before the commander-in-chief. He acceded to the man’s wishes, though he had him secretly watched because he did not trust him.84 Caesar’s unexpected gain was Sextus’ unforeseen loss.
Caesar gave the order for the campaign to recommence. Two legions under Messala crossed the Strait of Messina and landed on Sicily where they joined up with the army of Lepidus.85 Meanwhile Statilius Taurus sailed from Tarentum around the coast to Mount Scylacium and successfully landed his troops. There he briefly met Caesar, before he returned to his operations base at Vibo. More men and matériel from Africa attempted to land but were intercepted by Papias, one of Sextus’ captains.86 Two legions were lost at sea and any men who managed to reach the shore were struck down without mercy by the Pompeians. Nevertheless, Lepidus’ other legions did manage to land at a later date.
Agrippa was at Caesar’s side in Vibo.87 After first reconnoitering the area, they decided now was the right moment to despatch their refurbished fleet. They agreed to take up a position at Strongyle (modern Stromboli), a small volcanic island in the Tyrrhenian Sea off the north coast of Sicily. Caesar then left Agrippa in command of the fleet. Caesar went to join up with Messala and Taurus with the objective of launching an attack on land against Sextus’ stronghold at Tauromenium (Taormina on the east side of the island). In the ensuing naval engagements Agrippa would show the first flashes of tactical genius as a sea warrior.
In early August Agrippa moved his fleet from Strongyle to the island of Hiera (the modern Egadi Islands) laying a few miles off the coast of Trapani (west Sicily).88 Pompeius’ garrison offered no resistance and Agrippa seized Hiera. The following day he planned to attack Demochares, Sextus’ deputy, who had forty ships docked at Mylae.89 The place had special resonance for the Romans. Here in 260 BCE the first real naval battle between Carthage and the Roman Republic took place. It was Rome’s first win at sea. Perhaps buoyed by memory of the ancient victory, Caesar’s deputy adopted a suitably menacing stance.90 Sextus immediately sent 45 ships to Demochares from Messana (present-day Messina) under the command of his freedman Apollophanes, and followed up himself in person with seventy more vessels. Appian’s account of the Battle of Mylae is evocative and worth quoting in full:
Agrippa, with half of his ships, sailed out of Hiera before daylight in order to have a naval engagement with Papias only.91 When he saw the fleet of Apollophanes also, and seventy ships on the other wing, he sent word to Caesar at once that Pompeius was at Mylae with the greater part of his naval forces. Then he placed himself with his heavy ships in the centre, and summoned the remainder of his fleet from Hiera in all haste. The preparations on both sides were superb. The ships had towers on both stem and stern. When the usual exhortation had been given and the standards raised, they rushed against each other, some coming bow on, others making flank attacks, the shouts of the men and the spray from the ships adding terror to the scene. The Pompeian ships were shorter and lighter, and better adapted to blockading and darting about. Those of Caesar were larger and heavier, and, consequently, slower, yet stronger to give blows and not so easily damaged. The Pompeian crews were better sailors than those of Caesar, but the latter were stronger. Accordingly, the former excelled not so much in close fighting as in the nimbleness of their movements, in breaking oar blades and rudders, cutting off oar handles, or separating the enemy’s ships entirely, doing them no less harm than by ramming. Those of Caesar sought to cut down with their beaks the hostile ships, which were smaller in size, or shatter them, or break through them. When they came to close quarters, being higher, they could hurl missiles down upon the enemy, and more easily throw the corvus and the grappling-irons. The Pompeians, whenever they were overpowered in this manner, leaped into the sea and were picked up by their small boats, which were hovering around for this purpose.92
Aboard his flagship, Agrippa identified his adversary and went straight after him:
Agrippa bore down directly upon Papias and struck his ship under the bow, shattering it and breaking a hole in the keel. The men in the towers were shaken down, the water rushed into the ship, and all the oarsmen on the lower benches were cut off. The others broke through the deck and escaped by swimming. Papias escaped to a ship alongside of his own, and returned to the battle.93
From Sextus’ vantage point, the unfolding situation looked increasingly hopeless:
Pompeius, who observed from a mountain that his ships were making little headway, and that whenever they came to close quarters with the enemy they were denuded of fighting men, and that reinforcements were coming to Agrippa from Hiera, gave the signal to retire in good order. This they did, advancing and retreating little by little. Agrippa continued to bear down upon them, and they took refuge, not on the beach, but among the shoals formed in the sea by river deposits.94
He now wanted to move in for the kill, but danger lurked in the waters and
Agrippa’s pilots prevented him from running his large ships on the shoals. He cast anchor in the open sea, intending to blockade the enemy and to fight a battle by night if necessary; but his friends advised him not to be carried away by rashness and not to wear out his soldiers with excessive toil and want of sleep, and not to trust to that tempestuous sea. So in the evening he reluctantly withdrew. The Pompeians made sail to their harbours, having lost thirty of their ships, and sunk five of the enemy’s, and having inflicted considerable other damage and suffered as much in return. Pompeius praised his own men because they had resisted such formidable vessels, saying they had fought against walls rather than against ships; and he rewarded them as though they had been victorious. He encouraged them to believe that, as they were lighter, they would prevail over the enemy in the straits on account of the current. He said also that he would make some addition to the height of his ships. Such was the result of the naval battle at Mylae between Agrippa and Papias.95
Agrippa had won his first naval battle. Hearing the news, Antonius is reported as having reproached Caesar with the words ‘you were not able to take a clear view of the fleet, when drawn up in line of battle, but lay stupidly upon your back, gazing at the sky; nor did you get up and let your men see you, until M. Agrippa had forced the enemies’ ships to sheer off’.96 Caesar may not have deserved the barb, but it was a compliment to Agrippa’s talent.
Now Agrippa had to quickly decide how best to exploit that success. Appian continues,
Pompeius suspected that Caesar had gone to the camp of Taurus for the purpose of attacking Tauromenium, which was the fact. So, directly after supper, he sailed to Messana, leaving a part of his forces at Mylae so that Agrippa might think that he was still there. Agrippa, as soon as his army was sufficiently rested, bestirred himself and set sail for Tyndaris [modern Tindari], which had offered to surrender. He entered the town, but the garrison fought valiantly and drove him out. Some other towns espoused his cause and received his garrisons, and he returned that evening. In the meantime, Caesar had sailed from Scylacium to Leucopetra, [modern Capo dell’ Armi] having learned for a certainty that Pompeius had gone from Messana to Mylae on account of Agrippa. He was about to cross the straits from Leucopetra to Tauromenium by night, but learning of the sea-fight he changed his mind, thinking that a victor ought not to steal his passage, but to cross with his army boldly by daylight; for he was fully convinced that Pompeius was still confronting Agrippa. Looking down from the mountains upon the sea at daybreak and finding that it was clear of enemies, he set sail with as many troops as the ships could carry, leaving the rest with Messala until the fleet could return to him. Arriving at Tauromenium, he sent messengers to demand its surrender. As his guards were not admitted, he made sail to the River Onobalas and the temple of Venus, and moored his fleet at the shrine of the Archegetes, the god of the Naxians, [located at modern Capo di Schiso] intending to pitch his camp there and attack Tauromenium.97
Caesar was not yet aware of Agrippa’s victory. Back at Tauromenium he had with him ‘3 legions, and 500 cavalry without horses, 1,000 light-armed, and 2,000 colonists serving as allies, but not enrolled, besides his fleet’.98 As his surveyors laid out his marching camp, he found himself suddenly surrounded on three sides by Sex. Pompeius – cavalry approached him on land and ships advanced from the sea. Caesar’s inexperience showed itself again when he hesitated to rally his men for battle. On their own initiative, his troops split into disparate groups, each fighting until onset of night when the enemy withdrew. Finally Caesar delegated command to Cornificius ‘and ordered him to drive back the enemy and do whatever the exigency required’.99 He boarded his flagship and sailed off to rally his fleet. Even as he was doing this Sextus’ own fleet appeared on the horizon. Caesar had been caught unprepared. His vessels were routed and he only managed to escape because he had taken the precaution of hiding the commander’s ensign so his ship could not be picked out. All at sea, Caesar’s boat drifted until it arrived at the harbour town of Abala. There he found men sympathetic to his cause and he was able to get a message to Cornificius and another to Agrippa that he was well. He urged Agrippa to send Laronius and troops to come to the aid of Cornificius. Caesar himself left with Messala to Stylis where three legions stood ready under Carinas’ command. Messala went on to Puteoli to fetch Legio I to his base at Vibo. He issued orders for Carinas to depart for Lipara.100 On the political front, he charged Maecenas to return to Rome again to deal with the ‘Revolutionists’ who were stirring up trouble for him in the city.
Cornificius put up a stout defence behind the stake-topped turf wall of his temporary camp. While Sextus hoped to defeat him by starving him into submission, Cornificius broke out and tried to engage him in set-piece battle. The Pompeian would not oblige, and Cornificius led his men instead in an attempt to escape along a road, while subjected to an enfilade of missiles hurled at them by Numidian auxilairies recruited by Sextus.101 Their escape proved a terrifying ordeal and Cornificius took many casualties.102 To his great relief Laronius arrived and Cornificius – and what remained of his army – finally made it to Mylae.103
Agrippa, meanwhile, was trying again to take and hold Tyndaris, which Appian describes as ‘a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare’.104 The city, located some 58km (36 miles) from Messana, stood on a high hill projecting out as a promontory into the bay of the Tyrrhenian Sea bounded by the Punta di Milazzo on the east and the Capo Calavià on the west. It was regarded as strategically important by its Greek founders in the fourth century BCE and by both Carthaginians and Romans during the First Punic War. Following that brutal conflict it remained loyal to Rome, so much so that Cicero described it as nobilissima civitas, the ‘most noble community’.105 To capture the city became a strategic imperative for Agrippa. Nothing is recorded about the course of the siege save only that by the time Cornificius had escaped from his camp at the Shrine of the Archegetes it had already fallen to Agrippa.106 Now securely under Agrippa’s control, Caesar moved into Tyndaris with his troops and supplies, which were considerable: 21 legions (about 126,000 infantrymen assuming full strength), 20,000 cavalry and more than 5,000 lightly-armed skirmishing troops.107
Sextus still controlled the coastline of the northeastern promontory of Sicily from Mylae to Pelorus (Punta del Faro). He deployed garrisons along it and fortified the inland mountain passes. ‘In fear of Agrippa’, writes Appian, ‘they kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them.’108 For a while the ploy worked, but the menacing sight of Agrippa’s warships offshore troubled Sextus deeply. Finally, believing a report he received that Agrippa was advancing his fleet against him, he moved his position to Pelorus, abandoning Mylae and vicinity to Caesar.109 The report turned out to be false and Caesar was now able to ravage the region at will. By chance he found Lepidus when he was out foraging with his men near Mount Etna, and Caesar invited the triumvir to share his camp near Messana. Agrippa anchored his fleet nearby.110
Caesar decided the best strategy was to starve his opponent into submission and dispatched Taurus to capture the towns and hamlets which provided his supplies. Without provisions Sextus knew full well would soon fail. He still believed his strength was his nimble fleet. His best option now was to gamble everything on one last naval battle. He sent a message to Caesar inviting him to engage him in a naval battle to decide the war once and for all. Caesar accepted. A day was agreed and the place was the bay at Naulochus.111 Neither the day – perhaps 3 September – nor the exact location of Naulochus are known for certain, but the battle site lay somewhere east of Mylae where the coast sweeps into a great bay. On one side of it were arrayed 300 ships of Sex. Pompeius, Apollophanes (Papias), Demochares and Tisienus Gallus; on the other the assembled fleet of triumvir C. Iulius Caesar under the command of M. Agrippa.112 Along the shore, the infantrymen of both opponents stood and watched. Appian vividly describes the battle:
When the appointed day came the rival shouts of the oarsmen were first heard, accompanied by missiles thrown by machines and by hand, such as stones, firebrands, and arrows. Then the ships dashed against each other, some striking amidships, others on the prows, others on the beaks, where the blows are most effectual in discomposing the crew and rendering the vessel useless. Others broke the opposing line by sailing through it, at the same time discharging arrows and javelins; and the small boats picked up those who fell overboard. There was a struggle of soldiers while the sailors put forth their strength and the pilots their skill and their lung-power. The generals cheered their men, and all the machines were brought into requisition. The harpago achieved the greatest success. Thrown from a long distance upon the ships, as it could be by reason of its lightness, it clutched them, especially when the ropes pulled on it from behind. On account of the iron bands it could not be easily cut by the men whom it attacked, and those who tried to cut the ropes were prevented from reaching them by its length. As this apparatus had never been known before, the enemy had not provided themselves with scythe-mounted poles. One thing seemed advisable in this unexpected emergency, and that was to back water and draw the ship away; but as the enemy did the same the force exerted by the men was equal on both sides, and the harpago did its work.113
Accordingly, when the ships were drawn together, there was every kind of fighting, the men leaping upon each other’s decks. It was no longer easy to distinguish an enemy from a friend, as they used the same weapons for the most part, and nearly all spoke the Latin tongue, and the watchwords of each side were divulged to the other while they were mingled together. Hence arose many and diverse frauds and lack of confidence on both sides on the part of those using the same watchword. They failed to recognize each other completely, and meanwhile the fighting and the sea were a confused medley of corpses, clashing arms, and crashing ships. They left nothing untried except fire. This they abstained from, after their first onset, because they were locked together. The foot-soldiers of each army on the land beheld this sea-fight with apprehension and eagerness, believing that their own hope of safety was bound up in it. They could not distinguish anything, however sharply they might look, but merely a long-drawn-out line of 600 ships, and an alternation of cries and groans now on one side and now on the other.114
Judging from the colours of the towers, which constituted the only difference between them, Agrippa with difficulty made out that Pompeius’ ships had sustained the greater loss, and he cheered on those who were close to him as though they were already victors. Then he drove at the enemy and pressed upon them without ceasing, until he overpowered those nearest him. They then lowered their towers and turned their ships in flight toward the straits. Seventeen of them, which were in advance, made their escape thither. The rest were cut off by Agrippa and some were pursued and driven aground. The pursuers ran aground with them in the rush, and either pulled off those that had come to a standstill or set fire to them. When the Pompeian ships that were still fighting saw what had befallen these, they surrendered to their enemies. Then the soldiers of Caesar who were in the ships raised a shout of victory and those on the land gave an answering shout. Those of Pompeius groaned. Pompeius himself, darting away from Naulochi, hastened to Messana, giving no orders to his infantry in his panic. Accordingly Caesar received the surrender of Tisienus on terms agreed upon, and of the cavalry besides, who were surrendered by their officers. Three of Caesar’s ships were sunk in the fight. Pompeius lost twenty-eight in this way, and the remainder were burned, or captured, or run aground, and stove in pieces, except the seventeen that escaped.115
Sextus escaped with his daughter and closest friends along with seventeen ships to Mytilene, Lesbos and sought asylum with M. Antonius.116 Caesar did not pursue his adversary, nor did he encourage others to do so on his behalf.117 Sextus had sought the protection of his colleague, and to encroach on his dominion might prove provocative, and, moreover, as he stated later, he was not one of his father’s murderers.
Although Sextus had fled, his deputy L. Plinius had remained in Sicily and occupied Messana. While Caesar stayed in Naulochus, he despatched Agrippa and Lepidus to deal with Plinius. Seeing Caesar’s deputies and their armies gathering outside the walls of the city, Plinius sued for peace terms. Agrippa preferred to wait until Caesar arrived, but Lepidus, impatient to see the Pompeian’s troops join his own, accepted his surrender and let his soldiers pillage the city. The addition of new men at arms grew Lepidus’ force to twenty-two legions, and a large contingent of cavalry.118 Emboldened by his military strength he actively sought to take the whole island for himself and ordered his men to secure the defiles around the city so Caesar could not enter it. It was a foolish and consequential move. Through mutual friends the two men communicated. Lepidus wanted a larger role in the Triumvirate, which Caesar refused to grant him. The two men argued, and a standoff ensued. Caesar managed to win over Lepidus’ troops and when he entered his camp, following a struggle, he was hailed imperator and the men deserted to him.119 Realizing the hopelessness of his situation Lepidus presented himself to Caesar and sought his mercy. Caesar showed clemency, but stripped him of his position as triumvir and military command, letting him keep only his office of pontifex maximus.120 So quickly had one of the three most powerful men had been reduced to little better than a private citizen. Through the defections, Caesar’s army now numbered 45 legions, 25,000 cavalry and 40,000 lightly-armed troops, as well as 600 warships.121 However, his own troops, who had fought for him at Philippi and on other battlefields since now demanded their share of the rewards and to be allowed to retire. In the face of mutiny, Caesar remonstrated with his men, but it was an argument he could not win without greater loss to himself.122 Shrewdly, he recognized the contributions and sacrifices made by the troops and distributed awards for service and valour to all and prizes of victory to many, and in so doing secured their loyalty for a while longer.
When Caesar entered Rome victorious on 13 November 36 BCE he well knew that it was in large part due to his friend’s organization and military leadership skills that he did so. Agrippa’s loyalty too was rewarded. In two great sea battles in as many months, Agrippa had broken the military wing of Caesar’s political opposition. The position of the son of the Divine Iulius was now more secure, enabling him to stand up to his Pompeian adversaries in the Roman senatorial class. Agrippa had also eliminated the menace which the surviving son of Pompeius Magnus had inflicted upon the coastal regions of Italy and Africa. The grain could flow again unhindered from Africa and Sicily to the warehouses of Rome beside the Tiber, and the plebs could sleep at night knowing they would receive their daily bread. Agrippa’s vital contribution was rewarded with the gift of rich estates in Sicily, which had been confiscated from sympathizers of Sextus.123 The cash crops from these would generate enormous wealth for him in the years to come. Yet Agrippa merited a very special reward, one intended to be a very public recognition for his achievement. Caesar created a brilliant, one-ofa-kind military decoration for his loyal but modest friend.124 Variously known as the corona classica, corona navalis or corona rostrata (plate 4), it was a golden wreath surmounted with ships’ rostra, which Vergil later described as,
A naval crown, that binds his manly brows,
The happy fortune of the fight foreshows.125
It was a conspicuous award and one intended to be seen. A law was passed permitting him to wear this naval crown in triumphal processions.126 Widely circulated silver coins were minted showing Agrippa wearing this distinctive military decoration.127
Hardly had Caesar and Agrippa rested in Rome when they turned their attention to the Western Balkans and the inland region of Pannonia. Dio explains that:
He had no complaint to bring against them, not having been wronged by them in any way, but he wanted both to give his soldiers practice and to support them at the expense of an alien people, for he regarded every demonstration against a weaker party as just, when it pleased the man who was their superior in arms.128
Appian points to a longer term strategic goal, which was ‘Augustus greatly desired to possess it as a magazine convenient for a war against the Dacii and the Bastarnae on the other side of the Ister, which is there called the Danuvius’.129 The Romans made ‘first contact’ with the region in 229 BCE after crossing the Adriatic Sea, but it only came under the direct rule of Rome after it had been subjugated by military means in 167 BCE. The following year it became a protectorate. The 41-year-old Iulius Caesar was appointed to govern it in 59 BCE prior to his campaigns in Gaul. It was an important corridor between Italy, Macedonia, Greece and Asia. The short crossing by sea from Brundisium to Apollonia or Dyrrhacium saved time and expense compared to going overland via Aquileia and down the western Balkan peninsula.130 It was along the craggy Dalmatian coast and islands with its abundant sheltered natural harbours that pirates had launched their attacks on Roman shipping. Rome had long since dealt with them, but some Liburni still engaged in piracy, providing a casus belli for Caesar to lead an expedition (expeditio) against the Illyrians in person.131
The Romans called the western Balkans by the name Illyricum.132 Only later would they distinguish between Dalmatia and Pannonia. Dalmatian Illyricum ran along the Adriatic coast, stretching from the Drilon River in the south (in modern Albania) to Istria in the west (in modern Croatia) and to the Sava River in the north (in what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina).133 Pannonian Illyricum was land-locked and bounded by the Sava River to the south, and stretched to Alps in the kingdom of Noricum (in modern Austria) in the west, the province of Moesia (in modern Hungary) in the east, and as far north as the banks of the Danube River.134 There were no people who called themselves Illyrici: the region was a patchwork of independent native and immigrant communities living side by side, with different cultures, languages and politico-economic systems.135 In the north-west, in the foothills of the eastern Alps, near the Isonzo and the source of the Sava rivers, the tribes spoke a language called Venetic. Tribes speaking Celtic tongues occupied a broad sweep of the Balkans along the Sava and Drava rivers and their tributaries as far as the Morava. Illyrian peoples in the hills and valleys down towards the Adriatic coast lived alongside communities which had been heavily influenced by colonies of Greek settlers since the fourth century.
The details of the two-year long Illyrian War (Bellum Illyricum) are preserved by Appian and Dio.136 The expeditionary army began operations in the north (map 6). Dio states that Caesar personally led the campaign against the Iapodes, a nation of people who lived on the far south-eastern end of the Alps.137 They are described by Appian as a strong and savage tribe and by Strabo as a war-mad people, who adds that their armour was Celtic in style and that they were tattooed like the rest of the Illyrians and the Thracians.138 Caesar is reported as having delegated the task of subduing the rest of the tribes to others, among them C. Fufius Geminus, M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus and T. Statilius Taurus.139 Along the coastal inlets and islands a fleet of warships located and utterly destroyed the vessels used by the Liburni to harm Roman trade crossing the Adriatic.140 The lowland settlements fell quickly, but as the Romans advanced through their country and up into the hills they were met with stiff resistance.141 The Iapodes felled trees to block the trackways and launched ambushes from the cover of forest vegetation, but while they inflicted casualties against the invaders, their own losses were heavier.142 They abandoned their hamlets and towns in the lowlands, among which was Terponus. The Iapodes retreated up the mountain passes and made their last stand at their largest hilltop stronghold of Metulus, where Agrippa’s presence is recorded with certainty.143