THE YEAR 1950 DENOTED not only the halfway mark of the Franco-Vietminh War but also a turning point in the French approach to winning the conflict. As the year began, the March 8, 1949, Elysée treaty, promising more independence to Vietnam, languished in the French National Assembly; the French military effort against the Vietminh remained stalled; and French officials bickered among themselves about whether or not to support Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai as a viable political alternative to Vietminh leader Ho Chi Minh. Up to this point, Paris had preferred to conduct the war without interference from its allies, but when Chinese leader Mao Zedong recognized Ho Chi Minh’s government in January 1950, what had been a colonial battle suddenly became part of the globalized Cold War. Henceforth, French governments attempted to portray their engagement in Vietnam as a heroic anticommunist crusade instead of a colonial war fought to preserve the empire. By emphasizing the anticommunist nature of its war effort, Paris hoped to gain political and economic support from Washington and London. Following Mao’s recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the French National Assembly ratified the Elysée Accords, the United States guaranteed American economic aid to France’s military effort, and Britain and the United States recognized Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam.1
Washington’s decisions to provide Paris with significant aid and to recognize Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam represented the first important steps in the long transition from the French to the American presence in Vietnam. Such steps could not have occurred without the transformation of the Indochina conflict from a colonial to an anticommunist war. This chapter thus assesses how, from 1950 to 1953, French leaders convinced a skeptical Truman administration that Indochina was much more than an exploited colony maintained for reasons of French prestige and grandeur. Indeed, French officials cleverly portrayed Indochina as an integral outpost in the new frontier battles of the Cold War. Moreover, Paris emphasized the difficulties it faced in prosecuting such a war while maintaining its contributions to European defense. These laborious efforts to change American perceptions of Indochina paid great dividends as Washington decided to commit American money, materials, political support, and personnel to the French war effort. But French efforts perhaps worked too well. As the Truman administration became convinced that Asian and European policies were inextricably linked, it began to provide economic and military aid, exactly as the French had hoped; but American officials also insisted on being involved in French decision making vis-à-vis Indochina. This insistence marked the beginning of the eventual transition from French to American influence of events in Vietnam.
Were the French sincere in painting their Indochinese war as a communist rather than colonial concern? Or, were they cynically emphasizing the communist element to acquire American aid? The answer, unsurprisingly, is a bit of both. Although the French played the communist card a little too often in their requests for materials and money in the fight against the Vietminh, they were certainly sincere in establishing a common defense policy with the Americans and British in Southeast Asia. Successive French governments worked diligently to convince their American and British partners that a coordinated defense organization in Asia would halt communist aggression, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had secured western European defense. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the French successfully played on American fears of communist expansion, sparking the search for a united western policy against the communists in Indochina. Ultimately, the establishment of such a policy would prove elusive as Paris and Washington disagreed on the best way to guarantee a noncommunist Vietnam.
The France that had resolutely clung to one of its few remaining indicators of world power status in 1946 appeared more willing to compromise on Vietnamese independence by 1950. Frustrated militarily, Paris commenced work on establishing a separate South Vietnamese state to oppose Ho Chi Minh’s regime in the North. A series of agreements promising conditional Vietnamese independence had been signed in the late 1940s, culminating with the March 8, 1949, Elysée Agreement, signed by French president Vincent Auriol and Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai. The agreement recognized the unification of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina into the State of Vietnam, and the new state was given associate status within the French Union and a certain degree of autonomy under Bao Dai’s leadership.2 But the accords, which pleased neither Right nor Left in the French National Assembly, did not provide for total independence; Bao Dai’s government had authority over local affairs, but the French retained control over national defense and foreign affairs. Still, the French hoped the agreement would satisfy American calls for greater Vietnamese independence and thus lead to military and economic assistance from the United States.
A critic of French colonialism since World War II, the Truman administration provided little aid to the French war effort in Indochina during 1948 and 1949. U.S. officials advised French ambassador to the United States Henri Bonnet that the communist element in the Vietminh “would not suffice” to secure American assistance to France and remained skeptical of what had become known as “the Bao Dai solution.” Secretary of State Dean Acheson thought it would be unwise to commit to Bao Dai unless Paris granted more concessions toward Vietnamese independence, and even suggested sending a formal letter to the French foreign minister criticizing the Elysée Accords for not moving fast enough in this direction. U.S. ambassador to France David Bruce persuaded Acheson that such an action would be counterproductive.3 Infighting among the Office of Western European Affairs, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs also complicated American policy toward Indochina. It was not until the occurrence of a series of international events that increased the geopolitical importance of Indochina that the Truman administration began to change its views.
The Chinese communists’ victory in 1949 and the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb the same year led the Truman administration to consider increasing its support of the Bao Dai government. Sensing an opportunity, Paris capitalized on communist successes by renewing its plea for increased American aid to Indochina. As early as May 1949, many French military officials described the war in Indochina as an anticommunist effort and insisted that Bao Dai’s establishment of a base there would stop the communist advance.4 The British also encouraged an American commitment to Southeast Asia since they feared that if Vietnam fell, areas under British influence—such as Siam, Burma, and Malaya—would be next.
The Americans listened to French and British concerns but hesitated to become involved in what they still considered to be an essentially colonial war. On July 1, 1949, National Security Council (NSC) 51 recommended greater cooperation with the British to secure French guarantees for Indochinese independence. According to NSC 51, a successful solution to the Indochina problem—Vietnamese independence—would not only halt communism, but would also demonstrate that the West could create a partnership with indigenous nationalists. In addition, Southeast Asia would be preserved as a source of western and Japanese raw materials.5 Still, by the end of 1949, Washington remained unsure about how to achieve greater Vietnamese independence.
The Truman administration was not the only indecisive player. Although Paris was determined to seek American support, it had a difficult time deciding how to proceed in Indochina. Officials in Paris and Saigon repeatedly failed to coordinate with each other, let alone with their American and British allies. French high commissioner to Indochina Leon Pignon attempted to bring some cohesiveness to French policy in Indochina, suggesting that France create a policy of action commune, or “common action,” with the Americans and British in the Far East. After China recognized Ho Chi Minh’s government, Pignon advocated that France “guarantee the borders of Indochina, recognize Bao Dai’s government, and obtain material aid from the United States.” Jean Letourneau, the French minister of overseas France, added that France should focus on moving forward as quickly as possible with Vietnamese independence. Both Pignon and Letourneau were concerned that Paris was immobilized by political infighting and would not be able to take concrete actions toward independence.6 Their fears were soon justified as Paris hesitated between supporting Bao Dai and trying to reestablish contacts with Ho Chi Minh. New losses inflicted on the French forces by the Vietminh, and the French public’s growing opposition to the war, perpetuated French difficulties in determining a course of action. After much internal debate, Paris decided to support Bao Dai rather than reconcile with Ho Chi Minh.7
On January 18, 1950, the People’s Republic of China recognized the DRV. The Soviet Union followed suit two days later. The Chinese and Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s government helped turn the war from a local anticommunist struggle into a focal point of the Cold War.8 The French Assembly quickly ratified the stalled Elysée agreements, anticipating that the United States and Britain would recognize the Bao Dai government. As expected, London and Washington recognized the State of Vietnam within a week, and an American mission was installed in Saigon shortly thereafter. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship on February 14 further heightened the western sense of urgency and led to additional American political support for the French-backed Bao Dai.
Although the American commitment to Vietnam began with a political act—recognition of the Bao Dai government—the first material step would be economic aid to France. The Truman administration began working on the question of aid early in 1950. A problem paper, drafted by a team of representatives from the Office of Western European Affairs, the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), addressed the issue of U.S. policy regarding Indochina.9 The report weighed the difficulty of convincing Congress and the American public that the United States should support a colonial war against the possibility that the U.S. failure to assist the Bao Dai government might cause the French to work actively against American goals in Europe and abandon Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. The report concluded that aid was warranted on the basis that Indochina was important to U.S. security interests. By providing such aid, Washington hoped to gain significant leverage to compel Paris to grant independence to Bao Dai’s regime, although Acheson recognized that the greatest American bargaining power vis-à-vis France existed before the United States agreed to provide aid.10
French officials were also busy thinking of ways to gain leverage against their Atlantic ally. When Henri Bonnet formally requested economic and military assistance from the United States on February 16, 1950, he framed the request within the context of French budgetary and Cold War concerns. French representative to the United Nations (UN) Jean Chauvel emphasized that France could not afford “to continue being drained through Indochina” if French economic recovery were ever to be achieved. Unless the United States and Britain agreed to share some of France’s burden in Southeast Asia, France would be obliged “to liquidate its Indochina commitment.”11 The French Foreign Ministry, or Quai d’Orsay, also recognized the importance of portraying aid as a necessity in helping French leaders avoid having to make a difficult choice between Europe and Asia during a heightened Cold War. In particular, Bonnet reminded officials in Washington that France was on the only “hot” frontline in the Cold War. He recognized that American aid would bring “faster independence for the Associated States, new personnel, and implementation of the 8 March 1949 accords” while also drawing France “more closely into the Atlantic alliance with the United States.” Bonnet recommended asking for more rather than less aid and suggested French officials present themselves as “partners, not as solicitors.”12 This French gambit was successful in convincing the State Department that aid was necessary. Thus, French demands for arms and money that had been denied in 1948 and 1949 were now approved by the Truman administration. On March 10, Truman approved an initial grant of $15 million in military aid for Indochina out of MDAP funds.
At the heart of Franco-American deliberations over aid was the issue of Vietnamese independence. Once the United States began its financial investment in Indochina, it attempted to influence the conduct of the war and the uses of American aid.13 Both the United States and Britain urged the French Foreign Ministry to wrest control of Indochinese affairs from the Ministry of Overseas France. According to London and Washington, this act would provide some perceived legitimacy to the fiction of Indochinese sovereignty. But Paris had its own concerns about sovereignty and sought assurances that American aid would not entail reducing the French “civilizing influence” in Indochina. Letourneau was particularly concerned about preserving French political and cultural control. In a warning to both the Americans and the British, he pronounced in April 1950 that unless French influence was preserved, France would “not allow other countries to participate in the defense of the region.”14
Collective action in Southeast Asia appeared difficult to achieve in light of the opposing currents of the French fear of losing control and the Truman administration’s insistence on complete Vietnamese independence.15 The French believed that ratifying the 1949 Elysée Accords represented a large concession toward Vietnamese independence, but the Americans remained unconvinced. Paris suspected that insufficient, often unsatisfactory, and uniformly late American aid to Indochina was a tactic to pressure the French toward granting greater independence. Although the Pau Conference of 1950 guaranteed that Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and France would all have an equal voice in economic decisions, the three Indochinese states continued to insist on full independence. French concerns that the United States was encouraging this demand persisted. Although the Truman administration reiterated its support of the French war effort, an image of an anticolonial United States endured in the minds of the French.16 President Franklin Roosevelt’s calls for an international trusteeship of Indochina at the end of World War II and previous American hesitation in helping France had not been forgotten.
The issue of aid and how it was to be distributed continued to plague Franco-American relations. In March, an economic survey mission arrived in Saigon. The Griffin mission, as it came to be called, was designed to assess the need for economic and technical aid, to recommend aid programs designed to demonstrate the “genuine interest” of the United States in the people of Southeast Asia, and to help the governments there strengthen their economies and build “popular support.” In a significant boon to the French, the mission recommended the first large-scale aid—$23.5 million—for the three Indochinese countries.17 According to the Quai d’Orsay, the mission was badly informed about the political situation in Indochina, and its contacts with the Vietnamese aggravated French difficulties by giving hope to Vietnamese nationalists that they could rid themselves of French control. Quai officials insisted military aid flow to Paris, not the Bao Dai regime in Saigon, and worried that as they withdrew from internal Vietnamese affairs, the Americans would replace them.18
These concerns were confirmed when Bao Dai notified the French that the Americans had suggested giving aid directly to the Vietnamese.19 A battle between the French and Vietnamese then occurred as to how aid would be dispersed, which only furthered French suspicions about U.S. intentions. The Vietnamese made the most of the situation, as evidenced by the effort of the defense minister, Phan Huy Quat, to direct American aid to the nascent national Vietnamese army, bypassing the French. Ultimately, the United States funneled aid through the French, primarily because Paris categorically refused to allow direct military aid to the Vietnamese and because the Bao Dai government had no military organization that could effectively use the equipment.
Although their suspicions of American intentions did not dissipate, French leaders nonetheless welcomed American help in Indochina. By playing on American fears of the loss of Southeast Asia to communism, as well as the possibility that France would have to withdraw from Indochina to maintain its commitments in Europe, Paris succeeded in obtaining American aid in its fight against the Vietminh. But aid was only the first step; French officials believed that a coordinated effort at the highest military and diplomatic levels was essential to guarantee Southeast Asian defense against communism in general and Vietnamese defense in particular. By creating a united front against communism, the primary French goal of defeating the Vietminh would be secured.
After achieving their first goal of securing American military and economic aid, the French began their quest for coordinated action in earnest. As of March 1950, Acheson and the State Department insisted that the Indochina problem was more a political than a military one, and that the problem could be resolved through guarantees of Vietnamese independence. Therefore, although the United States provided short-term aid, Washington had no intention of establishing a long-term strategic plan in Indochina. The limited aid that the United States supplied would be used to introduce a “psychological element” necessary to finding a political solution. British foreign minister Ernest Bevin supported the American position during a tripartite foreign ministers meeting in March, when he expressed concerns that the French were not working quickly enough toward independence, and both Washington and London remained reluctant to tie their policies to the French war effort.20
The French began their offensive for coordinated action in April. During meetings with Truman administration officials, Bonnet pointed out that the French effort in Indochina was part “of the greater battle against the communist bloc,” and that it should be treated as such. He suggested that the Americans should do their part by “positioning additional American troops on the continent to offset French troops in Indochina.” Bonnet thus effectively targeted American Cold War concerns by linking European and Indochina defense when submitting aid requests to the Truman administration. Recognizing that the top American priority was containment, the French hoped to hold continuous meetings among the trois grands, or “big three,” on the world political situation, to keep the United States on the continent, and to develop a common policy in Southeast Asia. At this point, both the French and the Americans recognized the connection between Indochina and the continent, and both believed that Indochina was draining European defense.21
Paris continued to lobby for coordinated action, reiterating that there should be “complete agreement” among the three western powers and a common policy on Indochina and Southeast Asia.22 The Quai d’Orsay also emphasized the need for American supplies to fortify the war effort, indicating that Paris still envisioned a military solution to the conflict rather than a political one, contrary to the Americans’ recommendation.23 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought the United States should provide more aid to Indochina because it might give a psychological boost to the war effort, but it rejected the French proposal for military talks to develop a common strategy. A compromise solution, encapsulated in a State Department report, which was adopted by the NSC and signed by the president in April, provided the initial formal guidance for future policy in Indochina. The report defined Indochina as a key area of Southeast Asia and recommended that “support on a limited basis” be provided to the French.24
The French saw this American action as a first step toward establishing a coordinated allied policy in Southeast Asia, but much work remained to be done. The French Defense Ministry believed that an inter-allied effort in Indochina that provided materials, armament, and financial and military support for the Vietnamese government needed to be implemented as quickly as possible. Defense officials worried about presenting the Americans and British with a precise and constructive plan to achieve a “common policy” guaranteed to safeguard shared strategic interests. They feared that Washington and London would continue to resist such a policy, leaving France to fight the war against the Vietminh without allied support.25 French ambassador to Britain René Massigli shared such concerns, discerning two contradictory American policies. According to Massigli, on the one hand the Americans did not want to become engaged in “dangerous situations” outside Europe, but on the other hand they insisted on “giving their advice” and “engaging their European partners” in the Cold War.26 Thus, whereas the United States refused to consider contributing to a system of collective defense in Indochina, France was expected to maintain and further its contribution to continental defense while simultaneously fighting the Vietminh. The Defense Ministry’s and Massigli’s assessments were correct, to a certain extent. The Truman administration had been reluctant to commit to areas outside Europe, but Truman and Acheson had become convinced of the importance of stopping communism at the southern border of China.27
Tripartite meetings in London in early May 1950 represented the first serious attempt on the part of the French to draw their allies into a coordinated effort in Asia, as the three western powers discussed the “Indochina problem.” French foreign minister Robert Schuman noted that the worst predicament arising out of the conflict was France’s inability to contribute to western defense in Europe until the war was resolved. Schuman promised that France would not abandon Indochina, but he also insisted that France could not continue its “double effort” without “revising” its policy in Europe. In addition, Schuman argued that France was defending not only its own interests but the “common interests of the western powers against communist infiltration.”28 The Americans and the British accepted French claims that France could not carry out both European defense and the war effort in Indochina, but London and Washington still insisted that a common policy would be possible only to the extent that the French agreed to guarantee Vietnamese independence. Acheson pressed these concerns throughout the tripartite meetings, pointing out that Bao Dai’s regime in the South should be strengthened so that the western presence could be diminished. Schuman agreed that Vietnamese independence was important but emphasized that reestablishment of security was equally so. Already in 1950, the emphasis on security that would dominate both French and American policy in Vietnam was apparent, while political reform would remain a secondary consideration.
Acheson’s primary concern at the tripartite meetings was to preserve western solidarity. It was within this context that Acheson privately informed Schuman that the United States would grant aid for use in Indochina until June 30, but after that date aid questions would go to Congress.29 Although the United States was more committed to aiding the French in Indochina, the Truman administration drew the line at complete political support of French policy; both the British and the Americans refused Schuman’s request for a joint declaration on the three western powers’ resolve to stop communism in Indochina.30
From the French perspective, the May tripartite meeting gave a certain amount of satisfaction because of the general agreement to prioritize “reestablishing security” in Indochina. Promoting “sincere nationalism” was a lesser concern. American willingness to provide aid for both these goals, and the favorable response to this news by the American press, pleased French diplomats. But the meetings also underscored the lack of coordinated action among the big three, as U.S. leaders preferred to aid the three Indochinese states directly through the private sector rather than funneling aid through official French channels. Happily for the French, logistical difficulties in direct disbursement of aid and the increasingly tense international and U.S. domestic situations would ultimately weigh in France’s favor.31
Throughout spring, American willingness to support the French effort against the communists grew. Internal changes in the United States undoubtedly led to a growing sense of alarm among American officials and the general public. The domestic sense of crisis—symbolized by Senator Joseph McCarthy’s claims of communist spies and the replacement of George Kennan as director of the Policy Planning Staff by avid cold warrior Paul Nitze—had grown stronger. McCarthy’s allegations of communist infiltration in the American government created apprehension in Washington that contributed to the Truman administration’s decision to pursue a more vigorous anticommunist policy. Nitze’s belief that the United States needed to “roll back” communism corresponded to the new climate more closely than Kennan’s cautious approach to the communist bloc. American officials had also come to recognize the psychological dangers of a communist victory and allowed another $16 million to flow through MDAP, bringing the total aid to Indochina for 1950 to $31 million.32 In a May 24 letter addressed to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and France, Truman declared his plan to put into place an economic aid program for the three Associated States to assist them in “refinding their stability and to further their peaceful and democratic development.” Truman stated that such aid would “complement” the French effort and in no way implied “a substitution of French aid or France.”33
Increased aid to the Associated States demonstrated American concern over communist advances, but the Indochina situation remained a secondary consideration for the Truman administration as it continued to focus on European affairs. In Paris, meanwhile, French officials strategized on how to acquire American guarantees to provide even greater aid for Indochina and to help the French in the event of a Chinese attack. These issues provoked vigorous debate in a National Defense Committee meeting as high-level French officials met to discuss options in Indochina. By the end of the talks, members of the committee had failed to find a means to achieve guaranteed American cooperation.34 What the French could not know was that their war effort in Indochina was about to receive significant assistance from the Americans as a result of the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.
In June 1950, the French war effort became an anticommunist crusade for the Americans. A number of Cold War concerns led to this decision, but perhaps the greatest single influence in convincing the United States that the French were fighting not a colonial war but one against communism was the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. When North Korea crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, the Truman doctrine’s condemnation of “subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures” and commitment to containing such subjugation would now be applied to Asia.35 North Korea’s invasion of the South convinced many American officials that the Kremlin had orchestrated the maneuver to deflect alliance concentration from western Europe as a prologue to a Soviet attack in that region. The Korean War blurred previous distinctions between vital and peripheral interests, leading the Truman administration to view communism as an integrated and cohesive worldwide movement striving to undermine western capitalist society. Such views created the basis for a vastly accelerated rearmament program after 1950.
Not only had Europe and Asia become interconnected, but a link had been established between Korea and other Southeast Asian problems—for example, Indochina. According to French-born U.S. journalist Bernard Fall, one of the most perceptive observers of Indochina at the time, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea simplified American Far Eastern policy. Once more the situation allowed for a clear-cut division between good and bad—this time not between the Axis and Allied powers, but between communists and noncommunists. The Korean War galvanized support for the anticommunist crusade in Vietnam and accelerated American aid to the French. On June 27, 1950, Truman announced that more military assistance would be provided for Vietnam and that a military mission would be sent to provide close working relations with the French. A few days later, the first direct American military assistance arrived in Vietnam in the form of eight C-47 cargo planes. The Korean War thus brought the Truman declaration of “full support for all Asian regimes fighting communism” to the Associated States.36
Korea would change the Truman administrations European and Asian policies. European rearmament replaced economic recovery as the first U.S. priority, and Anglo-American planners called with increasing firmness for a German contribution to this military expansion. Although American officials did not believe a communist attack on Europe was imminent, they did read Soviet support of North Korean leader Kim II Sung’s invasion of South Korea as part of a larger Soviet strategy to probe for weaknesses in the resolve of the West to meet global challenges. The Truman administration believed it had to meet the Soviet challenge head-on by hitting hard in Korea and boosting the western military presence around the globe.37 One result of this determination to stand up to Moscow was that the American commitment to Indochina grew stronger.
Although the Korean War ensured American support for the French war effort, Franco-American disagreement on the best approach in Indochina continued. In July, Foreign Service officer John F. Melby led a mission to Indochina to determine the state of the French military effort and to make recommendations for future American policy there. The mission decried French commander in chief Marcel Carpentier’s strategy, which the Americans considered to be primarily defensive. The Melby report offered three alternatives—the United States could cut its losses, engage in a holding action, or prevent a communist victory at whatever cost on the grounds that Southeast Asia was a vital national security interest. The report advocated the third option and recommended increased aid and the establishment of a military assistance advisory group, but it also suggested placing more pressure on the French to grant Vietnamese independence and to provide an offensive strategy against the Vietminh before fully committing to the French war effort. Donald Heath, the new U.S. minister in Vietnam, argued against pressuring the French and advocated developing a national Vietnamese army as a solution to French problems, since the French army was the only defense against a communist offensive in Indochina.38 For the time being, Washington listened to Heath’s suggestions, toning down its demands for full Vietnamese independence, but still believing that independence was the only ultimate solution. The Truman administration soon found another way to exercise some influence on French decision making, sending the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) to Saigon in September 1950 under the leadership of General Francis Brink. As Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated, the United States had “no choice” but to help France, even though this would provoke charges of “imperialism.”39
MAAG, which comprised army, air force, and naval inspection teams, would play a critical role in creating an enduring American foothold in Vietnam, and, eventually, replacing French military advisers. MAAG’s initial role was to process, monitor, and evaluate American military aid to French and Vietnamese forces, but it gradually began to establish military programs, help build a national Vietnamese army, and coordinate U.S. military aid with French operational plans.40 The French rarely made American inspections of equipment or attempts at coordination easy. In turn, MAAG members were often frustrated by French disorganization and failure to account for materials. With the establishment of MAAG and the increasing flow of American materials under MDAP, the United States indicated the importance it attached to the French war effort as well as its realization that the French were fighting an anticommunist war not a colonial one. As aid increased, so did MAAG technicians and counselors. French commanders resented MAAG from the beginning, and with good reason. Content at first with simply supplying aid and personnel, MAAG became interested in taking over instruction of Vietnamese officers, training Vietnamese pilots, and supervising the French war effort.
American military aid pleased Paris, but increasing trips from American military personnel and the inclusion of American counselors and liaison officers in the French military forces prompted French concern over what they perceived as too many Americans attempting to control policy in Indochina. According to government officials, Americans in Saigon desired to move from simply supplying aid to giving advice, and eventually to “directing the whole affair.” American intervention each day became more tangible and visible, which was unacceptable to Paris since Washington did not share in French responsibilities. Perturbation with these issues, as well as other problems within the Western alliance, was evident in a detailed letter that Massigli sent to the Quai. Massigli worried that as France became increasingly dependent on the United States for European rearmament and aid to Indochina, French goals would be subordinated to American ones. He advocated improving Franco-British cooperation that would counterbalance American preponderant power, but he also recognized the need for more open exchanges of information and viewpoints among the three allies.41
Meanwhile, the French continued to push for allied unity. In a strategic move, Paris decided to send a symbolic battalion to the Korean front to show French solidarity and to offset American criticism about the lack of French participation in the war. French officials argued that this act would prove France subscribed to collective security and would guarantee allied aid in the case of new difficulties in Indochina. Paris believed that the French effort in Indochina would be better understood in the United States after the exploits of the French battalion in Korea became known. According to Quai officials, the Korean War had already influenced U.S. public opinion as Americans had renewed their interest in the Far East, recognized the importance of military preparedness, and begun to view Asia as the new battleground in the Cold War. French officials helped perpetuate this view by noting that the American effort to construct a coordinated effort in Korea underlined the need for a similar common defense in Southeast Asia.42
As French officials pondered how a common defense in Southeast Asia could be achieved, they continued to fight an uphill battle in Indochina. The Truman administration became convinced that a unilateral French military effort would not succeed in halting communist aggression. The development of a strong national Vietnamese army had been a priority for the United States early on in the conflict and soon became viewed as essential. Acheson thought that by providing an enlarged aid program to Vietnam to create a national army, a “psychological benefit” would occur in Indochina and the “depletion of western military potential” would halt. According to Ambassador Bruce, a Vietnamese national army would “on the one hand provide a basis for French withdrawal of their own forces, needed for European defense, and on the other serve to give outward and visible expression to Vietnamese nationalist aspirations.”43
The idea of a Vietnamese army as the answer to France’s predicament of adequate troop strength for European defense pleased the new René Pleven government.44 Prime Minister Pleven averred that the continued financial strain of funding both the Indochina War and European rearmament could result in “galloping inflation” that would impair the French role in NATO. Therefore, a supranational approach to defense budgeting in Europe was required. French claims of imminent economic collapse appeared exaggerated to American officials, who perceived little danger of inflation in France; they suspected the Pleven government of maneuvering Washington into a position where it would have to fund the entire amount of increased French military expenditures as France created a Vietnamese national army and a common European defense.45
Paris certainly intended to seek additional American aid. At a tripartite foreign ministers meeting in early September, France had two predominant concerns—how much aid the Americans could give France and what the United States would do in the event of a Chinese invasion of Indochina.46The United States was not ready to make a commitment to the French in the event of a Chinese invasion, but promised that more aid would be forthcoming.47 Acheson also agreed to tripartite military talks to discuss the Chinese threat. Still, according to Paris, the meeting had not produced an “ironclad” American commitment to the French effort. Despite the installation of an American embassy with three hundred personnel and multiple services and the sending of information missions, military supplies, economic aid, and American loans to the Vietnamese government, American policy toward Indochina was still one of “neither communism nor colonialism.”48
From Washington’s perspective, a Vietnamese army still seemed to be the best solution to the Asian and European defense conundrum. The American Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee recommended to the NSC a policy of encouraging the formation of national armies in Indochina. Although the committee’s main focus was on the means to improve the situation in Indochina, members also recognized that a phased French withdrawal from Indochina would strengthen Europe. A Vietnamese army, according to American officials, would “help solve defense problems in Asia and in Europe.”49
As the western governments struggled to come to terms with the rising atmosphere of crisis in Asia, Vietminh units attacked French border posts in the mountainous area near the Chinese frontier and the town of Cao Bang. A series of disastrous French military defeats followed, and the French were forced to withdraw from the Cao Bang area. By mid-October, Heath reported that the border between China and Vietnam had “virtually ceased to exist.”50 For the first time since the Indochina War began, the French were brought to the brink of defeat by Vietminh offensives.
The deteriorating military situation disrupted American plans for a Vietnamese army while making an improved prosecution of the war an urgent priority for the French. The Vietminh had sustained heavy casualties, but the Cao Bang offensive dealt the French a major psychological defeat. In Hanoi, rumors circulated that all French dependents would soon be evacuated. Back in Paris, Pleven came under heavy fire for the disaster, and the French National Assembly passed a motion giving the government a mandate to reinforce the war effort by any means necessary. The French defeats also ensured that the notion of phasing out French forces and building a Vietnamese army, which would release French troops to the continent for the benefit of NATO, effectively disappeared.51 Finally, the Cao Bang debacle encouraged Paris to demand more aid from Washington to salvage its position in the region.
Given the crisis situation in Indochina, were the French and Americans of the same opinion on what actions needed to be taken there by the end of 1950? The outlook from both capitals demonstrates that they were not. French thinking could be summed up in four points. First, Paris emphasized to Washington that the Indochina burden was crushing France and that the French contribution to European defense would suffer as the French sent more troops and funneled more money from the continent to Indochina. Second, the Pleven government demanded more American economic and military aid to relieve France’s burden. Third, French officials insisted that augmented aid did not authorize American officials in Saigon to take a bigger role in French policy decisions regarding political and military operations. Finally, if more aid failed to materialize, France would have to disengage either from Indochina or from a common European defense.
American thinking on Indochina by the end of 1950 followed a different path. The Truman administration’s policy toward Indochina contained a number of components. Although Truman did agree to more aid in Indochina, he felt that this aid should result in a greater American voice in French political and military policy toward Vietnam. American officials in Saigon concurred, advocating the appointment of an American military adviser to the French high command and American political advisers to the French high commissioner and Bao Dai government. In addition, the Truman administration was increasingly concerned about the slow pace of progress toward Vietnamese self-government. Many American officials felt the French were delaying relinquishing a number of vital powers to the Bao Dai regime, including control of communications, foreign trade, and customs. Moreover, most American officials continued to see the solution in Vietnam as political. The JCS concluded that any military victory over the Vietminh would be temporary. A long-term solution would require France to make sweeping political and economic concessions.52 Finally, although American officials disagreed among themselves on the amount and type of aid to be assigned to Indochina, they all agreed on two points. The Truman administration was convinced that Indochina was critical because its loss could threaten all of noncommunist Asia, and in order to avoid this loss, a Vietnamese army should be built up as quickly as possible.
At least some American officials recognized the dangers of increased involvement. The deputy director of MDAP, John Ohly, saw the demands on the United States “increasing daily.” He observed that the Americans were getting themselves into a position where their responsibilities tended to “supplant rather than complement” those of the French. Worried that Americans might become scapegoats for French failures, Ohly thought that the United States was “dangerously close” to being “so deeply committed” that it might even find itself involved in “direct intervention,” since such situations unfortunately had a way of “snowballing.”53 These comments in November 1950 highlighted the dilemmas Washington faced vis-à-vis the French and the Indochinese states.
Although the French were not willing to make additional political concessions, they attempted to reinvigorate their military effort. French morale in Indochina received a boost when General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny arrived as combined commander in chief of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) and high commissioner in Indochina. On his own volition, de Lattre, a leading proponent of a national Vietnamese army, immediately relaxed restrictions on American inspections and contacts with the Vietnamese, leading to improved Franco-American relations and better coordination on creating a viable Vietnamese army. Indeed, in 1949, some 41,500 Vietnamese were working with the French troops, but by the end of 1950, thirty battalions had been organized, and by the end of 1951, fifty battalions existed. Such progress was attributed to the combined effort of de Lattre and Bao Dai.54 Paris also enhanced its efforts to promote Indochina as an international problem by sending Letourneau and General Alphonse Juin to Indochina to assess American views on the conflict.
The ensuing report indicated three separate American attitudes toward the French. The official diplomats had serious reservations about the French effort, insisting that the Pleven government needed to grant further concessions toward Vietnamese independence. The military officials recognized the difficulty of the French position and wanted to provide more rapid and massive assistance. Economic officials wanted to see the “French era” in Indochina ended. Finally, the report noted that British influence had declined drastically with the American arrival and that British personnel in Vietnam had grown more anti-French.55 The solution, according to Letourneau and Juin, was to convince American diplomats of the importance of coordinated action while warning the various American aid missions that France took exception to overt American interference in its decision making. In conclusion, the report advocated closer cooperation with both the Americans and the British.
Closer cooperation proved a difficult task. Outgoing high commissioner Pignon complained bitterly about the Americans. He recognized that France and the United States needed to establish some sort of coordinated action before the Vietnamese succeeded in playing the two sides off each other, but he saw the Bao Dai solution as a failure and believed the Vietnamese had already pitted Paris against Washington. Pignon argued that the entrance of the United States onto the scene, much more than the communist peril on the frontier, was responsible for Bao Dai’s reticence toward the French. According to Pignon, “while American dollars were slow in arriving, American intervention in Vietnamese politics occurred at a much faster pace.” Pignon stated that since the arrival in Saigon of an American diplomatic presence and the Griffin mission, it had been “practically impossible” for the French to “advance in any domain.” The problem was not American hostility, but the State Department’s belief that full independence was necessary before political progress could be made. The Vietnamese, according to Pignon, gave more weight to the American legation than to the French high command, and the Americans were playing a “double game.” To the French, they claimed that they were disappointed in the Vietnamese inability to unite and work together, but to the Vietnamese, they said that the French were at fault.56
Although various U.S. missions in Indochina were playing a double game to a certain degree, in that some American elements encouraged the Vietnamese to insist on greater French concessions toward independence, Pignon overstated the extent of American influence in Indochina. American dealings with the Vietnamese stemmed from frustration with French officials’ refusal to address the political aspects of the Indochina problem. British officials shared this frustration but preferred to speak to the French separately so they did not feel their allies were “ganging up on them.” In early November, British high commissioner in Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald met with Pleven, advocating independence for the Associated States. Pleven announced to MacDonald that he was “preaching to the converted,” and that Pleven, Schuman, and Letourneau all thought that France should be promoting greater independence, but that French president Vincent Auriol was reluctant to grant further political reform.57 This discussion illuminated the divisions within the French government on how best to prosecute the war. In addition, while many high-ranking officials in Paris had come to embrace the necessity of political reform, those in Saigon still clung to the idea of a military victory.
This ambiguity in French policy making had not been resolved by the time high-level Franco-British discussions took place in December. Pleven and Schuman indicated that the French were trying to improve their military position in Indochina and build up indigenous forces to argue from a position of strength, but still had not succeeded in moving forward on Vietnamese independence. At the meetings, Schuman and Pleven were primarily concerned with the looming threat of a Chinese invasion and asked the British to help bring about tripartite talks at which this issue could be discussed. British leader Clement Atlee agreed that London and Paris needed to persuade Truman to agree to military meetings at the highest level to create a coordinated effort in Indochina. Shortly after the conference, the French signed a military convention with the Bao Dai government in which France took further steps toward the creation of an independent Vietnamese army. In a symbolic gesture, France agreed that French officers serving in the Vietnamese army would wear Vietnamese uniforms. More substantive was the agreement that Vietnamese officers and enlisted men serving in the French armed forces would be transferred to the Vietnamese army.58 On December 23, France, the United States, and the three Associated States signed a military assistance agreement that provided indirect financial and material aid to Indochina and augmented MAAG’s role in helping centralize aid requests. These events indicated a general willingness on the part of the French, British, and Americans to work together in Indochina, but still left the French unsure about the extent of the American and British commitment.
According to French officials, as of January 1951 the foreign missions in Indochina and the various tripartite meetings had failed to provide significant inter-allied cooperation. French concerns with western solidarity in both Asian and European defense were apparent as Paris assessed its part in the Atlantic alliance structure. French officials had become increasingly sensitive to what they saw as a lack of solidarity outside the geographical boundaries of NATO. As a result, French military leaders redefined France’s three essential missions: to participate in international engagements in European defense; to ensure the internal and external security of the Metropole, North Africa, and the French Union; and to reestablish order and stability in Indochina and stop communism in Southeast Asia.59
Internal exchanges highlighted the difficulties France faced in carrying out its three missions. When de Lattre requested additional reinforcements for Indochina in late 1950, the French National Defense Committee realized that this demand would force France to choose between Europe and Asia. French military advisers insisted that if Paris did not send reinforcements to Indochina, Tonkin would be lost, making the defense of Saigon and the rest of Southeast Asia difficult. Pleven did not share the military opinion that holding on to Tonkin was necessary for protecting Saigon and the rest of Southeast Asia. He advocated holding off on making a decision about sending more troops to Indochina and favored concentrating on European defense. Letourneau believed that the Americans could not possibly expect France to continue the fight in Indochina and still insist that absolute priority be given to European rearmament. Letourneau thus recommended securing additional American guarantees of aid and political support in Indochina as a way of avoiding a choice between Indochina and Europe.
The key element to French policy, as both Pleven and Letourneau recognized, was American help. Paris thus attached great importance to a number of meetings that took place between high-ranking French and American officials at the end of January 1951 in Washington—in particular the Truman-Pleven talks. Before the meetings, Pleven informed the Quai that it was essential to establish a common policy with the Americans in Asia and that Korea and Indochina should be considered the “same problem.” On the American side, Washington moved slowly with respect to Indochina and allied unity, in part because it was reformulating its policy.60
As the talks began, Acheson and other State Department officials discussed the French request for $70 million in additional aid and high-level tripartite consultations on Far Eastern economic, political, and military questions. The general consensus was to avoid tripartite consultations on general Southeast Asian problems because of difficulties with the JCS, the potential hostility of other allied states, probable accusations of imperialism, and the belief that the United States would become so involved in commitments of this type that it would no longer be in a position to take unilateral action. American officials preferred to focus solely on Indochina. In subsequent meetings with the Americans and British on Asian questions, Pleven continued to press for a consultative organization, arguing that Asia had become important in its own right. Truman disagreed with Pleven’s suggestion, fearing that other nations would resent a big three organization. Acheson pointed out that numerous organizations were already in place—a system of military consultations in Indochina had been established in September, and the North Atlantic Standing Group was also in place.61 The British also announced their opposition to an organization run by the trois grands.
American and British hesitance on a tripartite organization for Southeast Asia stemmed from a number of other concerns that were not voiced publicly during the meetings. There was major French political instability, and the Americans feared that the French were considering talks with the Soviets on European issues. David Bruce and other American officials suspected that French demands for regular tripartite meetings on Southeast Asia resulted from their desire to be consulted as often as their British counterparts were. The British also had doubts about French motivations. According to British consul general in Saigon Frank Gibbs, during early January the French had flirted with the idea of negotiating with the Vietminh. The British speculated that de Lattre had been appointed not because Paris intended to “hang on” but because French officials desired to have a “strong man on the spot” who could negotiate with honor. Gibbs thought that the French had even begun to consider holding elections as a pretext to withdraw, since Ho Chi Minh would undoubtedly triumph over Bao Dai. Once the Vietminh halted their military offensive, it appeared the French had given up this strategy. Although Gibbs had no concrete proof for his suspicions, the Foreign Office took his views seriously, and the British remained suspicious of French motives in calling for coordinated action. By the end of the meetings, however, despite their failure to establish a tripartite organization on Southeast Asia, the French had succeeded in convincing the Americans of the importance of viewing Korea and Indochina as part of the same fight against communism and of providing a coordinated effort in Indochina.62
Improvements in inter-allied cooperation, resulting in large part from French planning, were evident at the Singapore conference that took place a few months later to study the strategic situation in Southeast Asia. At the tripartite military talks, the French, Americans, and British agreed that they needed better and faster exchanges of information, that Tonkin was crucial to the defense of Southeast Asia, and that Indochina should be integrated into a common defense system for Southeast Asia. At the same time, the NSC also approved NSC 90, which recommended “collaboration with friendly governments on exchange of operations against guerrillas,” indicating the increasing American commitment against the Vietminh. Although the talks at Singapore produced no formal consensus on allied policy in Indochina, the French believed they had convinced Washington of the importance of beginning tripartite talks on formulating a joint strategy for the overall defense of Southeast Asia and acknowledged that Franco-American relations were progressing more smoothly.63 The Americans remained reluctant, however, to commit to Southeast Asian defense when a coordinated continental European defense remained out of reach.
By mid-1951, the latent, if unrecognized, contest between France-in-Indochina and France-in-NATO as priorities in U.S. planning and funding had intensified for two reasons. First, NATO force levels remained alarmingly low. Second, in June the United States finally announced its support for the European Defense Community (EDC) and set about ensuring French cooperation while at the same time insisting that the French effort in Indochina continue. The pressure of EDC negotiations intensified the conflict within France over resource allocation between continental rearmament and the Indochina War.
The EDC had become a factor in American policy toward Indochina beginning in 1950. As the Cold War became globalized, the United States realized it did not have enough forces to deploy in Europe and Asia. During a meeting among the French, American, and British foreign ministers in September 1950, Acheson announced that the United States would not significantly increase the numbers of American forces stationed in Europe unless a European defense force supplemented by German participation came into being. Britain appeared willing to accept the idea of German rearmament, but France rejected this demand. The British were annoyed that France was more concerned about Germany than about the Soviet Union, and both the United States and the United Kingdom were determined to include Germany in European defense.64 Thus Franco-Anglo-American cooperation on German rearmament at this time was nonexistent. Following the September conference, French official Jean Monnet provided the impetus for an alternative to German rearmament. Monnet was in an influential position, as a friend of both French foreign minister Robert Schuman at the Quai and of French prime minister René Pleven. His advice resulted in the Pleven Plan—a rearmament initiative that envisioned a supra-national European army of one hundred thousand men, fielding divisional units from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Although the initial American response to the Pleven Plan—or the EDC, as it came to be known—was unenthusiastic, the French succeeded in persuading administration officials that they were sincere.65
In June 1951, the so-called Eisenhower conversion and French legislative elections were critical to the EDC’s progress.66 Dwight D. Eisenhower, as supreme allied commander in Europe, had initially been skeptical of the French EDC plan, but he came to view the EDC as a means of rearming western Europe with a minimum of American involvement. In addition, June elections in France left the French Assembly with six blocs and no clear majority. The Right and the Communists increased in strength, which meant more nationalist and pro-colonial sentiment as well as less interest in a common European defense, but the Socialists, who formed the largest bloc opposed to German rearmament, no longer had a place. Given his warm support of the EDC, Georges Bidault’s appointment to the Ministry of Defense was of particular significance. French opinion on the EDC spanned the spectrum. General Juin warned that France could not fight in Indochina and rearm, and he refused to support the EDC unless the army was given the means to carry out its responsibilities in Indochina and inside the EDC.67 Other officials assumed that French Assembly members would vote in favor of the EDC once they saw the unappealing alternatives, such as German entry into NATO or American and British independent rearming of Germany.
As the Americans focused on European problems, the French faced an uphill battle in convincing Washington to commit further resources to the French war effort in Indochina. Paris decided to send one of its most dynamic generals to Washington in July 1951 to jump start American interest in the war effort. De Lattre’s trip proved valuable. He lamented the State Department’s lack of “valuable information” about Indochina and French policy, but he did succeed in ensuring continued financial support for the war through Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) funds and by convincing Acheson to resist placing additional pressure on the French to grant Vietnamese independence.68
De Lattre’s voyage to Washington was successful in that the Truman administration agreed to maintain American support, but French officials began to ponder a number of unappealing options to extricate themselves from the conflict if additional aid was not forthcoming. The French could negotiate with Ho Chi Minh directly but undoubtedly at a major disadvantage given the military situation. Paris could give independence to the Associated States and withdraw troops, but the three states would protest, probably make a deal with the North, and endanger French lives and property. French forces could relinquish control in stages starting with Tonkin, but coordination of such a plan would be difficult. According to one Quai official, it was unlikely that French forces alone would achieve decisive success, but the danger of working with the UN or allied nations was that France might still end up “exiting” Indochina. France had to be frank with its allies: either they decided to help or France would withdraw. If France fell in Indochina, it would undoubtedly cause problems for the United States in Europe because French officials would resent America’s failure to help in Indochina and would refuse to cooperate on European defense.69 The French thus viewed their position in Europe as the key to extracting American cooperation in Indochina.
Western and Eastern defense problems were now intimately linked, according to French officials, but Paris had not resolved how to move forward on either issue. In a letter to Georges Bidault about Atlantic alliance defense, Schuman complained that “we don’t know how much force would be needed in Europe and the East, how we would finance it, or how we would establish a long term plan since the NATO committees do not have the necessary authority to do this.” During a private meeting, Schuman and Acheson agreed they would set up a small Franco-American committee to work on this problem. Regarding aid for the war effort, the French believed it would be difficult to carry out the war for more than nine months without American aid of around $420 million in addition to material and equipment.70
The real turning point in Franco-American discussions over aid came during top secret talks with de Lattre in September. According to de Lattre, “if Korea and Indochina [were] part of the same war, then the United States should be willing to fund the French effort.” De Lattre’s visit to the United States was well timed: after the Chinese invasion of Korea, the Americans were completely convinced of the seriousness of the communist menace in the Far East. During his meetings with American officials, de Lattre succeeded in convincing Washington that Korea and Indochina were one war, but such acceptance did not lead the Americans to take practical steps toward establishing a unified Franco-American war effort in the Far East.71 De Lattre was more successful in increasing the amount and speed of delivery of American military supplies and in wresting assurances from Acheson that the United States had “no desire to replace the French or undermine the French Union.” Shortly after de Lattre’s visit to the United States, British military leaders concurred with the Americans that the French battle in Indochina deserved more funding and support.72
The issue of funding was critical. Only by obtaining more aid from its allies would France be able to pursue European defense and the war effort in Indochina. French National Defense Committee members refused to choose between the two, leading Pleven and Schuman to try to capitalize on the apparent American and British consensus by once again seeking Washington and London’s cooperation in starting a tripartite consultative body to study options for the Indochina problem and a possible Chinese attack. The Americans and British, however, remained evasive.73 At this point, the French believed that the British feared becoming entangled in a war against China and that the Americans were focused on the Korean War, therefore neglecting events in Indochina.74 So although de Lattre had succeeded in convincing his allies of the anticommunist nature of the fight against the Vietminh, the United States and Britain once again resisted devoting their full attention to the French effort.
Although the Franco-Vietminh war did not rank as a high priority for the Truman administration, American influence in Indochina grew steadily from 1950 to 1953. American military aid was important in contributing to this growth, as evidenced in MAAG’s expansion, but even more so was the proliferation of agencies and personnel that focused on economic and technical aid. Indeed, French perceptions of the official U.S. position in Washington were largely colored by the activities of local American agencies and representatives in Vietnam—the United States Information Service (USIS), the Special Mission for Technical and Economic Aid (STEM), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. press correspondents, and numerous American visitors representing various organizations from home. Americans arriving in Saigon quickly became skeptical of both the French war effort and French claims that they were moving forward with Vietnamese independence. These Americans welcomed the opportunity to spread American, rather than French, values in Vietnam.75
American influence in Indochina expanded as the agency responsible for administering U.S. aid to the Associated States, the ECA, sent STEM to Saigon in September 1950. Directed by Robert Blum, STEM focused on building up the Bao Dai regime, modernizing the infrastructure of the rural-based economy, and strengthening bilateral relations between the Vietnamese and Americans in order to promote American democratic values. Unlike American military advisers, who were required to work through French representatives, STEM officials could negotiate directly with the Vietnamese government. French officials in Saigon quickly came to resent the Blum mission. In particular, they protested efforts by STEM officials to promote Vietnamese interest in American culture, which were perceived as a gratuitous insult to the French civilizing mission.76 The French feared that American intervention would lead to a loss of French cultural influence and political control in Indochina.
French concerns about the consequences of additional American economic aid increased over time. STEM aid was administered first through the ECA then, after 1951, through its successor organizations, the Mutual Security Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration. On September 7, 1951, the United States and the Bao Dai government reached a bilateral accord. The United States promised direct economic and technical aid through STEM—conditional on Congressional approval each year—and the South Vietnamese promised to use the aid according to American goals specified by Washington, to communicate the information necessary to carry out aid programs to U.S. officials, to hold consultations with American representatives, and to support STEM activities. Two types of economic aid existed. Commercial aid allowed dollar credits to be put at the disposition of Vietnamese importers and was administered through the Provisional Commission for the Importation of American Economic Aid—which included one member from France and each of the Associated States, as well as an American observer. The Provisional Commission received applications from prospective importers and awarded licenses.77 The second form of economic aid—direct aid—completely bypassed French control. The French representative on the Provisional Commission ensured that American commercial aid did not eliminate French production in the Vietnamese market, although cheaper American products could still reduce the French economic presence. French officials also succeeded in sabotaging American efforts to promote local industries that could produce rudimentary military materials and thus boost the independence of the Vietnamese economy.
STEM originally had representation in Saigon, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane, employed about two hundred people, and possessed the statute of a diplomatic mission. Through STEM, Americans assisted Franco-Vietnamese forces in matters of technical, medical, and civil works programs, including building roads, airfields, ports, and railroads; helping with road repairs; public health and sanitation; rehabilitation of war victims and refugees; education; agricultural production; forests; fishing; public administration; and purchasing supplies and equipment. STEM recognized its role as a supporting one in cooperation with existing programs, at least in its first year. Members worked closely with French specialists who helped with technical advice, focusing on specific projects in agriculture, public health, handicrafts, relief, industry, and education. For example, in carrying out their malarial work, STEM members relied on the documentation and experience of the French Pasteur Institute. French and Americans cooperated in distributing fertilizer to individual farmers, reconstructing the Sontay pumping station and irrigation system in the Red River delta, and airlifting emergency supplies, medicines, vitamins, and clothes to refugees gathered in Central Vietnam. Another joint effort was “The Great Village of Dong-Quan” in the delta border of the war front. The American Economic Aid Mission provided eleven million piastres, and a committee of French, Americans, and Vietnamese helped oversee the project. Top Vietnamese, French, and American officials all visited the village.
Americans made use of a number of informational tools for their aid programs. A wide variety of exhibits, posters, pamphlets, and leaflets were prepared to assist in antimalarial programs, the fight against trachoma, the promotion of the use of fertilizer, and the provision of first aid care in rural areas. STEM also launched a series of technical films, such as Selling Produce, Hands across the Sea (which emphasized the science of growing bananas and their transportation, storage, and distribution), and Avery Community (which showed how the people of Avery community in Cherokee County, Georgia, had established a leading farm community). Other films included Living Rock, which stressed the importance of minerals; The Streamlined Pig, for tips on pig raising; Breeding for Eggs and Meat Quality; Celery Harvesting Methods; Gardening for a Better Living; and Suggestions for Bean Pickers.78 All of these films emphasized the ingenuity of American, not French, agricultural methods, technology, and culture.
As a result, STEM’s presence continued to exasperate French officials. Although Blum recognized that the United States should avoid undermining the French position and civilizing mission, he noted that STEM officials faced constant suspicion even when they tried to cooperate with their French counterparts. American efforts such as the model low-cost housing project Cité Nguyen Tri Phuong—which included one thousand housing units, forty-four commercial buildings, schools, a dispensary, and a police station—aggravated such suspicions because they demonstrated the magnanimity of American aid to the detriment of French projects.79 Blum and American chargé d’affaires Edmund Gullion favored direct American support of the Vietnamese, a fact they did not hide from the French. Indeed, de Lattre on numerous occasions protested STEM’s efforts in Indochina, referring to Blum as “the most dangerous man in Indochina,” and he was not alone in his concerns. French officials worried about the direct aid aspect of the mission, especially the frequent contacts Americans had with local administrations. In one of the more laughable moments of Franco-American discord, de Lattre, during a dinner party, launched into a tirade against the Americans, accusing them of everything from supporting the Vietminh to having a larger stand at the annual kermis in Hanoi. In fact, the Americans did have the larger stand. The point was, the French understood exactly how dangerous American aid in Vietnam could be for French interests there.80
Leon Pignon had warned as early as 1950 that the Vietnamese were becoming fascinated by “American civilization” and all that it could procure. According to Pignon, American transportation, radio, cinema, music, and advertising were all being diffused in Vietnam. The French tried to slow down this process, but the Americans in Vietnam insisted that the colonial appearance was still too noticeable and needed to be modified. Pignon feared that the American agencies in Vietnam were determined to “depuppetize” Bao Dai and “defrancify” Indochina. He noted that France did not have the means to combat American cultural propaganda, so French officials should make Washington more aware of the “essential nature of French cooperation in Indochina” to withstand the communist threat.81
The French kept a watchful eye over American cultural and propaganda activities from their inception, carefully noting exactly how many Americans were in the Saigon legation, economic, military, and religious missions, and the private sector. French officials also kept track of American journalists, the number of Vietnamese students who arrived in the United States each year, and the ways in which propaganda was distributed through information halls, libraries in Saigon and Hanoi, tracts, bulletins, and cinemas. The French remained dismissive of American tracts, brochures, and posters as mediocre and simplistic in their anticommunism, but they recognized the value of increasingly sophisticated USIS films, especially One Year in Korea from 1951, which emphasized the anticommunist—and anticolonialist—nature of the American effort in South Korea. As of 1951, USIS had about two hundred films in French, a few in Vietnamese, and more in Vietnamese arriving. Popular English classes were met with growing French concern, as only the “lack of professors” kept the United States from establishing more courses. About one thousand Vietnamese were learning English in the early 1950s, most of whom were located in Saigon. American officials also loaned records to Radio Vietnam to promote American music, and one of the first American books to be translated into Vietnamese was a text on American life and civilization. The U.S. federal government broadcasting service Voice of America began broadcasting in Vietnamese as well. It is worth pointing out that British cultural activities in Indochina, according to the French, were “practically nothing.”82
Despite their concerns that American economic aid and cultural activities were “not exactly in line with French ones,” some French officials argued against accusing the Americans of “systematically contravening French influence” since the Americans were in a “difficult position.” As one official noted, the Americans appeared to recognize that it was in their “best interest” to work with the French, but they wanted to avoid leaving themselves open to criticism from the Vietnamese or other newly independent Asian countries that they were aiding a colonialist power. It was thus “tempting” for them to work without the French and “to follow their own ideas to achieve the best possible results.”83
With the finest of intentions, Americans had become more involved in Vietnamese internal affairs while trying to maintain some distance from the French. Blum, who was recalled by Washington in late 1951 as a result of French objections to Blum’s claims that American officials should play a larger role in Vietnamese affairs, stated that because of the “prevailing anti-French feeling, we knew that any bolstering by us of the French position would be resented by the local people,” and because of the traditional French “sensitivity” at seeing any increase of American influence, “we knew they would look with suspicion” upon the development of direct American relations with local administrations and peoples. American infighting over these issues had percolated throughout 1951, with Blum and Gullion pushing for greater involvement while Heath and U.S. ambassador to France David Bruce argued that the United States was not in a position to “replace” France.
Donald Heath, in a fascinating cable, noted that when sent to Saigon he had been instructed that Americans were to “supplement but not to supplant.” He added that, without the French, the State of Vietnam would “not survive six weeks.” Militarily, no other power could “take over” from the FEC. Politically, no group except the Vietminh espoused the elimination of the French, and there was no place “behind which such American influence could be exerted and none is likely to be permitted.” Nor could such a party or such a pro-American movement be “built overnight” out of the military and economic aid programs in existence. Economically, the ECA and MAAG budgets were “minor” compared with French expenditures; they were “sufficient if wrongly applied” to “embitter” Franco-American relations, but they were “not enough to replace” the French contribution.84 There we have it. The cable outlined exactly what the United States would have to do, and what it eventually did, to set in motion the gradual replacement of France in Indochina.
STEM was not the only organization to grate on French nerves. CIA officers also had a number of ideas on how to improve the French campaign against the Vietminh and were not shy about sharing them. Although the French tended in public to reject CIA advice—such as forming partisan groups to fight behind rebel lines—they often quietly implemented CIA recommendations. Despite their antipathy, by the end of 1952 Paris had agreed to host more CIA personnel in Indochina.85
Economic and military aid had a number of political consequences. The United States was subsidizing about one third of French costs in Indochina by 1952, and in July of that year the U.S. legation in Saigon was raised to embassy status. Heath presented his ambassadorial credentials to Bao Dai and Prime Minister Nguyen Van Tam, who had replaced Tran Van Huu in June 1952, and a Vietnamese embassy was established in Washington. Meanwhile, the French National Assembly and Council had passed the Indochina budget by overwhelming majorities in January 1952, but such enthusiasm rested on the assumption that France would share even more of its burden with the United States. On the American side, Acheson assured the French that Indochina was of “extreme importance” to the United States but that “it was a very difficult problem to resolve and the Americans did not know what to do yet”; this demonstrated the Truman administration’s willingness to continue its current efforts, as well as its reluctance to commit additional resources to Vietnam and its determination to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia during an election year. A side effect of U.S. aid was the realization by many Vietnamese in Saigon that the Americans could serve as a valuable counterweight to the French, especially considering obvious Franco-American divisions over how aid should be distributed and that American aid earmarked to fight communism seemed likely to increase over time.86
Despite an intensified political and economic commitment on the part of the United States, the French military effort in Indochina lost steam with General de Lattre’s sudden retirement and subsequent death. De Lattre’s death shocked and saddened the American public. American newspapers mourned him as the “French MacArthur,” noting that de Lattre had been a key figure in persuading the United States to support the French war effort.87 Without de Lattre, the Truman administration worried that France would not be able to regain the initiative in Indochina. Bitter battles along the southern fringe of the Red River delta forced further French evacuations and indicated that France might have to abandon the entire North, proving that American fears were well grounded.
European concerns also kept the Americans divided over how the United States should proceed in Asia. Acheson continued to advocate holding the line in Asia while concentrating on Europe. John Allison, assistant secretary for Far Eastern affairs, disagreed, noting that “as the struggle in Indochina continues the French will find increasingly compelling the choice between the support of the Indochinese operation and the support of French commitments to NATO.” He argued that the United States should bear in mind that a reduction in the Indochina operation was a reduction in the realities of men and material in an active theater of war; reduction in NATO commitments were, in fact, “paper reductions.” According to Allison, the problem was “so important and so complex as to require consideration at the highest possible level.”88 Both Allison and Ambassador Heath acknowledged the importance of the Indochina conflict in its own right rather than as an extension of the Cold War in Europe but feared that the American priority on European defense would always dominate Asian policy.
French authorities used concerns over French capabilities in Europe to push for more aid to Indochina.89 These efforts to pressure Washington once again had a considerable effect, leading the United States to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the French during the NATO council meetings at the end of February 1952. The United States promised to buy $200 million worth of military equipment for French use in Indochina to help France meet European defense obligations, indicating that the Truman administration was well aware Paris would not be able to carry out European and Indochina defense simultaneously. At a meeting of the NSC in early March 1952, Acheson asked senior NSC staff to conduct a major study of the priority of Indochina defense as compared to NATO defense, and what the United States was prepared to do to keep France in Indochina.90
American officials also began to target other problems that impeded allied unity. Soon-to-be-director of the State Department’s Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs Philip Bonsal focused on the psychological factor. If the Indochina effort was to be anything more than a “holding operation,” according to Bonsal, a “climate of confidence” needed to be created among Vietnamese, French, and Americans. The only way to convince the Vietnamese to shoulder their own problem lay in granting them independence. As yet, however, no one had “thought this through to the end.”91 The United States wanted to sustain the struggle against communism in Asia, but not at the expense of defense in Europe, hence the long-standing concern for building native forces. The trouble lay in persuading France to grant the amount of independence needed to make the scheme work. The effort to bolster France in both Indochina and Europe, neat in theory, would be more difficult to put into practice.
Following the devastating French military losses in North Vietnam, in early 1952 a chiefs of staff meeting took place to discuss common strategy in Indochina. American general Omar Bradley, British field marshal Sir William Slim, and French general Alphonse Juin agreed that the threat from the Tonkin border was significant and that the Americans should send air and naval reinforcements if necessary. Recommendations on inter-allied cooperation—including a free exchange of information, acceleration of aid to Indochina, a common system of navigational control in Southeast Asia, and measures against contraband—were approved and put into practice. An ad hoc committee under French general Paul Ely’s leadership, composed of French, American, British, Australian, and New Zealander officials, was also established to study the measures to be taken in the event of a Chinese attack on Indochina. For the French, American agreement to such a committee represented the long-sought U.S. commitment to Southeast Asian defense.92 Thus, despite de Lattre’s death, the French policy of urging a coordinated effort in Southeast Asia was finally paying dividends.93
American officials confirmed French beliefs that the United States had become more committed to Indochina’s defense. Robert Hoey, chief of Indochina affairs at the State Department, noted that the chiefs of staff meeting at Washington and the formation of the ad hoc committee marked an important turning point. For the first time, an inter-allied conference at the “highest military level recognized not only the capital importance of Indochina, but also the necessity of integrating a system of common defense” against Chinese aggression. The French believed that as a result of these two meetings, France was on track to achieving “a solid Anglo-American guarantee of the Tonkin border.” Further affirmations of such hopes could be seen in NSC 124/2, which called for the United States to contribute air and naval support for the defense of Indochina, to interdict Chinese lines of communication, and to blockade the Chinese coast. If those measures proved to be insufficient, NSC 124/2 further specified that the United States would take air and naval action in conjunction with France and Britain against all suitable military targets in China.94
Although the Truman administration had established a firm strategy regarding Chinese intervention in Indochina, the government’s overall approach to Asia was less resolute. In May 1952, Republican leader John Foster Dulles demanded a more “positive” and “dynamic” U.S. foreign policy. He was particularly concerned with Asia, arguing that the United States needed to “retake the initiative” in the Cold War. Dulles had been an early critic of the French war effort, accusing the French at a 1950 Council on Foreign Relations discussion of a “Maginot Line” mentality in their dealings with Indochina. The JCS also wanted a more offensive policy and worried that French sensitivity about NATO strength might hinder efforts in Indochina. The problem for American policy was not to keep the French indefinitely in Indochina, but to facilitate the inevitable transition from colonialism to independence in such a way that there was no opportunity for communism to flow into an intervening power vacuum. During a mid-May meeting with Truman, Acheson explained that the best possibility for handling the current situation in Indochina was to reattempt the buildup of the native army. Acheson also wanted a tripartite warning issued to China that the big three would react immediately to any aggression and that it would be impossible to confine that reaction to Indochina.95
Regular tripartite meetings from 1950 to 1953 were designed to iron out allied difficulties regarding Southeast Asian defense; however, in practice they usually highlighted allied disagreements and hesitations in establishing unified action. The two biggest French concerns regarding Indochina remained American financial and military aid and the problem of a coordinated strategy. A common theme throughout this period was French insistence that France might not have the resources to fund defense spending in Europe and Asia. Paris maintained that if it was to enter the EDC, it needed to have the same (or higher) force levels as the Germans. In order for this to occur, the Indochina situation and its resulting resource drain must be resolved. As French official Edgar Faure claimed, “Indochina [was] at the heart of the European problem.”96 The signing of the EDC treaty on May 27 by France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands marked another turning point; European defense would demand a heightened degree of political commitment in U.S. planning at precisely the moment when the Truman administration had begun to focus on Southeast Asia.97 From this point, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish European from Southeast Asian policy in U.S. national security planning. The muddle permeated strategic planning for the rest of the Truman administration and would also plague the Eisenhower administration.
A foreign ministers meeting among Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Schuman at the end of May 1952 emphasized the intermingling of European and Asian policy. One of the biggest French questions at the conference was whether Indochina was to be considered an international problem. The French asserted that despite the Truman-Pleven meetings in 1951 and de Lattre’s visit in September 1951, American views on the conflict remained obscure. During the meetings, the French once again attempted to create a common Southeast Asia military organization, but allied unity on this issue remained elusive; Acheson was opposed to a permanent organization, preferring a tight association with existing organizations.98 Moreover, how to build a viable Vietnamese national army also continued to be a top priority. Letourneau, whose duties as minister resident of Indochina were roughly equivalent to those of high commissioner, asserted that only through increased American aid would France be able to build Vietnamese national armies, which would allow for a continuation of the French effort in Europe. If American aid did not materialize, French officials threatened, France would have to slow down its effort in both Indochina and Europe.99
As Henri Bonnet observed, all the effort going into integrating the French, American, and British strategies would never pay off until the three governments agreed on the principles that would determine a common strategy in Asia.100 How could such an agreement be reached? According to Truman and Acheson, Paris needed to retake the offensive in the war. Implementing such a strategy proved difficult, as the most serious military crisis since the 1950 Cao Bang disasters occurred in the Black River area of northern Vietnam in late 1952. The largest French operation ever attempted, Operation Lorraine, quickly became bogged down in the face of stiff Vietminh resistance. The operation taxed French resources, leading to the now ubiquitous French demands for more American aid, which Acheson refused.101
The British, when looking back over the past few years, realized that Franco-Anglo-American thinking on Indochina had been dominated by consideration of what collective action should be taken in the event of open Chinese aggression in Indochina. By the end of 1952, the possibility of such aggression had become remote, according to the Foreign Office, and in the meantime, Paris and Washington had closed their eyes to the actual danger of the Vietminh. British officials had become convinced by Quai d’Orsay arguments that Indochina represented the biggest obstacle to European defense and that France had to obtain more financial and material aid from the incoming Eisenhower administration in order to secure both Europe and Indochina.102 London was particularly concerned that if a concrete policy toward Indochina failed, the West would end up fatally undermining NATO in Europe. Consequently, the Foreign Office suggested that if France could “face the facts” in Indochina and send more reinforcements, then the British, along with the Americans, could perhaps guarantee forces equal to the German forces proposed under the EDC for the next two years. The British even went so far as to suggest that they would agree to increased American military and economic aid to France for Indochina and a temporary diminution of aid to Europe, provided the French had a sound plan for “clearing up the Indochina situation.”103 In the end, London accepted the French argument that their ability to maintain European defense depended on the rise or fall of French fortunes in Indochina.
Fears of communist expansion, French skill at manipulating these fears, and periodic French claims that France might have to withdraw unilaterally from Indochina if it did not receive more aid, led to increased American support of the war effort in Vietnam during the last few years of the Truman administration. French documentation overwhelmingly points to Paris’s determination to secure an American commitment to the French war effort and to use the Atlantic alliance to retain colonial possessions. But French political leaders were not simply trying to manipulate or blackmail their counterparts in Washington; they were sincere in their belief that without American help they would not be able to continue a colonial but also anticommunist fight that was unappreciated by the United States.104 Additionally, American attempts to promote Vietnamese independence and a Vietnamese army, the search for a European defense alliance against the communist bloc, and the nature of the Western alliance itself all played a role in furthering the American commitment to France. The Truman administration constantly wavered on whether to pressure France for additional reforms in exchange for more American aid, but ultimately decided to provide the aid without the reforms, thus decreasing its leverage vis-à-vis Paris.
From 1950 to 1953, American economic, technical, and military assistance gradually increased as European and Southeast Asian defense became linked, and the United States began to view Indochina as an essential outpost in Southeast Asia. Although Washington still opposed a combined command arrangement for Southeast Asia, the French had succeeded in portraying Korea and Indochina as two separate fronts in the same war against communism. The American commitment to a noncommunist Vietnam had undoubtedly grown larger over the last years of Truman’s presidency, but at the end of 1952, American officials still sought a political solution—Vietnamese independence—instead of a military one. This would change during the Eisenhower administration.