AS A RESULT OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE, France now had a political end in sight to more than seven years of conflict in Vietnam. However, its American ally was still focused on a military victory. Intra-alliance politics played an important role in dictating how France and the United States proceeded in the months leading up to the Geneva Conference and at the conference itself, demonstrating the fragility of allied solidarity. Designed to settle the Korean and Indochina conflicts, Geneva would be the first major test not only of East-West but also of West-West negotiations on Asian issues since Stalin’s death. Ultimately, allied solidarity failed at Geneva as the accords left the door wide open for the United States and France to pursue separate policies in Vietnam.1
Shortly after Berlin, the Vietminh launched a major offensive against the French outpost at Dien Bien Phu. In keeping with Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai’s advice that “in order to achieve a victory in the diplomatic field” they should emulate the Chinese success on the eve of the Korean armistice by winning several battles in Vietnam, the Vietminh planned to strengthen their negotiating position at Geneva through a major military victory.2 Paris asked Washington to intervene unilaterally to lift the siege at Dien Bien Phu, but the Americans preferred to intervene multilaterally and suggested that a number of anticommunist countries join together against the Vietminh. The British wanted no part in a multilateral military intervention. They feared that such a move would provoke a Chinese invasion of Vietnam and escalate the conflict into a major war before negotiations could begin at Geneva. These differing goals prevented the French, Americans, and British from developing a coordinated policy to save the French military effort at Dien Bien Phu, resulting in the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7—the day before the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began.
The Geneva conferees had a number of agendas. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped to enhance international communist prestige through their support of China, the Vietminh, and peaceful coexistence while sowing seeds of discord among the Western allies. At the same time, Moscow also wanted to avoid further escalation of the Korean and Indochina conflicts that could lead to full-scale world war.3 China planned to make the most of its first official international conference, whereas the exhausted Vietminh wanted a cease-fire. The noncommunist nationalists in South Vietnam were skeptical of the conference, expecting that the French would yield to DRV demands. The French, British, and Americans all had different goals for the conference. The French were determined to settle the Indochina conflict at the negotiating table and were prepared to go to great lengths to achieve peace; the Americans wanted the French to keep fighting and avoid a settlement that gave away too much to the communists; and the British intended to resume their role as a world leader through their co-chairmanship of the conference with the Soviets and create a relaxation of tensions between East and West. From the beginning of the conference, western interests diverged widely, leaving the United States feeling increasingly isolated from its allies. Ultimately, the British and French agendas prevailed at Geneva, leading the United States to the fateful decision that it could secure a noncommunist Vietnam without France.
In early 1954, negotiations remained front and center as the Laniel government focused all of its attention on Geneva. A January visit to Vietnam by French minister for the Associated States Marc Jacquet, and one in February by the minister of defense, René Pleven, confirmed the overwhelming problems France faced in trying to continue the war. Their conclusion? Negotiate. The Laniel government recognized that France could not negotiate directly with the Vietminh because France needed to tie the Soviet Union and China to the accords as well. According to French deputy prime minister Paul Reynaud, China wanted peace in order to proceed with its domestic consolidation and hoped to receive concessions from the West for helping solve Asian problems. The Soviets also advocated peace because they feared the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. In addition, China and the USSR were worried about American intervention.4 Reynaud thus believed that the Chinese and Soviets would not hinder a peaceful resolution to the Indochina conflict. French foreign minister Georges Bidault was not so sure. He worried that the communists would drive a hard bargain at the negotiating table. Other top officials, including Pleven, believed that at the base of any French policy had to be the guarantee for Vietnamese independence. Pleven also advocated “Vietnamizing” the armed forces, and insisted that if the South Vietnamese did not make an effort to combat the North, France should consider itself free of obligations.5
While the Laniel government continued to debate the French approach to Geneva, American officials also scrambled to develop a policy, but one that involved military, not political, action. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) played a key role in formulating Indochina policy. According to the board, the key to the success of military operations continued to be well-trained, properly led indigenous forces effectively employed in combat operations against the communist forces. The eventual goal should be homogenous indigenous units with a native officer corps. One OCB report noted that the French had “insufficient success” in this area.6 According to another assessment of the situation by a special committee comprised of defense, state, CIA, and JCS members, the American and French “investment in dollars, casualties, and moral and political involvement would be fruitless” if the communists won. Therefore, the committee recommended that the United States, Britain, and France reach an agreement with respect to Indochina rejecting any compromise that would “cede all or part of Indochina to the communists.” The committee proceeded on the assumption that the status quo could be altered to result in military victory prior to discussions at Geneva. Failing this, Washington “should not entertain discussion of Indochina at Geneva or having entertained it, should ensure that no agreements were reached.” If France accepted a negotiated settlement, the Eisenhower administration should “decline to associate itself with such an agreement and find a means of continuing the struggle without the French.”7
Meanwhile, French military victory remained elusive. By the end of 1953 it had become clear to General Henri Navarre that his central objective of recovering the initiative in Tonkin’s Red River delta was failing. Consequently, he decided to draw the Vietminh into battle where superior firepower and control of the skies would ensure success. He took the calculated risk of garrisoning Dien Bien Phu with the best units and reserves from the Tonkin delta. According to Navarre, Vietminh leader Vo Nguyen Giap lacked the logistic capacity to concentrate enough troops to overwhelm the garrison. The French artillery and airpower would pulverize any artillery the Vietminh attempted to place on the heights overlooking the valley. Navarre was certain that these weapons, in combination with his tanks and machine guns, would decimate the Vietminh infantry battalions as they descended into the valley. He planned to keep the two airfields in the valley open during the battle to supply and reinforce the garrison. Dien Bien Phu thus ended the search for the classic, set-piece battle in which the French hoped to bring the destructive power of modern technology to bear on the elusive communist enemy. A battle at Dien Bien Phu, according to Navarre, would inflict a stunning defeat on the Vietminh and was the final element in the Navarre Plan.8
Navarre’s decision to give battle at Dien Bien Phu had the support of the French and American governments, although some of his subordinates remained unconvinced that Navarre’s strategy was sound. The battle of Dien Bien Phu began on March 13, 1954, and it soon became apparent that Navarre had completely miscalculated Giap’s intentions and capabilities. In the first five days of battle, the Vietminh overran the fortress’s three northern artillery bases, which rendered the airfield useless. The Vietminh had the superior numbers, guns, and strategy at Dien Bien Phu.
The worsening situation at Dien Bien Phu made a coordinated Franco-American policy toward Geneva even more difficult. The Eisenhower administration expected that Paris would ask the United States to intervene militarily, which the French did. In March, the Laniel government formally requested American military intervention to relieve the pressure on Dien Bien Phu. By shoring up Dien Bien Phu against Vietminh attacks, French leaders hoped to strengthen the French bargaining position at the Geneva Conference. The French demand provoked enormous debate within the United States and among the Western allies. President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles had already begun to explore the possibility of military intervention but exhibited a reluctance to proceed without Congressional and international support. They formulated a new American policy that contemplated military intervention under the mantle of “united action,” whereby Western allies, namely the United States, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand, would intervene multilaterally at Dien Bien Phu.9
As conditions at Dien Bien Phu grew increasingly ominous, the Laniel government sent General Paul Ely to Washington in a last-ditch effort to secure American military assistance. Ely would soon replace Commissioner General Maurice DeJean and Commander in Chief Henri Navarre by taking over both their jobs to become French high commissioner in Indochina. He was familiar with the situation in Vietnam because he had attended numerous tripartite talks in the early 1950s on the issue of a common Southeast Asian defense. Although Ely did receive guarantees for aircraft and aircraft technicians, help with the formation of the Vietnamese National Army, and fresh warnings to Beijing not to intervene, it was not until a private meeting at the end of Ely’s visit between Ely and Admiral Arthur Radford that the possibility of direct American intervention was dangled in front of the French general. At the meeting, Ely and Radford apparently discussed what would become known as Operation Vulture, an American B-29 bombing raid against Dien Bien Phu.10 Ely later claimed that Radford had promised the United States would intervene unilaterally, whereas Radford denied it. The meeting became more a series of complaints than a policy discussion. Ely accused the Americans of comporting themselves as though they wanted “to replace the French politically and economically in Indochina.” Radford retorted that France was moving “too slowly in these areas,” that the French were not keeping their engagements to keep the Americans informed, and that the French were “too sensitive about being replaced.”11
Eisenhower remained reluctant to involve the United States in the fighting and cautioned Dulles not to say anything to the French that the Eisenhower administration could not guarantee, but he did suggest that he would not “wholly exclude the possibility of a single strike, if it were almost certain this would produce decisive results.”12 Plans for Operation Vulture were discussed during a March NSC meeting. Two objectives for the immediate future emerged from the meeting: to create a framework for “possible united action to assist or possibly replace the French in Indochina,” and to consider possible courses of action “in case the French decided to withdraw from the area.” Complaining that France was incapable of making the hard decisions required of a great power, Dulles feared French weakness “would leave a vacuum in Asia, which the Soviets would fill if the United States did not act.”13
On March 29, 1954, in a speech entitled “The Threat of Red Asia” given at the Overseas Press Club of America, Dulles announced the need for united action in Indochina. This speech represented the Eisenhower administration’s first public announcement of an American plan for a coalition of western powers and their Asian allies against any further communist advance in Southeast Asia. Dulles’s speech was intended to warn the Soviet Union, China, and the Vietminh of the possibility of some form of multilateral action in Indochina.14 Although the French desired American military intervention to lift the siege at Dien Bien Phu, they had been counting on a unilateral effort, not a multilateral one. The Laniel government opposed internationalization of the forces fighting in Indochina, fearing that the Americans would take over the military decision making. The French thus approached the concept of united action cautiously.15 What the French did want was immediate relief for Dien Bien Phu in the form of an American bombing attack.
Throughout March and April, the Eisenhower administration never defined united action except in the broadest terms indicating some sort of military action. At his weekly press conference on March 31, Eisenhower failed to further clarify united action and left wide open the question of whether he would use U.S. force in Indochina. In the meantime, the concept of united action slowly evolved from a straightforward effort to arrange favorable conditions for an air strike to a longer-term effort to create a Southeast Asian alliance structure. The United States began to follow a two-track approach, enlisting support for intervention to be followed by an alliance. The Americans made it clear to the French that they would not intervene militarily in Indochina unless both France and Britain agreed to united action.
On April 10, Dulles went to Europe to secure western support for united action. Dulles had received a certain amount of encouragement from Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, but the French and British worried that united action would torpedo the discussions on Indochina that were to begin on May 8 at Geneva. The British resisted being committed to a common defense of Southeast Asia that could drag them into the Indochina War, and Paris did not want to internationalize the war through united action, fearing that Washington would gain control of the war effort. Worried about a breakdown in allied unity, Dulles sent a letter to Prime Minister Churchill outlining his concern that the possibility of the communists driving a wedge between the allies, given the state of mind in France, would be “infinitely greater” at Geneva than at Berlin.16
United action also faced problems at home, as Congress wanted an understanding with American allies before moving forward. Building on Congress’s hesitance, and in order to give his administration some time to explore all options, Eisenhower set forth three conditions to be met before he would approve American intervention: Congressional approval; international cooperation with active participation from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, including troops and, if possible, participating units from Thailand, the Philippines, and other states in the region; and a full political understanding with France that it would remain in the war to the end and that it would guarantee independence for the Associated States.17 After a controversial discussion, American officials during an April NSC meeting agreed to postpone for the time being any military action on Indochina until the United States determined how negotiations at Geneva were proceeding.18
Although still unsure about multilateral action, Eisenhower categorically opposed unilateral American intervention, which he believed would result in world condemnation of the United States as an imperialist power. In order to ensure victory, according to Eisenhower, the Associated States had to be granted complete independence and the United States should intervene only in concert with other western and Asian powers. In an interesting assessment of the French, Eisenhower wrote that the French government lacked the capability to make up its mind what to do in any given set of circumstances and that, since 1945, France had not been able to decide who it feared most—the Russians or the Germans. As a consequence, France’s policies in Europe had been nothing but “confusion, starts and stops; advances and retreats.” According to Eisenhower, France still wanted to be considered a world power but was entirely unready to make the sacrifices necessary to sustain such a position and was bound to be shown up, as in Indochina, as incapable of doing anything important by itself. Eisenhower also stated that the only hope for France was to produce a new and inspirational leader—by this he did “not mean one that is 6 feet 5 and who considers himself to be, by some miraculous biological and transmigrative process, the offspring of Clemenceau and Jeanne d’Arc.” Clearly Eisenhower did not see General Charles de Gaulle as the solution to current French problems.19 Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Alfred Gruenther, on whom Eisenhower depended as his most reliable link to the French leadership, agreed that French defeatism was “very bad,” especially Pleven’s attitude, and that Bidault was also “very wobbly.”20
Further undermining both unilateral and united action was Matthew B. Ridgway, who had become the army chief of staff in mid-1953. According to Ridgway, only a decisive defeat of China in a general war would accomplish American objectives of defeating the Vietminh. Ridgway considered the costs of achieving such a victory too high. If the United States did invade, it would leave the American army in a very bad position vis-à-vis Russia. Even intervention limited to Vietnam would constitute a dangerous diversion of limited U.S. military capabilities and would commit armed forces in a “non-decisive theater” to the attainment of “non-decisive local objectives.” In a memorandum to Eisenhower, Ridgway claimed that a war limited to Indochina would at best result in stalemate as in Korea. Other American military officials, in particular General James Gavin, also expressed misgivings early on about united action and whether France would find U.S. requirements politically acceptable.21
Although Eisenhower and Dulles appeared to alternately embrace and reject united action in a series of speeches and pronouncements throughout the spring, in the end, British and Congressional opposition prevented such action. British concerns about public support of a multilateral force in Indochina, as well as London’s determination to await the outcome of Geneva, resulted in London’s refusal to condone united action. Dulles and Eisenhower castigated Britain, with Eisenhower at one point going so far as to suggest sending a note to Churchill positing that “the Churchill Government was really promoting a second Munich.” London feared harming the Anglo-American relationship but was more concerned about becoming involved in a military action that could turn into a world war. Foreign Secretary Eden’s statements had been deliberately vague, but by mid-April the British had clarified their position. They would not support united action.22
Congress also played a vital role in ensuring the rejection of military intervention. When, in early April, Dulles and Radford met with members of Congress, they decided against Congressional action until U.S. allies were on board. An extended debate took place in the Senate a few days later, and members again expressed their opposition to unilateral U.S. involvement, leading Eisenhower to reassure members that American combat troops would not be introduced except as part of a coalition. Senator William Knowland, in particular, opposed any Congressional resolution giving the president more power.
Eisenhower and Dulles had agreed to proceed with military intervention without British cooperation if Congress would provide a resolution granting the president “discretionary authority” in Indochina.23 Although there were a number of drafts of the resolution, the final draft read as follows: “The President is authorized to employ Naval and Air forces of the United States to assist friendly governments of Asia to maintain their authority as against subversive and revolutionary efforts fomented by Communist regimes, provided such aid is requested by the governments concerned. This shall not be deemed to be a declaration of war and the authority hereby given shall be terminated on June 30, 1955, unless extended.”24 The resolution was a daring move on Eisenhower and Dulles’s part as it would have opened the door for unlimited naval and air intervention in Vietnam. In addition, six divisions of marines, each twenty thousand strong, could have been used in such an operation.
Knowland informed Dulles and Eisenhower that the draft of potential discretionary authority they had in mind would not be endorsed by Congress and that both the Democratic and the Republican leadership in Congress felt that the United States should not intervene unilaterally but should only intervene in the event that U.S. allies would as well. Knowland also insisted that the French guarantee immediate independence for Indochina. American allies were not prepared to accede to the first Congressional requirement and the French were not willing to compromise on the other.25 Congress thus remained the biggest domestic obstacle against united action. Most Congressional members were willing to increase American participation in Indochina providing the executive branch did not gain predominant control, but they drew the line at military intervention under presidential discretionary authority. Both Dulles and Eisenhower complained that Congress had “hamstrung” them by refusing to give the president discretionary authority.26
Other forms of military intervention were also on the table. In mid-April, Dulles and Bidault met to discuss options. Bidault came away from the meeting convinced that Dulles had offered him two nuclear bombs to use at Dien Bien Phu. French officials stated that Bidault had been almost incoherent at the time, and Dulles denied making the offer.27
Despite British and Congressional stonewalling, as well as increasing French incoherence, the Eisenhower administration considered united action well after the Geneva Conference was underway. Dulles kept Ambassador Douglas Dillon and Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith informed about the possible internationalization of the war, stating that France had only two choices: American intervention or capitulation. He asserted that “intervention might involve consequences of utmost gravity.” The reactions of the communist bloc could not be predicted. Also, if it became necessary to proceed without active United Kingdom participation, the implications would be “extremely serious and far-reaching.”28 Dulles thus kept united action alive; he urged Dillon and Smith to discuss military plans orally with Laniel, but cautioned them against leaving anything in writing. In the meantime, the French clearly wanted to end the conflict at a diplomatic conference rather than on the battlefield. French ambassador Henri Bonnet recognized that American willingness to work toward a negotiated settlement at Geneva was absolutely vital to French success but doubted the Americans would cooperate since they believed “Geneva could only result in communist advances.” According to Bonnet, the French should “endorse” united action only if the communists intensified the conflict as the conference proceeded. Bonnet thought it unlikely that the communists would jeopardize their chances at Geneva by starting an offensive. Thus, on the eve of the Indochina talks at Geneva, the Americans and French continued to discuss the possibilities for direct American military intervention, but the American refusal to intervene unilaterally and Congressional and allied opposition to united action precluded a military solution to the French dilemma.29
In assessing American policy toward united action, it seems likely that Eisenhower declined military intervention because of France’s refusal to meet conditions rather than any particular aversion to the use of force against the Vietminh. According to Eisenhower, he “had been unable to obtain the conditions under which the United States could properly intervene to protect its own interests.”30 Eisenhower viewed the French as frantic in their desire to be thought of as a great power, to the extent that it was “beneath their dignity” to accept help in the conflict. Eisenhower claimed that he had tried to create a political climate among the interested powers that would make it politically feasible for the United States to intervene.31 In addition, Eisenhower did attempt to coax Congress to pass a resolution giving the president discretionary authority in Indochina even after the British had declined to participate in united action. He sought a blank check from Congress for united action, urged the French to continue the struggle, asked Churchill and Eden to reconsider their stance against united action, and, finally, was willing to move ahead without British participation.32 Thus, the evidence suggests that Eisenhower did not use united action as a tactical ploy to bring about greater communist concessions at Geneva. The French, rather than the Americans, were more interested in using the possibility of American intervention as a trump card in their negotiations at Geneva, and complained bitterly whenever high-ranking American officials suggested that such intervention was no longer an option. Dulles, more so than Eisenhower, was committed to united action and willing to escalate the conflict, but in the end British and Congressional pressure forced him to set aside united action as a strategy to keep the war going.33 Dulles, on June 8, and Eisenhower, two days later, announced that they would not ask Congress for additional authority for U.S. direct intervention in Vietnam.
French morale crumbled with the major military and psychological defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954, the day before the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began. French military leaders had been convinced that they would crush the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu, thereby establishing a strong negotiating position at Geneva. Their plan backfired when the Vietminh launched their devastating attack, eventually forcing a French surrender. Bidault was “much discouraged” as he did not see any way to avoid an outright French military defeat. When looking at the Vietminh decision to take the offensive at Dien Bien Phu, French officials concluded that the Vietminh were well aware the Soviet Union and China might use the upcoming Geneva conference for their own ends. The Vietminh had thus tried to reach a direct accord with the French before April 26. But after Franco-American collaboration increased with Ely’s trip to the United States and the provision of more American supplies, the Vietminh realized they would not be able to negotiate directly and were worried that South Vietnamese leader Pham Buu Loc might conclude a favorable treaty in Paris that would grant Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam complete independence. For that reason, the Vietminh recognized that a victory at Dien Bien Phu was a necessity.34
What can we conclude from the failed allied effort at Dien Bien Phu? For the French government, military leaders, and public, Dien Bien Phu epitomized the hopelessness of the war. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted to continue plans for an international military effort to salvage Dien Bien Phu as the conference opened. Both Paris and London stood firm in their refusal to consider such an effort until prospects for peace had been fully explored. Ultimately, Dien Bien Phu represented an enormous symbolic victory for the Vietminh; it took what remained of the fight out of the French and consequently dashed American hopes for a continued French war effort in Indochina, convincing the Eisenhower administration that the United States would have to halt the communist advance in Indochina on its own. Washington chose to keep its distance from the proceedings, replacing Dulles with Smith as the Indochina phase began.35 Although the Eisenhower administration exercised some restraint against a complete rupture with France, recognizing that an openly divided western presence at Geneva would only strengthen the communist position, American officials at all levels were beginning to conclude that the best way to achieve a noncommunist Vietnam was to remove the colonial element—that is to say France—and start over.
The Americans were worried. As the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began, collective action among the Western allies at this point looked difficult indeed. Dulles hoped that the French delegation would not agree at Geneva to terms that the Eisenhower administration felt involved “virtual abandonment of [the] area to communist forces.” “Certainly,” according to Dulles, American officials “should have full opportunity to know what was going on and have timely opportunity to express our views, and if they are ignored, publicly to disassociate ourselves.” Dulles also continued to keep the idea of united action alive, but downplayed his interest in it by insisting that the Eisenhower administration refused “to intervene purely as part of a white western coalition which is shunned by all Asian states.”36 As he watched from Washington, Dulles feared the worst at Geneva.
Dulles’s concerns were well warranted as the French committed themselves wholeheartedly to a political solution. Paris had developed two tactics for pursuing negotiations. Laniel and the Quai favored negotiating with the Soviets and Chinese, while Pleven advocated negotiating directly with the Vietminh. Eventually, French negotiators would pursue both options. In assessing their Russian and Chinese adversaries, the French adopted the position that Moscow did not want war, did not control China, and feared that China, by engaging in imprudent actions, could launch a world conflict. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s earlier concessions at Berlin to bring about the Geneva Conference, and Moscow’s abandonment of a conference dedicated to resolving all Asian problems, led the French to believe that the Soviets would cooperate on a peaceful settlement to the Indochina conflict. With respect to Chinese policy, the French assumed that China feared the substitution of the United States for France in Indochina and needed material and equipment on a long-term scale to modernize its economy and consolidate its regime. Therefore, China would also cooperate at Geneva.37
Regarding French policy toward the Vietminh, there were three possibilities according to Bidault. Paris could withdraw completely, which would be unacceptable to the South Vietnamese. Tonkin could become an independent state in Vietminh hands, but such a solution would need to be negotiated with the Chinese and imposed on the Vietminh. Or, the country could be partitioned. This last solution was the best compromise, Bidault felt, even though the Americans would be annoyed—Bidault had given them formal assurances that France would not accept a division of Vietnamese territory.38 Other Quai officials concurred, noting that any classic political solution, such as a coalition government between Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh or popular consultations, would be advantageous for the Vietminh. Dividing the country in two would be the least hurtful to French interests; but it was essential that such a solution appeared to come about “not as a result of a French initiative, but as a consequence of the armistice imposed by the circumstances.”39 Although France had publicly denied that it advocated partition, in private circles French officials recognized that partition might be the best compromise that Paris could expect. The British also viewed a division of Vietnam as the best solution.
British and French actions at Geneva demonstrated the limits of American influence in a region where Europeans held substantial interests. Paris and London’s determination to negotiate had prevented the United States from organizing a coalition to intervene militarily in Vietnam, thus denying the Eisenhower administration the internationalization of the war it had long sought. The British and French were much more interested than the Americans in reaching a modus vivendi with the Soviets and Chinese, and they planned to work for an implicit spheres of influence agreement. Paris and London were determined to prevent the outbreak of a regional war that would divert resources into a secondary theater of combat.40
The United States had other plans, and embarked on a series of actions that could be construed as attempts to sabotage the conference. The French were incensed by Dulles’s May 11 speech in which he stated that Southeast Asia could be held “without Indochina.” According to Ely, who was shocked by the speech, “rarely did a great power change its tune so quickly, from insisting on united action to preserve Indochina, to announcing that Indochina was not indispensable to Southeast Asia.” Ely believed that France had been “deceived” by the United States and would subsequently have to rethink its negotiating position at Geneva.41 It is difficult to arrive at any other conclusion but that Dulles was deliberately trying to undermine the French position at Geneva by taking away the threat of American intervention in case communist demands were unacceptable. Dulles later rectified his comments, but this did little to calm French suspicions.
Following the May 11 speech, other American actions indicated to the French that the United States was reconsidering its agreement to the Geneva Conference. Many American officials who visited the Far East did not stop in Indochina at that time, and American declarations on Geneva were uncertain, contradictory, and conditional, giving the French the impression that the United States was willing to accept the loss of Indochina. Moreover, the Americans once again wanted to bring Indochina before the UN, which French officials vehemently opposed, fearing such action would “wreck the Geneva negotiations.” The British also rejected this stratagem, seeing it as a cover for future American intervention in Indochina. Paris and London worried that an appeal to the UN would cause the Soviets to become more difficult, just when they had eased up slightly in Geneva.42 Dulles noted at an NSC meeting that an appeal for UN observers made by the Thai government (at the behest of the United States) had made some progress, “despite obstacles placed in its way by the British and French,” to whom it had been necessary to present a virtual ultimatum. At least there had been first steps toward “getting the UN involved in Southeast Asia,” according to Dulles.43 These American actions indicate that the United States at least tested the waters to see how easy it would be to sabotage Geneva.
From the French viewpoint, the Americans appeared to be trying to torpedo the conference. Paris believed that if Geneva failed, the United States would make plans to intervene militarily. Maurice DeJean, commissioner general for the Associated States, had become suspicious that the Americans were using their recent declarations about the unimportance of Indochina as a tactic to ensure American control of Indochina when Geneva failed.44
French suspicions were at least partially justified. In an attempt to bring back a modified form of united action, Dulles indicated that the United States would internationalize the war or ask for UN intervention if an acceptable solution at Geneva was not reached. In a clear example of contingency planning, Dillon notified the Laniel government in mid-May of seven conditions the United States would require before Eisenhower asked Congress for authority to use American armed forces in the war. High-level Franco-American talks followed, at which Laniel informed Dillon that the French had agreed to most of the conditions. Washington and Paris thus proceeded with extensive contingency planning in the event of Geneva’s failure. According to Bonnet, if the Soviets and Chinese did not settle, there was a real possibility that there would be an unleashing of war in Asia and that the Americans would provide military support.45
French officials were becoming increasingly convinced that any American intervention would be disastrous and that France should reach a peaceful resolution as quickly as possible. But if Geneva failed, according to DeJean, it was preferable to have American intervention than to have a direct accord with the Vietminh with no international guarantee. Indochina represented “the future of the French Union, France’s world position, and American friendship with all that it signified, particularly with regard to France’s position in Europe,” since France was incapable of defending itself against Russian imperialism. DeJean was worried that the loss of Indochina would result in a complete revision of American policy that would then favor Germany. The result would be German rather than Soviet hegemony in Europe. Bidault also thought France needed to indicate that it would continue the fight if necessary. Franco-American collaboration, notably American training of the Vietnamese armed forces, would result in an increase of American materials and aid in establishing an infrastructure in the South, according to Bidault.46 Bidault thus returned to Paris from Geneva at the end of May for one purpose—“to get mad and raise hell.” This tactic apparently worked, as the French government decided to stand fast at Geneva and send reinforcements to Indochina.47
Although by late May it looked as though the conference had stalled, with neither side appearing willing to compromise, secret talks between French military representatives and the Vietminh leadership had already begun. These talks were a result of Eden and Zhou Enlai’s encouragement and French internal debates on how to proceed with the conference. Bidault and Laniel had planned on a cease-fire with pockets of regroupment—the so-called leopard skin strategy—instead of vast territorial zones. Vietminh representative Pham Van Dong brought up the idea of a readjustment of zones, which left the door open to a division of the country. But Bidault, DeJean, and Navarre all insisted on the leopard skin strategy. Thus chief French representative Brigadier General Henri Delteil and chief DRV representative Vice Minister of Defense Ta Quang Buu, along with their seconds, Colonels Michel de Brébisson and Ha Van Lau, met secretly to discuss cease-fire arrangements, as directed by Chauvel but bypassing Bidault. Brébisson and Lau had already been working together since mid-May to settle the evacuation of the wounded at Dien Bien Phu. It was at a June 10 secret meeting that the Vietminh agreed for the first time to divide Vietnam temporarily, but with no indication as to how or when elections to reunify the country would be held.
Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this concession came from the DRV’s fear of the consequences of two treaties signed between the French and the State of Vietnam on June 4. The two treaties, initialed by Laniel and Prime Minister Buu Loc, but not signed by Bao Dai or French president René Coty, recognized the State of Vietnam as a “fully independent and sovereign state invested with all the competence recognized by international law.” Moreover, the treaties stated that the French and Vietnamese would associate freely within the French Union and mutually agree to the establishment of defense and foreign relations conventions on the basis of complete equality. Not only did the treaties finally grant Vietnamese independence, but they also paved the way for the Americans to provide direct aid to the State of Vietnam.48 Although Dulles had publicly insisted on Vietnamese independence, privately he was not so sure, commenting to Eisenhower that Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were not ready for complete independence. It would be, in his words, “like putting a baby in a cage of hungry lions. The baby would be rapidly devoured.”49
As a result of the June treaties, both combatants began to explore the idea of a temporary partition of Vietnam. Despite promises to Bao Dai, Buu Loc, and the Americans about not partitioning the country, that is precisely what the French began to do. In mid-June, during the secret negotiations—which excluded representatives from the State of Vietnam—the Vietminh indicated that they wanted an end to the war, two zones, elections in six months, and negotiations directly with the French, not with the Vietnamese State. In addition, Tonkin was non-negotiable. Delteil and Brébisson both noted in talks with Bidault in mid-June that the division was a temporary military partitioning to separate combatants and allow peace to return, not a political one à la Korea. The French also learned from Buu Loc that the Vietminh were most concerned with American intervention and increasing Chinese influence over DRV affairs. The Vietminh thus were willing to compromise, even allowing Bao Dai to come back as chief of state. The priority was to avoid U.S. intervention.50 French diplomat Jean Sainteny confirmed these views, claiming that the decision to send Pham Van Dong to Geneva was an indication of Hanoi’s seriousness in ending the war, and that the Vietminh’s “greatest fear” was U.S. intervention and “greatest impetus” was Chinese pressure. The French were correct—the DRV representatives were sincere. The Americans, however, had gotten many things wrong, not least of which was communist earnestness in negotiating an end to the conflict in Indochina.51
Or had they? Since the Americans were kept apprised of the secret talks and allowed them to go forward, it is worth speculating why they made no effort to ensure the State of Vietnam’s representation. If one subscribes to conspiracy theories, it is possible to conclude that the Eisenhower administration did nothing to stop negotiations at the time to preserve greater liberty of action later. In other words, if Bao Dai’s government did not take part in the eventual Franco-Vietminh agreement, even though the State of Vietnam had been recognized as an independent country by the French, then Saigon and Washington would be on somewhat tenable legal ground in claiming that they were not bound by the agreements. But this possibility must rest in the speculative realm until further evidence surfaces that the Americans were already pursuing a post-Geneva policy that would not include Franco-American cooperation.
As negotiations at Geneva still appeared stalled, American officials asked themselves how they had gotten into such a position. The answer, for many, centered on the EDC-Indochina connection established so many months ago. U.S. officials were well aware that the American obsession with the EDC had delayed or inhibited its Indochina policy. American insistence on the EDC gave the French an additional argument for a policy of liquidating the war in Indochina—namely that they must save their limited military strength in order to outweigh the expected German forces in the EDC. Moreover, this EDC factor appeared to have had an important effect in precipitating the conference at a time when the weak French position in Indochina would reduce the bargaining power of the anticommunist side. Since at least 1952, the “failure to implement U.S. policy in Indochina” with respect to the Associated States’ independence could in large part be attributed to the “desire to secure French ratification of the EDC” and to the consequent hesitancy to irritate French “sensibilities” by pressuring the French to make significant concessions to the national inspirations of the peoples of Indochina.52 State Department officials eventually recognized the dangers of letting one policy dominate all others, and saw that the EDC had obstructed American policy in Indochina. But as the EDC had become Eisenhower and Dulles’s personal priority, State Department officials could not speak out against it, and U.S. policy remained unaltered.
According to Dillon, Indochina had, by spring 1954, replaced the EDC as the biggest French concern; French hopes centered on the Geneva Conference as a means to achieve a political solution to the Indochina War, but Dulles continued to urge Dillon to keep the pressure on the French to ratify the EDC. A frustrated Dillon sent a message to Dulles indicating his concern. He noted that, although pro-EDC members of the French government originally saw “no connection between EDC and Geneva,” the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the present military crisis in Indochina had “drastically changed” the situation. The EDC was, for the most part, “inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-U.S. negotiations regarding united action in Indochina.” Although there was no “direct logical connection” between the two, the way in which “we handle present Indochina negotiations with France is bound to have great effect on our friends in French Government who are supporting EDC.”53
No “direct logical connection” existed between the EDC and Indochina issues; the Americans had invented one for themselves. Dillon recognized that only the conclusion of Franco-American negotiations on Indochina would push the EDC to a vote with a reasonable chance of success. A spirit of alliance between the two countries could then be renewed. Dillon argued against exerting more pressure on the French, which he feared would greatly strengthen the position of those deputies in the French National Assembly who favored peace in Indochina at any price. Dillon did convince Dulles to delay sending an official letter to the Laniel government warning that unless France ratified the EDC treaty immediately, the United States and Britain would consider practical steps needed to integrate West Germany without France.54 Still, Dillon’s efforts to salvage the situation ultimately proved unsuccessful. In the Cold War climate, few American officials challenged the secretary of state’s conception of the EDC as the best solution to the German problem as well as the best line of defense against the Soviet bloc. Thus, Dulles’s insistence on the EDC led to a series of events that American officials had tried to avoid.
The first of these was the collapse of the Laniel government on June 12. According to Laniel, his government fell because of American pressure to ratify the EDC. American attempts to keep a distance between the United States and the results of the Geneva Conference probably further weakened Laniel’s position. Laniel later wrote in his memoirs that it would be his “policy toward Europe rather than Indochina” that would topple his government. Laniel knew that in their desire to avoid ratification of the EDC treaty, elements of his majority coalition, although supporters of his policies in Asia, were going to “abandon” him and would not hesitate to use the tragic events in Indochina to overturn his government, “whatever the cost.” The fall of Dien Bien Phu had been the occasion, but not the true cause, of his removal. “Harassed on Indochina,” he was “really overthrown on the European issue.”55 Attempting to force the Laniel government to deal with the EDC and Indochina at the same time had backfired, as Radical Socialist deputy Pierre Mendès France took over the government. Mendès France had been a vocal opponent of the war for months, and Eisenhower and Dulles distrusted him because of his supposed stance against the EDC and his determination to find a political solution to the Indochina conflict. Upon taking office, Mendès France swore that he would resolve the Indochina conflict within thirty days, or resign.56
Despite the secret Franco-Vietminh talks, deadlock on almost all major issues led Eden to leave the conference in mid-June, and Smith left for Washington a few days later. Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Reading and Foreign Service officer U. Alexis Johnson took their places. Before his departure, Smith notified chief French delegates Jean Chauvel and Marc Jacquet that the option of American intervention no longer existed, since it seemed the French had wanted it primarily as a negotiating point.57 The British and Americans thus reduced their presence at the conference, and French policy making appeared to be falling apart as Quai officials squabbled amongst themselves.58
The already harassed French leadership became exasperated with a new Anglo-American initiative. In an attempt to repair Anglo-American relations that had been damaged over the united action fiasco, the British and Americans agreed to an Anglo-American study group, which would coordinate the two countries’ responses to the outcome of the conference and lay down minimum conditions for a settlement. The United States and Britain came up with a seven-point communiqué necessary for their agreement to respect the settlement: (1) preservation of the integrity and national independence of and removal of Vietminh troops from Laos and Cambodia; (2) preservation of at least half of Vietnam and, if possible, an enclave in the Red River delta; (3) no restrictions on the maintenance of stable and secure noncommunist regimes (including the right to import foreign advisers and weapons and to maintain adequate forces for internal security) in all three countries; (4) no political provisions that would risk the loss of the retained area to communist control; (5) no exclusion of the possibility of reunification by peaceful means; (6) peaceful transfer of refugees; and (7) an effective control mechanism. Mendès France eventually accepted the conditions. Although Washington had hoped to produce a definite agreement with London, Churchill and Eden had merely stated a hope that the French would not settle for anything less than the Anglo-American conditions.59
As of July 1, State Department officials were still advocating sending American troops to Indochina, arguing that its loss would be a terrible blow to U.S. prestige throughout the world. Dulles at this point remained unconvinced, believing that world opinion would condemn such a move.60 Despite his disgust with Mendès France’s promise of peace in Indochina, Dulles recognized that it would be “better for Franco-American relations if [we] don’t have to disassociate ourselves from the French under spectacular conditions.”61 The Americans continued to follow the conference proceedings without intervening directly. Paris was less than thrilled with the American claim to “respect the accords [at Geneva] if the terms were not too far from American conditions.” The French were convinced that the United States did not want success at Geneva and that if the conference failed, the Eisenhower administration would intervene militarily.62
The Americans also doubted their ally’s intentions. During the Geneva negotiations, American leaders, and Dulles in particular, concluded that Mendès France had negotiated a secret deal with Moscow. Dulles believed that Mendès France had promised to sabotage the EDC in exchange for Soviet pressure on the Vietminh at the Geneva Conference. Refusing to accept assurances that the French had not made this deal with the devil, Dulles believed that they had actually reached a point where they would rather abandon Indochina altogether than save it through American intervention. He mused that the United States would have to either force the French “into line” or else accept a division with France. Both courses of action involved the “gravest difficulty,” particularly in relation to the EDC.63
In numerous internal documents, Mendès France clearly stated that he did not meet with Molotov to discuss the German problem until after the end of the Geneva Conference. The Soviets did not have any acceptable propositions, according to the French prime minister, who found Molotov’s solutions “rather deceptive.” Mendès France added that “as I have already stated many times there was no deal at Geneva.” He did remark that “maybe it would be okay to let them [the Soviets] think [he] had agreed,” as there was no chance that a majority in the National Assembly would ratify the EDC.64 Smith also reassured Dulles that no under-the-table deals between Molotov and Mendès France existed, but Dulles remained skeptical long after the EDC’s eventual defeat.
Misperception played a key role in how the western powers negotiated at Geneva. Looking back, Mendès France indicated he had no idea how suspicious Eisenhower and Dulles were of him, especially since he had agreed to the seven Anglo-American conditions for a peaceful resolution and had assured the Americans that he would not discuss the EDC with Molotov until after the conference. Of course, when he also refused to discuss the EDC with Dulles during the conference, Dulles assumed the worst. Dulles and a number of other high-ranking American officials were already disposed to dislike Mendès France, in part because of all the anti-Mendès France letters that the Eisenhower administration had been receiving from more right-leaning figures in France.65
Dulles should have been more concerned about Franco-Sino negotiations as France had hoped to negotiate with China at Geneva, promising French “good offices” with respect to UN representation if China pressured the Vietminh to reach an honorable accord. The possibility of a Sino-Franco deal—UN representation of the PRC for peace in Indochina—rather than a Soviet-Franco agreement—the EDC’s demise for peace in Indochina—did not figure in American concerns.
Throughout the conference, Henri Bonnet played a key role in smoothing tensions between Dulles and Mendès France, constantly reassuring Dulles that the French government would uphold the Franco-American alliance.66 In turn, Paris expected Washington to respect the Geneva results. Dulles realized that any impression that the United States had intentionally blocked an Indochina settlement might damage the EDC, but he remained incapable of separating Asian from European policy. According to the Eisenhower administration, the United States had to go along with the Geneva Conference or face a complete loss of American influence in France, in relation both to the EDC and to Indochina. American interests would thus be best served, not by burying the Geneva Conference and beginning immediate military intervention, but by helping the French negotiate.67
As negotiations over the fate of Indochina intensified, Smith and Dillon attempted to soften Dulles’s alternately belligerent and conciliatory stance toward the French. They differed from Dulles in that they did not see the EDC as the only option regarding West Germany’s rearmament; nor did they believe the French could continue the fight in Indochina. This contrast in approach to European integration and to Indochina became apparent when Smith reassured French officials that the United States would give certain guarantees to the settlement reached at Geneva and confirmed that the United States would continue to aid France once negotiations concluded. He also stated that the outcome of the EDC would not affect the “collaboration” of the two governments in Indochina.68 Bonnet remarked that he had never “found an influential member of the American government more willing to help preserve the French Union.”69 Despite Dillon and Smith’s attempts to modify Dulles’s decisions, in the end Dulles was the one responsible for linking the EDC and Indochina and must bear the brunt of responsibility for the outcome at Geneva that he despised.
Once it became clear that the French and Vietminh were close to reaching a final agreement, Mendès France successfully coaxed Dulles into sending Smith back to the conference table for the last phase of talks. After his return, Smith and Molotov appeared to achieve an acceptable armistice for both sides, but Dulles forbade Smith to sign any declaration in concert with the Soviets. Consequently, the accords were signed by all the participants except the Americans and the State of Vietnam and went into effect on July 22. The main clauses of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities for Vietnam included provisional partitioning of the country at the seventeenth parallel, regrouping of French forces to the south and Vietminh forces to the north of the seventeenth parallel within three hundred days, and a ban on increasing any military material in either part of the country (although equipment that became obsolete could be replaced—a clause that would become increasingly important to the Americans). The three other key points were the creation of an international control commission composed of Indian, Canadian, and Polish delegates; the organization of elections to ensure unification of the country before July 20, 1956; and the prohibition of international military alliances for both sides.70 The agreement included six chapters, forty-seven articles, and an annex that delineated the boundaries of provisional assembly areas and the location of the temporary military demarcation line and demilitarized zone. The accords demonstrated the undersecretary of state’s point that “diplomacy has never been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be held on the battlefield.”71 Militarily, the French were incapable of winning the war, which meant they had to make major concessions during the Geneva negotiations, no matter how urgently the Americans insisted they should not.
In the end, Smith signed a separate American agreement not to obstruct the resolutions of the Geneva Conference as long as they did not interfere with American national security, which, by this point, had come to be defined very broadly. Thus, the United States was not bound to uphold the decisions made at Geneva the way other signatories were. Smith’s unilateral declaration at Geneva stated that the United States “will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb” the Geneva agreements, that it would “view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security,” and that the United States should “continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections, supervised by the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly.”72 And yet, the United States consistently undermined these points during the following years as it created an international military alliance (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization [SEATO]), brought in military personnel, and helped sabotage the 1956 elections.
As for Bao Dai and his representatives, they had remained adamantly opposed to partition, and this position did not change when Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Buu Loc as prime minister in June 1954. In fact, Diem’s independent nature manifested early on when he almost resigned after learning the terms of the cease-fire. Washington worried that Bao Dai and Diem would declare unilateral independence from the French Union or even come to a negotiated settlement with the DRV.73 The former action would have severely tested Franco-American relations, which were already on difficult footing. Instead, the chief negotiator for the South Vietnamese, Tran Van Do, under orders from Diem and Bao Dai, abstained from signing the final Geneva Accords and registered his protest against the Geneva Conference agreements. Bao Dai had suspected all along that France would betray him at Geneva. French actions, including a refusal to include his representatives in the secret Franco-Vietminh military talks, failure to keep Tran Van Do apprised of the evolving negotiations, and willingness to partition the country, confirmed Bao Dai’s suspicions.
After agonizing debates among the French, British, and Americans, what did the Geneva Conference actually achieve? Ultimately, the Geneva Accords did establish peace in Indochina, at least temporarily. Both China and the USSR exerted pressure on the North Vietnamese to compromise, with the result that the North did not capitalize on its military victories, settling for partition at the seventeenth parallel. This partition temporarily created the two political entities of South and North Vietnam. The Soviet Union had only limited interests in Southeast Asia and appeared to have pursued a conciliatory line toward France at the conference to encourage French rejection of the EDC. China sought to enhance its international prestige and avoid American intervention. Bao Dai and Diem decried the accords, protesting that they had not signed them and would not adhere to them. The major issue of reunification was left deliberately vague, and the accords themselves were so ambiguous that they could be interpreted in a number of ways. The French were relieved because peace in Indochina meant that France could finally turn its attention to other issues, such as European defense. The Americans were decidedly less enthusiastic but now had time to build up noncommunist forces in South Vietnam. The British congratulated themselves that a full-scale war over Indochina had been prevented. The French and British saw the accords as an imperfect but acceptable solution to a difficult problem, but for the Eisenhower administration, “the net effect of the Geneva Conference and of subsequent developments had been to advance the communist position in Asia.”74 In arriving at a truce in Indochina, allied pressure had been critical: it led the Eisenhower administration to acquiesce in negotiations that it did not desire or think prudent. The allies therefore deserve most of the credit for opening the door to negotiations and bringing about a solution in Indochina in spite of Washington’s wishes.
In examining the Geneva Conference, one point becomes clear: the western leaders spent more time negotiating among themselves than with their communist rivals. This phenomenon had become the order of the day. By the time the West arrived at a compromise policy, events had usually overtaken Paris, London, and Washington’s decisions. In addition, the West spent much time and effort in trying to smooth over internal disagreements. After the conference, both French and American leaders proclaimed their commitment to a common policy in Indochina, but the end result of conflict within the alliance was that the West had difficulty in presenting a united front to the communist bloc.
The end of the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, brought a political settlement of the First Indochina War and relief for the French. Publicly the Eisenhower administration stated that it was satisfied with Geneva, but privately American officials worried that U.S. prestige had “suffered greatly” and that to regain it the United States would have to “disassociate itself” from France in Indochina.75 As for the EDC, Bonnet and Mendès France consistently reiterated throughout the summer that the French National Assembly would refuse to ratify it. Mendès France made it clear that he did not have a majority in the National Assembly even with his stature enhanced by the peaceful resolution of the Indochina conflict. Bonnet insisted that the United States, and Dulles in particular, accept this fact.76 Despite numerous warnings, the Eisenhower administration was shocked by the French National Assembly’s defeat of the EDC on August 30, 1954, by a vote of 319 to 264. French fears of German resurgence, aversion to American strong-arm tactics, and belief that the communist threat on the European continent had diminished combined to precipitate the EDC’s defeat. And yet Washington saw this vote as a French betrayal of allied unity.
Significant fallout from Geneva occurred on many fronts, from the petty to the critical. Mendès France was annoyed when Dulles bypassed Paris on his trip to London and Bonn at the end of September, viewing Dulles’s act as a deliberate weakening of his influence when he needed all the strength he could muster. The French press was also critical; Aurore regretted that “American diplomacy has once more shown a remarkable lack of psychology” in its dealings with other nations.77 More significantly, Washington continued to criticize Paris’s failure to ratify the EDC and moved quickly to admit Germany into NATO. The French had little choice but to accept this move because of the Eisenhower administration’s fury over the EDC’s demise, its refusal to wait any longer for West Germany’s integration into the Western alliance, and its threat to cut off all aid to Indochina.78 If the United States had insisted on West Germany’s integration into NATO or established a bilateral agreement with West Germany before Geneva, would the reduced tensions over western European security have allowed for a political solution in Asia acceptable to the Americans? Although there is no conclusive answer, the evidence suggests that perhaps subsequent American intervention in Indochina would have taken a different path.
Now that the EDC-Indochina link had been broken, what did this severing mean for future American involvement in Vietnam? Dulles’s linkage of the EDC and Indochina from 1953 to 1954 had already increased Washington’s financial and political commitment to a noncommunist South Vietnam. American insistence and French delays on the EDC’s ratification had created immense frustration on both sides of the Atlantic that would reverberate in later years. Franco-American mutual distrust increased, with the result that both sides were less willing to work together in Vietnam after Geneva. The EDC’s failure also prompted the United States to disassociate itself from French policy in Europe, leading a number of Americans to think they could just as easily pursue their own course in Vietnam. The French were well aware that the EDC’s failure had jeopardized their liberty of action in Asia, recognizing that in order to stay a great power, France had to remain in the Far East and Indochina and thus had to create a policy that the Americans would support.79
The U.S. diplomatic setback at Geneva also accelerated momentum toward greater American involvement in Vietnam.80 By the end of the Geneva Conference, Eisenhower and Dulles seriously considered pushing France out of Indochina completely so the United States could rebuild from the foundations. They realized that the French presence was still needed, but the balance of power between the French and Americans was changing rapidly and would soon weigh in the Americans’ favor. According to a post-Geneva NSC briefing, the main French effort was to maintain a “presence” in the South to the “detriment of a more effective and popular Vietnamese government” that would be able to “rally nationwide support.”81 Eisenhower and Dulles thus had three options: pull out of Indochina, increase American involvement, or maintain the status quo. They chose to increase American involvement by demanding a larger U.S. role in training troops and overall strategic planning. These efforts were meant to substitute French control in Vietnam with greater Vietnamese independence and American informal influence. Washington wanted to maintain a French military presence, but as France withdrew politically the United States would take France’s place as the major western power in Southeast Asia.
In a precursor of moves to come, in late May Dulles sent a cable to Dillon urging contingency planning. Dulles wanted the Associated States to play a role in the programming of American aid and to receive military aid directly. Americans in Saigon, while also recommending more direct intervention, recognized the importance of working with the French. The French military and STEM had begun to coordinate more effectively on public works projects in 1953 and 1954, and economic aid, health, sanitation, and agricultural practices would suffer if Franco-American collaboration broke down. Counselor Minister Robert McClintock in Saigon advocated cooperation with the French but argued that French commanders should be subordinated to American strategy. McClintock believed development of the Vietnamese National Army should be the number one American military objective. The United States should directly train troops, the chief of MAAG should have authority to organize such training, and MAAG should be increased to accommodate its new role. The United States also needed to abrogate the existing pentalateral agreement between the Associated States, France, and the United States by which aid was funneled through the French. In late June, ninety additional personnel were assigned to MAAG and American officials began work on a system to provide direct aid to South Vietnam.82
The French were also thinking ahead. Mendès France sent a letter to the head of the French delegation at Geneva emphasizing the importance of providing an aid program to the South Vietnamese. Attempting to deflect the Eisenhower administration’s unilateral move toward direct aid, he suggested the three western powers should make a public announcement about their intention to help Diem’s government and then bring research groups together to figure out how to implement such a plan. He suggested they could work something out either through a tripartite agreement or through the UN. He also indicated his willingness to work on a multilateral program of assistance to Dillon a few days later.83 The French were also considering how to avoid increased American involvement. French and South Vietnamese representatives agreed in a secret annex at Geneva that the State of Vietnam would not place any facilities at the disposal of foreign armed forces without the acceptance of the French government; nor would they allow increased personnel and materials for the training of Vietnamese forces without first consulting the French. Clearly, French officials were preparing for an American attempt to bypass them in the South.84
Both Paris and Washington made at least some attempts to analyze what had gone wrong in Vietnam. Perhaps C. D. Jackson said it best when he summed up the last few years of American involvement in Indochina as the “U.S.-Indochina Mess.” According to Jackson, U.S. decisions could be attributed to “wishful thinking, rosy intelligence, oversimplified geopolitical decisions, deliberate French bending of the facts, and unwillingness to retreat from previously taken policy decisions.” Jackson saw the “big black mark” against Eisenhower as his failure to give Indochina the continuity of thought that it rated. It kept reappearing before his mind as an endless series of irritating incidents, when either Robert Cutler or Arthur Radford or Walter Bedell Smith or Allen Dulles or John Foster Dulles came “rushing in with the latest bulletin and asking for a decision on a Navarre Plan or another $500 million, or the dispatch of six flying boxcars, or what have you.” The line to Eisenhower was always, “Well, things don’t look too hot right now, but I think if you will do just this one more thing everything will be all right,” followed by an invocation of the domino theory. But Jackson did believe that Eisenhower saw earlier, more clearly, consistently, and forcefully than anyone else the fatal weakness of the whole French situation, namely the political weakness, which was inevitably reflected in the fighting qualities of the Vietnamese soldiers. He worked harder than anyone to try to get the French to agree to U.S. training of Vietnamese troops. The Eisenhower administration was also frequently torn between conflicting intelligence reports from the embassy, MAAG, STEM, and special emissaries. John Foster Dulles realized the gravity of the situation and the importance of the area from the beginning. In fact, according to Jackson, he more even than the military kept stating that if Indochina went, all of Southeast Asia was gone. But Dulles also encountered strong State Department pressure to “play along with the French.”85
As for the French, Jackson believed “they were just being very French.” They guessed that if the United States had appropriated $800 million for Indochina aid in one year, if the United States felt “as strongly” about Southeast Asia as it apparently did, and if the United States was going to be as “diplomatically correct” as it always had been in the case of France, the policy to be pursued was to “siphon” as much out of America as possible, in the forlorn hope that the sheer weight of dollars and hardware would bring about the “needed miracle.” Jackson’s comments are yet another demonstration that American officials recognized the Franco-American relationship had dominated U.S. policy toward Indochina, but Jackson tended to blame State Department officials for urging the Eisenhower administration to continue “the American commitment to France.” What Jackson failed to understand was that, by refusing to break the link between the EDC and Indochina, Dulles was the real culprit in creating the “U.S.-Indochina Mess.”86
After Geneva, the blame game also began in France. According to Navarre in his bitter autobiography of the war, “it was Geneva and not Dien Bien Phu that signaled the defeat of France.” Navarre blamed Mendès France for selling out to the communists. National Assembly deputy Edouard Frédéric-Dupont claimed that if Laniel had still been in power, a Korea-type settlement would have occurred and elections would never have been agreed to. Frédéric-Dupont had served as minister for the Associated States (after Bidault had forced Marc Jacquet to resign from the position) and had attempted to alert officials in Paris of the secret Franco-Vietminh negotiations regarding the partitioning of Vietnam to try to save the Laniel government. Frédéric-Dupont was forced to resign after his attempt failed. Mendès France, in response to Navarre and Frédéric-Dupont’s attacks, noted that he had not given away any more than Laniel, and that the Vietminh had always insisted that any division of the country would be temporary.87 Neither the Vietminh nor the French could have suspected the fatal consequences of partitioning Vietnam, as the United States now had a pro-American South Vietnamese government, two years, and half a country to work with. Intensification of the war and the broadening of the conflict had only been averted at Geneva.88
The Eisenhower administration learned a number of lessons from what it considered the triple failures of united action, the Geneva Conference, and the EDC. Perhaps the most important was the need for a preexisting network of regional alliances to support U.S. activities in any given area of operations. Dulles consequently proceeded with discussions of a regional coalition that had begun during the crisis atmosphere of Dien Bien Phu. Indeed, according to NSC 5429, the “damage done” to the United States because of French “reverses” would have to be fixed through a Southeast Asia treaty organization (what came to be known as SEATO). Attendees at the Manila conference of September 1954 completed work on the organization, creating a regional multilateral defense system composed of the United States, France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. SEATO, which had strong Congressional support, was officially implemented on February 19, 1955, to deter communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam would be covered under the SEATO umbrella, despite French attempts to keep SEATO discussions separate from tripartite talks on Indochina.89
SEATO was thus, in many respects, a response to the perceived loss at Geneva. It was not as strong as NATO as it only obligated member states to “consult” with one another in the event of aggression, but it did serve as an American warning to Hanoi and Beijing that the United States was prepared to act if hostilities resumed. It appeared that the continual French plea from 1950 to 1953 for an allied Southeast Asia military organization had been answered. The only catch was that the Americans were running the show. The French had given SEATO a cool reception in the wake of what they considered American and British betrayal at Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, they had resisted moving forward with SEATO too quickly so as to avoid jeopardizing negotiations at Geneva and for fear of having to commit yet more French troops to another supranational organization they would not be able to control. The EDC debacle was, of course, still fresh in their memories, but it was also fresh for the Americans, who insisted on SEATO. Thus, not only had the Geneva Conference diminished the power of French colonialism, but it also accelerated the American transition toward closer alignment with the South Vietnamese. SEATO would become another weapon in the American arsenal for replacing French influence with an American one in Vietnam.
Until 1953, France and the United States had been drawn together by their mutual concerns in Europe and in Indochina, cemented by France’s dependence on American foreign aid. From early 1953 until the summer of 1954, Washington and Paris pursued different objectives, both in Indochina and in European defense policy. The Eisenhower administration sought a continuation of the French war effort and ratification of the EDC but obtained neither, seeming to have seriously misjudged the political prospects for both in France. French ratification of the EDC was highly unlikely by 1954 even without the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. As the Gaullists asked: Were the French to countenance a retreat from Southeast Asia and give up maintaining a national army in Europe? The disparity between French and American aims during this period raises serious doubts about the Eisenhower administration’s de facto policy of linking the EDC’s ratification to American aid for France. Although the Eisenhower administration never formally linked the two issues, both Paris and Washington recognized that a connection existed and successive French governments did not hesitate to exploit American insistence on the EDC.
The timing of increasing Franco-American disagreements is intriguing. As one American national intelligence estimate noted, “since the death of Stalin and the calling of the Geneva conference, the chief new element of Soviet policy was a heightened effort to convince non-Communist countries that Moscow and Beijing desired peaceful coexistence, and that U.S. policy was the only obstacle to a new era of peace in Asia.” According to the report, this new element conformed to the present worldwide communist tactics of “minimizing tensions and of exploiting methods” to divide the free world, and particularly to detach the United States from its allies.90 Indeed, throughout 1953 and 1954 the western powers spent at least as much time second-guessing each other’s intentions as they did Soviet plans. Paris and Washington pursued divergent policies after Stalin’s death, exactly as U.S. analysts had predicted. Stalin’s death, it seemed, had a profound influence on West-West relations.
With the death of Stalin in early March 1953, both Washington and Paris saw new opportunities for reducing East-West tensions. The Americans were slower to act, in part because the Eisenhower administration saw no reason to soften U.S. policy in the event of a change in Soviet leadership. In responding to the Soviet peace offensive, Eisenhower and Dulles intended to place pressure on the Soviet Union and exploit the succession struggle to gain concessions at the bargaining table. From the French perspective, Soviet concessions at Geneva represented concrete evidence that Moscow truly desired détente with the West. Thus, at the moment when American fears of the EDC’s failure and a negotiated peace detrimental to western interests in Indochina peaked, the French decided that European defense and the EDC had become less pressing, and that the Soviets were equally interested in establishing peace in Asia. Mendès France insisted that he had made no deals with Molotov to exchange peace in Indochina for the non-ratification of the EDC, but the EDC’s defeat poisoned Franco-American relations and furthered Washington’s perception that Soviet claims of “peaceful coexistence” were a ploy to undermine western solidarity. In the end, American predictions of allied disunity became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as Washington failed to test the validity of Soviet claims while Paris attempted to verify Soviet peace offerings.
The Soviet peace offensive was at least partially successful. The First Indochina War ended with the July 21, 1954, Geneva Accords, and the French National Assembly defeated the EDC on August 30, 1954. The Soviet Union thus avoided becoming further embroiled in a war that was not vital to Soviet security and it escaped facing a united European defense community. But the Soviets had perhaps scored a bigger victory than they realized. Franco-American relations would become even more difficult as the two countries competed for influence in South Vietnam after Geneva. Until Geneva, the Americans maintained a careful balance between urging the French to pursue the war aggressively and not pressing them so hard that they retreated completely from Vietnam or the EDC. But with the EDC-Indochina connection finally broken, the Eisenhower administration was free to pursue its own course of action in Vietnam, which is precisely what it would do. The European shadow that had dominated Asian policy since 1950 was gone.
France achieved remarkable success in acquiring American aid, linking Korea and Indochina, and internationalizing a solution to the Indochina conflict at the Geneva Conference. After Geneva, this success would come back to haunt them, as it appeared that they had done too good a job of interesting the United States in Vietnam. Franco-American competition would increase as the two western powers turned to the task of finding a capable South Vietnamese leader who could inspire confidence, maintain a noncommunist South Vietnam, and win the 1956 elections.