THE SPECTER OF THE 1956 ELECTIONS posed the next challenge to French influence. Back in mid-July 1954, the weary conferees at Geneva had reached an agreement on all major issues except for the difficult problem of national elections.1 The DRV refused to end hostilities until a specific date for all-Vietnamese reunification elections had been identified. As a result, point 14(a) of the cease-fire agreement between the French and DRV representatives (the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam) recognized a two-year interval before general elections “which will bring about the unification of Vietnam.” The only other mention of the elections existed in the deliberately vague final declaration. According to point 7, “General elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.”2 Thus, the Geneva Accords stipulated that elections would take place in 1956 to reunify the country but left out the details of how such an election would be achieved. Understanding why these elections failed is central to explaining the increased American presence in Vietnam.
The period immediately after the Geneva Conference, and, in particular, the problem of how to bring about, or not bring about, the 1956 elections, was a critical juncture for the Vietnamese, French, and Americans. Much current scholarship dismisses the 1956 elections as a non-event resulting from firm American backing of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem’s refusal to consult with the North.3 The situation, however, was more complex. In examining the changing international landscape, the differing concerns of the Geneva participants, and Diem’s 1954–1956 diplomacy, a more nuanced view of who, and what, derailed the 1956 elections emerges.
Despite the vague wording of the cease-fire agreement and final declaration at the Geneva Conference, it appears unlikely that the provisions for national elections were simply a cosmetic means of obtaining North Vietnamese consent to end the war. Most of the governments represented at Geneva took the election provisions seriously and expected the elections to be held.4 However, the international situation evolved quickly after the conference in ways none of the participants had foreseen. The elections failed because the primary conferees involved, with the exception of Hanoi, had other concerns that took precedence. In addition, Diem’s refusal to work with the French and the subsequent French withdrawal from Indochina created a change in the players on the field and hence in the scenario for the 1956 elections. What follows is a perspective of the changing international scene from each of the major players involved in the elections issue.
The prospect of the 1956 elections posed a serious challenge to U.S. policy in South Vietnam. At the final session of the Geneva Conference, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith gave a “unilateral declaration” of U.S. policy toward free elections in Vietnam in which he claimed to “make clear” the American position. He failed, but for good reason—during and following the conference, American officials were scrambling to develop a coherent policy toward the 1956 elections. In the first part of Smith’s declaration, he upheld Washington’s traditional stand in favor of free elections. In the second part, Smith indicated a loophole for the South Vietnamese government by recognizing South Vietnam’s right to determine its own policy.5 The declaration pointed to the Eisenhower administration’s difficulties in reconciling the traditional American ideal of free elections with the reality that if an election took place, North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh would deliver a crushing defeat to Diem. The United States had continually advocated free elections in Germany, Korea, Austria, and Greece and would be in an awkward position vis-à-vis world opinion if it did not do the same in Vietnam. And yet, a communist triumph in elections could also cost the United States dearly in terms of world opinion. What to do? Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested that by affirming they would participate in genuinely free elections, Washington and Saigon would be “taking the high ground.” Such a position was “unassailable in intent,” Dulles argued, and it held out little danger since communist nations “never permitted a free and open political process.”6
According to Kenneth Young, director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, the dilemma facing the Americans was that American policy goals were at odds with long-held values. The United States could not press France to oppose elections without running grave risks on disclosure, which would seriously damage the French government and the U.S. position in Asia at this time. On the other hand, uncertainty regarding the elections weakened U.S. efforts to build up strength in Vietnam.7 As early as mid-November 1954, French high commissioner for South Vietnam Paul Ely raised the issue of elections with U.S. special representative to Vietnam J. Lawton Collins. In turn, Collins requested guidance from the State Department. Not until the end of January 1955 did the NSC request that the State Department devise a position paper. The American position paper, which was not completed until early May, recommended that consultations be held providing North and South Vietnam were the only parties involved.8
By late January 1955, the Eisenhower administration recognized it had to establish a specific policy toward the elections.9 In February, the Division of Research for the Far East prepared an intelligence report with the assumption that elections would take place, but, given the ambiguous nature of the Geneva Accords and subsequent statements by the parties involved, Washington had almost no guidance on how to proceed. In addition, DRV statements regarding the elections had not advanced beyond vague generalities. The most interesting aspect of the report was that none of the Geneva participants had taken a stand on the elections issue yet—everyone was waiting for someone else to make the first move.
Following Geneva, the French and Americans first discussed the elections issue formally during the November 1954 talks between Dulles and Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France. Mendès France suggested breaking the elections into small local units rather than holding national elections. The Americans countered with the idea that the North and South should elect an equal number of delegates to a single assembly and that the assembly’s power should be confined to drafting a constitution subject to ratification by both governments prior to its adoption. Eisenhower officials also believed it was conceivable that the requirement for elections in Vietnam might be satisfied by a simple referendum on the question of reunification or by holding elections for a constituent assembly—in which membership from the North and South might be roughly equal.10 Either way, Washington hoped to present the appearance of cooperating while indefinitely prolonging the partition of Vietnam.
In early March 1955, Dulles met with South Vietnamese foreign minister Tran Van Do, after being alerted by Collins that the Diem regime apparently had no firm policy on elections and wished to discuss the issue. Dulles urged Diem to accept the principle of holding elections and then to insist on procedures that would guarantee that they would be carried out fairly. Dulles pointed out that in the case of Germany, the West and East had been discussing elections for ten years without being able to come to an agreement on what constituted free elections.11 Diem remained noncommittal, and Dulles returned to the United States convinced that South Vietnam was too inexperienced in free electoral processes to negotiate effectively with the DRV on the issue of nationwide elections.12
By the end of March, a draft on American policy toward the elections had been prepared. The administration recognized that if the United States urged South Vietnam to avoid elections, it would forfeit any possibility that it might eventually be able to secure British or French support for its policies in Vietnam. American officials thus argued that the only reasonable course of action was to give South Vietnam general support and encouragement to open discussions with the North on the elections issue. This policy would allow Diem to pose as a “champion” of national unification.13
In a follow-up memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson pointed out that when the French learned of the U.S. position to encourage, but not command, Diem to begin consultations with the North, French suspicions would be confirmed that the United States was attempting to “scuttle” the elections. They might then try to bring to power someone less amenable to U.S. influence. American officials feared the prospect that Paris and London would reject Washington’s stringent conditions for elections, especially if the DRV resumed hostilities. American officials also considered how to discourage the International Control Commission (ICC)—which had been set up at the Geneva Conference to ensure that South and North Vietnam upheld the Geneva provisions—from playing too prominent a role in the electoral discussions. The Eisenhower administration hoped that South and North Vietnam would be the only principal parties in the negotiations.14 In deliberating over acceptable and unacceptable conditions for the elections, one American official noted that “this whole question of the elections in Vietnam may be the key issue on which we hold or lose Vietnam.” U.S. policy was to encourage South Vietnam to proceed with consultations for the elections, while urging Diem to stress the need for free expression of the national will. Washington wanted Diem to agree to consultations because the North Vietnamese already had the political advantage of claiming that they were fighting a nationalist war of liberation.15
A critical obstacle to formulating U.S. policy toward the 1956 elections at this time was the uncertainty surrounding Diem’s position. Throughout April 1955, as Diem battled against the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen, it remained unclear whether Diem would survive the crisis. Washington also recognized that it might find itself alone if it urged South Vietnam to insist on terms unacceptable to the communists while Britain and France advised the South to capitulate to communist terms rather than run the risk of a resumption of hostilities. The NSC was concerned that if South Vietnam tried to avoid elections, the communists would be able “to pose as the sole champions of national unification.” The overall U.S. position in the world “would be harmed by American identification with a policy which appeared to be directed towards avoidance of elections.” The NSC also acknowledged that the British and French believed themselves “committed,” as signatories of the Geneva agreements, to a program of “encouraging” elections.16 Thus Diem’s triumph over the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen did not bolster the Eisenhower administration’s confidence in opposing elections. Indeed, American officials feared that the ICC and co-presidents would intervene, and the international situation as well as American public opinion would slip if Diem continued to stall. Kenneth Young suggested that the United States might have to strongly suggest to Diem that he should not count on Washington’s assistance if South Vietnam were responsible for “election breakdown and Vietminh action.”17 And yet, at the same time, the State Department worried that Diem would think the western powers were “ganging up on him” if Washington agreed to the French and British proposals to put more pressure on South Vietnam to begin consultations.
During a June NSC meeting, when the issue of the State Department’s recommendations (NSC 5519) on pre-electoral consultations and the elections came up, Eisenhower and Dulles postponed discussion because the situation was “not sufficiently clear to warrant Council action at this time,” and because the British, French, and South Vietnamese had not made their positions clear. The general consensus remained that the United States should try to persuade Diem to agree to consultations and to notify him that if he refused, he would face great difficulties with the French and British. Young recommended that the United States go along with Diem’s refusal to consult, recognizing that the main problem would be persuading the French and British to agree to this idea. Eventually, the State Department produced a policy statement that said the United States “should leave the issue to the Vietnamese themselves.”18
American officials in Saigon also recommended postponing NSC consideration of the 1956 elections. With Diem’s position still shaky, American ambassador to Saigon G. Frederick Reinhardt thought that the United States could run into trouble if it developed a firm and rigid government policy while several elements involved were “subject to change.” American policy at the time assumed there was a possibility that South Vietnam would be able to “deter or defeat” North Vietnamese insurrection, “sustain order” in the South, and become “strong enough” to win a free election confined to the South. Should this not be the case, it would be necessary to review not only U.S. policy on elections but also basic U.S. policy toward Vietnam. American officials acknowledged that Washington could not take the position of opposing the principle of unifying Vietnam through free elections, but they also believed that the Geneva agreements were ambiguous and unspecific regarding the type of elections to be held, the specific purposes of the elections, and the procedures to be followed, all of which would provide some leeway for American actions.19
Throughout spring 1955, internal discussion centered on how best to proceed. American officials seesawed on whether to support or discourage elections, suggesting that the UN should be asked to step in but worrying that U.S. allies would react unfavorably. By early July, most American officials began to fear a crisis was looming. With the Geneva summit scheduled to begin on July 18, Dulles urged the Saigon Embassy to convince Diem to issue a statement acknowledging Hanoi’s willingness to begin consultations. This way, Dulles hoped to head off Soviet claims at the summit that the South had repudiated the Geneva Accords.20
The more important reason for urging Diem to agree to consultations was that American officials recognized U.S. credibility would be harmed by identification with a policy that appeared to be directed toward avoiding the elections. An NSC report stated that “world public opinion and, for that matter, domestic opinion would have difficulty in understanding why the United States should oppose in Vietnam the democratic procedures which it advocated for Korea, Austria, and Germany.” The United States also acknowledged that France and Britain wanted the elections to take place and that the French, in particular, feared that failure to hold the elections would provoke a resumption of hostilities by the DRV in which France would be “directly and involuntarily involved” due to the presence of large numbers of the FEC through 1955 and the first half of 1956.21 All of these factors made it difficult for Washington to arrive at a coherent policy toward the elections.
During the second half of 1954 and much of 1955, the Eisenhower administration was in a quandary as to how to deal with the elections issue, hoping the elections would not take place but anxious to avoid the charge of having sabotaged them. The best option, for Washington, was indefinite postponement. Diem made the choice for the United States by refusing to cooperate and ignoring the July 1955 deadline to begin consultations with the North. The Eisenhower administration considered using the threat of cutting American aid in order to force Diem to consider consultations, but in the end chose not to. Against its better political instincts, but fearful above all of the collapse of the anticommunist government in the South, the Eisenhower administration decided to support Diem.22 Throughout these developments, one theme can be clearly seen—the United States operated on an ad hoc basis when dealing with the 1956 elections.
Scholars have argued that because of U.S. backing, Diem assumed a bold and confident posture in opposition to the national elections that were so central to the Geneva agreements.23 In fact, senior American officials tried to coax Diem to participate in preliminary consultations—albeit primarily for propaganda purposes—but even before he was sure of U.S. backing, Diem refused to agree to such consultations. Perhaps one American official summed it up best when he wrote, “Although our ability [to] exert pressure is apparently great because of government’s dependence on U.S. support, in actual fact, if we wish our efforts to be effective we can do little more than use ardent persuasion, basing our arguments exclusively on Vietnam’s self-interest.”24
While American policy was more ambivalent toward the 1956 elections than scholars have acknowledged, French officials at the time were convinced that the United States would not go through with the elections. American officials continually pointed out to the French that “neither France nor Britain nor any other power made any specific pledge to these elections. No government signed any document, no assembly discussed it, it was ratified by no Parliament. It is therefore really binding on no one.” Paris thus assumed that Washington would do nothing to help promote the 1956 elections, concluding as early as November 1954 that the United States “would stop the elections and refuse to consider alternatives to Diem.” Still, in the period immediately following the Geneva Conference, French officials felt the elections should be held. The official position in Paris was that a failure to hold elections would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Geneva. More importantly, French leaders feared that if the elections did not take place, North Vietnam would have a pretext to renew the war.25 At the same time, French officials wanted to avoid promoting the elections too forcefully for fear of creating a diplomatic rift with the United States. For Paris, an election would essentially terminate French responsibilities, but so too would an overt U.S. or South Vietnamese assumption of blame for the consequences of what might follow if elections failed to take place.
The French Foreign Ministry also recognized that some kind of entente between North and South Vietnam could result in smoother Franco-Vietnamese relations and avoid a resumption of hostilities. Mendès France thus advocated a flexible policy in dealing with the elections. During a tripartite meeting in May 1955, French officials tried to decide who should take the initiative to bring South and North Vietnam together. The French saw two possibilities: an approach could be made to the co-presidents or to the ICC. Paris preferred the second option since the ICC was officially in charge of supervising the elections. French officials also suggested that senior American, British, and French representatives should meet in one of the western capitals to discuss views on objectives and conditions of the elections rather than relegating such discussions to local officials in Saigon. This way, Paris planned to hammer out a common policy to be presented jointly at a four-power conference with Diem. The United States quickly put the brakes on American participation, fearing that France wanted to place responsibility for upholding the Geneva Accords on the United States. Washington thus declined French suggestions for a tripartite working group on the elections. After the July 20 deadline to begin consultations passed with little notice, France became less concerned about a renewal of hostilities on the part of the Vietminh and the 1956 elections became a less pressing matter. The loss of momentum was apparent; ICC members noted that all sides were at an impasse. New Delhi notified French officials in Saigon that perhaps the ICC’s presence in South Vietnam was “no longer necessary” since the elections were stalled, implying that Paris “could and should place greater pressure on Diem” to begin consultations.26
In fact, New Delhi had it wrong—French officials could not place greater pressure on Diem. Rather, Saigon’s policies posed an immense obstacle to moving forward with the elections. The FEC continued to be the biggest issue plaguing Franco-Vietnamese relations. According to South Vietnamese officials, Franco-Vietnamese relations “would improve” and the elections issue “could be resolved” once military issues were settled, in particular the withdrawal of the FEC. The French, for their part, insisted that if the Diem government became the sole power in the South, it had to agree to respect the clauses of the Geneva Accords or else the French would have to notify the other members of the Geneva Conference. During a February 1956 meeting between French foreign minister Christian Pineau and South Vietnamese representative in Paris Pham Duy Khiem, Khiem urged Pineau to publish a declaration that the elections issue should be solved by the North and South themselves. Pineau accepted in principle as long as such a declaration did not violate the Geneva Accords. Still, the South Vietnamese continued to stall on the elections issue, insisting on further French concessions on military matters, and the French quickly had to decide what their policy toward elections should be.27
Pineau decided on gradual disengagement from the accords, evidenced in his February 8 announcement that, with respect to the political clauses of the Geneva Accords (i.e., elections), France was “no more accountable than any other country and had no further obligations than any other signatory.” Paris’s agreement to the South Vietnamese request that France withdraw its troops also indicated French determination to withdraw, as did the decision to have the ICC work with the South Vietnamese leadership rather than French officials in Saigon. The South Vietnamese Liaison Mission to the ICC was established and all French Liaison Mission functions were transferred to the South Vietnamese. France also refused to continue its ICC payments, questioning why, if it was being relieved of its responsibilities in South Vietnam, it should continue to pay a quarter of ICC costs and half its local costs. And, in a May 14 note to the co-presidents of the Geneva Conference, France stated that it had “relinquished all responsibility to the Geneva Agreements.” Finally, on August 15, Pineau officially notified North Vietnamese foreign minister Pham Van Dong that France had no further responsibilities with respect to the Geneva Accords.28
French officials had a number of comments on both their speedy withdrawal and the elections issue. French representative to South Vietnam Henri Hoppenot sent Pineau a long and detailed letter on failed Franco-American cooperation in Vietnam. Regarding the elections, Hoppenot contended that “no effort whatsoever was made to begin consultations, and exchanges of view on topics of mutual interest only occurred when the French ambassador instigated them.”29 Pineau concurred that the non-elections were key to Diem’s survival, and that after the election date passed, South Vietnam was determined to maintain its independence, evidenced in the non-renewal of France’s commercial status, the withdrawal of the FEC, and the turning of high commissariats into embassies. Regarding the Americans, Dulles and the State Department had assured France on numerous occasions of their willingness to establish Franco-American cooperation in Vietnam, but Pineau noted that “the facts showed otherwise.”30
By the end of November 1956, French officials recognized that Vietnam no longer had need of French aid—military, financial, political, or otherwise—and that France inspired “neither hatred nor envy.” One historian has claimed that France had little leverage in South Vietnam and was too dependent on American economic support and political backing of French interests elsewhere in the world, particularly North Africa, to challenge the repudiation of the elections. Others have asserted that France simply “abandoned” South Vietnam.31 French documentation demonstrates that neither of these explanations satisfies. Rather, Diem’s unwillingness to work with the French, the withdrawal of the FEC, and the dissolution of the French high command led France to reevaluate the nature and extent of its responsibilities to the Geneva Accords and hence the 1956 elections. Once it was clear that Diem would remain in control of South Vietnam, that the FEC would be withdrawn, and that the DRV would not renew hostilities after South Vietnam’s refusal to begin consultations by July 20, 1955, France chose to focus on preserving its economic and cultural presence in Vietnam. After all, its attempts to maintain a political and military presence had been thwarted by Diem and the Americans. In the end, France had little choice in its gradual decline from guarantor of the Geneva Accords to minor player.
As co-chair to the Geneva Conference, Britain considered itself responsible for ensuring that the Geneva agreements were fulfilled and for keeping the peace in Vietnam.32 In the end, however, London failed both in persuading Diem to begin consultations and in convincing the United States to adopt a stronger stance against Diem’s intransigence. British attempts to bring about the elections were stymied by Saigon and Washington’s machinations. The British were also less willing, after Geneva, to challenge the Americans directly on Vietnamese issues, as they had expended significant diplomatic capital in spring 1954 by refusing to go along with united action and by insisting on a negotiated settlement.
By early February 1955, the British had become convinced that the Americans would not promote Vietnamese elections and that it was therefore up to London to take an active role in ensuring that the elections took place. Frank Tomlinson, head of the Southeast Asia Department of the British Foreign Office, in a letter to the Foreign Office noted that, “while the British proceed on the basis that elections will be held unless good reason is shown to the contrary, the Americans are certain now that there will be good reason to the contrary and that elections will therefore not be held.” Scrawled on top of the letter was a note from senior Foreign Office official Denis Allen stating, “we have been relying, apparently quite vainly, on the fact that Dulles spoke in Paris of the importance of abiding by the provisions of Geneva.” In addition, by April it was clear that Saigon refused to begin preliminary talks with Hanoi. Therefore, British officials urged the Diem government to respect the framework of the Geneva agreements. If, for example, the South insisted on elections under UN supervision, it would open itself to the charge of failure to comply with the Geneva agreement. The British recommended that the elections should aim at setting up a “joint constituent assembly” that would then draft a constitution for the entire country, a suggestion that both the Americans and French had also considered.33
All that the British wanted was for Diem to initiate “preliminary contact” with the DRV on the subject of the elections no later than July 20. If the South Vietnamese did not, and fighting broke out, London emphasized that it would not support South Vietnam. When informed of continued South Vietnamese intransigence, Prime Minister Anthony Eden commented that “American support of Diem has been obstinate and unhappily successful. Does it have to continue whatever the price?” But Eden recognized how difficult it would be to convince Diem to begin consultations if the Americans failed to pressure the South Vietnamese leader as well.34
In mid-April 1955, the British Embassy in Washington notified the State Department that provisions for consultations and elections were fundamental to both the spirit and letter of the Geneva settlement and that the British would not welcome a SEATO attack should South Vietnam’s refusal to begin consultations precipitate a North Vietnamese invasion of the South. Accordingly, the British urged Diem to respond to the North Vietnamese note in which Hanoi expressed its willingness to begin consultations on schedule. London asserted that it would approach Diem unilaterally, without American support, if necessary.35 Although Washington did agree to ask Diem to contact the North, neither British nor American officials succeeded in convincing Diem to begin consultations. The British were particularly concerned because of the fast-approaching Geneva summit. London feared that the Soviets would make an issue of the 1956 elections during the summit, which began on July 18, 1955. Surprisingly, the Soviets appeared content with British promises that they were doing their best to bring Diem to begin consultations with Hanoi. Much like the French, the British breathed a sigh of relief after the July 20 deadline had passed.
The process was repeated in mid-September when the British proposed a joint démarche to convince the South Vietnamese to respond to Hanoi’s overtures. After American officials suggested that the British make the attempt alone, British ambassador in Saigon Sir Hugh Stephenson urged Diem to cooperate, and, in return, London would defend the South Vietnamese position at the forthcoming four-power foreign ministers meeting in Geneva at the end of October. When Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov brought up the issue of the 1956 elections at a co-chair meeting in late September, British foreign minister Harold Macmillan stated that Diem still insisted he did not have the authority to speak for South Vietnam until the National Assembly elections were held, and that once they were held, Diem would be less opposed to consultations.36
In an attempt to exert more pressure on Diem, the Foreign Office looked to the Quai d’Orsay. British officials recognized their failure to consult Paris and French officials in Saigon because of waning French influence in Vietnam. London had come to consider the French a liability rather than an asset in dealing with South Vietnam. But after listening to French complaints about being ignored, the Foreign Office decided to work with them, despite the “great sensitiveness in Paris about any indication, however groundless, that the French government was no longer regarded as playing a leading role in matters related to Indochina.”37
Regarding the Americans, Eden believed that Dulles moved further from his promise to respect the Geneva Accords every time he spoke. Eden wanted to address Washington on this issue in the near future. According to Eden, if the Americans were going “to advise a wrecking of the Geneva agreement—for that is what it amounts to—we should make it clear it is their sole responsibility.” Eden urged the Foreign Office to remind Dulles that his recent public statements about Diem were not consistent with the American position at Geneva. London assumed that persuading Diem to do anything depended on the amount of pressure the United States was willing to place on him. Stephenson recommended trying to avoid linking British policy “with the fate of one man who might not always be strong enough to carry through what he himself wishes and undertakes to do.”38
As the communist bloc continued to protest South Vietnamese intransigence, the British adroitly sidestepped the issue. In one case, British officials went so far as to suggest that Diem’s public statement of October 7 (which simply reiterated past statements that free elections were impossible in the North) constituted a form of consultation and that it was up to Hanoi to provide a concrete response. But London understood the communists might shortly become annoyed with western stalling tactics. During a Molotov-Macmillan meeting on November 9, Molotov mentioned the fourth interim report of the ICC, which was severely critical of South Vietnam and called for action by the co-chairs. Molotov therefore recommended a formal co-chair meeting. Macmillan wanted to avoid such a meeting, which would put London in the difficult spot of explaining Diem’s behavior. Molotov decided to back away from his recommendation when Macmillan threatened to bring up communist interference in Laos at the meeting. Both Macmillan and Molotov acknowledged that they had to address the August 17 letter from North Vietnamese foreign minister Pham Van Dong protesting South Vietnam’s conduct; the September 12 letter from Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Eden asking the co-presidents to intervene; the October 7 letter from South Vietnamese foreign minister Vu Van Mau, in which Mau reiterated the South Vietnamese position as stated in the July 16 and August 9 declarations; the letters of October 31 and November 7 from Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai, in which the Chinese called for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference; and the fourth report of the ICC. On December 21, the co-presidents (after much stalling) sent a vague letter to Geneva participants stating that the Geneva Accords were not being respected and that something needed to be done.39 The essential point here is that the co-presidents were unwilling to take a decisive stand on the elections issue.
In late January 1956, the British received another Chinese note demanding the reconvening of Geneva. In response, British foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd made a half-hearted attempt to persuade Dulles that the way to maintain peace in Indochina was to pressure Diem to “consider” elections. He also wanted Diem to “adopt a more conciliatory attitude” toward the ICC. The Foreign Office opposed holding another conference, which would take up time and money, and which the Americans would probably boycott. The British decided their best option was to stall as long as possible by pretending to consider the Chinese proposal. Given the South Vietnamese and American repugnance for such a conference, this tactic might cause them to make more concessions to British views. In addition, the Foreign Office did not feel that the French had much to contribute toward a constructive policy because of their wounded pride at being forced to withdraw the FEC. British policy was thus to keep everyone in suspense, even though London had decided that another conference would not be advisable.40 In some respects, British officials appeared to spend more time confusing their allies than their adversaries.
Rather than a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, London succeeded in convincing Moscow that a co-president meeting would be more useful. The results of a co-chair meeting in April 1956 between British representative Lord Reading and Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko were again vague. The co-chairs urged both North and South Vietnam to “transmit to the Co-Chairmen as soon as possible, jointly or separately, their views on the time required for the opening of electoral consultations and the holding of elections.” They also stressed the importance of maintaining the cease-fire. In addition, the Soviets agreed that the two co-chairs would request that the ICC stay on to continue its normal activities.41 The result of this meeting was that the 1956 elections were delayed indefinitely and the ICC agreed to the Saigon government’s offer to ensure the safety of ICC members after the French left.
Following the meeting, British officials closely observed American actions toward the elections, ultimately concluding that American support of Diem would cause Diem to become even more opposed to consultations with Hanoi. In particular, British minister to Saigon Sir Hubert Graves noted that Walter Robertson’s recent speech at an American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) meeting had stiffened Diem’s resistance to elections. The British interpreted Robertson’s appearance as State Department support against the elections, which made Stephenson’s efforts of persuading Diem toward a conciliatory attitude more difficult. The AFV meeting did not represent a clear American policy on the elections, but it did further Franco-American discord for a number of reasons: the French ambassador received an invitation only at the last minute; Senator John F. Kennedy referred to the South Vietnamese as having suffered through “centuries of colonial exploitation” and “deliberate policies of illiteracy”; and renowned American foreign policy professor Hans Morgenthau declared that the French war “was essentially a colonial war waged for retention of French control under whatever constitutional guise.”42 Such rhetoric convinced the British that the Americans and South Vietnamese would continue to avoid any actions that would bring North and South Vietnam closer to an election.
The main British concern during the period of negotiations over the 1956 elections was to ensure that the South Vietnamese government respected the conditions of the cease-fire so that the British could claim the Geneva agreements were being upheld. London needed South Vietnamese cooperation to maintain “the fiction” that negotiations within the framework of the Geneva agreements continued. That way, the British could avoid being forced into a position where they would have to admit that the South Vietnamese were in breach of the agreements. The best tactic to obtain this result, according to the Foreign Office, was to work with the Americans to urge Diem to enter into consultations that “would lead to deadlock and the status quo.” It was felt that the ultimate objective was to “arrive at a stalemate resulting in acquiescence in indefinite partition, but that this hope should not be made public and that in any event communist reactions may prevent the realization of British policy.”43 In other words, London should continue to procrastinate.
Foreign Office official F. S. Tomlinson agreed, noting that, “we have been procrastinating for over a year now and much of the heat and venom has disappeared from communist propaganda . . . there accordingly seems a chance that, if we go on dilly-dallying without ever confronting the communist powers with what they could plausibly represent to be a repudiation of the Geneva agreement, they may be content to let matters slide indefinitely.” The British thus planned to maintain the cease-fire in a divided Vietnam while allowing the idea of nationwide elections to slip gradually into oblivion. The Foreign Office hoped that the temporary partition of Vietnam would become as much a fait accompli as those of Korea and Germany, and was convinced that the British policy of seeking to postpone a crisis had already done much to remove the danger of one.44
The critical tactic in London’s greater strategy of procrastination was jump-starting consultations between North and South. The British thus remained engaged in South Vietnam, trying to smooth over matters with the ICC and making sure that the Geneva agreements were not destroyed. Still, Diem’s intransigence, doubts about American support of British attempts to convince Diem to begin consultations, and lack of Soviet insistence on elections all led Britain to press the issue of the 1956 elections less forcefully than it could have. When few comments or protests arose from the co-presidents’ decision in April 1956 to postpone the elections indefinitely, the British breathed a sigh of relief, and continued to work quietly toward preventing an outbreak of hostilities between North and South Vietnam.
A key factor in the western decision to avoid pressing Diem on election issues was Moscow and Beijing’s amazing lack of concern about the subject. Although the Soviet Union and China should not be treated as a single entity, in the case of the proposed 1956 Vietnamese elections, both countries had similar aims. Neither wanted to risk war with the United States over Vietnam and both were in the middle of pursuing a new peace offensive of international communism. The Soviet Union was not eager to risk a confrontation with Washington or broader western counteraction in South Vietnam in the event of an attack from the North. In addition, Moscow was well aware that by indefinitely postponing elections, it had the advantage of avoiding a precedent that, if followed in Germany and Korea, would be to the detriment of the communist bloc. The Chinese made periodic attempts to hold South Vietnam to the 1956 elections, in particular by claiming that France was responsible for upholding Geneva, but these attempts were never followed by concrete action toward elections. China also feared war with the United States as it was still recovering from Korea. The West correctly assumed that neither the Soviet Union nor China wanted to engage in any actions in Vietnam that might risk a world conflict.45
The first Soviet statement regarding the 1956 elections appeared in mid-August 1954. The Soviet position was that the elections would be entrusted to an all-Vietnamese consultative body composed of representatives from the DRV and Diem camps. The consultations, to begin in July 1955, appeared to be the device by which the communists hoped to create a coalition government even prior to the holding of elections.46 Despite public declarations promoting the elections, the Soviets made a number of conciliatory gestures regarding Vietnam. One of the most interesting occurred during the summit conference at Geneva during July 1955. The western powers had been urging Diem to make a statement on the 1956 elections in order to avoid Soviet accusations that the West was not upholding the Geneva Accords. During the conference, Molotov raised the issue of the 1956 elections but did not press it. Perhaps, as Dulles noted, the Soviets were more focused on promoting their peace offensive and wanted to avoid dealing with Vietnam at the conference. Soviet hopes of raising their reputation in the international arena, their concern with getting the Americans to talk to them as equals, and their focus on resolving European security problems must have influenced their thinking. They also could not have missed the implications for Germany if free elections were in fact held in Vietnam.47
Then, at a foreign ministers meeting in early fall, Harold Macmillan notified Molotov that Diem would not cooperate until a South Vietnamese National Assembly was elected. Molotov replied that “the prior establishment of an Assembly [was] a legitimate pre-consultation step.”48 In addition, the Soviets agreed to a co-president meeting instead of a reconvening of the Geneva Conference in April 1956. The Americans had been fearful that the Soviets would insist on resolving the elections issue. Why the Soviets did not is still something of a mystery. Almost certainly the internal power struggle between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Molotov played a role, as Khrushchev had advocated a buildup of Soviet strength rather than an exploitation of divisions in the West as the best means to secure Soviet foreign interests. In addition, as Eden remarked, food struggles and peasant uprisings against collectivism led to “relatively modest pressure” from communist sources for the 1956 elections.49 The outcome of Soviet reasoning was Moscow’s decision to avoid pressuring the West on the 1956 elections issue and instead content itself with publishing periodic communiqués, such as the joint Khrushchev-Nehru declaration of December 13, 1955, calling for all parties to cooperate.
The Chinese put forth more, but not much more, effort than the Soviets to see that consultations for the 1956 elections took place. China periodically appealed to the ICC and co-chairmen to force Diem to comply with the Geneva Accords. For example, in August 1955, Zhou Enlai addressed Macmillan and Molotov, giving his “total support” to the DRV’s position and demanding that the co-presidents take all actions “necessary” to uphold Geneva.50 Eventually, in January 1956, the Chinese proposed to the British that a new conference on Indochina be convened at Geneva because of South Vietnamese noncompliance. To derail this idea, London suggested a co-chair meeting, which the Soviets agreed to, effectively ending the debate.
During a bilateral Anglo-American meeting at the end of January 1956, British and U.S. officials indicated their belief that the communists had become resigned to the postponement of elections. The North Vietnamese now wanted at least two to three years to undermine the South. Although the communist bloc desired another Geneva Conference, it was not necessarily to promote the 1956 elections. The Americans and British believed that the communists hoped to bring Zhou Enlai into contact with the West and to allow Molotov and Zhou Enlai to promote proposals for regional pacts and neutralization. Reconvening the Geneva Conference would give the two communist powers contact with the neutrals and a “propaganda forum,” which would probably be their primary purpose in any conference. Moreover, western officials believed that the Chinese requests for reconvening Geneva meant that the communists favored political and diplomatic means rather than large-scale violence.51 It appeared that the Soviets and Chinese had more important issues to consider than the 1956 elections.
A key international event that confirmed western beliefs that the communists would not insist on the 1956 elections was the April–May 1956 meetings between representatives of Britain and the Soviet Union in their capacity as ongoing co-chairmen of the conference. Gromyko and Macmillan agreed that maintaining the cease-fire was paramount and that the deadline for holding elections could be extended past July 1956. Although at first Gromyko insisted on a new conference and the legal obligation of the French to the Geneva Accords, he eventually dropped both issues. Following the talks, the Soviet Union and China did little to press for a political settlement. So the deadline, July 1956, passed without any action to fulfill the most important clause in the Geneva agreement, and it looked as though Vietnam would become another truncated nation, like Germany and Korea. According to American officials, the leisurely pace the communists followed regarding the consultations issue indicated that they would not place unbearable pressure on reunification.52 Indeed, the Soviet Union appeared to accept South Vietnam as an independent nation. When South Vietnam requested to join the UN in 1957, the Soviet Union even went so far as to suggest that both South and North Vietnam be allowed in—without consulting Hanoi—which might have resulted in a de facto permanent division between North and South Vietnam.
The British contended that the Soviets did not want to engage in any risky policies toward Indochina because more time for consolidation in North Vietnam was required. London also theorized that the Soviets accepted that communist unification of Vietnam in the near future was unlikely and were content to settle for the propaganda advantage of claiming they supported free elections. The Foreign Office concluded from Soviet actions that the Russians did not have a direct interest in Indochina and that they therefore did not want to gamble on dubious policies that might lead to a crisis with the West.53 With respect to the Chinese, London noted that Beijing was still recovering from the unfinished revolution at home and the effects of the Korean War, and would therefore seek to avoid another direct confrontation with the United States.
Communist reasoning for not insisting on the 1956 elections remains unclear. Bernard Fall has noted that perhaps the ambiguity of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference explains why the communist powers, after South Vietnam’s refusal to hold the nationwide elections referred to in the declaration, did not raise more than a perfunctory outcry about “treaty violations” and did not attempt to submit the agreement or the final declaration to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.54 Still, additional factors must have played a role. Perhaps China and the USSR did not press the elections because they wanted to promote their adherence to the principles of “peaceful coexistence” to the West as well as to neutralist countries. Or perhaps China and the USSR were more concerned with stabilizing North Vietnam economically rather than achieving immediate national reunification. It appears that both the Soviet Union and China tried to promote international communism through peaceful means and that neither was willing to risk a war with the West over the 1956 elections. As Ilya Gaiduk has noted, the Soviets undoubtedly wanted to prevent Vietnam from becoming a major issue among the great powers.55 Moreover, the nascent Sino-Soviet split became apparent in 1956, thus hampering a coordinated communist policy toward elections and leaving Hanoi precariously balanced between its two allies.
The North Vietnamese public position on the 1956 elections was less of a mystery than the Soviet and Chinese positions—Hanoi wanted the elections to occur. Ho Chi Minh certainly realized that the elections would greatly benefit the North and thus made every political effort to see that the elections took place. The North Vietnamese repeatedly attempted to ensure that the Geneva co-chairmen, as well as the ICC, China, and France, pressured the United States and Saigon to cooperate. Still, Hanoi realized early on that Diem and the United States would attempt to sabotage the elections and that internal problems would also prevent the North from making as strong a case as possible. French diplomat Jean Sainteny was one of the first observers to recognize the importance of the elections to the North Vietnamese, noting that “it is indeed undeniable that any policy tending to confirm the partition of Vietnam by opposing free elections carries within it the seeds of a new conflict.”56
In adopting a diplomatic strategy, the North Vietnamese focused on France. The DRV welcomed Sainteny as delegate general of France in North Vietnam and stated its willingness to preserve cultural contacts with France. These moves were undoubtedly made with an eye toward the elections, since the North assumed France would maintain control in the South. The North Vietnamese gambled that the French would continue to support unification in order to maintain their presence in Vietnam. Hanoi could not possibly have anticipated how quickly France would lose control in South Vietnam to Diem and the Americans.
The Soviet Union and China’s lack of support for North Vietnam’s position was a huge disappointment to North Vietnamese officials. Much has been made of this point. Ho Chi Minh realized he could not have defeated the French without Soviet and Chinese assistance and thus could not afford to resist their pressure to downplay the elections issue after Geneva. However, he and many others in the North Vietnamese leadership remained convinced that political struggle was the only option in achieving unification and were thus determined that, in two years, all of Vietnam would belong to them.57 Despite the current focus on Soviet and Chinese influence on Hanoi, perhaps the most significant mistake Hanoi made was its miscalculation in assuming that France would maintain control of South Vietnam until at least July 1956. North Vietnamese officials, along with most of the rest of the international community, counted on Diem’s inability to maintain control as well as continued French command of decision making in South Vietnam. Thus, French influence, or lack thereof, rather than Soviet and Chinese influence, was the determining factor in why Hanoi was not able to force the elections issue.
The DRV seized the initiative regarding the 1956 elections in a June 6, 1955, declaration in which they stated that they were ready to consult. A month later, Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong addressed a letter to Bao Dai and Diem, again expressing Hanoi’s willingness to begin consultations and asking Diem to name his representatives. Shortly thereafter, Ho Chi Minh visited Beijing and Moscow to rally their political support (and material aid). When it became clear that the South Vietnamese would not begin consultations and the July 20 deadline passed without action, Pham Van Dong protested to the co-chairs: on August 17, he asked them to enforce the application of the accords. Hanoi continued to protest periodically well beyond July 1956, yet its protests were universally ignored or sidestepped by the other Geneva signatories. How much of North Vietnamese protest was real and how much was used for propaganda purposes remains in debate.58 But American officials were concerned that their earlier assumptions that North Vietnam would never agree to free elections might have to be reconsidered. The DRV was undoubtedly holding off beginning a prolonged subversive movement in the South until the international situation evolved to a point where such a move would have more legitimacy—which would be the case if the 1956 elections did not take place without a new international agreement being negotiated.59
In early February 1956, French officials recognized that Hanoi’s new willingness to speak with the French, after attempting for a certain amount of time to work with the South Vietnamese, indicated that the North no longer had any hope of beginning consultative conferences with Saigon and had instead decided to bypass the Diem government entirely. To this end, the DRV demanded a new conference be held with the same signatories and the three members of the ICC. Moscow and Beijing concurred. Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Pham Van Dong also reiterated that the South Vietnamese, as the successors of the French, had the same obligations to the Geneva Accords. Hanoi’s unrelenting propaganda on this subject was understandable, according to the French, since the North Vietnamese feared that Saigon would succeed in reinforcing its anti-Geneva stance on the international level. This, French officials claimed, was undoubtedly the real reason behind Beijing and Hanoi’s diplomatic offensive to commence consultations.60
According to French reports, the DRV grossly underestimated the Diem regime, believing it would “fall like a ripe fruit either during the general elections or from internal subversion.” Hoppenot suggested that since the elections would not take place and internal subversion had not proved successful, the North Vietnamese had become paralyzed by their policy of waiting. They now realized that their chances of reunifying the country were quickly diminishing. Thus their propaganda became more violently directed against the Americans and Diem, who were “sabotaging the Geneva Accords,” and against the French, who had “shirked their obligations.” Understandably, the DRV now sought to address the elections question on an international level and applauded the Chinese and Indian propositions for reconvening a new Geneva Conference.61 Paris concluded that the situation would remain unchanged unless the North attacked the South or the South revised its stance regarding the elections.
Clearly, of all the signatories of the Geneva Accords, the DRV was the most insistent that the 1956 elections take place, but their protests against South Vietnamese violations of the accords yielded few results. The United States accurately estimated that, at least until July 1956, the DRV government would concentrate primarily on a political struggle for reunification, witnessed in Ho and Giap’s emphasis on “peaceful reunification.” But, as the French recognized, the question to be addressed was what the Vietminh would do next.62 On May 11, 1956, Pham Van Dong had addressed one last conciliatory letter to Diem calling for general elections, the result of which would be a coalition government and restoration of normal relations. After July 1956, Pham Van Dong continued to press for consultations, but preparations were underway in the North to confront South Vietnam and the United States with a different type of challenge. And this time, Hanoi would not allow Soviet and Chinese influence to derail North Vietnamese plans for the South.
The final point to develop is the South Vietnamese perspective, and in particular, Diem’s role in preventing the 1956 elections. Following Diem’s appointment as prime minister, the French, British, and Americans all thought of him as a very honest, rigid, and moral person but one who was not very adept politically. The West consistently underrated him, but Diem turned out to be savvier than anyone could have anticipated. Diem’s success in subverting the 1956 elections, and thus ensuring his continued regime, warrants a closer look.
By mid-May 1955, Diem had succeeded in eliminating most of his internal opposition—in particular the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen sects. He was now ready to tackle the 1956 elections issue. South Vietnamese officials reiterated to American Embassy officials in Saigon that they could not go along with the Geneva Accords since they had not signed them.63 Diem was on somewhat solid legal ground here because of the June 4, 1954, treaties signed by French and South Vietnamese officials recognizing the State of Vietnam as a fully independent and sovereign state. When the elections issue became more urgent, Diem and Vu Van Mau were able to deflect pressure to consult by reminding the Geneva conferees that South Vietnam was not obligated by the accords since it had been excluded from negotiations and thus never signed the final agreements.
Indeed, the South Vietnamese position was crystal clear. South Vietnamese foreign minister Tran Van Do protested the armistice and announced that South Vietnam would reserve “its full freedom of action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to its territorial unity, national independence, and freedom.” Then, as early as June 1955, Diem began to claim that the status of the FEC must be resolved before the elections could be discussed.64 Diem also insisted that the National Assembly elections take place before he would take part in consultations.
At this point, NSC policy still operated under the assumption that consultations would occur, and Washington realized that it had to decide whether it should “compel” Diem to begin consultations. Washington also had to worry about France and Britain allowing conditions for free elections to be watered down, and that if the United States continued to support Diem, and the DRV attacked, the Eisenhower administration would have to proceed without its allies. One American official stated that if the United States was willing to intervene militarily in the case of a Vietminh attack, then it “could back Diem.” If the United States was not willing to intervene, it “should not back him.”65
In the interim, the three western powers, primarily the United States and Britain, tried separately to convince Diem to make some sort of response to the North Vietnamese letter that stated Hanoi was prepared to begin consultations on time. What eventually resulted was Diem’s July 16 radio broadcast in which he declared South Vietnam was not bound by Geneva since it had not signed the accords and would not hold elections until the North renounced its “totalitarian methods of terror” and placed national interests above those of international communism. Diem claimed that he did not oppose elections but insisted such elections are “effective only with freedom,” making no mention of consultations. The American Embassy in Saigon concluded that communist provocations and disturbances in South Vietnam were now “imminent possibilities” as a result of Diem’s speech, which had “barely left the door open” for negotiations with the North. The embassy also noted that Diem’s actions could isolate Saigon and Washington from their allies just as the threat from the North was rising.66
In the face of Diem’s intransigence, the British, French, and Americans agreed that South and North Vietnam should have some sort of contact and decided, in a rare concerted allied effort, to impress upon Diem the necessity of providing a better response to North Vietnamese demands for consultations. These efforts proved unsuccessful. Diem managed to further western exasperation when the South Vietnamese foreign minister released a partial text of the joint French, British, and American aide memoir. After some creative editing, the released portion indicated that, although the three western powers had put pressure on Saigon to hasten the elections, they were actually in complete agreement with Diem’s position on them.67 Then, even before Diem had received Pham Van Dong’s September 20 message calling once again for talks, Diem categorically declared that there would be no consultations or negotiations, undoubtedly to forestall further interference on the part of the western powers. Both Ambassador Stephenson of Britain and Ambassador Reinhardt of the United States tried to moderate Diem’s response to the North, and throughout the rest of 1955 and into early 1956, the West continued to urge Diem to begin consultations and to make contact with Hanoi, to little avail.68
Diem had already offended American sensibilities regarding democratic procedures when he staged a referendum in October 1955 on the question: “Do the people wish to depose Bao Dai and recognize Ngo Dinh Diem as the Chief of State of Vietnam with the mission to install a democratic regime?” Diem garnered an impressive and impossible 98 percent of the vote as a result of propaganda, intimidation tactics, and tampering with votes. Diem’s autocratic style was repeated in the March 4,1956, South Vietnamese elections for a National Assembly, whose task was to produce a constitution for South Vietnam. During the elections, one of the seats created for the so-called refugee constituencies went to Diem’s sister-in-law, Madame Nhu, who ran as an “independent” to ensure government control of the assembly. The results of the elections gave pro-government forces a solid majority. Hoppenot noted that the various American organizations in place in South Vietnam wanted Diem to provide at least a semblance of democratic elections, but Diem refused to allow any opposition party to develop; he disqualified all candidates with any organized support outside the government—ranging from the conservative Dai Viet to the radical Vietminh. Kenneth Young had advocated delaying the elections out of fear that they might result in a splintered assembly, but he need not have worried. Diem ensured that he would remain in complete control. Other Americans, both official and unofficial, were less comfortable with Diem’s actions. As David Anderson has noted, Washington finally had the “trappings if not the substance of substantive government.”69 Diem’s flagrant disregard for democratic principles did not bode well for the American officials encouraging him to begin consultations for the 1956 elections. In fact, South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States Tran Van Chuong notified the Eisenhower administration at the end of 1955 that his government would not participate in elections.
In a typical encounter, Dulles met with Diem in mid-March 1956 to suggest that the time would come when it would be useful for Diem to take a positive stance on the principle of free elections. This would entail no danger to Vietnam, since free elections could never take place in communist-dominated territory, but such a declaration would be helpful to Vietnam and its friends. Diem appeared receptive, but a few days later, in a meeting with Young, he countered that such a statement in support of free elections “might confuse and upset the people in Vietnam and perhaps lead them to believe the Vietminh were playing [the] predominant role here.” As the French wryly noted, South Vietnam’s refusal to consult with the North obliged its partners—France, the United States, and Britain—to resort to all kinds of machinations to avoid being condemned for undermining the Geneva Accords.70
For Diem, proof that his policy of firmness and independence had succeeded could be seen in the co-presidents meeting during April 1956. According to Saigon, the results of this meeting meant that the country would not be reunified through elections and that no consultations or contacts would occur between South and North Vietnam.71 By making consultations with Hanoi contingent on National Assembly elections, French withdrawal of the FEC, and the dissolution of the French high command, Diem, much more so than the United States, succeeded in sabotaging the 1956 elections.
Even before the July 1956 deadline, Diem had begun to look to the future, and he sought to consolidate his rule by promulgating the South Vietnamese constitution, reorganizing the government, and working on economic reform. Hoppenot claimed that “the seriousness with which Diem envisages these tasks will not allow, no matter how warmly he smiles through his refusals to his French and American partners, any economic, military, and above all political concessions.”72 Diem was determined to follow an independent policy.
As a result of the April 1956 meetings between the co-chairs, the status quo in Vietnam moved beyond the July 1956 date given in the Final Declaration at Geneva for reunification through elections. In May 1956, South Vietnam agreed to take over French responsibilities for maintaining the cease-fire, the ICC agreed to continue its supervisory functions, and the French agreed to exercise their good offices in Saigon for the preservation of the armistice arrangements. Thus, the issue of the 1956 elections was indefinitely postponed. Thereafter, Hanoi continued to bring up the issue periodically, but for all intents and purposes, the 1956 elections became the 1956 non-elections and were quickly forgotten. The West viewed this fact as a communist failure, while the communists decided to retrench and increase their internal subversion in South Vietnam.
So what, if any, conclusions can be reached about the 1956 non-elections? Perhaps, the first is that the approach taken by the signatories of the Geneva Accords was one of confusion. The western approach to the elections was one of disorganization and mistrust, in which events tended to overtake policy. French officials placed a high priority on moving forward with the 1956 elections but were convinced that Washington would not allow the elections to proceed. American officials were more concerned with building up the Diem government, hoping to prolong consultations for the 1956 elections to buy time to either stop the elections completely or to ensure that the South Vietnamese candidate won.73
When Diem insisted that the United States take over training of the Vietnamese army on January 1, 1955, and the French withdrew the last of the FEC from South Vietnam on April 28, 1956, Paris became more politically disengaged from the Geneva Accords and hence the 1956 elections. The French were more concerned about the preservation of their air and navy missions left in Indochina, the dissolution of the French high command, their loss of cultural influence, and their accountability to the Geneva Accords when they no longer had any political or military control in South Vietnam. Ultimately, then, the failure of the 1956 elections was not a foregone conclusion, nor was it a result of a coherent American policy of abetting Diem in his refusal to begin consultations. Rather, the elections failed because the major players involved focused on other concerns and because France had lost military and political control in South Vietnam by 1956. If Saigon and Washington had not succeeded in reducing the French military presence, the French would probably have insisted on holding elections. Thus, although it is undoubtedly true that the Geneva agreements regarding elections were vague, that the final declaration was not signed by the United States and South Vietnam, and that no concrete system had been put in place for implementing the elections, the most important factor leading to their failure was the French military withdrawal.
As for Diem, no one in July 1954 predicted the staying power he would demonstrate. Diem played a much larger role in undermining the 1956 elections than he has been given credit for. Diem continued to pursue an independent policy after he ensured that the 1956 elections would not take place by distancing himself from U.S. policy and trying to create a better working relationship with other Asian nations. In a rather shrewd diplomatic move, Diem attempted to style himself as both a noncommunist and a nationalist Asian leader. In this way, Diem calculated that he could avoid being too closely associated with the United States, thus escaping Bao Dai’s fate of being considered a puppet.74
With respect to the supposed puppeteer, most scholars have assumed that the United States was responsible for ensuring that the 1956 elections did not occur, and, to a large degree, the United States must be held accountable. Certainly the United States had a hard time accepting the diplomatic solution reached at Geneva and exerted its influence in preventing the 1956 elections. But for the two-year period following Geneva, the United States proceeded on the assumption that consultations for the 1956 elections would have to take place, if only for propaganda purposes. It was only after Diem’s continued intransigence that American policy evolved toward opposing the elections. Furthermore, the United States continued to equivocate on the elections issue until it became convinced that France and Britain would offer only token resistance to Diem’s refusal to consult with the Vietminh. This acquiescence was due in large part to French disengagement from Vietnam. Moreover, the Americans, French, and British correctly concluded that the Soviet Union and China were not willing to risk a war with the United States in order to ensure the elections took place. Thus, American policy was not the only factor involved. When examining the failed 1956 elections from an international perspective, the fluid nature of the world situation and Diem’s agency emerge as the more important reasons for this failure.
The non-elections of 1956 were critical to future American intervention in Vietnam. With the French out of Vietnam, the British acquiescing to Diem’s refusal to negotiate with the DRV, and Soviet and Chinese acceptance of the indefinite postponement of the 1956 elections, the United States had an open field to continue and increase its already significant nation-building system in South Vietnam. Washington still had to contend with Diem’s continued resistance to American policies, but the biggest challenge to preserving a noncommunist South Vietnam had already begun. Modifying Walter Bedell Smith’s claim that “diplomacy has never been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be held on the battlefield,” Hanoi had decided that what could not be gained diplomatically (reunification of Vietnam) would now be tried on the battlefield.75 Preparations had commenced to increase North Vietnamese activity in the South. Thus, the failure to carry out the 1956 elections limited the possibilities for peace between South and North Vietnam, intensified problems in the Western alliance, and helped ensure that the United States would continue to operate in Vietnam without much international support. In the end, the non-elections ensured the continued reduction of the French presence and paved the way for an increased American presence in Vietnam.