August 1917: London
The man selected to command the new London Air Defence Area (LADA), 45-year-old Major General Edward Bailey Ashmore, at the time commanded the guns of 29th Division on the Western Front. Importantly he had trained as a pilot and had previously held positions at brigade level in the RFC. He perfectly fitted the requirements as outlined in Smuts’ report. It seems he also had a sense of humour.
At the time I was… in the line north of Ypres, and my dugout… was drenched with gas most nights, so that the change to London had, for me at any rate, some advantages. The bombing on the Army fronts had not up to that time amounted to very much, and I am afraid we of the Expeditionary Force were inclined to look on the troubles of London somewhat lightheartedly. The fact that I was exchanging the comparative safety of the Front for the probability of being hanged in the streets of London did not worry me.1
Ashmore took up his new position on 5 August 1917. London, within the context of LADA, extended far beyond the capital. It included all the fixed anti-aircraft guns and searchlights of the London, Harwich, Thames and Medway, and Dover commands, as well as mobile anti-aircraft brigades assigned to the Harwich and Dover commands. At the time of his appointment, Ashmore’s authority also included six RFC squadrons (Nos. 37, 39, 50, 51, 75 and 78, plus Nos. 44, 61 and 112 now forming) as well as all Observer Corps companies of the Royal Defence Corps east of a line drawn across the country from Grantham in Lincolnshire to Portsmouth in Hampshire. However, the new LADA commander quickly discovered that the guns were going to be a problem.
Lieutenant Colonel Simon, London’s gun commander, had requested more guns in June but had seen his plan rejected. He had put forward another scheme on 16 July, supported by Lord French, proposing a ring of gun stations about 25 miles out from London, to break up approaching bomber formations. This plan, requiring many additional guns, also met with rejection from the War Council, with Lord French informed on 9 August, four days after Ashmore took office, that the priority remained to arm merchant ships for defence against U-boats. With no support forthcoming, Simon reshuffled his pack to boost the guns on the main approaches, moving ten there from other parts of the capital and bringing in another 24 from outside London.
Ashmore also considered ways to deal with an increasing ‘friendly fire’ problem. In response he introduced his ‘Green Line’ plan, which specified areas of action (see map, p.xix). In essence the ‘Green Line’ was an imaginary line drawn about 20 miles out from London and surrounding the capital, creating a border before reaching Simon’s 25-mile gun line. Beyond this line the guns had priority, but inside it that priority switched to the defending aircraft. Ashmore admitted that he found it difficult to draft the order, with the resulting wording open to interpretation and leading to some errors of judgement at first.2
Ashmore also recognised the difficulty in getting information to pilots once they were in the air. In daylight hours, since the latter part of 1916, the Ingram system had operated. It consisted of a large white T-shaped marker placed on the ground at airfields, with white discs arranged around it, each configuration conveying a different message and directing pilots towards enemy aircraft. Ashmore was not impressed.
Our pilots had little training in the use of this system, and there was too much delay in setting the signals out to make them of any real value. Practically, therefore, the defenders left the aerodromes without organization, and once in the air received no help from the ground.3
Ashmore advocated another system, reverting to an idea promoted but not adopted as far back as summer 1915.
I arranged for large white arrow signals to be laid out at searchlight positions, and at other points where men were available to work them. The arrow was to be kept pointing to the enemy aircraft so long as they were in sight… Our pilots, seeing the arrow, would know in which direction to look for the enemy. In clear weather these arrows could be seen from a height of 17,000ft.4
Also in early August 1917, pairs of BE12s from No. 37 Squadron and No. 50 Squadron were equipped as wireless telegraphy tracker aircraft. The pilots were able to send back basic messages to ground stations in Morse code giving location, number of aircraft, direction and time, but not height. The trackers, however, could only transmit, they could not receive information.
A week after taking up his new role, Ashmore could report: ‘Our new arrangements, so far as concerned the squadrons close to London, were in fair working order by 10th August. We had not long to wait for them to be tested.’5
On the first day of the Third Battle of Ypres, 31 July 1917, after a two-week preliminary bombardment, the rains came. They continued for three weeks and turned the shattered, cratered landscape into a morass that shaped for many the enduring hellish image of the First World War. This same weather had curbed the impatient Rudolf Kleine for a while, but on 29 July, ignoring the advice of Leutnant Georgii, he authorised a raid. Shortly after crossing the Belgium coast, however, Kleine encountered the bad weather Georgii had forecast, forcing him to turn back.
12 August 1917, 5.55pm: Southend-on-Sea
On Sunday, 12 August, the weather cleared a little during the morning and Kleine decided at short notice to make a raid; it seems unlikely Georgii gave his approval. Due to the lack of recent action many of the men had been granted permission to go into Ghent and Kleine could only muster 13 crews. Kleine’s own crew did not take part and he gave command of the raid to Oberleutnant Richard Walter, the squadron’s senior flight commander. They planned to target the naval facilities at Chatham, with Southend-on-Sea marked as the secondary target. Any individual aircraft forced to fall out near the British coast would target places on the north Kent coast as they headed home. Two Gothas soon dropped out with engine issues, while the remaining 11, encountering strong winds from the south-west, were pushed further north than intended. This would have serious consequences later.
At 5.06pm the formation appeared off Felixstowe, some 20 miles north of the usual line of approach. Flying into the face of a stiff wind, Kagohl 3 followed the coast southwards, managing about 60mph. On reaching the mouth of the Blackwater at 5.30pm, the squadron, now reduced to ten after another had dropped out, followed the river upstream towards Maldon before turning south again, heading towards the airfield at Rochford near Southend, home to the newly formed No. 61 Squadron.
The first RFC pilots took off in response to the raid at 5.14pm while Kagohl 3 followed the coast southwards, and were from No. 46 Squadron, on loan to Home Defence. Many more took to the air but most settled into their standard patrol lines, anticipating a raid on London. Ashmore decided to hold back No. 61 Squadron, as they had no chance of reaching the Gothas on their inward journey, planning to send them up later to intercept the raiders when he had information on their return course.6 But as Kagohl 3 approached Rochford, No. 61 Squadron’s commander, Major Edward Pretyman, took matters into his own hands and sent his squadron up.7
Two bombs dropped on Rochford airfield at 5.50pm, injuring two RFC mechanics, but caused no damage to buildings. Another dropped harmlessly near a railway line. But Walter could see heavy banks of rain cloud towards London and, battling against the wind, he abandoned the idea of a raid on Chatham. Nearing Canvey Island he fired signal flares redirecting the squadron to the secondary target – Southend. Guns at Shoeburyness and others of the Thames and Medway Garrison now burst into action as the first five bombs dropped on Leigh-on-Sea where one, in Lord Roberts Road, passed sideways through a house and buried itself 6ft below the foundations. Luckily for the occupants it failed to detonate. In the next road, Cliffsea Grove, seven houses were rocked by an explosion but the occupants escaped unhurt.
Passing over Westcliff-on-Sea seven more bombs dropped but three failed to explode while the others did no significant damage. And then, at 5.55pm, on to Southend-on-Sea.
Southend, about 40 miles from London by train, had long been a popular summer destination for the capital’s day-trippers and thousands enjoyed the experience each year: a train journey, a walk along the promenade, the beach, the pier, fish and chips for lunch and home before dark. When the ominous drone of Gotha engines filled the sky, many visitors were making their way back to the station for the homeward train to London, ‘others were churchgoers, and a number were making purchases at a newsagent’s shop and an adjoining restaurant’.8 With little cover, those that could crowded into shop doorways. At least five bombs fell within a 200-yard radius of the Great Eastern Railway station off Victoria Avenue, and in the roads leading to the station all hell broke loose.
Alderman Martin of Southend had driven into the town from Rochford.
He came upon a heap of torn and mangled humanity, 20 people in all being involved, and at once conveyed bodies to the mortuary. In the roadway was a little girl [12-year-old Dorothy Rice] who was on her way to a Salvation Army meeting and who was killed. Another victim was a mother of two children, the latter escaping with injuries.9
Walter and Edith Batty had taken their two children to Southend for the day; the parents were both killed and their children injured. Jessie Orton from Bethnal Green died, as did her 5-year-old daughter. Thomas Cornish died too, alongside his 13-year-old daughter Emily, as did a married couple, John and Leah Cohen from Plaistow. It took three or four days before the remains of another woman were identified; Ada Childs was 32 and lived near Regent’s Park in London.
Two bombs just overshot the station. The first exploded in Milton Street.
‘I heard a torpedo whistling through the air,’ said a man who did heroic rescue work. ‘It fell ten yards off as I lay on my face. Down came another and another quite near. I thought I was a dead man. On the other side of the street a Salvation lassie and an old railway guard [Charles Humphries] lay dead.’10
The second of these bombs smashed into a house in Guildford Road and destroyed it. Of the five people inside two, cousins Frederic Hawes (14) and Lena Gooding (7), were killed. About a mile beyond the station an explosion wrecked a house in Lovelace Gardens where a family of three were having tea. Elizabeth West and her daughter Gladys died but Mr West escaped unharmed.
The raid ended by 6.00pm, the final two bombs dropping over Bournes Green and Little Wakering but neither detonated. In the greater Southend area 32 people were dead (17 were from London) and 46 injured. But it could have been worse. Of the 34 bombs that fell between Rochford and Little Wakering, 16 failed to explode.
The official German statement issued to the Press reported:
One of our aviation squadrons yesterday attacked England. Bombs were dropped with visibly good results on the military works of Southend and Margate at the mouth of the Thames. One of our aircraft is missing.11
At the same time Southend’s chief constable, H.M. Kerslake, could not fathom the reason for the attack: ‘There is nothing that we should consider a military objective in Southend.’12
While Kagohl 3 headed homewards with RFC pilots in pursuit, notably from No. 61 Squadron, another 12 bombs fell in the sea. But as the German press release confirmed, bombs had also fallen on Margate.
12 August 1917, 5.40pm: Margate
The lone Gotha that dropped out of the formation earlier with engine problems passed over Margate on its return journey. At 5.40pm anti-aircraft guns opened fire and this attracted RNAS pilots who had taken off earlier from Manston, Eastchurch and Walmer, many flying first-class Sopwith fighting machines, such as the Camel, Triplane and Pup. The first bomb fell in the sea before the bomber passed inland and dropped three more in the Cliftonville district. The first wrecked an unoccupied house in Surrey Road, the second landed in the grounds of Laleham School on Lower Northdown Road, the third about 250 yards further south, in the grounds of Surrey House School on Laleham Road. These last two smashed windows, broke down doors and sent ceilings crashing to the floor amidst great clouds of plaster dust. Back out over the sea and pursued by as many as nine RNAS pilots, the Gotha led a charmed life and, despite attacks from at least six of the pursuers, eventually crossed the Belgium coast on one engine at a height of just 600ft, crash-landing near Ostend. Against the odds the pilot had brought the crew home.13
Flight Lieutenant Harold Kerby had been amongst the pursuers in a Sopwith Pup, but had not managed to engage and turned back. About 30 miles from the British coast, Kerby saw a group of eight Gothas pursued by British aircraft. He attacked but it came to nothing, then he spied a lone Gotha some 4,000ft below the main group and made his move.
Attacked from front and drove him down to water where observed him to turn over. Saw one of occupants hanging on to tail of Gotha. Threw him my lifebelt and did two or three circuits around him and returned to England. On way back observed four Destroyers when at 6000 ft going towards Dunkirk. Fired 3 Very’s lights to try and get them to follow [me] back to machine in water but they continued on their course.14
Although he failed to draw help to the scene, Kerby received the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions.15
The crew of the downed Gotha were lost: 22-year-old commander Leutnant der Reserve Hans Rolin, Unteroffizier Rudi Stolle, 25, (pilot) and Unteroffizier Otto Rosinsky (gunner), aged 21. But Kagohl 3 also lost four other Gothas. As well as the aircraft that crash-landed near Ostend, three others also crashed; one had simply used up the very last drop of fuel as the pilot prepared to land. The wind that had pushed the Gothas further up the coast, and the subsequent battle against it, had consumed valuable fuel. Others may have suffered battle damage, adding to the already inherent difficulties encountered when landing a Gotha. Of the 11 Gothas that had taken part in the raid, defenders had shot down one and four crashed; Kagohl 3 paid a heavy price. The crews of Kagohl 3 claimed three British aircraft shot down, but all pilots returned unharmed.
In Britain, those senior officers concerned with aerial defence had been surprised by the raid, as is shown in the official – secret – report distributed in October 1917; it made no hesitation in pointing the finger of blame for the German losses.
One of the most interesting features of the raid is the comparatively unfavourable nature of the weather in which it was carried out. It was hardly expected that a raid would be attempted on 12th August. The reason is to be found in the character of Hauptmann Kleine, who is known to be a rash and headstrong officer, obsessed by the desire to raid London. He has on several occasions endangered the safety of his machines by taking them out, or ordering them to be taken out for this purpose, in weather utterly unsuited for long distance raiding purposes, and he is responsible for having caused a large number of them to crash in such weather.16
There were also other technical issues that both sides needed to investigate. British pilots were experiencing a great number of gun jams when closing to attack and many of the German bombs were failing to detonate.
August 1917: Germany
While Kleine took stock of his problems, the new moon on 17 August heralded the darkest nights of the month and offered a raiding opportunity for Strasser’s Zeppelins. But that date also set a limit on the further development of the Naval Airship Division. Up to this time the division had been receiving, on average, two new Zeppelins per month. The army’s Erster Generalquartiermeister, Erich Ludendorff, proposed in July an increase in aeroplane production. To facilitate this, he recommended halting airship construction and redirecting the aluminium and rubber to aeroplanes. Admiral Scheer, commanding the High Seas Fleet, leapt to the defence of the Naval Airship Division, pointing out that German bombers were limited to the south-east corner of Britain while Zeppelins could reach the industrial north and midlands. To continue these raids at least one new Zeppelin per month would be needed and, even if the raids were abandoned, a new Zeppelin every two months would still be required to fulfil North Sea reconnaissance duties. On 17 August, the matter reached a conclusion. In future the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea would be limited to 18 Zeppelins with the Naval Airship Division overall capped at 25 and 27 crews, with replacement airships restricted to roughly one every two months.17
Although experiencing a favourable phase of the moon, the weather did not immediately suit a raid on Britain, but scouting missions and patrols continued. One took place in the early hours of 21 August when L 23 left Tondern and headed north up the Jutland coast.18 Some miles in the distance her commander, Oberleutnant-zur-See Bernhard Dinter, sighted a British light cruiser squadron with supporting destroyers. One of the cruisers, HMS Yarmouth, carried a Sopwith Pup able to fly off a platform fitted over her forward guns. The pilot, 25-year-old Flight sub-Lieutenant Bernard Smart, waited while HMS Yarmouth turned into the wind and increased her speed as he prepared for the hazardous take-off. Although some miles off and disappearing behind clouds at times, Smart remained focused on L 23, climbed quickly and closed on the Zeppelin as it turned away from the naval squadron. Dinter transmitted a wireless message: ‘Am pursued by enemy forces.’19 Smart, flying at 7,000ft, had managed to get above L 23, then took up a position to the Zeppelin’s rear and attacked.
[I] dived at roughly an angle of 45 degrees getting up a speed of 130 knots [150mph]. One man and machine gun was observed on top of envelope, but I zigzagged slightly until quite near… When within 150 to 200 yards fired burst of 10 to 15 shots, but they went rather high so nose-dived, flattened out and fired continuously until within 20 yards of stern when flames broke out and I made a sharp dive and swerve to avoid ramming Zeppelin. Having recovered myself I looked back to observe effect.20
His eyes fixed on the fiercely burning stern of the L 23 as the airship rapidly fell away. The flames spread quickly and by the time it hit the sea only a small part of the forward section remained intact. A column of dense black smoke reached ‘an apparently enormous height’ as oil and fuel burned on the surface. Dinter and his 17-man crew were all killed. Bernard Smart located the naval squadron and ditched in the sea close to a pair of destroyers. Soaked through and cold, he determinedly clung to the tailplane of his slowly sinking Sopwith Pup as he waited for the rescue boats to pick him up. His achievement saw him awarded the Distinguished Service Order, but the reason for the award remained secret, preventing information on the cause of L 23’s destruction reaching Germany.
22 August 1917, 12.30am: East Yorkshire
Later that same day, 21 August, Strasser considered the weather suitable and ordered a raid by L 35, L 41, L 42, L 44, L 45, L 46, L 47 and L 51. Both L 35 and L 51 turned back early, while Strasser accompanied the raid onboard L 46, his deputy, Viktor Schütze, lost in the destruction of L 48 over England back in June.
The remaining six Zeppelins arrived off the Yorkshire coast at about 8.30pm, remaining over 60 miles out to sea for around three hours before making their move. But although the officers variously reported bombing shipping near Spurn Head and raids on Lincolnshire, there are no British reports, either official or in the local press, of any bombs falling in these places. What is clear is that the Zeppelins were all at great height – up to 20,000ft – and in the extreme cold experienced at this altitude, liquid compasses froze, despite adding as much as 44 per cent alcohol to prevent such an occurrence.21
Only Kuno Manger’s L 41 made an incursion over Britian that night. He appeared intent on attacking Hull but, thwarted by vigilant searchlights and anti-aircraft guns, his movements were restricted to the area east of the city. Due to L 41’s great height it proved difficult to hold her in the beams of light and for the gunners to accurately find the range, but their efforts appear to have acted as a deterrent.
L 41 crossed the Yorkshire coast near Tunstall at 12.03am heading inland and, after some meandering, dropped an incendiary bomb over the village of Elstronwick, probably for the crew to estimate ground speed, or perhaps even to determine if they were over land or sea.22 From there, heading south-west, Manger passed a few miles east of Hull, remaining unseen until heading between Paull and Ryehill at about 12.30am.
From many points brilliant searchlights were raking a clear starlit sky, and about one o’clock a silvery Zeppelin was revealed in what looked like a circle of fire, and it was quickly exposed to terrific gunfire.23
The searchlight at Paull found L 41 first, at about 12.48am; the Zeppelin slowly began to move towards it.
Now and then flashes would leave the ship, followed by loud explosions; but the noise of the bombardment was so great that it was difficult to distinguish bombs from guns.24
L 41 released seven bombs as she approached Paull, but all landed in open country and were ineffective. At the same time guns at Paull, Marfleet and Chase Hill Farm commenced firing. Held by the lights and under fire, Manger turned away from Paull and at 1.00am passed over Hedon where he dropped five more explosive bombs.
Damage on the east side of the town, on Baxter Gate, affected 11 cottages. And more followed.
All that remains of the Primitive Methodist Chapel are the four walls, which enclose a great heap of debris. The entire building is gutted, the bomb having smashed the pews, pulpit, and galleries to atoms. Across the way, and within a hundred yards, the Roman Catholic Church suffered considerably.25
Damage also occurred at a YMCA hut on the Burstwick Road where a man received slight injuries, the only casualty of the raid. Manger continued and just over a mile further on released three explosive and 12 incendiary bombs, which landed a mile east of the village of Preston. Somewhat surprisingly, L 41 then turned about and headed south once more, using cloud cover where possible, but at 1.10am the Marfleet searchlight found her. Five minutes later, L 41 dropped a single bomb over Thorngumbald, a village between Paull and Ryehill, as guns at Paull and Marfleet opened fire again. At 1.19am L 41 reached the Humber, seemingly uncertain which way to go as searchlights and guns on the south side of the river now joined in, as did others onboard the scout cruiser HMS Patrol and the destroyer HMS Nith. The hunted Zeppelin climbed rapidly, turned away and disappeared into clouds, Manger making good his escape.
RFC pilots from No. 33 and No. 76 squadrons flew 21 sorties that night, but only nine of these took place with L 41 still overland. Yet the aircraft forming the northern squadrons were just not capable of engaging raiders at the heights Zeppelins could now reach. Only two pilots saw L 41, but just one, Second Lieutenant Herbert Solomon of No. 33 Squadron, flying a BE12a from Scampton, opened fire, although he knew the target was beyond the range of his guns.26
Although other Zeppelin commanders claimed successful raids, where their bombs fell remains a mystery. There were unconfirmed reports of Zeppelins and explosions far inland, but no bombs were traced and these were dismissed at the time. Strasser, on board L 46, claimed he came inland and saw the lights of a big city which he thought could be Sheffield but turned back as he felt the distance too great. There were reports from Doncaster of the sound of Zeppelin engines; Doncaster is about 15 miles north-east of Sheffield. Strasser then states that L 46 flew back towards the coast, dropping bombs on Louth, but no bombs fell anywhere in Lincolnshire.
The raid proved ineffective, causing damage estimated at just £2,272, but those responsible for Home Defence were beginning to realise that a new class of Zeppelin had arrived, one that could operate beyond the reach of the northern defences.
***
While Strasser had been fighting for the future of the Naval Airship Division and preparing for his latest raid against the north of England, at the Ghent headquarters of Kagohl 3, after the disappointment and losses of the raid on 12 August, Rudolf Kleine remained as keen as ever to try again. So keen, in fact, that on 18 August he once more ignored the advice of the weather officer, Leutnant Georgii. While Belgium may have been experiencing good weather, it did not indicate the conditions approaching over Britain. Not a single bomber reached England and for Kagohl 3 it evolved into the worst single day in the unit’s history.
Kleine ordered all available Gothas to take part and 26 departed the Ghent airfields. When well out to sea it became apparent that strong winds had blown the formation far north of its planned course. Kleine ordered Kagohl 3 to turn back but they became scattered in the difficult conditions. One Gotha returned direct and only just made the coast before it crash-landed near Zeebrugge. Others passed over neutral Dutch territory and came under heavy fire; two were damaged and, having made emergency landings, their crews were interned by the Dutch. Others managed to reach friendly territory but were forced down or crash-landed when fuel supplies became exhausted. The exact figure is unclear but of the 26 Gothas that took part in the aborted raid, two came down in the Netherlands, one near Zeebrugge and perhaps as many as nine others suffered damage to a greater or lesser extent. Inevitably crews were lost and injured and a least one officer died. Another disaster for Kleine, and one of his own making.
22 August 1917, 10.30am: Margate and Ramsgate
Undeterred by the losses, however, Kleine launched his next raid just four days later. The implications of the previous raid meant only 15 Gothas were available. But with ever present engine malfunctions, five turned back early, including Kleine’s own aircraft. Command of the raid again passing to the senior flight commander, Richard Walter. This time the plan did not include London, instead Sheerness or Chatham as well as Dover were the targets.
News of the bombers approach telephoned from the Kentish Knock lightship at 10.06am led to the first RNAS aircraft getting airborne nine minutes later, swiftly followed by the first of the RFC fighters, taking up their patrol lines to protect London. The defenders flew 138 sorties.
The German bombers were again observed at 10.30am as they approached the north-eastern corner of Kent.27
They were moving slowly… like a flock of birds, in the shape of an inverted letter ‘V’. Anti-aircraft gunners quickly sighted them, and found the range in a remarkably short space of time. Shrapnel could be seen bursting round the raiders…, the invaders appeared like silvery dragon flies glistening in the sunlight. They dodged in and out of the white and black puffs of smoke which appeared just below them.28
The anti-aircraft guns held nothing back and blasted 537 rounds into the sky over the next 16 minutes. And RNAS fighters were engaging too. This combined attention of guns and aircraft proved deadly.
Presently one of the raiders was seen to shudder, and slip sideways. She dropped very slowly, with a spinning motion, then suddenly did something that looked like an attempt to loop the loop. Recovering herself for a moment, she seemed to stand still in the sky, turned completely over, and plunged towards the sea. Margate’s cheer nearly drowned the thunder of the guns.29
The Gotha came down at sea about three-quarters of a mile off Margate. Her commander Leutnant Walter Latowski and the pilot, Leutnant Werner Joschkowetz, died but the 19-year-old gunner, Unteroffizier Bruno Schneider, survived, found clinging to the tailplane of the sinking Gotha by the crew of the destroyer HMS Kestrel. From the confusing aerial engagement three RNAS pilots shared a claim for shooting down the Gotha.
But the remaining Gothas were also in trouble – one shell burst under a Gotha’s wing.
A tongue of fire leapt out from the rear of the aeroplane and it began to descend… The sight of the falling Gotha fascinated and enthralled. Though the machine was rapidly descending the pilot, with a wonderful display of airmanship, managed to keep the keel of his craft fairly even. But as the fire spread the wings fell away and the remainder came toppling down in a shapeless mass.30
The bulk of the Gotha fell in a field about 2 miles from the coast. Despite the best efforts of a farmer, Oberleutnant Echart Fulda, Unteroffizier Heinrich Schildt and Vizefeldwebel Ernst Eichelkamp all died.
With two of his ten aircraft already shot down, Kleine fired flares to divert his remaining force to Dover, but the message, unclear or not seen, saw bombs dropped on Margate and Ramsgate before they reached Dover.
At Margate five hastily dropped bombs fell with limited effect. One wrecked an unoccupied house in Windsor Avenue and seriously damaged the neighbouring property, and two that landed in Approach Road smashed windows in about 60 properties in the vicinity. An unexploded bomb smashed through the roof of 42 Cliftonville Avenue and another buried itself in a potato plot near St Mildred’s Road. There were no injuries.
A single bomb landed in a farmer’s field near Broadstairs before the main attack descended on Ramsgate, where 34 bombs fell over a wide area of the town. A number large buildings, formerly schools, were now occupied by the Canadian military which had a strong presence in the area, being utlised as military hospitals, including Chatham House, which suffered a direct hit, Townley Castle, where three bombs exploded in the grounds, destroying tents and out buildings, and St Lawrence College where three bombs in the grounds smashed numerous windows. The Chatham House bomb crashed through the roof and down to the basement before exploding, causing extensive damage, and killing Private David Crighton of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, working as a butcher/cook, and injuring others. Shortly after the raid the Canadian authorities moved all their hospitals away from the Ramsgate area. A bomb in Church Hill, outside the newspaper offices of the Thanet Advertiser, struck another Canadian soldier, Gunner John Paul, who had taken shelter there. ‘[It] mutilated him so terribly,’ the newspaper reported, ‘that he died soon afterwards.’31
Most of casualties were caused by a bomb that exploded on Military Road at the harbour where granite mooring posts on the quayside ‘were snapped off like carrots’.32 A number of storage facilities cut into the chalk became makeshift shelters, but when the bomb exploded some people were still standing at the entrances. Six men and a 5-year-old girl, Nellie Fox, were killed or died of their injuries, with others badly wounded. One of those killed, Walter Spain, had been out of work for some time but had secured a job earlier that morning. He had gone home, changed his clothes and was on his way back to begin his new job when the raid began. He died while seeking protection at the shelters.33
Other bombs narrowly missed the Ramsgate County School, the Public Library and St George’s Church where people were sheltering in the crypt. The bomb smashed stained glass windows and damaged neighbouring properties. At Ramsgate Town Station a bomb struck one of the platforms ‘shattering a great amount of glass and practically destroying a building which was being used as an emergency canteen to supply the immediate requirements of wounded soldiers’ as they arrived from France, but everyone there escaped injury. Elsewhere, in Picton Road, where ‘houses were shockingly damaged,’ three children were injured.34 Other explosions ravaged buildings in Prince’s Street, High Street, Boundary Road, Alexandra Road, Percy Road, Hollicondane Road, Duncan Road and St Mildred’s Road. Casualties in Ramsgate rose to nine killed and 22 injured.
22 August 1917, 11.10am: Dover
The remaining eight Gothas headed south along the coast towards Dover, engaged by anti-aircraft guns and harried by pilots of the RNAS. A bomb dropped harmlessly in a field at Whitfield then, at 11.10am the Dover guns opened fire, which persuaded two of the Gothas to head straight out to sea, leaving the other six to unload nine bombs on the town.
The first of these exploded in the yard of the Admiral Harvey public house on Bridge Street, killing 17-year-old barmaid Lucy Wall. She had been in the yard and had just asked a neighbour standing at a window if the aeroplanes were German. She told Lucy they were and urged her to go inside, when ‘something fell like a flame of fire fell past the window, and burst below’. Lucy died before helpers could get her on to a stretcher. One of those first on the scene, Ernest Ewell, described the scene in the yard where he found Lucy lying.
There was a bad wound at the top of the left arm, and a deep wound below the left breast. She was lying about 10 yards from the hole made by the bomb, and on the wall behind her, at about the same height as the wounds were marks where it had been struck by pieces of the bomb.35
A bomb in Priory Hill failed to detonate, but another in the grounds of Dover College caused significant damage while injuring four soldiers and two officers – two of the soldiers later died. At 53 Folkestone Road a bomb that passed right through the house failed to detonate, narrowly missing two of the occupants. And at Dover Castle two bombs near the keep killed a horse and seriously injured a soldier of the Royal Defence Corps; two more fell in the harbour close to the RNAS seaplane station.
A Sopwith Camel piloted by Flight sub-Lieutenant Edward Blake from RNAS Manston, one of those who pursued the Gothas to Dover, received credit for shooting down a third Gotha as the raiders turned for home. Of the ten bombers that had reached Britain, three had been shot down and another crashed as it neared Ghent with the loss of all onboard. Added to the losses during the aborted raid four days earlier and those incurred in the raid of 12 August, the situation appeared unsustainable. Kleine urgently needed to reassess his strategy.
For Edward Ashmore it had been eventful first 18 days in command of the wider London defences. But he had no time to feel complacent because the elements that made up LADA – the aeroplanes, guns, searchlights and observers – would soon be facing a new, more challenging examination.