The resources deployed to oppose the raid on the morning of 22 August were impressive. The Kent anti-aircraft guns fired 1,449 rounds at the ten Gothas, which had quickly been reduced by losses to eight and then seven by the time they set course back to Belgium. In addition, the RNAS had 17 aircraft airborne from the air stations at Dover, Eastchurch, Manston and Walmer, harrying and attacking the raiders. At the same time the RFC flew 121 sorties, despatched from the usual wide-range of RFC formations, an increasing number of which were made by first rate fighters. Most of these aircraft took off in anticipation of an attack on London so did not see action, but it demonstrated how far the defence organisation had progressed in the short time since the daylight raids commenced three months earlier. In addition, aircraft based in France had kept up the pressure on the returning Gothas, and for the first time a BE12 ‘tracker’ aeroplane, flown by Second Lieutenant Leonard Lewis of No. 50 squadron, transmitted a wireless telegraphy message from air to ground giving the position and direction of the Gothas returning past Dover.
Back in July, Lieutenant General Smuts had been asked to prepare a report looking into Home Defence arrangements against air raids and secondly, the air organization generally and the higher direction of aerial operations. He had delivered the first report on 19 July then, on 17 August, came the second part. Again, he had listened to those with expert knowledge, and once more Lieutenant General Sir David Henderson, Director General of Military Aeronautics, proved a big influence. The report’s recommendations proved momentous.
Looking ahead, Smuts acknowledged the likely future impact of air power.
As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.1
Smuts recommended the creation of an Air Ministry to replace the rather limited scope of the current Air Board, and an air force independent of the army and navy. He advocated ‘[A Ministry] consisting of a Minister with consultative Board on the lines of the Army Council or Admiralty Board… This Ministry to control and administer all matters in connexion with aerial warfare of all kinds whatsoever’. Within this ministry ‘an Air Staff be instituted on the lines of the Imperial General Staff responsible for the working out of war plans, the direction of operations, the collection of intelligence, and the training of the air personnel’.2
And then came the recommendation directly affecting the personnel of the RNAS and RFC.
That the Air Ministry and Staff proceed to work out the arrangement necessary for the amalgamation of the [RNAS] and [RFC] and the legal constitution and discipline of the new Air Service, and to prepare the necessary draft legislation and regulations, which could be passed into operation next autumn and winter.3
Smuts’ recommendations were accepted by the War Council on 24 August. For now, the RNAS and the RFC continued their separate courses, but on 1 April 1918 a new independent air organisation would take to the skies – the Royal Air Force.
Interestingly, Hugh Trenchard, commanding the RFC in France, and often considered the ‘father of the air force’ had opposed the change during wartime.
I thought that if anything were done at the time to weaken the Western Front, the war would be lost and there would be no air service, united or divided… Henderson had twice the insight and understanding that I had. He was prepared to run risks rather than lose a chance which he saw might never come again. He did so with no thought of self-interest, and it is doubtful whether the R.A.F. or Britain realises its debt to him, which is as least as great as its debt to Smuts.4
Britain’s air defences had acquitted themselves well in August and plans were in motion to secure a wider, more co-ordinated commitment to the future of air defence. Yet this comfortable position, without warning, now turned upside down – Rudolf Kleine switched Kagohl 3 from daylight to night-time raids.
The losses suffered by Kagohl 3 during August could not be allowed to continue. While aeroplanes could be replaced, it took time to train new crews to replace those killed or injured in combat or the increasing numbers injured or killed in landing accidents. After the raid on 22 August, Kleine halted the campaign. The switch to night bombing meant an intense period of training for his crews to acquaint themselves with the very different experience of flying and navigating over the featureless North Sea in the dark. But unlike the Zeppelins, which used the darkest nights of the month to try and hide their great bulk, the smaller and more nimble Gotha aircraft timed their attacks to coincide with brighter moonlit nights.
***
2 September 1917, 11.05pm: Dover
On the night of 2 September, while Kagohl 3 were completing their retraining, another squadron attacked Dover. That night Kagohl 4, generally employed against Allied positions on and behind the Western Front, made an attack on the French Channel ports. A very clear, starry night meant those on the Kent coast could see the anti-aircraft fire. Then, without warning, the action moved closer to home.
… at 10.55pm we could distinctly hear Aircraft approaching from S.E. and was over us at 11.05pm, a few minutes later bombs were dropped on Dover… Neither the anti-aircraft guns or searchlights of the Dover defences came into action.5
Dover had indeed been caught off-guard. A single aircraft had broken off from the raid on the French coast, its crew making an attack on Dover. It came inland close to Dover Castle where three bombs fell on the camp of the 6th (Reserve) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, at Northfall Meadow. One of them destroyed a hut, killing Second Lieutenant Henry Larcombe and injuring another officer of the battalion and two men of a Labour Corps company attached to the Fusiliers.
Passing on the north side of Dover Castle, the next bomb, a dud, fell in the grounds of a VAD hospital at Castlemount. The authorities showed much interest in the bomb, an adapted 25-cm trench mortar shell nicknamed by British soldiers the ‘Crashing Christopher’, weighing in at over 90kg. It appears to have been an innovation limited to Kagohl 4. The next three bombs were of the small 12kg type: one damaged a cottage in Castlemount Road, blowing out the side wall and slightly injuring a young girl, before seconds later two fell in neighbouring Leyburn Road damaging two houses. Another exploded at Prospect Cottages, to the rear of Maison Dieu Road, shattering walls and injuring two women. The next two, a 50kg bomb and a ‘Crashing Christopher’, ripped through Crundall’s Timber Yard, located just off High Street, wrecking the sawmill and a timber shed. They also made a huge crater in the rear garden of the Angel Inn on High Street.
[It] did a tremendous amount of damage by concussion to the backs of the houses in Wood St. and High St. People had to be got out of their bedroom windows so badly were the houses knocked about.6
Three bombs fell on the Western Heights, part of Dover’s defences dating back to the Napoleonic Wars, leaving craters but causing no casualties. A final bomb fell in the sea. The raid had not been a particularly damaging one, but it gave evidence of a change in tactics about to be embraced in earnest by Kagohl 3. Night time raids on Britain, and particularly London, were about to become the norm.
***
Edward Ashmore, the commander of LADA, had received information that Kagohl 3 pilots were practising night flying and accepted the inevitable: ‘I had every reason to expect aeroplane raiding at night.’ For him that caused a problem as his improved defences were created to oppose daylight raids.
To fly the more efficient scout machine at night was not considered possible. This opinion was impressed on me at the time by the RFC commanders, who were men not in the least likely to underate the possibilities of their pilots.7
It meant a return to the older, slower aircraft types that had been successfully deployed against the Zeppelins but which Ashmore realised ‘were quite incapable of catching a Gotha, even if they could find one’.
The overall warning system at LADA headquarters, however, worked well, as Ashmore explained.
The first indication of a raid, generally before the enemy crossed our coast-line, was reported to the duty officer… the staff and telephone operators on duty were summoned to their ‘action’ positions… The code word ‘Readiness’ was then issued on the direct lines, to warn for action all guns, searchlights, aerodromes, etc. Scotland Yard were also informed, in order that the police and fire brigades should make their preparations.
As soon as ‘Readiness’ was received, the fighter squadrons would have machines lined up, and the pilots dressed and waiting in them.
When the approach of the enemy was confirmed, the order to patrol was sent out…
The progress of the raid was reported by the observer cordons and other reporting stations. These had special telephone facilities, known as the ‘Airbandit’ system, from the code word used to ensure priority.
Once the message arrived at LADA headquarters it passed to Ashmore. The responsibility for civilian warnings principally lay with the Home Office, relying on information provided by Ashmore.
… for the sake of speed, the process was made automatic. The warnings were arranged in a colour code as follows:
‘Readiness’ – Warning troops, police, etc., for action.
‘Green’ – Air raid is threatened.
‘Red’ – Air raid is imminent.
‘White’ – Enemy clear of the district.
‘Yellow’ – Cancel all precautionary measures.
‘Turn in’ – To all troops, etc.
There was in the operations room a map divided into the various warning districts, with an ingenious arrangement of coloured lamps behind it. When a particular district was threatened, I had only to press a switch, and the district on the map turned green; when attack was imminent another switch turned the district red. These colour signals went automatically to the Telephone Trunks Manager at the G.P.O. [General Post Office], who was supplied with a list of warnings to be issued in each case…
In anticipation of further raiding, probably by night, we had constant rehearsals of the control system… On the evening of 3rd September, during a rehearsal at which Lord Derby – then Secretary of State for War – was present, a real warning came through. With some tact Lord Derby at once withdrew.8
***
3 September 1917, 11.12pm: Chatham
In Belgium, Kleine decided the time had come to launch Kagohl 3 on its first night raid. But for this initial action he chose not to strike London but the closer target of Chatham with its naval facilities. Kleine called for volunteers and selected five crews, including his own. Gone were the formations of the daylight campaign, now the bombers took off at five-minute intervals to avoid the risk of collision in the dark. Shortly after take-off, however, one of the Gothas turned back with engine problems. Some things did not change.
Ashmore received the first report of hostile aircraft at LADA headquarters at 10.35pm when engine sounds were heard from the North Foreland, on the north-eastern corner of Kent. Moments later one of the Gothas turned inland between Westgate and Margate, flying south-east across Thanet, heard but unseen as it searched for a target. The intrusion achieved little.
It remained for some minutes then proceeded, after dropping two bombs in a meadow. Five more bombs were dropped at a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, two falling in oat fields, two in a potato field, and a fifth on a shed at the rear of an unoccupied house. No other damage was done.9
The remaining three Gothas continued their westward course following the Thames Estuary, however, the searchlights sweeping the sky struggled to find them in the bright moonlight.
In Chatham no one expected a raid. Those who had been to the music halls or picture palaces were advised of gun practice taking place that night, and six RFC aircraft were in the air as part of Ashmore’s rehearsal, although two had just landed when those first bombs dropped near Margate. Inexplicably the telephone warning for Chatham met with a delay.
The leading Gotha bypassed Chatham before turning back and approaching the town from the west, dropping its first two bombs at Frindsbury and Rochester at 11.10pm without causing any damage, although one landed dangerously close to a gas works.
Across the River Medway in Chatham four bombs fell around the Royal Naval Barracks. Two, falling either side of the huge Drill Shed, caused only minor damage, but the two that hit the building brought tragedy and devastation.
The Drill Hall, about 250 yards long with a glazed roof, served as an overspill dormitory for about 700 sailors, packed close together and sleeping in hammocks. At 11.12pm two 50kg bombs smashed through the glass roof and exploded with terrific force within the hall sending lethal shards of razor-sharp glass arrowing downwards amongst the sleeping sailors. Those outside the Drill Hall rushed to give what help they could. One of them, E. Cronk, witnessed the full horror.
I shall never forget that night… we of the rescue party picking out bodies, and parts of bodies from among glass and debris and placing them in bags – fetching out bodies in hammocks and laying them on a tarpaulin on the parade ground (you could not identify them). I carried one sailor to the sick-bay who was riddled with shrapnel and had no clothes left on him…
It was one of the most terrible nights I have ever known – crying and moaning of dying men who ten minutes before had been fast asleep.10
Another of the rescuers, Ordinary Seaman Frederick Turpin, also left an account.
It was a gruesome task. Everywhere we found bodies in a terribly mutilated condition. Some with arms and legs missing and some headless. The gathering up of the dismembered limbs turned one sick… It was a terrible affair and the old sailors, who had been in several battles, said they would rather be in ten Jutlands or Heligolands than go through another raid such as this.11
The final casualty toll of those in the Drill Hall reached 130 killed12 with another 86 injured – the greatest loss of life in a single incident throughout the German air offensive against Britain. But the raid continued.
Two bombs exploded harmlessly on open ground on the edge of the dockyard, followed by three along the Inner Lines defences of Chatham. A bomb struck Trinity School and another Mansion Row, but one that exploded in gardens about 50 yards from the Sally Port injured five people. Two of them were Royal Navy personnel; one, Engine Room Artificer Claude McIntyre later died of his injuries.
The jury were taken to the bedside of George Downs, who said he was with McIntyre at the time of the raid, in company with two girls. The girls began to run but witness said ‘what is to be will be,’ so they stood still, and at once a bomb fell in front of them.13
In the garden of Government House, between Chatham Barracks and the Garrison Church, three bombs exploded amongst growing potatoes, and three that dropped on the open space of the Great Lines, between Chatham and Gillingham, exploded about 250 yards west of the Royal Naval Hospital. The explosions shattered numerous windows in the area. Another smashed directly into a house at 2 Church Terrace, Luton, on the outskirts of Chatham, where George Longley, a draper’s assistant, and his wife Mary, were in their dining room. Their son, two daughters and a niece were all in bed when Mrs Longley thought she heard an aeroplane so her husband went into the garden to investigate. As he did so the bomb smashed down through the house to explode in the cellar, ‘blowing the place to pieces’ and damaging the houses on either side. Two policemen saw the explosion, then a great cloud of dust engulfed the house.
Cries for help were coming from the ruins and [Police Sergeant Ernest Hoare] and others set to work to rescue, and after a time brought out Mr Longley’s daughter and niece neither of whom was badly hurt.14
All members of the family, except Mary, were eventually pulled from the rubble, bearing surprisingly light injuries. Only on the following day did they find Mary Longley’s lifeless body, buried half upright in the wreckage of her home.
South of the naval complex, seven 12kg bombs fell on the town. Two straddled the Town Hall, one exploding on open ground near the Royal Sailors’ Home and the other in Town Hall Gardens. A bomb at 139 High Street damaged a house and a pub, then four landed close to Chatham railway station, damaging homes and other buildings but injured only one person. Finally, about 2 miles south-east of Chatham, a couple of bombs dropped in a field at Shawsted and amongst growing hops near Capstone.
One of the Gothas still had bombs on board when, at 11.50pm, it approached the Isle of Sheppey and began dropping 12 bombs around the village of West Minster inflicting only minimal damage, although there were near misses at a gasworks and an isolation hospital. The final three bombs on Sheppey landed closer to Sheerness: one on the Naval Recreation Ground and two on the Royal Naval Balloon Ground, but this only resulted in damage to a garage.
Although no anti-aircraft guns opened fire from Chatham, at 11.48pm the first of the guns on the Isle of Sheppey briefly engaged a fleeting target, joined by others, but none were in action for more than 90 seconds as the last Gotha headed back down the Thames Estuary. Other guns, at Whitstable and Herne Bay, also engaged briefly at 11.57pm. The last bomb dropped near the North Foreland at 12.17am but failed to detonate.
The handful of RFC pilots involved in the raid rehearsal were joined in the air by seven others from three night-flying squadrons: Nos. 37, 39 and 50. They saw nothing of the enemy, but there were also three other pilots – surprisingly – in the air. No. 44 Squadron based at Hainault Farm in Essex flew Sopwith Camels but were considered a daylight squadron, due to concerns over the perceived danger of flying an aircraft with such sensitive handling at night. The squadron commander, 22-year-old Captain Gilbert Murlis Green was a skilled pilot with victories to his credit in Macedonia, and felt aggrieved to be denied this chance of action. He contacted Home Defence Brigade and eventually gained permission to take off, accompanied by Captain Christopher Brand and Second Lieutenant Charles Banks.
Cecil Lewis, now a flight commander with No. 44 Squadron, had never flown at night and offered observations on the problems these pilots faced in the Camel.
Most of the pilots had no experience of night flying. None of the machines were fitted with instrument lights, so to go up in the dark meant flying the machine by feel, ignorant of speed, engine revs, and of the vital question of oil pressure. If this gave out, a thing which happened quite frequently, a rotary engine would seize up in a few minutes, and the pilot might be forced down anywhere.15
Undaunted, Murlis Green, Brand and Banks took off. They saw nothing but all touched down again safely, as Captain Brand delightedly recalled.
We patrolled for about 40 minutes then returned for news, and incidentally to find out if we could effect a safe landing. This successfully accomplished convinced us of the delightful qualities of our machine (Sopwith Camel), and the exhilaration of our new adventure created the most intense excitement and eagerness among the other pilots.16
Ashmore shared their excitement: ‘This was perhaps the most important event in the history of air defence.’17
While Ashmore delighted in this development, Kleine could also express his happiness with the outcome of the Englandgeschwader’s first night raid. They had found their target and bombed it, while facing little in the way of opposition. Keen to strike again with the moon still full, Kleine called for volunteers and ordered a raid on London for the following night. Eleven crews stepped forward.
4 September 1917, 10.25 – 11.00pm: Orfordness, Margate, Tiptree and Dover
As on the previous night, the Gothas took off at five-minute intervals but two aborted the mission after engine problems developed. The first Gotha appears to have lost its course and reached the Suffolk coast at about 10.25pm near Orfordness, about 50 miles north of the Thames Estuary. Flares burning at the Orfordness Experimental Station airfield attracted the Gotha which quickly dropped seven bombs before turning back out to sea. None found the target.18
At 10.38pm, a Gotha approached Margate’s Cliftonville district and, keeping close to the coast, also dropped seven bombs. One, in Oval Gardens, failed to explode and two in Eastern Esplanade smashed windows in ten properties. Two falling in Surrey Road practically demolished No. 13 but five women inside were fortunate to suffer only minor injuries. These bombs also significantly damaged No. 5, injured a young couple walking past the Hotel Florence, and affected properties in Cornwall Gardens. In all, the bombs damaged about 29 buildings and injured eight people.19
Another lone Gotha strayed into rural Essex at about 11.00pm, dropping 11 bombs near Tiptree where a searchlight flickered across the sky. All fell on farmland, breaking windows to the value of a little over £3.20
At 10.40pm, while these individual Gothas dropped bombs over Kent, Suffolk and Essex and the remaining aircraft continued towards London, a single Gotha from Kagohl 4 made another sudden attack on Dover. As on the previous occasion, amongst its bombload were adapted 25cm ‘Crashing Christopher’ mortar shells. Three bombs fell in Dover harbour before the Gotha flew a straight course, east to west, over the town. Bombs fell on Pencester Meadow in the centre of the town, on a nearby timber mill and at the rear of a property in Biggin Street, with much of the force striking homes in Queen’s Court, but everyone involved escaped injury. The next two bombs, mortar shells, struck houses in Priory Hill but failed to detonate, although flying rubble killed the unfortunate Henry Long. Another of the ‘Crashing Christophers’ exploded with great force behind two houses in Widred Road. Both were wrecked, killing Edward Little, aged 73, and badly injuring his married daughter, Minnie Smith. She finally succumbed to her injuries in October. Her husband and three others were also hurt. Two bombs in Odo Road resulted in the lower half of No. 14 being wrecked, the upper floor only held in place by the houses on either side. The family, who were fortunately in the upper part at the time, escaped. Of the final three bombs, one in a back garden in Edred Road caused no damage, another exploded on the roof of 56 Union Road, blasting the occupiers down the staircase, and the last exploded at the end of Union Road on the local Corporation’s refuse tip. The attack lasted about a minute. No one sighted the raider, although they heard it; the local defences had no time to come into action.
The confused information flooding into Home Defence headquarters from observers with little experience of tracking aeroplane sounds at night, resulted in an official statement that a force of 26 Gothas were over south-east England with ten reaching the capital, whereas there were only nine raiders and just five over London.
As soon as LADA headquarters believed the raiders were heading for London, the warning system swung into operation. ‘The warning was received between 11.15 and 11.30pm. Special Constables and Red Cross VAD units were mobilised, and police appeared on cycles with the ‘Take Cover’ notice.’21 But no maroons exploded in the sky – they were only to be used as a daytime warning. Those who lived close to Underground stations gathered their children and sought subterranean safety, as did many theatregoers emerging into the cool night air from their evening’s entertainment. London did not have long to wait for the main act.