For the Air Commandos 1945 opened almost literally with a bang. The last few days of 1944 had seen the pilots of the 5th Fighter Squadron attack the usual bridges and enemy positions along the Irrawaddy. Lynn, the squadron commander, had something more spectacular in mind, however. He had long believed that the 500-pound bombs the P-47s usually carried were too light to inflict serious damage to bridges. The Air Commandos had hung two 1,000-pounders on their Thunderbolts occasionally, but Lynn wanted to use three of these big bombs. He talked to Pitts, the 6th’s commander, at Asansol and asked him if he thought the idea was feasible. Pitts thought so and agreed to make a test flight carrying the three bombs.
Klarr’s P-47 was chosen for the test and was loaded with a 1,000-pounder under each wing and one under the fuselage. Pitts flew the test himself on December 30. After dropping full flaps and applying full power to the Jug, Pitts lumbered off the runway. The takeoff run took a bit more ground than normal, but plenty of runway remained. Pitts thought the fighter flew pretty well, although turns were somewhat sluggish. After becoming comfortable with his plane’s handling characteristics, Pitts dropped the bombs in a standard glide-bombing run. The bombs came off smoothly, and Pitts radioed Lynn to go ahead and fly a mission.
Lynn was eager to go, and on the afternoon of January 1, he and Lt. Malcom Wilkins, the 5th’s operations officer, each with three of the big bombs, staggered off from Fenny bound for Taungdwingyi and its important bridge. The bridge was sixty miles south of Meiktila, and it carried the main Mandalay–Rangoon rail line. This was a long mission—a round trip of seven hundred miles—and the planes had to climb to over 10,000 feet to clear the Chin Hills. Lynn attacked the bridge first, dropping his two wing bombs, then returning to drop his fuselage bomb. Wilkins followed, dropping all three of his bombs on his pass. Lynn scored a direct hit with one of his bombs and knocked out one of the bridge’s spans. Lynn’s other bombs were near-misses. Following the return to Fenny, a check of the fighters’ fuel tanks showed they had about thirty minutes of fuel still available. Although the concept of hauling three 1,000-pounders was proven, the Air Commandos never flew another mission with them. Range was greatly reduced when carrying these weapons, and this was too valuable to waste.1
The ACG’s 5th Fighter Squadron continued to attack bridges and rail facilities with success, but one of its more spectacular missions was flown on January 3, when thirteen aircraft defied heavy antiaircraft fire to bomb oil refineries at Yenangyaung. Dense columns of smoke soaring thousands of feet in the air attested to the accuracy of the bombing. An escort mission to Mandalay on January 13 was a bit more difficult. Second Lt. Earl Price was shot down but evaded capture and returned to the squadron in February.2 Two days later eighteen P-47s hit the airfield at Heho. After bombing the runway the planes strafed hangarettes scattered about the field. As Lynn passed over a hangarette he had been strafing, he noticed white smoke coming from it. He circled the field to allow his flight to catch up and saw the white smoke had turned to a heavy black cloud. He thought little of it then, believing the enemy had probably stored fuel there.
The 5th Fighter Squadron was flying at a rapid pace, escorting B-24s to Mingaladon on January 16 and 12th BG Mitchells to Hsumhsai and Nawnghkio on January 17. The first mission was a milk run, but heavy antiaircraft fire greeted the Air Commandos on the second mission. This fire was accurate and holed six planes, one seriously, but no one was wounded, and all planes returned home.
It was a different story on January 18 when they returned to Heho. After safely escorting B-25s attacking the Heho and Aungban airfields, eighteen P-47s dropped down to strafe. Lynn led the attack again and set afire a hangarette. Making a second run he saw an Oscar surrounded by flames in the hangarette he had just strafed. His pass was similar to the one he had made on the 15th, and he saw the remains of a Lily in the hangarette he had hit on that raid. Upon his return to Fenny Lynn put in claims for a Lily destroyed and an Oscar probably destroyed.3
One Air Commando did not return from Heho. First Lt. Richard T. Gilmore’s plane was struck by ground fire. He pulled up and bailed out. Others in his flight saw Gilmore land safely, and plans were dispatched to rescue him. Before he could be reached, however, he was captured. He suffered brutal treatment as a POW in Rangoon, and although he survived the war, his health had been ruined by this mistreatment.4
On the ground by mid-January, Slim was ready to unleash his troops on the enemy in an operation named Multivite. With typical English humor, the operation consisted of the following four phases, designated as vitamins:
1. Vitamin A—A concentration of IV Corps, less non-motorized elements, in the vicinity of Pauk;
2. Vitamin B—The securing of a bridgehead in the vicinity of Nyaungu by the 7th Division;
3. Vitamin C—A concentration of motorized elements of the IV Corps (the 17th Division, less one brigade) in the bridgehead, and:
4. Vitamin D—A rapid advance to Meiktila and the seizure and construction of an airfield there for use in a fly-in of a brigade group of the 17th Division.5
As can be seen by these phases, Meiktila, not the storied city of Mandalay, was Multivite’s primary objective. An attack toward Mandalay would most likely just push back the Japanese, whereas Meiktila offered a great opportunity to trap, then annihilate, the enemy. Meiktila was also the site of several airfields and supply dumps, as well as a major rail and road junction. The British army commander proposed an attack by XXXIII Corps on Mandalay to hold the defenders in place while he secretly moved his IV Corps south to the area between Chauk and Pakokku. From there, the corps would head directly for Meiktila. Although Slim stated later that the choice of Pakokku probably came out of discussions with his staff, it may be that he remembered Wingate proposing back in March 1944 the possibility of using one of his Chindit brigades against Meiktila via Pakokku.6
In preparation for the attack toward Meiktila Air Vice Marshal Vincent, commander of the 221 Group, chaired a meeting at Fourteenth Army headquarters on January 26. Among those in attendance were planning officers from Fourteenth Army and the Combat Cargo Task Force, Colonel Gaty, and Col. Arthur R. DeBolt, the 2nd ACG’s leader, and his operations officer, now–Lt. Col. Levi Chase. It was decided at this meeting that air operations for the IV Corps’ drive on Meiktila would be handled almost entirely by the two Air Commando groups, with the exception of some fighters from the 221 Group for interceptor duty and some Combat Cargo Task Force aircraft. The Air Commandos would be responsible for close support, fighter cover, transport, and glider duties, with one 1st ACG liaison squadron for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, casualty evacuation, and liaison. Also, the fighter squadrons were to undertake tactical reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance missions as soon as possible.7
Following this meeting, Stratemeyer decided to combine the fighter and transport squadrons of the two Air Commando groups into a pair of provisional groups. The 1st Provisional Fighter Group, which also contained the B-25 Night Intruders, was commanded by Chase of the 2nd ACG. Major Neil I. Holm, the 319th TCS’s leader, commanded the 1st Provisional Troop Carrier Group. A proposal by Maj. Vincent Ulery of the 165th LS to combine all of the liaison squadrons into one organization was denied, however. Probably, it was thought that the widespread operations of these squadrons would create more of an administrative headache than consolidating command was worth.8
Although Arnold had specified that the Air Commandos were to be under USAAF operational control always, Stratemeyer performed a bit of sleight of hand regarding who actually controlled their actions during Operation Multivite. Nominally, Combat Cargo Task Force headquarters held control over the two Air Commando groups. However, Col. Robert D. Gapen was detached to the 224 Group headquarters to be the Combat Cargo Task Force representative there, where he was to exercise operational control of the Air Commandos. Actually, the staff of the 224 Group ran the show in violation of Arnold’s directive. Stratemeyer would state later, in commenting on a USAAF Evaluation Board report on air operations in the CBI that mentioned this arrangement, that the Air Commandos had remained in the U.S. chain of command, with the commanding general of Combat Cargo Task Force retaining operational control, and that Gapen’s position was just to coordinate the Air Commando’s operations with the No. 224’s headquarters.9
Meanwhile, prior to the January 26 meeting, on January 14, the XXXIII Corps’ 19th Indian Division crossed the barrier of the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay. Believing this to be the Fourteenth Army’s main thrust, the Japanese rushed reserves to the bridgehead in a desperate attempt to wipe it out. For a month, from January 20 to February 20, heavy fighting raged, which cost the enemy dearly in losses that could not be sustained. While the Japanese were stubbornly resisting the XXXIII Corps’ attacks, Slim’s IV Corps prepared to swing around the Fourteenth Army’s right flank to get behind the Japanese and cut them off. On the evening of February 14, the IV Corps’ 7th Division crossed the Irrawaddy south of Pakokku. Embroiled in fighting with the XXXIII Corps near Mandalay, the Japanese were unable to bring up enough defenders to contain this new threat. On February 21 IV Corps broke through the Japanese lines and drove toward Meiktila.10