With the war over, the clamor of the American public and politicians to bring the boys home rose to a deafening roar. The resulting implosion of America’s armed services had a devastating impact on the country’s military capabilities that was revealed just five years later with the outbreak of the Korean War. But that was in the future, and in the fall of 1945, the joy of ending a bloody and costly conflict overrode anyone’s contemplations of other wars.
Certainly not immune to these cutbacks were the Air Commandos. The end of the war found most of the Air Commando squadrons widely separated, particularly the liaison units. The 1st ACG’s fighters were at Asansol, while the 2nd’s were at Kalaikunda. For these men, much of their time was spent sightseeing, as flying time was slashed and men began returning home. The 1st ACG’s liaison squadrons were at Asansol also, but the 2nd ACG’s had left the group earlier to move to Okinawa, where they had been farmed out to various commands. The 127th LS was initially attached to the Thirteenth Air Force and then was with the Seventh Air Force. Both the 155th LS and 156th LS had been attached to the Fifth Air Force and then went to Pacific Air Command, U.S. Army. The 127th LS was inactivated in November 1945, and the other two squadrons were inactivated in January 1946. Finally, in a paper transaction, the 1st ACG and the 2nd ACGs, their fighter squadrons, and the 1st ACG’s three liaison squadrons were inactivated at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, in November 1945.1
Prior to this, the two group’s C-47 squadrons had remained active, both moving to China in September to transport men and equipment around the country. After turning over its planes to other units in China, the 319th TCS returned to India in early November, followed shortly thereafter by the 317th TCS, which also left its aircraft behind. Other than take part in the usual military formations, there was little for the men to do in India except relax and sightsee as their numbers quickly dwindled. On December 27, 1945, the 319th TCS was inactivated in India. The 317th TCS followed into the history books on February 28, 1946.2
The squadrons of the 3rd ACG hung on a bit longer. When the cease-fire was announced, the group’s fighter pilots were still on Luzon. They did not arrive on Ie Shima until August 28, but they did get in a few missions over Japan before V-J Day. The 318th TCS also did not move to the island until late in the month. The 5th Air Liaison Group (Provisional) was discontinued on September 10, and the 157th LS was assigned to the Fifth Air Force, while the 159th LS went to the Thirteenth Air Force. Only the 160th LS survived the immediate demobilization, although it went to Korea, where it operated apart from the rest of the 3rd ACG. The 157th was inactivated on October 25, 1946, and the 159th was inactivated on May 31, 1946.3
Olson received orders to proceed home on September 2, and Mahurin replaced him as group commander. Mahurin returned to the United States on November 20 and was succeeded by Col. Charles H. Terhune Jr. Meanwhile, the group’s stay on Ie Shima was relatively short. A few days following the official surrender ceremonies, the 318th TCS moved to Atsugi just outside Tokyo. There, it was heavily involved in transporting occupation troops into Japan and flying ex-POWs back to Okinawa for further movement home. By September 15 most of the 318th and the 343rd ADS were stationed at Atsugi.
The 3rd ACG fighter squadrons made the move to Japan on September 20, when the Mustangs and a few ground personnel flew to Atsugi on the first leg of a trip that eventually led to Chitose on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The fighters settled in there to perform air defense missions and other occupation chores. Then, on March 25, 1946, the 3rd ACG and all its remaining squadrons were inactivated at Chitose.4
The history of the World War II Air Commandos was thus relatively short, not much more than two years for the oldest group, the 1st ACG. And their times in combat were even more brief. Yet they accomplished much in that time. Operation Thursday had been remarkable, demonstrating that a large ground force could be flown in behind enemy lines and completely supplied and supported by air. That Thursday was not a complete success was not the fault of the Air Commandos or the Chindits. It was supposed to be part of a larger Allied offensive, and when that overarching effort was not made, the Chindits were left exposed. Nonetheless, Operation Thursday showed that with strong leadership, innovative tactics, and full commitment, much could be achieved.
Likewise, the 2nd ACG’s spectacular Don Muang raid showcased the flexibility and capability of the Air Commandos. Perhaps not surprisingly, the mission (the longest fighter mission on record to the time) was not mentioned in either the official history of the USAAF in World War II or in the official USAAF chronology of the war.
Primarily because it arrived late in the war and involved a command, the FEAF, that already had a number of groups committed to action, the 3rd ACG was unable to fully display its flexibility. It still performed all the tasks it was given admirably.
The most-respected Air Commando units were perhaps the light plane squadrons. They flew everyone and everywhere, carrying senior ground officers, delivering messages, dropping supplies, and the like. The evacuation of sick and wounded troops from the front lines drew the loudest praise from the troops, though. This one mission provided the infantry with confidence and faith that they would be taken care of and not left to suffer in the jungles of Burma and the Philippines.
Following the end of the war Arnold issued his Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War, in which he discussed USAAF activities during the last year of the war and looked to the future of the service he had led. One of the “new concepts” he mentioned in this report was of fully equipped airborne task forces that were able to strike far distant points and could be totally supplied by air. In other words, it was an extension of the Air Commando concept.5
But this idea was not to be. For some, the Air Commando concept had been too exotic. The groups never quite fit into a “proper” USAAF organizational structure, so no tears were shed at the dissolution of the Air Commandos by the skeptics who had never conceived the enormous possibilities of unconventional warfare afforded by these units. As the noted military theorist Liddell Hart wrote, “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind, is to get the old one out.”6
Alison put it another way. In an April 1944 report to General Giles, Alison stated, “Air Commando is a way of thinking and not a branch of the Air Force.”7 This way of thinking escaped many in the USAAF and, later, the USAF, but not all.
Cochran had his own ideas on why the World War II Air Commandos did not survive. In a 1975 interview he said,
The first one . . . was a task force, and it was a single-purpose organization that was to run about six months and just work itself out and go away. But as we kept building, and building, and building, we realized that this could be another form of combat unit. . . . The closest organizational unit to what we had was a group in the [Army] Air Force[s]. So they made up a provisional group . . . because after we got over there, we had to have a number. . . . This was an attempt to make order out of this completely different kind of unit that was floating around, the task force. So they formalized it and made it a group. Well, then they said, “Well, now we can make more groups of Air Commandos, and it will be like a bomber group, or a fighter group, or whatever, and then it will build itself into wings. You will have three and a headquarters and a wing, or something of that nature, three groups.”
Now, it started to take that form. . . . One was already out there. The one that was the task force became now a group. Then there was another group sent out, the 2nd Air Commando, and that was sent to India for the next season. Then the other two [actually, one] went to the South Pacific. They were diverted. Evidently, the structure, or the animal, was not healthy, because it didn’t last. It didn’t, in fact, become another kind of air unit. It never jelled, because here you’ve got transports, fighters, bombers, gliders, liaison aircraft, and you put that together, and you say, “Now, that’s a group.” Well, it wasn’t, and there was always the tendency to split it off. There was always the thing there that if it got in position it had to be supported by other people, and it would start to draw from other units. “Bring in that fighter squadron; bring in those transports over there, and attach them to this thing.” So the concept just did not lend itself to order, and it died.8
Cochran was perceptive. It became too much of a temptation for senior air leaders to grab various pieces of the Air Commandos to shore up shortcomings (real or imagined) in their own organizations. The Air Commando concept worked well in Operation Thursday when all components were employed to the same end of supporting Chindit operations behind enemy lines. But with Wingate’s death and the Chindits being used more as regular infantry, the Air Commando concept lost much of its relevance. And with the war finally turning in the Allies’ favor, the need for such specialized units became less important.
Yet, the new idea of unconventional units organized to carry out special operations that was lit by the World War II Air Commando groups did not die. Its flames flickered and ebbed over the years, but they kept burning. Others took up Alison’s “way of thinking” and sustained and refined it. Today, although the concept has changed in form, the Air Force Special Operations Command carries on the proud tradition of the Air Commandos—Any Place, Any Time, Anywhere.