BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works by Wittgenstein

APR	Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. C. Barrett, Oxford: Blackwell, 1966.
BB	The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
CL	Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters, eds. B.F. McGuinness and G.H. von Wright, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
CV	Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright, trans. P. Winch, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
LE	‘A Lecture on Ethics’, reprinted as PO Ch. 4.
LI	Wittgenstein's Lectures Cambridge 1930–32, ed. D. Lee, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
LII	Wittgenstein's Lectures Cambridge 1932–35, ed. A. Ambrose, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
LSD	‘The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience’, reprinted as PO Ch.11.
LW 1	Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, eds. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
LW 2	Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II, eds. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
M	G.E. Moore, ‘Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33’, reprinted as PO Ch. 6.
NB	Notebooks 1914–16, eds. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
NFL	‘Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”’, ed. R. Rhees, reprinted as PO Ch. 10.
NPL	‘Notes for the “Philosophical Lecture”’, in PO 14.
OC	On Certainty, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
PI	Philosophical Investigations, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
PG	Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974.
PO	Philosophical Occasions, eds. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
PR	Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975.
PT	Prototractatus – An Early Version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, eds. B.F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.
RFM	Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, eds. G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, third edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
RPP 1	Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
RPP 2	Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II, eds. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman, trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
TLP	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C.K. Ogden, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922.
VC	Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, shorthand notes recorded by F. Waismann, ed. B.F. McGuinness, trans. J. Schulte and B.F. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
Z	Zettel, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.

References are to page numbers with the following exceptions: (i) LW 1, OC, RPP 1, RPP 2, Z and Part I of PI, where numbers refer to section numbers; (ii) PT and TLP, where numbers refer to proposition numbers; and (iii) RC and RFM, where the roman numeral refers to part and the arabic to section.

Works by other authors

Albritton, R. (1966) ‘On Wittgenstein's Use of the Term “Criterion”’, in G. Pitcher (ed.).

Austin, J. (1961) Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Avramides, A. (2001) Other Minds, London: Routledge.

Baker, G.P. (1974) ‘Criteria: A New Foundation for Semantics’, Ratio 16: 156–89.

Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. (1984) Scepticism, Rules and Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1986) ‘Reply to Mr Mounce’, Philosophical Investigations 9: 199–204.

— (2001) ‘Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: The Exaltation and Deposition of Ostensive Definition’, revised form, in Hacker 2001.

Baldwin, T. (1990) G.E. Moore, London: Routledge.

Bambrough, R. (1960–1961) ‘Universals and Family Resemblances’, in G. Pitcher (ed.).

Barnes, J. (1982) ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, eds. E.J. Kenny and M.M. MacKenzie: 2–29.

Bennett, J. (1966) Kant's Analytic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berkeley, G. (1962 (1710)) The Principles of Human Knowledge, London: Fontana.

Bilgrami, A. (2002) ‘Realism and Relativism’, Philosophical Issues 12: 1–25.

Birnbacher, D. (1982) Logik der Kriterien, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.

Bradley, F.H. (1914) Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brandom, R. (1994) Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burnyeat, M. (1982) ‘Idealism and Greek Philosophy: what Descartes saw and Berkeley missed’, in G. Vesey (ed.) Idealism Past and Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carroll, L. (1872) ‘Through the Looking Glass’, in Alice in Wonderland, Ware: Wordsworth, 1992.

Cavell, S. (1976) Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1979) The Claim of Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (1981) Pursuits of Happiness, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1987) Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of Shakespeare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1988) In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Scepticism and Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

— (1990) Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

— (1994) A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1996a) Contesting Tears, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

— (1996b) The Cavell Reader, ed. S. Mulhall, Oxford: Blackwell.

Cherniak, C. (1986) Minimal Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Churchland, P. (1981) ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90; reprinted in W.G. Lycan (ed.) (1990) Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell.

Clarke, T. (1972) ‘The Legacy of Scepticism’, Journal of Philosophy 69: 754–69.

Cockburn, D. (1985) ‘The Mind, the Brain, and the Face’, Philosophy 60: 477–93.

Conant, J. (1991) ‘The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege and the Tractatus’, in The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Topics 20: 115–80.

— (1993) ‘Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense’, in T. Cohen, P. Guyer and H. Putnam (eds.) Pursuits of Reason, Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press.

— (2000) ‘Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and the Early Wittgenstein’, in Crary and Read (eds.).

— (2001) ‘In the Electoral Colony’, Critical Inquiry 27: 662–702.

— (2002) ‘The Method of the Tractatus’, in E.H. Reck (ed.) From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives in Early Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Conant, J. and Kern, A. (eds.) (forthcoming) Scepticism in Context, London: Routledge.

Cook, J.W. (1969) ‘Human Beings’, in P. Winch (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, New York: Humanities Press.

Crary, A. and Read, R. (eds.) (2000) The New Wittgenstein, London: Routledge.

Davidson, A. (1989) ‘Beginning Cavell’, in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds.) The Senses of Stanley Cavell, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.

Davidson, D. (1973–1974) ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67: 5–20; reprinted in Davidson 1984.

— (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (2000) ‘Truth Rehabilitated’, in R. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and his Critics, Oxford: Blackwell.

Davies, M. (1998) ‘Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant’, in C. Wright, B.C. Smith and C. Macdonald (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (2000) ‘Externalism and armchair knowledge’, in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.) New Essays on the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (2003) ‘The Problem of Armchair Knowledge’, in S. Nuccetelli (ed.) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Davies, M. and Stone, T. (1995) Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, Oxford: Blackwell.

Dennett, D. (1979) ‘Intentional Systems’, in Brainstorms, Hassock, Sussex: Harvester Press.

— (1987a) ‘True Believers’, in The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

— (1987b) ‘Making Sense of Ourselves’, in The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

— (1991) ‘Real Patterns’, Journal of Philosophy, 89: 27–51.

Descartes (1986 (1641)) Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. J. Cottingham, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diamond, C. (1991) The Realistic Spirit, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

— (2000a) ‘Does Bismarck have a Beetle in his Box? The private language argument in the Tractatus’ in Crary and Read (eds.).

— (2000b) ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus’, in Crary and Read (eds).

Dilman, I. (1981) ‘Bambrough: Universals and Family Resemblances’, Studies in Language and Reason, London: Macmillan.

— (1984) Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience, London: Macmillan.

— (1998) ‘Quine and Wittgenstein: Ontology and Reality’, Language and Reality: Modern Perspectives on Wittgenstein, Leuven: Peeters.

— (2002) Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution: The Problem of Linguistic Idealism, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Dretske, F. (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007–23.

Eldridge, R. (1997) Leading a Human Life, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fleming, R. (1993) The State of Philosophy: An Invitation to a Reading in Three Parts of Stanley Cavell's The Claim of Reason, Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.

Floyd, J. (1998) ‘The Uncaptive Eye: Solipsism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus’, in L. Rouner (ed.) Lonelineness, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Fodor, J.A. (1994) ‘Fodor, J.A.’, in Guttenplan (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.

Fogelin, R.J. (1987) Wittgenstein, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

— (1994) Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frede, M. (1987) Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Friedlander, E. (2001) Signs of Sense, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gadamer, H.G. (1986 (1960)) Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Verlag.

Glendinning, S. (1998) On Being with Others: Heidegger – Derrida – Wittgenstein, London: Routledge.

Goldfarb, Names, Objects and Realism in the Tractatus, unpublished manuscript.

Gould, T. (1996) ‘This Sceptical Life: How not To Read Cavell on Scepticism’, paper presented at Eastern Division Meetings, American Philosophical Association, December, 1996.

— (1998) Hearing Things: Voice and Method in the Writing of Stanley Cavell, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Greenwood, J.D. (ed.) (1991) The Future of Folk Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hacker, P.M.S. (1986) Insight and Illusion, revised edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

— (1990) Wittgenstein – Meaning and Mind: Volume Three of an Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1996) Wittgenstein – Mind and Will: Volume Four of an Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1999) ‘Naming, Thinking and Meaning in the Tractatus’, Philosophical Investigations 22: 119–35; reprinted with a postscript in Hacker (2001).

— (2001) Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Heal, J. (1989) Fact and Meaning, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1994) ‘Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach’, Mind 103: 5–24.

— (1996) ‘Simulation, theory and content’, in P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds.) Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1998) ‘Understanding Other Minds from the Inside’, in A. O'Hear (ed.) Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1999) ‘Thoughts and Holism: Reply to Cohen’, Analysis 59: 71–8.

Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1982) The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. A. Hofstadter, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

— (1985) History of the Concept of Time, trans. T. Kisiel, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

— (1990) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

— (1997) Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Hinton, J.M (1973) Experiences, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hume, D. (1978 (1740)) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hylton, P. (1990) Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, S. (1916) Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. W. Raleigh, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

— (1979 (1755)) A Dictionary of the English Language, London: Times Books.

Kant, I. (1961 (1781/1787)) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan.

— (1977 (1783)) Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. Carus and J.W. Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Kern, A (2000a) ‘Einsicht ohne Täuschung: McDowells hermeneutische Konzeption von Erkenntnis’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48: 915–37.

— (2000b) ‘Philosophie und Skepsis: Hume – Kant – Cavell’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48: 17–35.

Kremer, M. (forthcoming) ‘To What Extent is Solipsism a Truth?’, in B. Stocker and G. Guzey (eds.) Post-Analytic Tractatus, London: Ashgate.

Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

Levi, I. (1983) Enterprise of Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Locke, J. (1979 (1689)) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Niddich, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

McCulloch, G. (1995) The Mind and its World, London: Routledge.

McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1998b) Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1998a) Meaning, Knowledge, & Reality; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McFetridge, I. (1990) Logical Necessity and other essays, eds J. Haldane and R. Scruton, London: Aristotelian Society monograph.

McGinn, M. (1989) Sense and Certainty, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1997) Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London: Routledge.

— (1998) ‘The Real Problem of Others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on Scepticism about Other Minds’, European Journal of Philosophy 6: 45–58.

McGuinness, B.F. (1988) Wittgenstein: A Life – Young Ludwig 1889–1921, London: Duckworth.

Malcolm, N. (1967) ‘The Privacy of Experience’, in A. Stroll (ed.) Epistemology: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, New York: Harper and Rowe.

— (1968) ‘Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations’, in G. Pitcher (ed.) Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, London: Macmillan.

— (1986) Nothing is Hidden, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1989) ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Philosophy 64: 5–28.

Montaigne, M. (1993) The Complete Essays, trans. M.A. Screech, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics.

Moore, A.W. (2003) ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77: 169–93.

Moore, G.E. (1922) Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge.

— (1925) ‘A Defense of Common Sense’, in J.H. Muirhead (ed.) Contemporary British Philosophy (second series), London: George Allen and Unwin; reprinted in T. Baldwin (ed.) G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, London: Routledge, 1993.

— (1939) ‘Proof of an External World’, Proceedings of the British Academy 25: 273–300; reprinted in T. Baldwin (ed.) G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, London: Routledge, 1993.

Mounce, H.O. (1986) ‘Following a Rule’, Philosophical Investigations 9: 187–98.

Mulhall, S. (1994) Stanley Cavell: Philosophy's Recounting of the Ordinary, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1995) The Nature of Rationality, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Nussbaum, M.C. (1987) The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Hear, A. (1991) ‘Wittgenstein and the Transmission of Traditions’, in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.) Wittgenstein Centenary Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pears, D.(1987) The False Prison, Vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

— (1996) ‘The Originality of Wittgenstein's Investigation of Solipsism’, European Journal of Philosophy 4: 124–36.

Pitcher, G. (ed.) (1966) Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, London: Macmillan.

Popkin, R. (1979) The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Price, H.H. (1953) Thinking and Experience, London: Hutchinson's University Library.

Pryor, J. (2000) ‘The Sceptic and the Dogmatist’, Noûs 34: 517–49.

Putnam, H. (1981) Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1994) Words and Life, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

— (1999) The Threefold Cord, New York: Columbia University Press.

Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

— (1961) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View, New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Robinson, G. (1992) ‘Language and the Society of Others’, Philosophy 67: 329–41.

— (1998) Philosophy and Mystification: A Reflection on Nonsense and Clarity, London: Routledge.

Russell, B. (1913) Theory of Knowledge, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984.

— (1914a) ‘On Scientific Method in Philosophy’, in Mysticism and Logic, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917.

— (1914b) Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy, 2nd edition, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1929.

— (1956) Logic and Knowledge, ed. R.C. Marsh, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Ryle, G. (1971) Collected Papers, vol. 1, London: Hutchinson.

Sartre, J.P. (1993) ‘The Humanism of Existentialism’, in Essays in Existentialism, New York: Citadel Press.

Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sellars, W. (1956) ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Sextus Empiricus (1990) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. R.G. Bury, New York: Prometheus Books.

Snowdon, P. (1981) ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 175–92.

Stich, S.P. (1996) Deconstructing the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strawson, P.F. (1985) Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, London: Methuen.

Stroll, A. (1994) Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stroud, B. (1989) ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, in M. Clay and K. Lehrer (eds.) Knowledge and Scepticism, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sullivan, P.M. (1996) ‘The “Truth” in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein's Rejection of the A Priori’, European Journal of Philosophy 4: 195–219.

— (2002) ‘On Trying to be Resolute: A Response to Kremer on the Tractatus’, European Journal of Philosophy 10: 43–78.

— (2003) ‘Ineffability and Nonsense’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 77: 195–223.

Williams, B. (1974) ‘Wittgenstein and Idealism’, in G. Vesey (ed.) Understanding Wittgenstein, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture, Vol. 7, London: Macmillan.

Williams, M. (1996) Unnatural Doubts, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

— (1999) ‘Meaning and Deflationary Truth’, Journal of Philosophy 96: 545–64.

— (2001) Problems of Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Winch, P. (1972) ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, in Ethics and Action, London: Routledge.

— (1987), ‘Language, Thought and World in Wittgenstein's Tractatus’, in Trying to Make Sense, Oxford: Blackwell.

Wright, C. (1980) Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, London: Duckworth.

— (1982) ‘Anti-Realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria’ in G. Vesey (ed.) Idealism: Past and Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

— (1985) ‘Facts and Certainty’, Proceedings of the British Academy 71: 429–72.

— (1986) Realism, Meaning and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (1980) Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1992) Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

— (1997) ‘The Indeterminacy of Translation’, in C. Wright and B. Hale (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

— (2000) ‘Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof’, Philosophical Issues 10: 140–63.

— (2002) ‘(Anti-)Sceptics Simple and Subtle: Moore and McDowell’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 330–48.

— (2003) ‘Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference’, in S. Nuccetelli (ed.) New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wright, C., Smith, B. and Macdonald, C. (1998) Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press.