There are six essays in this section. The first three are single-part essays: 1.1 is about the sacred peaks—Beiyu Bian, 1.2 deals with the term ge chu, and 1.3 concerns original surnames. The other three essays are multipart and are on, respectively, commanderies (prefectures) and districts (nine parts—1.4–12); money and grain (two parts—1.13 and 1.14); and government students, or shengyuan (three parts—1.15–17).
Comment: This is an important statement of one of the fundamental components of Gu Yanwu’s political philosophy. On the question of terminology, I have, as elsewhere, followed Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985). He has this to say on the title:
Junxian 郡縣. Commanderies and Districts: from Qin on, a generic reference to the regional and local units administered by appointees of the central government in what eventually developed, through many transformations into the territorial-administration hierarchy of Provinces (sheng 省), Prefectures (fu 府), and Districts (xian 縣) in the Ming-Qing era; regularly used as a shorthand reference to such a governmental system (centralized, bureaucratic, direct) in contrast to the ancient Zhou dynasty system of regional and local administration by hereditary nobles “established by enfeoffment” (fengjian 封建…) and by subinfeudation (decentralized, feudal, indirect). (p. 201, no. 1758)
This essay should be read in conjunction with the material in RZL, section 8, and Liu Zongyuan’s essay on the fengjian system included in appendix 4.
1. To know why the fengjian [feudal or decentralized] system changed to become the junxian [prefectural or centralized] system is to know that this system will, in turn, break down and change again. If this is so, will this change again and return to being feudalism? Impossible, I say. If a sage were to arise and lodge the ideas of feudalism in the prefectural system, the empire would be well ordered. People from Han times onward all said that Qin was lost because of isolation. What they don’t know is that the Qin was not lost because it didn’t practice the fengjian system; the fengjian system also died out. Undoubtedly, the decay of this system started during the decline of Zhou and not from the Qin period. It was not the work of one day. Even if a sage had arisen, it would still have changed to become the junxian system.
Now, the breakdown of the junxian system has already come to pass and yet no sage has emerged. Nevertheless, every one of the ancient practices still persists. As a result, every day the people grow poorer and the central kingdom grows weaker, moving with gathering pace toward disorder. Why is this so? The failings of the fengjian system lay in the concentration of power in the hands of those below; the failings of the junxian system lay in the concentration of power in the hands of those above. The sages of antiquity treated the people of the world with public-spiritedness, rewarding them with lands and dividing up [the administration of] the state. The rulers of today completely appropriate everything within the Four Seas as their own commanderies and districts, and still this is not enough. All men are held in suspicion, all matters are controlled. Laws, statutes, and records of cases grow more numerous every day. In addition, inspectors and overseers are appointed, as are governors, on the grounds that in this way the prefects and district magistrates will be prevented from harming the people. What is not realized is that those holding office fearfully try to save themselves from error and regard getting a transfer as good fortune. As a consequence, they are not willing to concern themselves for a single day with being of benefit. How can the people do otherwise than become poorer? How can the country do otherwise than become weaker? If this course were to be pursued without change, even if thousands of years were to pass, I know it would lead to disorder and trouble, and this would become more extreme every day.
This being so, to venerate the status of the district magistrate, conferring on him authority over financial and administrative matters, to do away with the office of overseer, to set up the rewards of hereditary office, and to permit the practice of local officials selecting their own subordinates can be termed lodging the ideas of feudalism within the framework of the prefectural system. And this may allow the deterioration of two thousand years to be reversed. If future rulers wish to improve the lives of the people and strengthen the state, they would do well to attend to my words.
2. My proposal is this: change zhixian 知縣 [district magistrate] to become a fifth-rank official and rectify his name to call him a xianling 縣令.1 In appointing men to undertake these duties it is necessary to use those from within a thousand-li radius who are well versed in local customs. At first they should be called shiling 試令 [probationers]; after three years of competent service, they should become zhenling 真令 [true magistrates]; after a further three years of competent service, they should be appointed “father and mother” officials; after a further three years of competent service, they should receive an imperial letter recognizing their accomplishments; after a further three years of competent service, they should receive advancement in rank, an increase in salary, and be appointed for life. Those who resign because of old age or ill health can put forward a son or younger brother to replace them. If they can’t put forward a son or younger brother, allow them to put forward someone else. When such a person has been replaced and left office, he should live in his district as a “libationer” [jijiu] and receive a salary for the rest of his life. The man put forward to replace him should again be a probationary magistrate. After three years of competent service, he should be confirmed in office according to the method given above.
Every three or four districts, or perhaps every five or six, should constitute a prefecture. Appoint one prefect per prefecture and replace him after three years. Appoint and send out censors to tour the regions, replacing them after one year. Let all the provincial authorities be abolished.2 Establish one assistant under the magistrate, selected and appointed by the Ministry of Personnel. After the assistant has held his position for more than nine years, he can fill a vacant magistracy. Below the assistant there should be officers designated as follows: registrar, commandant, erudite, postmaster, granary master, patroller, and functionary. These should be established in full and not reduced. Let these men be chosen by the magistrate himself and have their names reported to the Ministry of Personnel. For the positions from registrar down, find and use men of the district to fill them.
If the magistrate is found to have committed a crime against the people, he should be banished if the crime is small and executed if it is grave. In the case of magistrates who are deemed competent and have established their home in the district, their names should be removed from the registers of their native places. See to it that those who become district magistrates of the empire are not able to transfer [out of the district] or return [to their native place] but devote the balance of their lives to the district and have their descendants for many generations live there. Banish those who do not perform their duties properly; execute those whose avarice is such as to destroy the integrity of the office. If they are living in the district, it is as district magistrate; if they are banished, they become exiles. If they are rewarded, it is as hereditary officials; if they are punished, it is by beheading or strangulation. How could there be anyone not encouraged to be a good official!
3. What is it that I call “the proper execution of duties” [i.e., being competent]? I say it is wasteland being opened up, uncultivated fields being cultivated, trees being made to grow luxuriantly, drains and ditches being kept in a good state, walls and fortifications being made secure, granaries and storehouses being kept full, schools being made to flourish, robbery and theft being eradicated, and weapons and utensils being kept in good repair. But the most important thing of all is to keep the people happy in their occupations.
Now, caring for the people is just like rearing the five domestic animals. If one man is in charge of horses and oxen, and another in charge of hay and fodder, and you also send an overseer to supervise them, and still have every minor decision referred to the master, the horses and oxen will grow much thinner day by day. To me this is not right. Better to choose a single groom who is diligent and capable, put him in charge of the horses and oxen, provide him with pastureland, and direct him to regularly produce more than is required for their feed. If you see the beasts grow fat, reward him; if not, then beat him. In this way the one who is the master will surely be a Wu Shi or a Qiao Yao.3
Thus, a single groom is enough to manage the afflictions of the world, and yet those who do this are numerous. And if he doesn’t trust his grooms but uses overseers, and even more, if he doesn’t trust the overseers, the eyes and ears of the master will be clouded with confusion. As a result, his heart that loves his horses and oxen will fail to overcome his schemes for scrimping and saving in grain, and the animals he is caring for will waste away. Thus, horses will grow fat under a single groom just as the people will be happy under a single magistrate.
4. Someone might say, “Without provincial intendants will the magistrate not become too important? If his sons and younger brothers replace him, is this not in effect a monopoly? If he comes from within a thousand-li radius, will he not be partial to his family and friends?”
Now, the reason why an official’s concern for his family and friends disturbs him greatly is that they are all far away. If they all lived together within one city, even if they thought to disturb him, they would not be able to do so. From Han times on, there have been many who administered their own districts and prefectures. The magistrates of Qufu4 have seldom shown the failings of greed and cruelty. And it wasn’t just that the descendants of Confucius were especially worthy; it was their circumstances that made them so. If the prefect were to be succeeded by a son or younger brother and there was concern about a monopoly of power, could a small and insignificant district raise an army in rebellion? Above, there would be the prefect. Couldn’t he raise forces from the neighboring districts to suppress the rebellion? If the prefect himself wished to rebel, would [the magistrates of] five or six districts be willing to set aside the possibility of handing down their official positions to their sons and younger brothers and follow the path of disorder? Would they not see that the Yang clan of Bozhou, after eight hundred years of hereditary titles, was executed because of rebellion?5
If you say that without overseeing officials [provincial intendants] it is impossible to bring about good order, how was it that the fourteen prefectures [fu 府] and four subprefectures [zhou 州] of the Southern Imperial Domain were directly responsible to the Six Boards? Moreover, in today’s subprefectures and districts, officials don’t have established responsibilities and the people don’t have established obligations, which is why there is the recurring misfortune of robbers and thieves. And if the Western and Tartar barbarians reach one subprefecture, it is overthrown; if they reach one district, it is destroyed. Not to plan against this but to worry about magistrates acting on their own authority is what I call not recognizing similarities.
5. That each person in the world cherishes his own family and is partial toward his children is an invariable state of affairs. What an official feels in his heart for the Son of Heaven and the ordinary people is certainly not like what he feels for himself. Even before the Three Dynasties, this was already so. Sages relied on this and made use of it. They used the self-interest of the world to bring to perfection the public-spiritedness of one man and the world was well ordered.
Now, if a district magistrate can be brought to look on his hundred li of land as his personal concern, then the people of the district will all be like his descendants, the land of the district will all be like his own fields, the inner and outer city walls of the district will all be like his own boundary walls, and the granaries and storehouses of the district will all be like his own granaries and cellars. If he takes the people as his descendants, he will inevitably love them and will not harm them. If he takes the land as his own fields and arable land, he will inevitably keep it in good order and will not neglect it. If he takes the inner and outer walls and the granaries and storehouses as his own boundaries and storage places, he will inevitably keep them well maintained and will not damage them. From the magistrate’s standpoint it is self-interest; from the emperor’s standpoint, it is what he seeks in bringing order to the world—no more and no less.
If one day there should be an unexpected rebellion, it would surely not be like the rebellion of Liu Yuan, Shi Le, Wang Xianzhi, and Huang Chao—men who ranged without restraint across thousands of li as if entering uninhabited regions.6 As a result, there would be defense to the death and the people would not flee. As a result, there would be resistance through unions and close alliances. This would not be for the emperor; it would be in their own interests. But acting on the basis of self-interest would be acting for the emperor. Thus the self-interest of the world is in effect the public interest of the emperor. “He was concerned for the general good so there was happiness; he was trustworthy so others relied on him.”7 This can come close to the good order of the Three Dynasties. Even more, the splendor of the Han and Tang may not be hard to reach.
6. Nowadays, of the misfortunes of the world, there is none greater than poverty. If, however, my theories were put to use, in five years there would be a small degree of well-being, and in ten years a great degree of wealth. For the moment, let me speak of this in terms of horses. In the empire, from the movement of couriers back and forward, the sending of records from subprefectures and districts to the capital, the sending of official reports, meeting and awaiting high officials, and the transmission of documents, right down to the use of horses by ordinary people on official business, in any one year there will be unimaginable millions of horses traveling unimaginable hundreds of millions of li. Now, if this were to be reduced by sixty to 70 percent, the horses and mules from the western and northern regions would be much more than sufficient.
Let me speak of this in terms of documents. A single matter must be reported to a number of district offices [yamen]; the goings and comings associated with reversals of decisions must be multiple. When it comes to the use for welcoming visitors, birthday greetings, and congratulatory messages, the overall cost of paper and materials borne by the people is not less than a great sum every year. At the present time, then, if there were to be a 70 or 80 percent reduction [in use], the bamboo stems of the southeast could not possibly be used up.
The other things to which this argument applies cannot all be enumerated. Moreover, if the one who is magistrate is able to examine plowing and harvesting, instruct on trees and domestic animals, the obtaining of the produce of the fields, the collecting of the fruits from trees and plants, the breeding of the six domestic animals, and the vigorous growth of timber, these things ought to double in amount within five years. From this, the profits from the mountains and marshes can be opened up. Now, in the matter of conscripted labor for mining, during and prior to the Yuan dynasty, there was a constant annual quota. In the Ming dynasty, the reason why the mines were closed down and did not produce was because they might call forth disorder. This is comparable to there being a vault full of gold. If this were to be brought forth at a highway crossroads, traders would come crowding to contend for it. If it were to be brought forth within the hall of a house, only the master would have access to it and those outside would not be able to contend for it. At the present time, where there are mines, if the emperor opens them up, this is like bringing forth gold at the crossroads of five highways. If the district magistrate opens them up, this is like bringing forth gold within the hall of a house. The profits from the mountains and marshes are maximized and not taken from the people. Therefore, I say this is a plan for enriching the country.
7. Among bad methods, there is none worse than taking the eastern subprefectures’ grain supplies and giving them to the western border troops, or using those of the southern prefectures to sustain the relay stations of the northern region. Nowadays, if you were to take all the tax revenue and return it to that district, evaluating whether that district was an important place or remote, and estimating whether the requirements were complex or simple, this would make that one district’s expenses always bearable and there would be excess. Also, let the salaries of the officials of a single district always exceed the regular amount and only afterward have the excess established as falling within the category of what is sent to the capital.
Before this, it is necessary to fix the taxes for the region, selecting upper, middle, and lower fields, arranging them in three or five grades. What comes from them should all be sent to the district magistrate who receives it. What is sent to the capital is called gong 貢 [tribute] or fu 賦 [tax]. In the case of irregular expenses, these would be treated as outlay from the fixed tax quota. If one district’s income was completely used up and there was still not enough, then subsequently there would be augmentation from the taxes of another district, this being termed xie ji 協濟 [lending assistance]. This, then, was the emperor’s wealth and could not be regarded as a regular fixed amount. Nonetheless, if this method were to be practiced for ten years, there would certainly not be a single district whose revenue was used up but was still not enough for that district.
8. Excellent, indeed, were Ye Zhengze’s words when he said, “Nowadays in the empire officials don’t have subinfeudation but minor functionaries do.”8 The deficiency of the subprefectures and districts is that these minor functionaries have burrowed themselves into “holes and caves,” fathers handing on their positions to sons and older brothers to younger brothers. Those who are particularly cruel and cunning then advance to become clerks in agencies and bureaus, thereby interfering with the authority of subprefectures and districts. Those in high positions are clearly aware that this is very detrimental to the empire and yet they are unable to do away with it.
If officials were all men from within a thousand-li radius, well versed in the affairs of the people and also appointed for life, then superiors and inferiors would be clearly distinguished and the people would be stabilized in their purposes. Regulations would be done away with and official business would be simplified. The power of officials would be sufficient to control the minor functionaries with something to spare, while the latter would have no way of exerting undue influence on the former and would themselves have to comply with the laws. What men of former times called “nurturing a million tigers and wolves in the midst of the people” would be completely done away with in a single day. In the joy of bringing good order to the empire, what could surpass this!
9. In determining the selection of scholar-officials, there is a recommendation that, in summary, uses the ancients’ concept of “township recommendation and village selection,” and there is an examination that, in summary, uses the Tang people’s methods of [assessing] personal appearance, speech, calligraphy, and judgment. For worthy and able scholar-officials recommended by districts, in alternate years one person should be examined at the Ministry [of Personnel]. Those of the highest rank should become court gentlemen [lang 郎]; there should be no fixed quota. Court gentlemen of the highest grade should go out and fill vacancies as district magistrates. Those of the second rank should become aides [cheng] and be employed near their own prefectures. Those of the third rank should return to their native districts and be appointed to the categories of registrar and military official.
In setting up schools, allow district magistrates and scholar-officials of their districts to make appointments themselves. Call the appointees teachers and not officials, and do not attach their names to the Ministry of Personnel. And at the capital, those of ducal and ministerial rank and above should imitate the Han-period method of san fu 三府 [Three Dukes],9 involving and employing them. Now, if there are scholars of the empire who have the Way and virtue and yet do not wish to serve in an official capacity, they should become teachers of others. If there are those who have learning and ability and think to involve themselves in the affairs of the age, their district magistrate should find and elevate them or the Three Dukes should find and summon them. This also makes it possible not to lose scholar-officials.
Someone might say, “One man in alternate years—is the path to merit and achievement not too narrow!” Transforming the scholar-officials of the empire so they don’t contend for merit and reputation is the greatness of kingly government. Besides, Yan Yuan did not take office; Min Zi resigned his official position; Qidiao never considered himself able; and Zeng Xi had a different objective.10 What need is there for achievement and reputation!
Comment: This is another important component of Gu’s political philosophy. The essential message is that taxation should not produce hardship and disaffection among the ordinary people. This means two things: (1) People should be taxed in what they produce. (2) There should be no added exactions made by venal officials, such as the “meltage fee” covered in the second section.
1. From the times of Yu and Tang,11 years of famine have been unavoidable—years when the people, driven to extremes by having no grain, sold their own children. Indeed, years of famine and the selling of wives and children were what even the times of Yu and Tang could not be free of. On the other hand, years of abundance in which there was the selling of wives and children never occurred, even in the last year of the Tang and Song dynasties.
In the past, when I was in Shandong, I noticed that the people who lived in Dengzhou and Laizhou, both coastal provinces, often said the price of grain was so low that the people living in mountainous and remote regions could not obtain the silver to pay the tax collector. Now, coming to Guanzhong from the west as far as Qixia, the year has been very abundant and grain very plentiful, and yet the people still follow one another in selling their wives and children. When it comes to the day of the grain levy, the people of the villages all come forth, and there is what is called a “human market.” When I asked a senior official, he said that in one district, those sold into military camps or who request the official seal [for tax exemptions], in one year came close to a thousand people, while there is no knowing how many people run away or commit suicide. Why is this?
It is because there is grain but no silver. What they harvest is not what they have to pay; what is sought is not what they produce. Now, silver doesn’t fall from the heavens. Miners have already stopped [mining]. Ocean-going vessels have already been withdrawn. The country’s silver that is among the people is already being dispersed and diminished by the day, and particularly in the mountainous and remote regions where merchants never set foot. Even if the silver were to be sought under threat of flogging, how could it be obtained! Therefore, the grain becomes cheaper every day and the people become poorer every day; every day they are more weighed down by taxation. Each year more people flee to avoid debt and each year the number of registered individuals diminishes. If this situation continues unchanged, who knows where it will end!
Furthermore, from what did [the use of silver] arise? What constituted wealth for the ancients were legumes and grains, and that is all. In their carrying out of trade, there was no alternative but to use money as a measure. Nevertheless, from the Three Dynasties to the Tang, what was taken from the people was grain and cloth, and that is all. From the implementation of Yang Yan’s two-tax law,12 there was the start of change and the levying of money but never of silver. The “Han Zhi” [Han Records] [chapter of the History of the Former Han] states that the Qin had a currency of two grades, but that silver and tin were used for utensils and ornaments and not as currency.13 From Liang times, starting in Jiaozhi and Guangdong, there were reports of the use of gold and silver as commodities. In the second year of the Jingyou reign period of the Song emperor Ren Zong [1035], there was, for the first time, an order to all circuits to pay the year’s taxes in strings of cash. For Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, this was changed to silver, and for Jiangdong, to silk. The reasons why this was chosen for Fujian and the two Guangs were that the mines and foundries were numerous and maritime trade was profitable. At the time of the Jin emperor Zhang Zong [1190–1208], the casting of silver coinage began. This was called “the precious commodity of the Chengan reign period” [1196–1200]. In public and private dealings alike, this was used as money. During the Zhengda reign period of the [Jin emperor] Ai Zong [1224–1231], the people used silver only in market transactions; they did not use the cast coinage. When we come to the present day, all levels of society use the latter universally and have forgotten what it arose from. However, if you examine the matter in the Yuan History, the amount of the annual tax levy that was silver was very low. This being so, then, the use of silver as a national tax doesn’t exceed two or three hundred years.
Nowadays, when people speak of taxes, they invariably speak of qian 錢 and liang 糧. Now, qian is money [copper cash] and liang is grain. Why should they also speak of silver? Moreover, the amount of silver in the world has not increased, and yet taxes have doubled, so this must be an amount that is not contributed. Formerly, at the time of the Tang emperor Mu Zong [821–824], goods were cheap and money expensive, so the proposal of the minister of finance, Yang Yuling,14 was used—that is, the order was given that the two tax grades of money were to be changed to cotton and various forms of silk for the convenience of the people.15
Xu Zhigao of Wu followed the words of Song Qiqiu16 in considering that money was not what was obtained from agriculture and sericulture, so to make people pay tax in money was to teach them to neglect the root and follow the branches. As a result of this, the various taxes were received in grain and silk. This, then, was the discussion of those of former times on what was collected from the people. Moreover, since they regarded money as being difficult to obtain, for the people to seek money would mean that they did not devote attention to the root. Does this not apply much more in the case of silver?
When former kings established taxes, they certainly collected what a particular place had. Nowadays, in major metropolises and large district cities—places of great commercial activity—even if all the tax levies are in silver, the people don’t report distress. But when it comes to places that are distant and remote—places that boats and carts don’t reach—even if only 30 percent of the tax levy is in silver, it still cannot be obtained. Distress the people with this, which certainly cannot be obtained, and ultimately distress will come to the state. Why not, then, work out what is appropriate for the land and place, estimate the amount of the annual tax collection, give thought to the methods of transmission, and find some compromise in these things? Order all prefectures and districts that don’t engage in commerce to pay entirely in what is natural for them. If this can’t be done, then levy the tax in money at a rate of three parts in ten. If money passes from those below to those above, there will be the unacceptable evil of excess and the value of money will be high, so with one act there will be two effects. There will be no deficiency in the taxes remitted, and there will be a livelihood for the people. There will not be the problem of the need for restraint, and there will be the payment of all that is owed. Among the present-day schemes, there is none more suitable than this.
To plant grains and yet collect taxes in silver is like rearing sheep and yet seeking horses. To rely on silver to enrich the nation is like depending on wine to satisfy hunger. It is by this individual foolishness that the deficiencies reach a point where state and people are bound together in exhaustion. This is inferior to the scheme that came from the various officials of the last stages of the Tang and Song dynasties.
2. Sad to say, from ancient times on, those who have held states have taken from the people—this is already well known. Nevertheless, I have not heard of there being talk of a “meltage fee.” Did the term “meltage fee” not arise in the era when tax was collected in silver? Is this not what is spoken of as the true tax being ten parts and the excess tax [surtax] being three parts? Is this not what is spoken of as the state misappropriating public funds and corrupt officials becoming rich? Is this not what the state rigorously guards against and yet what venal officials and knavish clerks preserve for generations, taking it to be a treasure for their descendants? Is this not the root cause of impoverishing the people, the source of exhausting wealth, the gateway to the beginning of banditry, and what ordinary timid men in official positions see with their own eyes but do not remedy?
What originally brought the meltage fee into existence was that the many taxes of the prefectures and districts, being collected as they were, household by household, and received in very small amounts, could not be sent up to the official storehouses in little fragments, which left no alternative but to melt them down. If there was melting down, then inevitably there was loss. What was termed loss amounted to only one or two parts in a hundred—that is all. There were avaricious men who thought that a levy outside the fixed quota could not escape official opposition, while selecting people and preying on them would not be enough to satisfy their greed. As a result, they made use of the term “meltage fee” as a cunning method of extortion.
Now, I don’t know in what year this arose, but the method was handed down, becoming more onerous from official to official and increasing from generation to generation until we come to the present time. Thus, if officials take a 20 or 30 percent profit, the people pay 130 percent for the state’s 100 percent. And if subofficial functionaries and their like take ten to 20 percent, the people end up paying 150 percent for the state’s 100 percent.
In these collections a small part is in liang [taels] and a great part is in zhu [1/24 of a tael]. In all cases, when the amount collected is in taels, it will invariably be from those with large landholdings, power, and influence—people who can cope with the shortcomings, deficiencies, and excesses I have mentioned. When the collection is in zhu, it is invariably from poor and lowly households, and although much is taken from them, they dare not speak out. As a result of this, 20 to 30 percent is added to the collection in taels, whereas 50 to 60 percent is added to the collection in zhu. This is less in the regular tax levies and more in the irregular tax levies. It is the regular tax levies to which attention is primarily directed; the irregular levies receive secondary consideration. Consequently, the addition to the regular levies is 20 to 30 percent, whereas that to the irregular levies may sometimes reach 70 to 80 percent. When this is sent to the provincial treasurer, it is called a surplus; when the contribution is made to the various regional commissioners, it is called regular practice. There is no alternative to meeting these demands, which are protected as something that cannot be broken. They have given rise to the people’s difficulties, which have never been greater than they are at the present time.
I have lived in Shandong for a long time. Among the people of the province there is not one who doesn’t knit his brow with care and complain of the oppression of this meltage fee. Only in Dezhou is this not so. When you ask why, they say the tax for the province is 29,000 taels, of which 20 percent is silver and 80 percent copper cash. No meltage fee is added to the copper cash, so the people’s resources are free from constraint compared with other districts. It is not that the officials of Dezhou are all worthy men or that the village functionaries are all good men. It is simply a matter of circumstances. I have also heard elders say that the greedy officials of recent times are much more numerous than in Tang and Song times. The reason why this is so is that copper cash is heavy and hard to transport, whereas silver is light and easy to transport. If something is hard to transport, then even if little is taken, it is considered a lot, whereas with something that is easy to transport, then even if a lot is taken, it will still be considered a little. It is not that the officials of the Tang and Song were particularly honest while those of the present time are venal. It is the circumstances that make things so. Nevertheless, the circulation of silver and the cessation of the use of copper cash mean riches for officials and robbery for the people.
At the beginning of the Ming, the people were prohibited from using gold and silver. Those who transgressed were presumed to be traitorous villains. Now, why is the use of gold and silver villainous? As for there being repeated prohibitions, the probability is that there was foreknowledge of corrupt practices inevitably coming to this [present state]. At that time, what was used in the marketplace and shops was in all cases the copper coinage of the Tang and Song along with single castings of the official coinage made to help out if there was a shortage. Nowadays, currency is weak and harmful metal has arisen; the dao of trading is weak and false things are made. The country’s wealth is seized by those above and the people’s resources are exhausted by those below. If the likes of Lu Zhi, Bai Juyi, and Li Ao were alive today, their loud sighs and lamentations would certainly be much greater than those they uttered in the mid-Tang period.17
Someone might say, you take the meltage fee to be a cause of distress for the people. If a change were to be made and taxes collected in grains and rice, would there be no cunning methods for taking extra grain from the people? I say I have never seen a food provisioner leaving office nor a grain measurer settling down with his family who traveled carrying a load of rice. Invariably they have bought silver before they left. And if there were two carts traveling on the road, the one in front with copper cash and the one behind with silver, then a great robber’s glance would always be directed at the one behind. This being so, not only are greedy officials much more numerous than in Tang and Song times but also those called mounted highwaymen north of the Yellow River are much more numerous.
Comment: The proliferation of government students and the abuses of the system were a particular cause of concern for Gu Yanwu. This essay should be read in conjunction with his other writings on the subject in sections 16 and 17 of A Record of Daily Knowledge—and in particular RZL 17.1. In calling for the abolition of government students, he lists four benefits: (1) government offices will be purified; (2) the burden on ordinary people will be relieved; (3) clique and faction formation will be eliminated; and (4) talented scholars will be able to emerge more readily.
1. Why is it that the state established government students? It was to collect the outstandingly talented students of the empire and nurture them in the schools, so causing them to perfect their virtue and reveal their talents, gain a clear awareness of the Way of former kings and an understanding of the affairs of the present time. Thus they could emerge to become high officials and great officers who could join with the emperor in his plans and deliberations and, together with him, bring about good order.
This is not how things are at present. If you were to gather together the government students of the empire, reckoning on three hundred per district, there would be not less than half a million men, and yet what they are taught is only to write essays in the examination halls. However, if you want to seek those with well-developed skills, you would not find one in several tens. As for those who understand the classics and are proficient in ancient and modern learning—men who could be of use to the emperor—you would not find one in several thousand. On the other hand, those who are deceitful, litigious, indolent, and stupid to the point of distressing officials are much more numerous. Because of this, their superiors increasingly dislike them and every day treat them more disrespectfully, subjecting them to conditions and regulations that every day become more vexatious. Thus it is that government students are increasingly disliked, increasingly treated disrespectfully, and increasingly vexed. And yet lowly men still press forward urgently day and night, stopping only when all their strength is spent—why?
It is because once they have attained this [status], they escape from the labor service of the people, they are not subject to the appropriations of the village functionaries, they are registered as gentry, they get to be received with due ceremony by senior officials, and they don’t suffer the disgrace of a flogging with a bamboo cane. Therefore, at the present time, those who wish to be government students are not invariably driven by the desire for achievement and rank; they wish to protect themselves and their families and nothing more. If we reckon that 70 percent of government students are those wishing to protect themselves and their families, there are almost three hundred and fifty thousand such men. This is contrary to the original intention behind establishing the category and has no benefit for the state.
But when it comes to people’s feelings, who is not concerned for himself and his family? Thus, in seeking this [status] night and day, there are some whose conduct is so extreme that they suborn, transgress the laws, and have to atone for their crimes, and yet they do not stop, such are the circumstances. So among government students of the present day, 70 to 80 percent attain their positions by improper means, and there are also students of warfare and sacrifices who in all cases buy their positions with money. Now, bribery is what the court must punish, and yet feelings for oneself and one’s family are something even former kings were unable to prohibit. So taking the laws of the present day, even if Yao and Shun were to be born again and could send the Four Villains away from the court, they would still be unable to put a stop to bribery within the empire.18 This being so, what, then, can be done?
I would ask that this system be done away with entirely and a different system instituted. It is necessary to select men with a thorough understanding of the Five Classics and then fill the positions with them, and also examine them on the twenty-one dynastic histories and the affairs of the present time, and then advance them. They should still be divided into the two categories of xiucai [cultivated talents] and mingjing [classicists], but those supported by the schools should not exceed twenty in number, and if there are not [twenty who are appropriate], the places should be left vacant. As for those who are teachers, they should be selected through decorous enquiry in the prefectures and districts and not appointed centrally. If things were like this, the state would have men of genuine usefulness, the districts would have scholar-officials with an understanding of the classics, and those who are men of talent would certainly flourish in the present times.
But in one township there will inevitably be this one family of ordinary abilities that will establish itself, and in one district there will invariably be a hundred. If all of these do not attain [the status of] government student in order to protect their families and are in the same boat as the common people in suffering the mistreatment and cruelty of the village functionaries and the beatings of the senior officials, how will the ruler’s intention to protect and encourage these people be realized? So then, there is the Qin and Han method of conferring noble rank. Initially there was a reward for military achievement, but later it was awarded as an imperial favor or for hard work or as a general or specific reward. Emperor Gao [206–195 B.C.E.] issued a proclamation that said, “At the present time my attitude toward noble rank is that it is not to be taken lightly…. I order officials to treat those of high rank well as this would be in accord with my intention.”19 However, by the time of Hui Di [194–188 B.C.E.], the people were able to purchase noble rank. Now, if the importance of noble rank attains an equivalence to an official position in terms of li 禮 [respect] and gives back to a family freedom from affairs, then men will be hastening to acquire it. By reinstituting that method it would be possible to put an end to the present one. Even if noble rank is confined to the giving of grain, the name would still be fair—at least it would not be as harmful as the selling of the various kinds of licentiate and the confusion this brings to the schools.
Now, in establishing merit and reputation and protecting oneself and one’s family, there are two paths. For gathering together men of eminence and for treating eminent people sympathetically, there are two methods. In both cases, if the two methods are practiced separately, they will not conflict with each other, but if they are made one, there will be problems. If the ruler shares the empire with these five hundred thousand men who don’t understand ancient and modern [learning], of whom three hundred and fifty thousand are trying to protect themselves and their families and avoid a beating, and he wishes to seek dukes and nobles and high officials from among them to establish the state and bring good order to the people, this is like “climbing a tree to look for fish”!20 In governing it will certainly be dangerous; in warfare it will certainly fail.
2. Do away with the government students of the world and the administration of government will become pure. Do away with the government students of the world and the difficulties of the ordinary people will be put to rest. Do away with the government students of the world and the practice of clique formation will be abolished. Do away with the government students of the world and talented men of use to the times will emerge.
Nowadays, it is government students who, by going in and out of the government offices of the world, disturb the administration of government. It is government students who rely on their authority to make arbitrary decisions in townships and villages. It is government students who are implicated with subofficial functionaries or who even become subofficial functionaries themselves. It is government students who rise up en masse and create a clamor if the government even once opposes their ideas. It is government students who take control of the government’s clandestine affairs and trade in these. Those in front make a noise; those behind chime in. Those in front rush forward; those behind follow. Those above them wish to bring them to order and yet they cannot do so; they wish to get rid of them and yet they cannot do so. If some slight restraint is imposed, they say it is “slaughter of scholars” or “burial of Confucians.”21 I consider them to have been a major problem for the past hundred years. And yet the few scholar-officials who understand the principles of government and have the ability to speak about them themselves all come from the ranks of government students and don’t dare to speak openly about the corruption. Therefore, it is impossible to eliminate this comprehensively at a single stroke. This is why I say do away with the government students of the empire and purify the administration of government offices.
There are three things in the world that bring distress to the people: retired officials, government students, and subofficial functionaries. These three groups all, by law, have their households exempted from taxation and labor services. Moreover, their not being called upon for miscellaneous labor services means these fall entirely on the ordinary people. Nowadays, large districts with 100,000 or more government students are commonplace. Suppose that one district has 100,000 qing of land and the government students hold 50,000 qing. Then the people with 50,000 qing are responsible for the miscellaneous labor services appropriate to 100,000 qing. If one district has 100,000 qing of land and the government students hold 90,000, then the people with 10,000 qing are responsible for the miscellaneous labor services appropriate to 100,000 qing. As the people’s land becomes increasingly less so the practice of the false assignment of land becomes increasingly great, and as this becomes increasingly great, so the people’s land becomes increasingly less and the government students increasingly important. The rich indulge in nefarious practices seeking to become government students; the poor, one after another, flee or die. Thus the government students do not bring one iota of benefit to their districts; indeed, they are a mountainous burden. Notwithstanding, all the expenses for the preliminary examinations fall entirely on the ordinary people, therefore those who especially bring distress to the people are the government students. I say this, then: do away with the government students of the empire and the difficulties of the ordinary people will be relieved.
Among the troubles of the empire, there is none greater than gathering together people from the four directions who don’t know one another and teaching them, so causing there to be cliques and factions. Of the government students in the empire, those who are near to one another are several hundred or a thousand li apart, while those who are distant are separated by ten thousand li. Their speech is not the same and their surnames and personal names are unfamiliar. But as soon as they have risen in the ranks of examinees, they have what is called a “chief examination officer” whom they call “examination mentor” and an “associate examination officer” whom they call “deputy mentor.” Scholars who are graduates of the same year are called tongnian 同年 [year mates], while sons of the year mates are called “year nephews.” Sons of the examination mentor and deputy examination mentor are called “elder brothers.” A student’s examination mentor and deputy mentor call him “disciple,” while those later chosen by the disciple are called “second-generation disciples.” The second generation disciples call their master’s master “grand master.” These associations are firm and enduring; the bonds formed cannot be broken. They write documents and exchange them on the roads, and they seek preferential treatment from government offices. On a small scale, this is enough to corrupt the administration and harm the people; on a large scale, it comes to the point of establishing cliques and causing subversion, taking hold of the handle of the ruler’s great sword22 and turning it upside down. Thus are all these things caused. Therefore I say: do away with the government students of the empire and the practice of clique formation will be eliminated.
The reason why the country selects government students and examines them in the interpretation of the classics and in essays, memorials, policies, and judgments is the wish for them to have a clear comprehension of the purport of the Six Classics and an understanding of contemporary affairs. Nowadays they use the interpretations printed by booksellers, calling these shiwen 時文 [model essays];23 they set aside the classical writings of the sages and don’t read the notes and commentaries of former Confucians or the histories of former dynasties. And yet they read these so-called shiwen. The shiwen that come out change with every examination. Young boys no taller than five chi [feet] can recite from memory several tens of these essays, and by making small changes in the text, can achieve an examination rank, while those who are dull witted can reach white-haired old age without attaining success. Experienced scholars may fritter away the most useful years of their lives in examination halls, whereas those who achieve rapid success at an early age also have a facile view of the affairs of empire and state, taking what constitute merit and achievement in a man’s life to be just this and nothing more. Therefore, this corrupts and ruins the talented men of the empire until the point is reached where scholars are not true scholars, officials are not true officials, soldiers are not true soldiers, and generals are not true generals. Subsequently, outlaws and villains have opportunities to gain advantage while enemy states and foreign aggressors have opportunities to prevail. If the effort put into the shiwen were to be directed to the classics and dynastic histories, as well as current affairs, then of necessity scholars of intelligence and courage with a thorough understanding of administrative principles would arise in their midst. Therefore I say: do away with the government students of the empire and let talented men of use to the age come forth.
3. Someone might ask, if government students of the empire were to be done away with, how would scholar-officials be selected? I say, what I refer to as doing away with government students is not doing away with government students per se; it is doing away with the government students of the present day. I ask that the method of “special imperial appointment” be used, along with the preservation of the system of government students and Confucian scholars. The people of the empire would not need to be asked whether they were government students or not. All would be able to gain advancement and be presented to the court. So then, if my idea were to be accepted, the numbers would be increased and yet the number drawing a government stipend would be limited to a fixed quota, retaining and imitating the Tang system of grading prefectures and districts. A small prefecture would have a quota of ten men, and so on up to forty men for a large prefecture and then stop. A small district would have a quota of three men, and so on up to twenty men for a large district and then stop. Estimate the size of their district’s population and the quality of their talented men, then rank them accordingly. If there are vacancies, fill them, and put a stop to the two methods of “tribute students” [suigong 歲貢] and “provincial graduates” [juren 舉人].
Of those who are graduates, select the ones who are accomplished and outstanding; all these should undergo an examination at the Ministry of Rites. Those who become presented scholars [jinshi] should merely be given the responsibilities of assistant magistrate and district defender in close relation to the people, not allowing them to advance with unseemly rapidity by restraining their feelings of greed and ambition. In arranging educational officials for them, worthy men of their district must be engaged, and they should not be added to the register of government employees. Put an end to the office of education intendant and direct these matters to the provincial administration commissioner.
Among all these students there will be some who are recommended and enter official service and some who pass the examinations and become presented scholars [jinshi]. There will also be some who don’t comply and end up being reprimanded and dismissed. And there will be some who, through decrepitude and illness, are unable to pursue a career but who wish to retain the scholar’s garb into old age. When vacancies for two or three men arise, gather together those who fall into the category of “Confucian apprentice” and select from their number those who understand the classics and are able to write well to fill the vacancies.
In this way, then, those in the empire who are government students will be few, and in being few, others will esteem them, and these men will also come to experience self-esteem. Do this, and teachers will not be troubled by teaching, while what was formerly called the gathering of scholars into factions to behave outrageously in the country will spontaneously stop without need for prohibition. If scholars “revive the old and understand the new,”24 and in their middle years are examined and compared so that they strive to realize their abilities, then it is appropriate to examine and compare ancient and modern methods, but I have not discussed this fully.
Someone might say, in the empire men of talent arise every day—there is no limit. But if they are all obstructed at the level of Confucian apprentice, what then? I would certainly say, if men of the empire, whether they are government students or not, can all gain advancement and be recommended to the court, then the method of selecting scholar-officials will not depend only on all scholars following a single path. Now, if there is selection of scholar-officials to assist the ruler in managing the country and they all come out of a single path, there cannot but be corrupt practices.