INTRODUCTION: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CENTURY
1. Meisel and Kendrik, Bloomsbury/Freud, p. 279.
2. Klein, Envy and Gratitude, p. 183. All future references to Envy and Gratitude will be indicated by EG.
3. Ibid., p. 202.
4. Freud used the word “psycho-analysis” for the first time in his “Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses” (1896), in Freud, Standard Edition, 3:141–56. But it is Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams, which was published in 1900 on the heels of his and Joseph Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1888), that has come to be viewed as the first psychoanalytic work.
1. JEWISH FAMILIES, EUROPEAN STORIES:
A DEPRESSION AND ITS AFTERMATH
1. Grosskurth, Melanie Klein. All future references to Grosskurth’s biography will be indicated by MK.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Ibid., pp. 10, 9.
5. Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
6. Ibid., p. 14.
7. Ibid., p. 20.
8. Ibid., p. 38.
9. Ibid., pp. 40–41.
10. Ibid., p. 41.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid., pp. 53, 51.
14. Ibid., pp. 84–85.
15. Ibid., pp. 83–84; emphasis added.
16. Ibid., p. 65.
17. Ibid., p. 66.
18. Cited in ibid., p. 69.
19. Ibid., p. 5.
20. Ibid., p. 113.
21. Meisel and Kendrik, Bloomsbury/Freud, pp. 192, 193.
22. Ibid., p. 294.
23. Ibid., p. 180.
24. MK, p. 148.
25. Ibid., p. 150
26. Ibid., p. 200.
27. Ibid., p. 392.
28. Freud, Standard Edition, 5:629–86.
29. MK, p. 70.
30. Ibid.
31. Freud, Standard Edition, 10:1–147.
32. Eugenia Sokolnicka published the case study of a little boy named Minsk in Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse in 1920, around the same time that Klein presented her own study in July 1920 to the Budapest Psychoanalytic Society.
33. Cited in MK, p. 75.
34. Cited in ibid., p. 74.
35. “The Psycho-Analytic Play Technique: Its History and Significance,” in Klein, Envy and Gratitude, pp. 122–40.
36. Abraham, Dreams and Myths; On Character and Libido Development.
37. MK, p. 98.
38. Ibid., p. 100.
39. See “A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders,” an essay in which Abraham describes the similarities between obsessional neurosis and manic-depressive psychosis, which he believes is a reproduction of the “loss of the object,” ibid. at 69, during the anal stage (feces) and of its equivalent in the unconscious, that is, the “expulsion of the object,” ibid. at 75.
40. MK, p. 109.
41. “An Obsessional Neurosis in a Six-Year-Old Girl,” in Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children, pp. 35–57. All future references to The Psychoanalysis of Children will be indicated by PC.
42. Cited in MK, p. 131.
43. Meisel and Kendrik, Bloomsbury/Freud, p. 279
44. Cited in MK, p. 138.
45. Ibid., p. 155
46. Cited in ibid., p. 162.
47. Ibid., p. 215.
48. Michael Clyne, who was analyzed by Marion Milner and who became a brilliant scientist, named his daughter Melanie. Melanie Clyne was Melanie Klein’s great-granddaughter.
49. Wollheim, “Melanie Klein,” p. 469, cited in Sayers, Mothering Psychoanalysis, p. 256
50. MK, p. 366.
2. ANALYZING HER CHILDREN: FROM SCANDAL TO
PLAY TECHNIQUE
1. See Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800.
2. See Allestree, The Whole Duty of Man, p. 296 (“The Devil will be diligent enough to instill into [newborns] all wickedness and vice, even from their cradles, and there being also in all our natures so much the greater aptness to evil, than to good”).
3. Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, pp. 228–29.
4. On the place and the representation of the child, see Cullen, Children in Society; Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500; Hendrick, Children, Childhood, and English Society, 1880–1990; Hill, Children and Society; Becchi and Julia, Histoire de l’enfance en Occident; Barret-Ducrocq, Love in the Time of Victoria and Pauvreté, charité et morale à Londres au XIXème siècle. I am grateful to François Barret-Ducrocq for his guidance on this subject.
5. Sayers, Mothering Psychoanalysis, p. 224.
6. That was the term used by Karen Horney’s daughter, who was Klein’s analysand beginning in childhood and who later became Dr. Marianne Horney Eckhardt. MK, p. 105.
7. “Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 10:5–147.
8. See Bégoin-Guignard, “L’Évolution de la technique en analyse d’enfants,” in Melanie Klein aujourd’hui, p. 55.
9. Klein, Love, Guilt, and Reparation, pp. 1–53. All future references to Love, Guilt, and Reparation will be indicated by LGR.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. The first part of this initial study is entitled “The Influence of the Sexual Enlightenment and Relaxation of Authority on the Intellectual Development of Children”; the second part, “The Child’s Resistance to Enlightenment,” was presented to the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society in 1921.
12. LGR, p. 4.
13. Ibid., p. 22.
14. Ibid., pp. 27, 21.
15. Ibid., p. 48.
16. Ibid., pp. 30–32.
17. Ibid., pp. 33–34.
18. See Miller, “Kleinian Analysis: Dialogue with Hanna Segal,” p. 254.
19. LGR, pp. 22, 48; emphasis added.
20. Ibid., pp. 49–50.
21. Ibid., p. 3.
22. Ibid., p. 27.
23. Ibid.
24. The expression comes from Pontalis, Frontiers in Psychoanalysis, pp. 95 ff, 103.
25. See Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena.”
26. Klein acknowledged that she was not “a natural-born mother,” whereas she believed that Winnicott had “a strong maternal identification, even though he had no children of his own.” MK, p. 233.
27. LGR, pp. 106–27.
28. Ibid., pp. 108, 109.
29. Ibid.; emphasis added.
30. Ibid., pp. 45–46; see also MK, pp. 95–96.
31. LGR, p. 45, n.1.
32. Ibid., p. 45.
33. Ibid., p. 46.
34. Ibid; see also MK, pp. 95–96.
35. LGR, p. 66.
36. Ibid., p. 72.
37. See pp. 203–207.
38. MK, p. 101.
39. PC, pp. 32–33.
40. EG, p. 126.
41. PC, p. 21.
42. Ibid., p. 33.
43. Ibid., p. 17.
44. Ibid., p. 22.
45. Ibid., p. 20.
46. Ibid., p. 27.
47. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:235–39.
48. British analysts appear to be particularly drawn to Klein’s innovation here, although Sylvia Payne has pointed out that some English analysts had engaged in transference interpretations before Melanie arrived in London. See MK, p. 340.
49. Montaigne, Essays I, p. 79.
50. PC, pp. 31–32.
51. Ibid., p. 34.
52. EG, p. 314.
53. Ibid.
54. EG, p. 124.
55. PC, p 32 n. 1, citing Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria” (1905), in Freud, Standard Edition, 7:48 (“J’appelle un chat un chat”).
56. PC, p. 32, n. 2.
57. LGR, p. 33.
58. Ibid., p. 41.
59. Ibid., p. 42.
60. Ibid., p. 43.
61. EG, p. 124.
62. Etchegoyen, “Melanie Klein and the Theory of Interpretation,” pp. 402–16.
63. See PC, “Preface,” p. xi.
3. THE PRIORITY AND INTERIORITY OF THE OTHER AND
THE BOND: THE BABY IS BORN WITH HIS OBJECTS
1. EG, pp. 52–53; emphasis added.
2. We would be well served to put Klein’s notion of the object always-already-there in the context of Hannah Arendt’s emphasis, in the context of the debate that she engaged in concerning Heidegger’s Platonic solipsism, on the being-in-the-world as an in-between, as an appearance-to-other-people within the bonds of the polis, in Aristotle’s sense.
3. Freud, Standard Edition, 14:67–102.
4. Ibid., p. 76.
5. “Leonardo Da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 11:57–137
6. “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in Freud, Standard Edition, 12:1–79.
7. “From the History of an Infantile Neurosis,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 17:1–122.
8. Freud, Standard Edition, 14:237–58.
9. Ibid., 18:1–64.
10. Ibid., p. 44. Translator’s note: Following current psychoanalytic practice, I generally use “drive” rather than “instinct” when conveying the German Triebe.
11. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:1–59.
12. See Segal and Bell, “Theory of Narcissism in Freud and Klein.”
13. Translator’s note: Following current psychoanalytic practice, I generally refer to “cathexis” as “investment.”
14. See, in particular, Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 256–57.
15. Ibid., p. 257.
16. “Ego narcissism would therefore be, as Freud pointed out, a secondary narcissism that is shielded from objects…. Ego narcissism suggests the splitting of the subject, and it replaces auto-eroticism as a state of self-sufficiency. In this context, primary narcissism is the Desire for the One and an aspiration toward a self-sufficient and immortal totality whose self-generation is at once a condition, death, and the negation of death.” See Green, Narcissisme de vie, narcissisme de mort, p. 132.
17. Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:116.
18. Wallon, Les Origines du caractère chez l’enfant; see also Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:277.
19. See Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:248, citing Carpenter, “Mother’s Face and the Newborn.”
20. See pp. 41, 71–72, 94, 106, 238.
21. See Balint, Primary Love and Psycho-Analytic Technique.
22. Petot, Melanie Klein.
23. Klein, Heimann, Isaacs, and Riviere, Developments in Psycho-Analysis. All future references to Developments in Psycho-Analysis will be indicated by DP.
24. Ibid., p. 293; emphasis added.
25. Ibid.; emphasis added.
26. Ibid., p. 199
27. This follows the terminology of W. R. Bion, who distinguishes between a contained (what is projected) and a container (the containing object), a dynamic that is concomitant with the formation of an “apparatus for thinking about thoughts.” See generally Bion, Learning from Experience. Bion developed the notion of the analyst’s mind as a “container” in his Attention and Interpretation: A Scientific Approach to Insight in Psycho-Analysis and Groups.
28. EG, p. 180.
29. On the heterogeneity between meaning and the drive, see part 3 (“Heterogeneity”) of Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language; see also Green, “A Few Thoughts on Modern Linguistics.”
30. I shall return to this point. See pp. 98–113.
31. See pp. 137–157.
32. PC, pp. 6–7; emphasis added.
33. Fairbairn, Psycho-Analytic Studies of the Personality.
34. Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:106.
35. EG, p. 6.
36. Ibid.
37. DP, p. 302.
38. Ibid., p. 318.
39. Cited in ibid., p. 317.
40. Ibid., p. 319.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 320.
43. See generally “The Effects of Early Anxiety-Situations on the Sexual Development of the Boy,” PC, pp. 240–78.
44. Ibid., p. 259
45. Ibid.
46. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 105.
47. Ibid., p. 106.
48. Ibid., p. 119.
49. Ibid., p. 120.
50. See Guignard, “L’Identification projective dans la psychose et dans l’interprétation.”
51. Ibid., p. 93.
52. See Kristeva, Powers of Horror, pp. 1 ff.; and Kristeva, Tales of Love, pp. 46–48.
53. “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” in LGR, pp. 262–89; “On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt,” in DP, pp. 271–91; “Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant,” in DP, pp. 198–236.
54. MK, p. 215.
55. LGR, p. 264.
56. See A Psycho-Analytic Dialogue: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, pp. 338–40.
57. LGR, p. 266.
58. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 57.
59. Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 6:268.
60. LGR, p. 268.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 269.
63. Ibid., pp. 277–79.
64. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 60.
65. Ibid., pp. 81–82.
66. LGR, p. 270.
67. Ibid.
68. Freud, Standard Edition, 14:237–58.
69. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 62.
70. LGR, p. 289.
71. Ibid., p. 369.
72. See pp. 114–136.
4. ANXIETY OR DESIRE: IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE
DEATH DRIVE
1. See Green, “Trop c’est trop,” in Gammill, Melanie Klein aujourd’hui, pp. 93–102.
2. Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and Dialectic of Desire,” in Écrits, pp. 308 and 320.
3. Petot, Melanie Klein, 1:67
4. Cited in DP, p. 275.
5. Ibid., p. 276.
6. Ibid.; emphasis added.
7. Ibid., p. 275.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 276.
10. See pp. 169–177.
11. See Kristeva, Female Genius: Hannah Arendt, pp. 3–8, 16–17, 31–38, 47–48, 213–215.
12. See pp. 158–191.
13. Freud, Standard Edition, 14:177. Specifically, Freud believed that the affect is never unconscious and that only its representation manages to succumb to repression. In addition, unconscious representation persists as a real formation in the unconscious following repression, “whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing. Strictly speaking, then, and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas” (ibid.). “The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings” (ibid., p. 178).
Freud returns to this debate in “The Ego and the Id” (1923) and refers to affect with a term that is curiously imprecise (“something”) while emphasizing the direct path by which the motion of affect becomes conscious: “Let us call what becomes conscious as pleasure and unpleasure a quantitative and qualitative ‘something’ in the course of mental events; the question then is whether this ‘something’ can become conscious in the place where it is, or whether it must first be transmitted to the system Pcpt…. In other words: the distinction between Cs and Pcs. has no meaning where feelings are concerned; the Pcs. here drops out—and feelings are either conscious or unconscious. Even when they are attached to word-presentations, their becoming conscious is not due to that circumstance, but they become so directly.” Freud, Standard Edition, 19:22–23.
14. See pp. 38–45.
15. For a modern conception of affects, see Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, pp. 73 ff. Although Green notes that Klein did not develop a theory of the affect, he shows how she has influenced all of those who have contributed since Freud to such a development, and he emphasizes that the affect is a “drive derivative” (ibid., p. 75); that it has a “direct” presentation (although it still is not associated with a representation) (ibid.); that it corresponds to antagonistic internal perceptions; and that affective motion involves a “psychization” (ibid., p. 237) that is inexpressible so long as the representation of things and the representation of words do not form along with it an intelligible amalgam. Yet unlike the Kleinians who, when faced with the difficulties of the affect problematic, highlighted the investment of an object, Green unfolds the cognitive and energetic traces of affect and explores its heterogeneity (its strength and its meaning) (ibid. pp. 303 and 313 ff.).
16. Petot, Melanie Klein, 1:155.
17. EG, p. 134.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. See “Criminal Tendencies in Normal Children,” in LGR, pp. 170–85.
21. Ibid., p. 181.
22. Green, “Trop c’est trop,” p. 95.
23. DP, pp. 302, 297, 199.
24. Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:237.
25. EG, p. 181
26. Ibid., pp. 187–88.
27. “Poor soul … Than, soul, live thou upon thy servant loss … / So shalt thou feed on Death, that feeds on men, / And, Death once dead, ther’s no more dying then.”
28. Gammill, Melanie Klein aujourd’hui, p. 57.
29. Ibid., p. 63.
30. EG, p. 198.
31. Ibid., p. 199.
32. Ibid., p. 185.
33. Ibid., p. 180, n. 1.
34. Ibid., pp. 205–06.
35. Freud, Standard Edition, 20:129, cited in ibid., p. 190, n. 1.
36. Ibid., pp. 190–91.
37. Ibid., pp. 203–04.
38. EG, pp. 195–96.
39. Cited in MK, p. 435.
40. Anzieu, “Jeunesse de Melanie Klein,” in Gammill, Melanie Klein aujourd’hui, p. 35.
5. A MOST EARLY AND TYRANNICAL SUPEREGO
1. PC, pp. 123–48.
2. LGR, pp. 370–419.
3. “This notion of a realm situated inside the mother’s body that provides a space for the child to project himself has remained fundamental and has laid the foundation for the notion of a psychic realm.” See Jean Bégoin, “Le Surmoi dans la théorie kleinienne et postkleinienne,” p. 40.
4. PC, p. 123.
5. Ibid., pp. 136, 137, 139, citing Freud, “Totem and Taboo,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 13:1–161.
6. PC, pp. 140–41.
7. Ibid., p. 130
8. “The Ego and the Id (1923), in Freud, Standard Edition, 13:1–161.
9. See “The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties” in LGR, pp. 370–419.
10. Ibid., pp. 416–17.
11. The “fact of being castrated” (in the girl) and the “threat of castration” (in the boy) mandate, in Freud’s view, two different fates of the Oedipus complex. In the boy, the castration complex “destroy[s]” the Oedipus complex and, by inciting the abandonment of libidinal investments, ushers in a firm masculine superego, which is the true inheritor of the Oedipus complex. The girl, on the other hand, who does not have to be “threatened” by castration (because hers is a “fact”) is introduced to the Oedipus complex by the very castration that she discovers when she assumes the feminine position of an object of love for the man, and she can abandon the Oedipus complex only very gradually, and perhaps not at all. As a result, “[women’s] super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men.” See Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 19:241–58.
12. See “The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties” in LGR, pp. 416 ff.
13. See EG, pp. 198 ff.
14. Ibid., p. 193.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Jean Bégoin notes that the idealized object is “always two-sided.” See Bégoin, “Le Surmoi dans la théorie kleinienne et postkleinienne,” p. 65.
18. EG, p. 192.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Meltzer, “The Genesis of the Super-Ego Ideal.”
22. “The being is thus enclosed in the very mechanism that he put in place to protect himself,” as we are told by Athanassiou-Popesco in “L’Apport de Melanie Klein et des auteurs post-kleiniens à la compréhension du fonctionnement psychique,” pp. 88 and 90 ff.
23. See pp. 190–191.
24. See Klein, Narrative of a Child Analysis. All future references to Narrative of a Child Analysis will be indicated by NCA.
25. See pp. 132–136.
26. See Kristeva, Female Genius: Hannah Arendt.
27. NCA, p. 225.
28. Ibid. p. 232.
29. Ibid. p. 235, n. 2.
30. EG, p. 249.
31. NCA, p. 231.
32. Ibid., p. 220.
33. Meltzer, The Kleinian Development. Part 2. “Richard Week-by-Week: A Critique of the ‘Narrative of a Child Analysis’ and a Review of Melanie Klein’s Work,” p. 70.
34. NCA, p. 461, n. 3.
35. See Gammill, A partir de Melanie Klein, p. 29.
36. “On the Sense of Loneliness” was published posthumously in EG, pp. 300–313. Klein’s essay appears to respond to Winnicott’s 1957 paper, “The Capacity to Be Alone,” which was published in The Matur/ational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, pp. 29–36. Winnicott distinguishes between the capacity to be alone on the part of a mature, postoedipal ego and a primitive capacity to be alone that is the domain of the baby granted “ego-support from the mother (ibid., p. 32). The youngest ego thus achieves “ego-relatedness” (ibid., p. 30), which is not “narcissism” but an edification of an “internal world” (ibid., p. 33) that is more primitive than Klein’s “introject[ed] … mother” (ibid.). We have here a good example of the back-and-forth exchange between Klein and Winnicott, an example that displays the originality of both analysts as well as their debt to each other. While Winnicott situates the capacity to be alone in a world of ecstasy, we will see that Melanie never distanced herself from a tone of desolation that strikes at the very heart of the serenity she had gained.
37. “On the Sense of Loneliness,” p. 313.
38. Ibid., p. 301.
39. Ibid., p. 302.
41. Ibid. p. 313.
42. Ibid., p. 312
6. THE CULT OF THE MOTHER OR AN ODE TO MATRICIDE?
THE PARENTS
1. See pp. 202–207.
2. EG, p. 197.
3. LGR, p. 192, cited in Petot, Melanie Klein, 1:166.
4. EG, p. 197
5. See PC, chapter 8; DP, chapter 6.
6. EG, pp. 197–98; emphasis added.
7. Ibid., p. 198.
8. See p. 126.
9. EG, p. 200.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 200; emphasis added.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 201.
14. See Arnoux, Melanie Klein, p. 62.
15. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 97.
16. PC, pp. 240, 241, 249–51; emphasis added.
17. Guignard, Epître à l’objet, pp. 149–54.
18. Ibid., p. 152.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 144.
21. See “The Effects of Early Anxiety-Situations on the Sexual Development of the Girl,” in PC, pp. 194–239.
22. Ibid., p. 228.
23. Ibid., pp. 196, 212.
24. Ibid., p. 214.
25. “Last but not least, let me very heartily thank my daughter, Dr Melitta Schmideberg, for the devoted and valuable help which she has given me in the preparation of this book” (ibid., p. xii [“Preface to the First Edition”]).
26. Ibid., pp. 220, 229, 232.
27. Freud, Standard Edition, 20:77–175.
28. PC, p. 123.
29. Ibid., p. 196.
30. Ibid., p. 198.
31. Ibid., p. 202.
32. Ibid., p. 206.
33. Ibid., p. 210.
34. S. Cottet, “Melanie Klein et la guerre du fantasme,” p. 110.
35. PC, p. 212
36. Ibid., p. 227.
37. Ibid., p. 228.
38. Ibid., p. 229.
39. Ibid., p. 236.
40. See Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 21:223–43.
41. Ibid., pp. 238–39.
42. Winnicott endorsed this idea, but, by acting as an intermediary between Klein and Freud, he conceived of a relationship between mother and child that at first lacked drives (along the lines of “being”) and that later became drive-based (along the lines of “doing”). See Winnicott, Home Is Where We Start From. We should also recall Bion’s “a-toxic” or detoxifying mother, a mother who guards against excitation. See Bion, Learning from Experience; Bion, Elements of Psycho-Analysis.
43. Freud, Standard Edition, 23:70.
44. PC, p. 238.
45. Ibid., p. 239.
46. For a critical review of the history of psychoanalytic thought on female sexuality, see “On the Extraneousness of the Phallus; or, The Feminine Between Illusion and Disillusion,” in Kristeva, The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, pp. 94–106.
47. Freud, Standard Edition, 16:250.
48. For the past few years, these notions have been developed assiduously and creatively by French psychoanalysts, particularly by Monique Cournut-Janin and Jean Cournut in “La Castration et le féminin dans les deux sexes.”
49. PC, pp. 243–44.
50. Ibid., p. 260.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 263.
54. Ibid., p. 257.
55. Ibid., pp. 244, 249.
56. See pp. 171–175 and pp. 178–180.
57. Translator’s note: See Freud, “Medusa’s Head,” in Freud, Standard Edition, 18:273–74.
58. See Kristeva, Visions capitales, the catalogue for the exhibition under the same name that was presented at the Hall Napoléon at the Louvre between April 27, 1998, and July 27, 1998.
59. See pp. 232–233.
60. Klein’s essay on The Oresteia was published posthumously in EG, pp. 275–99.
61. See pp. 158–169.
62. EG, p. 299.
63. Ibid., p. 280.
64. Kristeva, The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, pp. 149–50, 161.
65. LGR, p. 7.
7. THE PHANTASY AS A METAPHOR INCARNATE
1. Susan Isaacs, “The Nature and Function of Phantasy,” in DP, pp. 67–121.
2. See pp. 213–248.
3. DP, p. 83.
4. Freud, Standard Edition, 4:536.
5. Ibid., 5:543.
6. Ibid., 5:546.
7. Ibid., 14:269.
8. See Lacan, “The Topic of the Imaginary,” in Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique (1953–1954), pp. 73–88.
9. See pp. 158–169.
10. Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique (1953–1954), p. 85.
11. We should keep in mind the words of Alain Gibeault, who said that, for Freud, the “common language” of psychosis, as manifested by President Schreber, sets forth symbolic relationships that are remnants of archaic identities, and who noted that Freud enjoyed returning to theories on the origin of language that posited an “identity” between sexual words and the words used when one works. “Things that are symbolically connected to-day were probably united in prehistoric times by conceptual and linguistic identity.” See Freud, Standard Edition, 5:352.
12. DP, p. 92.
13. Petot, Melanie Klein, 1:58.
14. DP, p. 89; emphasis added.
15. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:227–32.
16. The adjective diplomatic is drawn from Petot, Melanie Klein, 2:190.
17. See Bion’s use of the elements alpha and beta in his Attention and Interpretation; and Piera Aulagnier and his pictograms in Aulagnier, La Violence de l’interprétation. See also my distinction between the semiotic and symbolic in Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language.
18. According to Freud’s “Repression” (1915), the affect is a subjective translation of a quantity of instinctual energy, and it is often tantamount to the analogous expression of “quota of affect.” Freud, Standard Edition, 14:152. Affect appears to be so bound up with self-consciousness that Freud wonders if it would be appropriate to speak of unconscious affect. Whereas unconscious representations remain repressed in the unconscious, the unconscious affect (the feeling of unconscious guilt, for example), corresponds only to a “rudiment.” Melanie Klein, on the other hand, appears to extend her notion of the fantasy until it includes that rudiment. On the modern evolution of a theory of affects in a work that takes careful note of Klein’s theories, see also Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse.
19. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, p. 2.
20. See pp. 158–169.
21. See Stern, “L’Enveloppe prénarrative.” See also Nelson and Gruendel, “Generalized Event Representations: Basic Building Blocks of Cognitive Development”; Mandler, “Representation”; and Cellérier, “Le Constructivisme génetique aujourd’hui.”
22. See pp. 213–225.
23. See p. 240.
24. Bion, Learning from Experience, p. 43.
25. See Nenunca Amigorena-Rosenberg, Leopoldo Bleger, and Eduardo Vera Ocampo, “Melanie Klein ou la métaphore incarnée,” in Psychanalyse: Cent ans de divan. Paris: Arléa-Corlet, 1995, p. 101.
26. See my “Psychanalyser au féminin: De quelques contributions féminines à la théorie psychanalytique.” Paper delivered at the Colloque d’histoire de la psychanalyse in July 1997.
27. Freud, Standard Edition, 21:227–28.
28. Kristeva, “On the Extraneousness of the Phallus; or, The Feminine Between Illusion and Disillusion,” in The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt; Kristeva, “La Fille au sanglot,” pp. 41–42.
8. THE IMMANENCE OF SYMBOLISM AND ITS DEGREES
1. LGR, p. 221.
2. Ibid., p. 230.
3. See pp. 38–40.
4. LGR, p. 225.
5. Ibid., p. 231.
6. Ibid., p. 230.
7. Ibid., p. 220; emphasis added.
8. See pp. 176–177.
9. LGR, p. 221
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Klein’s hypothesis of a primary symbolism could be compared to what Freud described as the “organ-speech” of schizophrenics, which implicates the logic of sameness versus that of resemblance: “What has dictated the substitution is not the resemblance between the things denoted but the sameness of the words used to express them.” Freud, Standard Edition, 14: 201; see also p. 263, n. 7.
13. Translator’s note: See Segal, “Notes on Symbol Formation.”
14. LGR, p. 225.
15. Translator’s note: See Lacan, Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953–1954, p. 85.
16. LGR, p. 225
17. Ibid., p. 226.
18. Ibid., p. 224.
19. See also pp. 48–50.
20. LGR, pp. 226–27.
21. Ibid., p. 225.
22. Ibid., p. 227.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. See pp. 139–140, 172–175.
26. See Gibeault, “Variation sur un thème ancien: construction et/ou reconstruction du psychisme de l’enfant.”
27. The expression comes from Green, The Work of the Negative.
28. As Hanna Segal has pointed out, some of Freud’s writings suggest that man is a “symbol user” (particularly when Freud suggests that the dream uses an array of collective symbolic creations that operate independently from the dreamer, that are made for good, and that are always available). Melanie Klein, on the other hand, “discovered man as the symbol maker.” See Segal, “Psychoanalytic Dialogue: Kleinian Thought Today,” p. 365.
29. See generally King and Steiner, The Freud Klein Controversies, pp. 567 ff.
30. See DP, pp. 73, n. 1, 124, n. 1; King and Steiner, The Freud Klein Controversies, pp. 531–35.
31. See Segal, “Notes on Symbol Formation.”
32. Susan Isaacs taught logic and psychology and became the head of the Child Development Department at the Institute of Education at the University of London in 1933. See her “The Nature and Function of Phantasy,” in DP, pp. 67–121.
33. Freud, Standard Edition, 18:14.
34. DP, pp. 72–74.
35. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:233–39.
36. DP, pp. 103–04; King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, pp. 544 ff.
37. DP, p. 104.
38. Ibid., pp. 104–05.
39. Ibid., p. 105.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Heimann completed her psychoanalytic training in Berlin, where she was analyzed by Theodor Reik. After emigrating to England in 1933 to escape the Nazis, she was at first a loyal follower of Klein, but later expressed her discontent and joined the “Independents.”
43. DP, p. 326.
44. Ibid., p. 146.
45. Ibid., p. 124.
46. Ibid.
47. Freud, Standard Edition, 19:235.
48. See pp. 169–171.
49. See Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, pp. 73–88; and “A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s Verneinung by Jean Hyppolite,” in ibid., appendix, pp. 289–97.
50. From an entirely different perspective, Hannah Arendt also explored the deep logical processes in which “taste” encounters “judgment.” See Kristeva, Female Genius: Hannah Arendt, pp. 220–230
51. See “A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s Verneinung by Jean Hyppolite,” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, appendix, pp. 289–97. The “new psychoanalysis” developed by Klein was also recognized in the March 1952 issue of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, which was devoted to Klein’s seventieth birthday and which was reprinted in New Directions in Psychoanalysis. See pp. 227–228.
52. See “A Spoken Commentary on Freud’s Verneinung by Jean Hyppolite,” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I, appendix, p. 292.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 293.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., pp. 292, 290–91.
57. Ibid., p. 292.
58. Ibid., p. 295.
59. Ibid., p. 297.
60. Ibid. See Rose, “Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein,” in Stonebridge and Phillips, Reading Melanie Klein. These remarks come to mind as we read Hanna Segal and her commentary on the shift from “equations” to the “symbol proper.” See Segal, “Notes on Symbol Formation”; see also pp. 176–177. The equivalent (as Hyppolite understands the term) of Verneinung is accompanied or supported by a suspension of destructiveness: “equivalent” and “suspension” indicate thought and allow it to free itself from the realm of “equations” that characterizes archaic fantasies.
61. Lacan, Écrits, p. 388.
62. Ibid, p. 396. Jacqueline Rose has carefully tracked these various intersections and divergences in her “Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein,” in Stonebridge and Phillips, Reading Melanie Klein, pp. 137–38.
63. Lacan, Écrits, pp. 390–92.
64. MK, p. 488.
65. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 569.
66. Ibid.
67. See Heimann, “On Countertransference”; and Heimann, “Further observations on the analyst’s cognitive process.”
68. In light of Winnicott’s February 5, 1947, paper delivered to the British Psycho-Analytical Society entitled “Hate in the Counter-Transference,” which observes that during certain stages in the analysis, the analyst’s hate is sought by the patient, and that the analyst must acknowledge the errors arising out of his hate in order for the analysis to continue effectively, and in light of similar notions presented by Margaret Little, Paula Heimann insisted to the Zurich Congress in 1949 that the analyst functions like “the patient’s mirror reflection.” See MK, p. 379.
69. See Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, pp. 79–86.
70. Segal, “Notes on Symbol Formation,” p. 393.
71. See, for example, Kristeva, Tales of Love, pp. 26–53. On the castration ordeal, see Kristeva, The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt, pp. 94–106.
72. Bion, Learning from Experience, p. 31.
73. Ibid., p. 6.
74. Ibid., p. 26.
75. Ibid., p. 6.
76. Ibid., p. 26.
77. Ibid., p. 35.
78. Ibid., p. 83.
79. Ibid., p. 33.
80. Ibid., pp. 36–37.
81. See Fain and Braunschweig, La Nuit, le jour, pp. 147–50, 175–76.
82. Bion, Learning from Experience, p. 83.
83. Ibid., p. 43.
84. See Rosenfeld, Psychotic States, which distinguishes between a projective identification that evacuates the bad parts of the self and a projective identification that is destined to communicate with objects and to make the patient amenable to the analyst’s understanding of him. From that perspective, we should recall Hanna Segal’s work on the symbol that followed her 1957 article on symbol formation (see pp. 176–177): in that work she recognized that there is a mutually beneficial relationship between container and contained that facilitates the development of the depressive position and the genesis of the symbol. See Segal, “On Symbolism.”
85. See generally Meltzer et al., Explorations in Autism.
86. See Bick, “The Experience of the Skin in Early Object-Relations.
87. See, in particular, Mazet and Leibovici, Autisme et psychoses de l’enfant; Hochmann and Ferrari, Imitation, identification chez l’enfant autisme; Privat and Sacco, Groupes d’enfants et cadre psychanalytique; Athanassiou, Bion et la naissance de l’espace psychique; Golse, Du corps à la pensée; Haag, “De la sensoralité aux ébauches de pensée chez les enfants autistes”; Haag, “Autisme infantile précoce et phénomènes autistiques: Réflexions psychanalytique”; Anzieu, “Les Liens originaires du moi à l’objet concret”; Anzieu, “Concrétude de l’objet et construction du moi”; Houzel, “Aspects spécifiques du transfert dans la cure d’enfants autistes”; Houzel, “La Psychothérapie psychanalytique d’un enfant autiste” and “Ce que la psychanalyse peut apporter aux parents d’enfants autistes”; Houzel, “Les Formations archaïques.”
88. See Tustin, Autistic Barriers in Neurotic Patients.
89. See Tustin, “Les états autistiques chez l’enfant,” in Rencontres avec Frances Tustin.
90. See Rayner, The Independent Mind in British Psychoanalysis. Translator’s note: The “Independents” were also known as the “Middle Group.”
91. MK, p. 234.
92. Winnicott, Human Nature, pp. 106–07.
93. Ibid., pp. 114–15.
94. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, p. 65.
95. See pp. 111–113.
96. See Winnicott, “Birth Memory, Birth Trauma, and Anxiety” (1949), in Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis.
97. LGR, p. 214.
98. Ibid., p. 211.
99. Ibid., p. 214.
100. Ibid., p. 215.
101. Ibid., p. 216.
102. Ibid., p. 217.
103. Ibid., p. 218.
104. See “On Identification,” in EG, pp. 141–75.
105. Ibid., pp. 164, 169.
106. Ibid., p. 159.
107. Ibid., p. 175.
9. FROM THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE TO THE FILIGREE OF
THE LOYAL AND DISLOYAL
1. Meisel and Kendrik, Bloomsbury/Freud, p. 188.
2. MK, p. 380.
3. DP, p. 198, n. 1.
4. I was made privy to these facts and observations by Phyllis Grosskurth, whom I thank very much.
5. MK, p. 7.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 6.
8. Through other means but in like manner, Hannah Arendt was obliged to carry out her work in a foreign language, English, a predicament that no doubt affected her thought, particularly her disputatious didacticism and her clarity, which kept her away from the presumed or feared madness of the mother tongue. See Kristeva, Female Genius: Hannah Arendt, pp. 185–187, 238–239.
9. “Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells.” Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 193
10. See pp. 188–190.
11. See pp. 94–97.
12. MK, p. 284.
13. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 535.
14. Ibid., pp. 538–39.
15. Ibid., p. 535.
16. Ibid., p. 558.
17. Rose, “Negativity in the Work of Melanie Klein,” in Stonebridge and Phillips, Reading Melanie Klein, p. 143.
18. DP, p. 32.
19. See Joan Riviere’s remarks in DP, p. 36.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 20.
22. Ibid., p. 35.
23. MK, p. 452.
24. Ibid.
25. MK, pp. 46, 53.
26. See pp. 46–48. This rumor has not been confirmed definitively, however.
27. MK, p. 183.
28. See p. 122.
29. Cited in MK, p. 199.
30. Ibid., p. 214.
31. Ibid., pp. 297–98.
32. Ibid., p. 297.
33. Ibid., p. 291.
34. Ibid., p. 293.
35. Ibid., p. 316.
36. Ibid., p. 242.
37. Ibid., p. 461.
38. Ibid., p. 462.
39. Ibid., p. 354.
40. Ibid.
41. See p. 74.
42. MK, p. 215.
43. Ibid., p. 231.
44. Ibid., p. 424.
45. Ibid., p. 216.
46. See generally Paula Heimann’s writings, particularly those included in DP; see also Heimann’s innovative theory of countertransference, discussed pp. 171–172.
47. MK, p. 381.
48. Ibid., p. 369.
49. Ibid., pp. 419 ff.
50. Ibid., p. 420.
51. See pp. 170–171.
52. See Isaacs, “The Nature and Function of Phantasy,” in DP, pp. 67–121.
53. MK, p. 398.
54. Ibid., p. 208.
55. See Riviere, “A Contribution to the Analysis of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction.”
56. MK, p. 382.
57. Ibid., p. 419.
58. With respect to the possibility of analyzing other cultures, Klein asserted, “I’ve never tried it. I would have liked it.” MK, p. 443.
59. Ibid., p. 438.
60. Ibid., p. 448.
61. In her biography of Klein, Phyllis Grosskurth speaks of “a strong element of homosexuality” in Melanie, and describes her as “the androgynous female whose true children were her concepts.” MK, pp. 362 and 385.
62. See Ramnoux, La Nuit et les enfants de la nuit de la tradition grecque, which structures this preontological universe into binary pairs (high/low, void and black, earth and depth, Night herself bearing two children, one black and one white: Thanatos and Hypnos, and so forth), whose reversibility teaches us to look death in the face.
63. While any human relation is ambivalent, since it contains traces of hostile sentiments, “the relation of a mother to her son” is the solitary exception: “based on narcissism, [it] is not disturbed by subsequent rivalry, and is reinforced by a rudimentary attempt at sexual object-choice.” Freud, Standard Edition, 18:101, n. 2.
10. THE POLITICS OF KLEINIANISM
1. MK, p. 162.
2. Translator’s note: See King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 627.
3. Anna Freud, Einführung in die Technik der Kinderanalyse (Vienna: Verlag, 1927). A translation of this work appeared in the United States in 1929, “On the Theory of the Analysis of Children,” in International Journal of Psychoanalysis 10 (1929), but the first British edition (Anna Freud, The Psycho-Analytic Treatment of Children [London: Imago, 1946]) did not appear until 1946.
4. Cited in MK, p. 164.
5. Cited in ibid., p. 168.
6. See King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies. Although the editors of this work did not have access to all relevant documents, particularly to Anna Freud’s personal archives, this work makes an exemplary contribution to the history of ideas in psychoanalysis.
7. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 24.
8. MK, p. 241.
9. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 238.
10. See MK, p. 257.
11. Cited in ibid.
12. André Green refers to it as such in his preface to the French edition of The Freud-Klein Controversies.
13. Cited in King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 235.
14. Reprinted in Jones, Papers in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 452–84.
15. Cited in King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 229.
16. First at the Jackson Nursery in Vienna, then at the Hampstead War Nursery in London, and, since 1952, at the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic, Anna Freud endeavored to directly observe children alongside her faithful colleague Dorothy Burlingham. With the assistance of Joseph Sandler, she created a developmental profile that enabled her to relate pathological divergences to the course of normal development and thus to determine whether therapeutic intervention or analytic intervention would be indicated. With its focus on the direct observation of children rather than on analytic reconstruction, the work of the Hampstead nurseries appears to have adopted a deductive approach that employed a high degree of systematization to foster the child’s socialization.
17. John Bowlby and Esther Bick went to the Tavistock Clinic in 1948 to offer training in child psychotherapy; Bick took over later on. Their treatment was based on observation and in particular on the analysis of projective identification in the analyst’s countertransference. Yet some critics objected to the religious character of some of the work being done at the Tavistock, which they felt was dominated by “matriarchal elements” as opposed to “the Freudian emphasis on the father.” See Eli Zaretsky, “Melanie Klein and the Emergence of Modern Personal Life,” p. 36.
18. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 227
19. Jones did so during the June 10, 1942, meeting, for example. Ibid., p. 195.
20. See Klein’s “The Emotional Life and Ego-Development of the Infant with Special Reference to the Depressive Position,” in King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, pp. 752–97 and the account of the discussion of May 3, 1944, at ibid., pp. 823 ff.
21. Ibid., pp. 758 ff.
22. MK, p. 299.
23. King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, pp. 231–32.
24. Cited in MK, p. 289.
25. Particularly Freud’s early case study of “Little Hans,” which she cites at length, and his essay entitled “Negation.” See King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, pp. 792, n. 19, 843, n.4.
26. Ibid., p. 842.
27. Ibid., p. 839.
28. Ibid., p. 778.
29. Ibid., p. 834.
30. Ibid., p. 779.
31. Ibid., p. 916.
32. Translator’s note: See MK, p. 403 ff. regarding Anna Freud’s reaction to Bowlby’s paper “Grief and Mourning in Infancy.”
33. Ibid., pp. 928–29.
34. MK, p. 428.
35. Bion, Experiences in Groups.
36. Ibid., p. 187.
37. See pp. 202–212.
38. See Rayner, The Independent Mind in British Psychoanalysis.
39. See Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, pp. 29–36.
40. EG, pp. 300–313.
41. See pp. 111–113.
42. See Lacan, “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” in Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, pp. 8–29; Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 194; MK, p. 376.
43. Lacan, Écrits, p. 70.
44. Ibid., p. 15.
45. Ibid., p. 20.
46. Lacan, Écrits, pp. 136–37.
47. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, pp. 1–7
48. See pp. 138–140, 169–177.
49. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, p. 21.
50. Letter from Melanie Klein to Clifford Scott, January 28, 1948, cited in MK, p. 377.
51. Ibid, pp. 376–77.
52. See Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 197.
53. See the March 1952 issue of the journal. A revised version, buttressed with two essays by Melanie herself and a preface by Ernest Jones, was published under the title New Directions in Psychoanalysis: The Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behavior.
54. See pp. 169–177.
55. “They practically ignored the papers and books of Freud’s late period…. Also they rarely used Freud’s very important, short paper ‘On Negation’ (Freud, S. 1925a), a real small masterpiece, on which the Kleinians based many of their claims that Freud could support their views.” King and Steiner, The Freud-Klein Controversies, p. 255.
56. See pp. 138–140.
57. Lacan, Écrits, p. 345.
58. Ibid., p. 667.
59. Ibid., pp. 728–29.
60. I thank Catherine Millot for bringing this point to my attention.
61. Lacan, Écrits, pp. 750–51.
62. Ibid.
63. See Klein’s “On the Sense of Loneliness,” in EG, pp. 300–13.
64. See, for example, Rustin, “A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis”; Rustin and Rustin, “Relational Preconditions of Socialism”; Rustin and Rustin, The Good Society and the Inner World; Alford, Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory.
65. See Stonebridge and Phillips, Reading Melanie Klein.
66. Rustin and Rustin, “Relational Preconditions of Socialism,” p. 218.
67. Alford, Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory, p. 170.
68. “In caring for others from within ourselves, we seek not to overcome their separateness but to assert our individuality through an act of caritas, an act that reaches outward from my boundaries to another’s without denying either” (ibid., p. 184).
69. Ibid., p. 49.
70. See pp. 169–177.
71. “A Kleinian perspective holds out little hope for such a transformation [of humanity]. Nevertheless, it finds in human nature as it is currently constituted cause for hope—a hope, to be sure, that remains tragically unfulfilled, especially in the large group.” Alford, Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory, p. 136.
72. See Lacan, “Le Cas ‘Aimée’ ou la paranoïa d’auto-punition” (1932) and “Motifs du crime paranoïaque: le crime des soeurs Papin” (1933), in De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité, pp. 153–343 and 389–98.
73. See LGR, pp. 345–46.
74. Bion, Learning from Experience, pp. 36–37.
75. See John Phillips, “The Fissure of Authority: Violence and the Acquisition of Knowledge,” in Stonebridge and Phillips, Reading Melanie Klein, pp. 160–78.
76. See p. 38.
77. See Hochmann, “Winnicott et Bion dans l’après coup des Controverses,” pp. 141–42.
78. The very destructiveness that theologians, particularly Protestant and Orthodox ones, call kenosis, from ekenosen (“emptied,” “useless,” “gratuitous,” in the realm of “nonbeing,” “futility,” and “nothingness”). Kenosis evokes incarnation as a limit experience because the culmination of the human form that Christ endured is structured through annihilation and death.
79. See Parat, L’Affect partagé.
80. See LGR, p. 86.
81. Ibid., p. 81.
82. With the exception, perhaps, of the phallic stage, particularly in the boy, see p. 127, but also in the girl, see p. 123.
83. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering. Chodorow emphasizes the way the desire for motherhood is shifted inside the object relation between the mother and her daughter.
84. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love. In the light of the bond between mother and baby, Benjamin focuses on the intersubjective tension in the erotic bond between two people more than on the tension inside the individual.
85. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur. Dinnerstein analyzes the “androgyny” of the woman as a result of the “couple” relationship formed between the young girl and her mother during the preoedipal phase.
86. Women: A Cultural Review 1, no. 2 (Spring 1990). The special issue includes articles by Ann Scott, Janet Sayers, Elaine Showalter, Margot Waddell, Mary Jacobus, Noreen O’Connor, and Juliett Newbigin, as well as an interview of Hanna Segal by Jacqueline Rose.
87. See Mary Jacobus, ibid.; see also Sayer, Mothering Psychoanalysis; and Brennan, “The Foundational Fantasy.”
88. I discuss some of these contributions on pp. 177–185.