BACKGROUND TO THE GERMAN ATTACK
By mid September 1944, the Allied advance through Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland had lost much of its momentum at, or just across the western border of Nazi Germany.
Having established the initial American foothold in Normandy, the US Third Army broke out of its beachhead. With the capture of St. Lo and the destruction of German forces near Montmorel (Falaise), American troops raced through France, Belgium and Luxembourg to the German border, a distance of about 750 miles. This put them about 75 miles away from the industrial heart of the Ruhr on the east bank of the Rhine. The capture of Aachen on October 21st and subsequent heavy fighting in the Hürtgen forest, southeast of the city, served to slow down, then stop the American advance into Germany. Another factor contributing to the slowdown was the over-extension of supply lines, meaning that the ‘Red Ball Express’ was still bringing supplies to the front from depots in Normandy and around Paris. This was costly in terms of manpower and vehicles. In First Army, its theoretical strength of 1,010 medium tanks was down to 85%. In the case of the 3rd Armored Division, of an authorised medium tank strength of 232, only 70 were in condition for frontline duty. The manpower shortage further aggravated the situation, thus contributing to the stabilisation of positions along the German border.
Having withdrawn to positions within the Westwall (Siegfried Line) and facing mounting pressure on the eastern front, Hitler was in desperate need of breathing space. After the daily conference of Saturday, 16 September 1944, convened in the Wolfsschanze, (Hitler’s field headquarters in East Prussia), the Führer called a meeting of his household military staff. Generaloberst Alfred Jodl and Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel were present, as was Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, the acting Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Guderian was holding direct responsibility for the conduct of military operations on the eastern front. Also in attendance was Reichmarschall Herman Goering’s Luftwaffe (Air Force) representative, General der Flieger, Werner Kreipe. In conflict with direct orders to the contrary, Kreipe kept a diary in which he recorded notes of each daily conference. The meeting began with a briefing by Jodl in which he tried to downplay the effect of his gloomy report of the status quo on the western front. By that stage in the war, those in attendance were well aware of Hitler’s tendency to fling violent tantrums when faced with news that he found distasteful. As Jodl gave an overview of the situation in the west, Hitler suddenly cut him short and, after a few moments of strained silence stated, ‘I have just made a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counterattack, that is to say, out of the Ardennes, with the objective of Antwerp’!
Adolf Hitler explains his war strategies to Reichsmarschall Göring and Generalfeldmarschall Keitel.
He then went on to outline his plan for what was to become the last major offensive in the West.
HITLER’S PLAN
In Hitler’s opinion, the situation wasn’t quite as desperate as some of his staff might suggest. The slow down and stabilisation of the Allied advance in the West, coupled with an expected seasonal loss of momentum of the Russian attacks in the East, might just give him the respite he so urgently sought. Despite intense Allied air raids, Hitler’s armaments chief, Albert Speer and his staff had done a first rate job of maintaining, and in some cases, improving industrial output. Production of fighter aircraft rose from a monthly rate of 1,016 in February 1944, to 3,301 in September of the same year. The Führer’s present optimism, spurred on by his inner circle of advisors, led him to believe mistakenly that a German offensive through the Ardennes could succeed. A new mobilisation plan launched by Reichminister Josef Goebbels on 24 August 1944, would, in Hitler’s eyes, give him the manpower needed to undertake the planned attack.
By late 1944, major decision-making at the level of the OKW, was the responsibility of one man, Adolf Hitler, who despite every indication to the contrary, believed in his own ability as a military genius. He likened his predicament to that of his idol, Frederick the Great, who, when facing certain defeat, at the commencement of the Seven Years’ War, defeated armies twice the strength of his own. He thus succeeded in buying time during which the Allied coalition fighting him collapsed. To Hitler, this constituted a precedent for his own dilemma in 1944. He believed that in capturing Antwerp, he’d deal the Allies such a blow that the shaky alliance facing him would disintegrate. He hoped that his offensive would isolate the British 21st Army Group, enabling him to surround British and Canadian armies before the Americans could react. Had not the hillyforested area east of the Ardennes lent itself to the huge troop build-up required for the successful Blitzkrieg attack in May 1940. Hitler believed that he could repeat, to a certain extent, what he’d tried before. This time however, his attacking troops could not count on effective air support, so an attack late in the year would have to gamble on the hope that bad weather would keep Allied fighters grounded.
Initially, Hitler planned to attack between the 20 and 30 November on an eightymile front running from Monschau in the north to Echternach in the south. Seizure of bridges over the Meuse River would be followed by a race to capture Antwerp itself, after which, British and Canadian forces north of the line Bastogne-Liège-Antwerp would be annihilated. The plan called for the use of 35 divisions, of which 10 would be armoured. Massive artillery and rocket support would be given to two attacking panzer armies in the lead with their flanks covered by two armies largely composed of infantry divisions. Whatever limited air support there was, s would be made available and all planning would aim at securing tactical surprise and speed. Absolute secrecy was crucial to the build-up with only Hitler’s closest advisors let in on the plan. Jodl and his staff presented Hitler with five different attack scenarios, of which they recommended two in particular, Operation HOLLAND and Operation LIÈGE-AACHEN. The first would consist of a single thrust attack aimed at destroying enemy forces between Liège and Aachen. Hitler opted for a combination of the two, a double envelopment known to the planners as the Grand Slam or the Big Solution.
Up to this point, the two major field commands concerned, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt’s Oberbefehlshaber West (Ob West) – headquarters of the C-in-C Western Front – and Generalfeldmarschall Walther Model’s Army Group B, had not yet been let in on the plan to regain the initiative in the west. On 22 October, their respective Chiefs of Staff, General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal and General der Infanterie Hans Krebs went to Hitler’s headquarters requesting further reinforcements to defend Germany’s industrial heartland of the Ruhr.
Adolf Hitler greets Mussolini at Berchtesgaden in 1942. The SS officer behind Hitler is Obersturmbannführer Richard Schulze Kossens who in December 1944, would lead the attack against Charles MacDonald’s company.
After the daily conference, Hitler told them of his plan and their respective roles therein. Both signed a pledge of secrecy upon pain of death concerning the new operation, by then code-named WACHT AM RHEIN (Watch on the Rhine). Hitler then went on to stipulate required troop strengths, asserting that he would personally assure their availability. Keitel then promised both generals that he’d make 4,250,000 gallons of fuel available as well as fifty trainloads of ammunition. As Westphal and Krebs prepared to leave, Hitler ordered that Ob West should prepare a draft plan for the first phase of the operation.
Despite the fact that Belgians often refer to the battle as the ‘Von Rundstedt Offensive’, the attack was the Feldmarschall’s in name only. Hitler detested the Old Prussian intensely and saw him as representative of the haughty officer corps. Many of them thought of Hitler as a usurper in his role as commander of the OKW. He’d dismissed Rundstedt twice and brought him out of retirement as a figurehead behind whom the troops would rally in the forthcoming attack.
General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal, Chief of Staff to Feldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt. (Author’s collection. Courtesy of General Westphal).
On 27 October, Rundstedt and his staff went to Model’s Army Group B headquarters at Fichtenhain near Krefeld, to discuss the plan with Model. By then, the operations plan drawn up by Ob West for presentation at Army Group B headquarters, was code-named Operation MARTIN. Rundstedt and Model thoroughly disapproved of the ‘Big Solution’ deeming it over-ambitious. Their alternative, the ‘Small Solution’, proposed an operation aimed at destroying Allied forces in the Aachen-Maastricht-Liège salient.
The army commanders designated to lead the attack were present at this meeting. General der Panzertruppen Hasso E. von Manteuffel would command Fifth Panzer Army, Obergruppenführer der Waffen-SS, Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich, Sixth Panzer Army and General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger Seventh Panzer Army. The participating generals agreed that the ‘Big Solution’ was over-ambitious and suggested that they should attack no further than the Meuse River. The result of this meeting was that Model agreed to produce a new plan, largely following the lines of Operation MARTIN. This plan arrived at Ob West on 28 October pending receipt of additional written instructions from Jodl. These instructions arrived at Rundstedt’s headquarters on the night of 2 November. In this message, Jodl referred to the objective of Antwerp as ‘unalterable’, adding ‘Although from a strictly technical standpoint, it appears to be disproportionate to our available forces, in our present situation, however, we must not shrink from staking everything on one card’.
German emblem for the counteroffensive. The sketch is one made from memory by O/Gefr Wilhelm Scodzic, 1129 Volksgrenadier Regiment.
