VC10 advertising by Vickers.
‘The VC10 had to be better than the 707, not just different, and we succeeded that requirement in many ways.’
Sir George Edwards, OM, CBE, FRS, FRAeS
This is the story of not just an airliner, but also the airline industry, an airline and the nation and society it served. The Vickers VC10, the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), the geopolitical and social history of Great Britain and the British Empire are all interwoven. Other national airlines have served political, as well as passenger needs, but the circumstances surrounding BOAC, the end of an era, and government edict to a national, yet State-supported carrier, are circumstances unique to BOAC and the VC10.
Throw in the legacy of Imperial Airways, the British class system, the remnants of The British Raj, African independence, and a curious narrative of attitude and paradox emerges in this airline and airliner story. Somehow, the VC10 became the culmination of several decades of African and colonial aviation adventure by the British and their airline. For Africa is not just an essential part of the VC10 story, but the origination of it.
The sleek VC10 was not a triumph of form over function, but rather a triumphant engineering-led elegance of function. The VC10’s function dictated its form and on the subsonic side of Concorde, that form happened to be the most beautiful airliner ever made. Most people agree with such sentiment. So, reflecting the late Dr Ing. Ferry Porsche’s wonderful phrase about his cars having ‘elegance of function’ seems to be a great way of capturing what we are talking about in this aeroplane. And if we are to make an automotive analogy, I suggest that the VC10 would be a V12 Aston Martin; power and handling being to the fore. If the VC10 had been German, it would have, of course, been a Porsche 911 930-series Turbo – with everything hung out the back.
There have been many things said about the VC10, its main British civil operator, BOAC, and about the rival 707. Some such tales are lies, some manipulations, and some are stated in truth. Even today, there remain differing versions of certainty. It is vital that a rational and evidence-based opinion is framed. We need to put aside national egos and agendas, and reach a view of the VC10 – and the great BOAC battle with the Boeing 707 – that understands that we cannot always make direct or fair comparisons between the two competing airframes; because they were designed differently for differing requirements. Boeing’s 707 was originally smaller, less oceanic-capable, the Vickers VC10 was also originally smaller and not targeted at ocean crossings; both designs ‘grew’ until they were bigger. One – the 707 – lacked runway performance by design; the other – the VC10 – had runway performance, but lacked ultimate ultra-long-range ability – at the request of its specified operator.
Many years ago, I wrote a technical history book on the VC10 which was well received by enthusiasts and by the men who made the VC10: I tried to pay tribute to their incredible work as best as my then younger mind could. Some readers objected to my claim that if you were to design a specific ‘hot and high’, runway dedicated airframe, it still ought to be T-tailed and rear-engined. Critics said that as since the VC10, there have been nothing but conventionally shaped airliners with wing-mounted engines – I was wrong. But this was a claim of perceived wisdom, rather than pure fact. For the T-tail and rear-engined layout does remain the choice for regional and business jets needing ultimate performance – the Citation X proves the point. Bombardier’s CRJ 200, Embraer’s Phenom, Fokker’s 100, Gulfstream’s G650, all seem to have proven my ‘clean wing’ point – T-tails and rear engines are still an effective configuration for delivering lift in a specific application. Boeing’s C17 is T-tailed too, as is the A400M; true, they both have wing-mounted engines – but use high wings to avoid the foreign object ingestion problems and roll-angle limitations of low wings with pyloned engines dangling off them a few inches from the ground. So the VC10-type layout is still viable and does have benefits. Oh, and T-tailed, rear-engined 727s and DC9/MD80s (reflecting their manufacturers faith in the configuration) are still flying.
VC10 advertising by Vickers.
Coming back to the VC10 and its wider airline story has been a long-held ambition and I am fortunate enough to have known and been previously tutored by the late Brian Trubshaw, the man who knew so much about the VC10 and what happened to it.
I still cherish my childhood memories of flying on VC10s to and from Africa. I will never forget my first sight of that wonderful dark blue BOAC VC10. My grandfather, himself a pilot and a member of West London Aero Club at White Waltham (scene of a famous 1977 low-level VC10 flypast), took me to London Heathrow. Then, I saw what was to be my airliner bound for Africa. There it was, a BOAC VC10, with its 40ft high, whale-tailed empennage jutting proudly out in a line-up of blue and golden ‘Speedbird’ tailfins at Terminal Three, London Heathrow Airport. There were VC10s everywhere: VC10s roaring at full power, or nose-up clawing into the sky, with the sense of energy from a distant tail. Other VC10s arrived with the eerie howling sound from the engines as thrust reverse was cancelled on the landing roll out. Once on board, the voice of the gold striped captain, reassuring in its silken tones, the glimpse of a stewardesses elegance, the murals on the cabin bulkheads; the fleeting flash of dark blue and gold hues, all added to the sheer sense of the VC10 occasion; such things made a mark on a child.
When I returned to a British school, before Concorde was launched into airline service, the fact that I had flown in on a BOAC VC10 was something special, even my teachers asked me about it and I flashed my BOAC ‘Junior Jet Club’ souvenir book as if it was a passport to identity. It carried with it a certain cachet. Schoolboys drooled over Ferraris, Jaguars, Aston Martins and Porsches, but they also drooled over blue and gold VC10s and Super VC10s. Just as in the old days of the Imperial flying boats, to have flown in on a VC10 and arrived from afar, really was something, it meant a lot – less about the passenger – but more about the sheer style and brilliance of the machine itself. There was a real sense of adventure in having flown on the VC10. And coming home on an East African ‘Super’ VC10 was, for jealous schoolboys, akin to arriving from the moon.
As a child and as a man, I was, like so many, utterly enthralled by the VC10, it was at least, a healthy obsession. Later in life I was lucky enough to fly a VC10, and spend a few precious hours with the RAF machines at Brize Norton. I still recall sitting in the ‘jump’ seat behind the commander as we rocketed upwards, thundering up, nose high, the Conways crackling and the VC10 steeply attacking the sky. That old cliché about climbing like a homesick angel suddenly seemed so apt. Then we burst out of the clouds like a cork out of a bottle and into the blue and levelled off, seemingly coming to a standstill as the power was pulled back and silence ruled. You could not get that thrill in a 707 or DC-8. Only taking off from a winch-launch in a super-sleek glider was to later rival the sensation of climb angle and speed.
Flying to and in Africa, has remained a draw to me. In the 1990s I was fortunate enough to be a brief part of the story of the Catalina flying boat owned by Pierre Jaunet that operated from the Zambezi. We moored that Catalina, registered as ‘Z-CAT’, at the old Imperial Airways flying boat pier that could still be found upstream from Victoria Falls. From there we set off across Africa, tracing the old Imperial route. I even got to fly Z-CAT from the left hand seat – and made a bad job of it. But I know how lucky I was to be part of that re-enactment of a past glory. The Catalina was so slow that we were overtaken by an eagle that flew alongside us, eyeballed me in the cockpit, hunched its wings and dived ahead of us. The ghosts of Imperial’s C Class flying boats were surely watching. It was from, and for Africa, that the C Class, the Comet and the VC10 were all conceived. I first thought of writing about that history there and then, moored on the banks of the Zambezi where once, elite passengers took a small launch out to a giant silver flying boat that rested like a metallic dragonfly lapped by Zambezi waters, glinting in the sun and emblazoned with the legend ‘Imperial Airways London’. It was a link with home, or a tumbrel to ride afar.
At the other end of the Imperial route lay Rose Bay, Sydney. I spent a few brief, yet wonderful months there, in paradise, spending every day on the harbour, right next to the old flying boat base on Sydney’s magical inlet. Today, small float planes buzz about Rose Bay and the superb Catalina restaurant reminds us of those great days of the weekly aerial link between England and a cove on Sydney harbour, one brushed by a warm, light breeze, as C Class flying boats jostled at their moorings. A small memorial and a few hints of a grand past mark the place at Rose Bay where history was made. You can take a ferry from Circular Quay to Rose Bay, and if you are lucky an ancient de Havilland Beaver floatplane will alight upon the water in front of you. Just imagine what it would have been like if it had been a giant C Class depositing itself with one last heave after the long journey from England and Singapore.
As a child I also flew on Boeing 707s, DC-8s, Caravelles, 727s and even Nigeria Airways Dakotas, and other types, before adult experiences on 747s and the trijets. I can visualise now the view of barnacled, podded, wing pylon-mounted engines nodding on their mounts as Mr Boeing’s 707 was rocked and twisted by heavy turbulence over Texas, and as the glamorous Pan American (Pan Am) flight attendants in their tight, blue, figure hugging skirts, bustled about making the cabin secure, while the grey-haired, utterly dependable gold striper in command up front in the Boeing’s small cockpit drawled over the cabin PA system, reassuring us that there was: ‘Nothing to worry about folks, Boeing builds them strong.’
It was the sight and sound of the VC10 that inspired me and many others to devotion and it was the VC10 men that did it – Messrs, Edwards, Hemsley, James, Lawson, Marshall, McElhinney, Petty, Salisbury, Stevenson, Walsh, Wilmer, and Zeffert. BOAC’s Ballantine, Bristow, Stoney, Todd, and many more contributed to the VC10 affection too.
British Formula 1 Grand Prix driver, Innes Ireland was another VC10 fan, and over a single malt (bottle not glass), Ireland, who lived up the road, recounted to me his tale of returning from the South African Grand Prix at Kyalami, on a VC10, when the crew invited him to the flight deck for take-off from Johannesburg (and Salisbury). Ireland said he could not believe the take-off performance.
‘The thing went up like a bloody rocket, nose nearly vertical old boy!’ Ireland, more used to Comets and 707s, had never experienced anything like it, adding: ‘Whatever BOAC management said, the pilots and crews loved their VC10s. That machine had real performance like a sports car, and it was so stylish. It just oozed class. I have an Aston Martin in the garage, it’s just the same, do you want to see it? Oh, would you like more Glenmorangie?’
The battle between the VC10’s main operator, BOAC, and its boardroom – of the VC10 versus the Boeing 707 – has become the stuff of legend amongst enthusiasts; a battle perhaps not dissimilar to that about the Spitfire, the Hurricane, and the Messerschmitt Bf 109, in terms of aviation debate. British opinion versus American opinion has become a fulcrum of perception, but there remains an internal British argument about the merits of the VC10 and BOAC’s role. It is suggested that the evidence of numbers indicates that the thousand-plus 707s sold, prove its superiority over the fifty-four VC10s and Super VC10s sold, but the analysis and opinion needs to be much more sophisticated than such numerical basis might suggest, or allow. After all, as an analogy – we would not say that the Ford Escort or Volkswagen Beetle were ‘better’ cars than a Rolls-Royce, Aston Martin, or a Ferrari – just because the Ford and the VW sold in their millions compared to the tiny numbers of British or Italian exotic cars. Comparing apples with pears has never really been fair, has it? But there are many aspects to the debate.
Surely it is unfair to attack the Boeing 707 on grounds of emotion or ego, just as it is unfair to attack the VC10 on similar or other grounds. The VC10 was not perfect and the 707 was not flawed; the two were different – designed for different tasks at different times. The VC10 was an expensive engineering solution to a unique specification, but the fact remains that the VC10 did offer aspects of design and application that were more advanced than the 707.
This text is an attempt to take a good look at the past of Imperial and BOAC, and at events which then centred our attention on the VC10 itself. I have tried to deliver the full story, but nothing is definitive. In my books I am sometimes accused of being too wordy or too detailed. This may be true, but surely it is better to have provided all the evidence in detail and be criticised for that, than the alternative.
There is far more to the VC10 story than meets the blinkered eye of perceived wisdom. I often find that people of certainties, rely on others acquiescence not to challenge their pronouncements – or then frame any such questioning, as heresy or insult. It is an intriguing trick. To me, the VC10 has suffered at the hands of such people, and herein I offer my view, and the evidence to support it, you are free to disagree and go away and write your own VC10 book – which would be more constructive than whingeing on the web.
We need to go back to the Edwardian era and thence to the 1920s flights of Imperial Airways in order to fast forward to BOAC, to understand the reasons for the VC10 and all the issues around it. I make no excuse for a detailed examination of Imperial and BOAC, for without them and their needs and actions, the demands of BOAC’s routes, the demand for a machine (the VC10) to meet such needs would not have transpired. So a lengthy look backwards is the perfect antidote to the current clichéd mantra of ignoring events by ‘going forwards’ and therefore omitting the lessons that might be learned. Just like an air crash investigation, history requires that we do indeed look backwards to find out what happened. Verdicts require all the evidence, not just what certain parties presume to be a socalled truth stated upon the certainties of pre-decided outcomes.
The potential of the VC10 and its possible variations was overshadowed and affected by politics and other factors. Much of the technological lead that the Vickers designers created for the VC10, and its planned variants, was thrown away – but not by Vickers. The lack of realised development was such a waste – as with the hovercraft, the work of Sir Frank Whittle, the Rover car company, and so much more – Britain failed to develop or market these developments, or simply sold them off to a foreign bidder in an apparent ideological attempt to dispose of the nation’s engineering base.
We should also recall the VC10’s excellent safety record in the context of the accident-strewn era in which it flew. The airline business was not as safe in 1970 as it is today. Big jets branded with big airline names often fell out of the sky after prior warning events that could have precluded the final fatal outcome.
Brian Trubshaw the VC10 and Concorde test pilot was kind enough to write the Foreword to my earlier VC10 technical history book. Prior to his death, he supplied the following words about the VC10 and BOAC and this text, which I include here:
Note from the late ‘EBT’, Brian Trubshaw, MVO, CBE, FRAeS:
‘The full and forensic story of BOAC’s involvement should be charted alongside that of Vickers, Sir George and the team of which I was part. It is clear that the passage of time, and a broader view, will deliver a record of what actually occurred across all the issues.
‘There is no doubt that with the VC10, BOAC got what it asked for, but went on to criticise its own child. Other factors were at play, many political. Like too many great British products, the VC10 became immersed in politics and changing attitudes of various BOAC chairmen. Other events in global aviation, not least the lengthening of the runways the VC10 was designed to tackle, moved the goalposts. However, the facts are that the VC10 was a design triumph that eradicated many of the issues associated with the first generation of jet airliners on both sides of the Atlantic
‘The great reserves of power, lift, and overall performance, designed and built into the VC10, gave it the possibility of being developed in a manner that the rival Boeing 707 could never have been, and such development was laid down by Vickers/BAC and its team of brilliant designers. That such potential was lost was not their fault. The blame lay with others. I was there; I was intimately involved as test pilot and then chief test pilot of Vickers-Armstrongs after I succeeded Jock Bryce in that role. We flew and proved the great VC10 design of Sir George Edwards, Ernie Marshall and the men of Vickers at Weybridge. We launched the giant airliner as the biggest ever built in Europe at the time, actually lifting off in a distance of just over 2,100ft on the 3,800ft runway (plus a short run-up extension) from Brooklands. This was not something a 707 or DC-8 could ever have managed.
‘Other factors influenced what happened next and Vickers advanced work was forfeited. A 24,000lbs thrust development of the Conway engine, a 30ft fuselage extension for over 200 passengers and more fuel tankage, could have created a whole new market for a developed VC10. The various cargo handling designs were also ahead of their time.
‘How odd it was that BOAC should have undermined their airliner, yet also subjected it to a significant marketing campaign the likes of which had not been seen before. VC10 and Super VC10 made many friends at, and for BOAC, and in the RAF and other airlines. BOAC and the RAF never lost a VC10. At the moment, VC10’s are still flying with the RAF, which seems fitting.
‘To have the design story and the operational, political, and commercial story of the VC10 brought together, should wipe away a few false trails and the misconceptions that have grown with time.’
Trubshaw was clear about the VC10: BOAC surely did get just what it asked for in the ultimate subsonic airliner of its era, and it seems, beyond.
As Trubshaw stated: ‘The commercial battle of the airlines and their airliners in the 1960s is an intriguing and important tale that deserves to be told. Too many of our great British inventions have suffered the tragedy of wasted development.’
Trubshaw also made reference to first generation jet airliner design issues on both sides of the Atlantic; there he was also framing the Comet’s issues. The Comet 1 was small, and used four engines to transport less than forty passengers. The revised Comet 4 was moderately stretched; meanwhile patriotic fervour framed the Comet as the great hope of British-is-best design, despite its known limitations. It might pay the reader to recall that even the ultimate Comet 4 was smaller than a Lockheed 1649 Super Constellation. Except in speed, Comet was a step backwards in passenger capacity, payload and range. Sheer speed was to prove not to be enough.
Admitting that the Comet, as the world’s first jet airliner, was an unfinished and flawed work, was never going to happen in 1950s Britain and such a statement will infuriate those who, today, are still certain of their certainties. And how dare anyone suggest that de Havilland’s were anything but perfection in everything they did. De Havilland’s were of course brilliant, but not infallible.
But at least the Comet 4 had decent runway performance at ‘hot and high’ difficult airfields; early 707s did not have such capabilities. African Governments, scared of losing US investment, paid for their own runways to be lengthened – thus removing part of the VC10’s advantage and handing access and market share to the 707 and DC-8. Even after such runway work, 707s and DC-8s were heavily compromised in payload range terms from such airports. Yet the VC10 answered the separate problems of the 707, Comet and more. At one stage in the late 1960s, Flight magazine pontificated that the Super VC10 would end the sales run of the mighty 707. Flight also opined on just what an all-VC10/Super VC10 mixed passenger and cargo fleet at BOAC would have done. As we know, neither scenario became a reality.
Sir George Edwards knew from the innovative Viscount (400+sales), and then the less well received Vanguard (less than fifty sold), that there was no point in building a new airliner design that matched, or mirrored, existing or planned competing airframes. In his 1973 RAeS lecture he revealed an underlying truism, one applicable to the thinking behind the VC10: ‘It is never any good doing something that is either level with, or behind the state of the art, merely because the operating costs are low.’1
From Viscount to Valiant to ‘Vanjet’ studies and to VC10 first-flight, this is a great story of design triumphing, despite fluctuating corporate and political events. All these years on from the VC10 days, there is still something about the VC10 and the life of a supposedly inanimate lump of finely hewed metal. Here, was true industrial design and engineering legend, a machine like no other. At one brief stage of a glamorous 1960s history, the Super VC10 was the biggest airframe in Europe, and the strongest, most stylish, fastest, and most powerful civil airliner built and flown anywhere; a true second generation airliner. Did any subsonic aeroplane ever look so good? BOAC’s rich, dark blue, with the shinning golden ‘Speedbird’ glinting on that stunning sculpture of a tail, just added to the emotions of the VC10 moment.
That this aircraft should engender such affection remains an interesting aspect of human behaviour. Maybe it was the shape and stance of that amazing tail that captured so many hearts, for here was the proof that great design can deliver so much. That further VC10 and Super VC10 potential was designed for, yet cast aside by the decisions of idiot politicians, seems a tragedy, and one that can still be felt at Weybridge, where the Vickers veterans still gather at their Brooklands Museum home at what must be the greatest enthusiasts’ altar of winged and wheeled worship on the planet. They still feel raw at what was lost, and who can blame them.
I hope I have managed to meet the design target for this narrative; hopefully we are only slightly over-specified in weight, in the act of proving the point. The men of Vickers might have made the rare occasional mistake, but this is my record of their genius and the genesis of the airliner that BOAC procured from them, and the resulting design – the incomparable VC10.
Perhaps it is time to set the tailplane incidence, arm the stall warning and stick pusher, check the flap and slat settings. Then sit up straight and release the brakes, spool-up the Rolls-Royce engines, then launch, hit V1 and Vrotate, and climb steeply away to VC10 skies amid the sound of crackling Conways and a howling upon the ruffled airs of flight. Here, lies the sheer engineering and design brilliance of the VC10. Vickers called it, ‘the shape of the future’, and it was.
Lance Cole
Downderry Cornwall, Arcturus Zimbabwe, Rose Bay Sydney