VC10 Elevated Flight deck Nose-Loading Freighter Proposal.
Here lay perhaps the hardest part of the VC10’s lost potential, the story of what not just might have been, but the story of what was dreamed, designed, drawn, and modelled for a great array of VC10 and Super VC10 derived ideas and airframes. Once again, thanks to Vickers, it was all there for the taking, but instead, it was thrown away by the men of power and politics.
Many airlines were canvassed and the VC10, Super VC10 and variants thereof, were presented notably to Pan Am, New Zealand National Airways, Air New Zealand, Varnair, Cathay Pacific, United, Eastern and CSA. But there came no more VC10 business. Yet the VC10 and its planned derivatives got close to major overseas sales. Letters of Intent for VC10 freighters were signed by United Airlines, Eastern Airlines, and Trans-Australia Airlines. As early as 1960, an advanced, ultralong-range Super VC10 with two-crew, 196 seats and extra fuel tanks was framed for a presentation to Pan Am in New York. A high-capacity short-haul VC10, or VC11 Mk1 (not to be confused with the later, short-fuselage VC11 proposal), was also suggested to BEA and major world airlines. A later proposal saw the real possibility of restarting VC10 production for a Chinese order – that sadly came to nothing.
Having turned out Wellington, Viking, Viscount, Valiant, a host of smaller Vickers Supermarine military airframes, and having turned the V1000 into Vanjet, and into the VC10, the men of the Advanced Projects Office at Vickers had heads full of ideas. Anything was possible, so long as money and potential orders could back up the development of an idea. But with an airframe like the VC10 already firmed up, developing it was the natural thing to do; exploiting the VC10’s civil and military potential was obvious.
By 1960 ideas were coming thick and fast. What about a VC10 that could carry passengers and freight in the main cabin, or just cargo as a pure freighter? How about a stretched VC10 to carry 200+? What about a double decked VC10 to carry 265 passengers? What about a 5,000 mile range, missile-launching platform for a nuclear deterrent – the new Skybolt missile? How about a clip-winged de-rated VC10 for BEA to use across Europe, or a smaller – back to Vanjet type – reverseengineered VC10, a VC11 shorter range variant?
The projects included:
LR/1 and LR/2
These plans included adding trailing edge wing tanks, underfloor cylindrical ‘quick-fit’ fuel tanks and a potential leading edge ‘fillet’ to house a fuel tank to the basic airframe housing 250 gallons or 500 gallons+ of extra fuel, and these ideas were initially the VC10 ‘LR/1’ and ‘LR/2’ types that were ingredients for a larger ‘Super’ variant of the Standard model VC10.
The LR/1 would have extra tanks in the baggage/freight holds at the expense of such capacities. Winter and summer tankage volumes as fitted, yet removable fuel tanks could adapt to weather and range demands on the routes. The LR/1 might also have a leading edge fillet tank. The LR/2 would see changes to wing metalwork to also add wing-root fillet cited tanks. Adding this extra tankage at minimum structural expense could put the VC10 range up to a level where it could manage a non-stop flight from London to the US West Coast, or on trans-Pacific sectors – a 707-320B speciality. The LR/1 saw an 8,000lb increase in fuelled MTOW weight and the LR/2, with both sets of wing tanks and tip-tanks, gained 14,000lbs. Fuel capacities rose to 163,000lb/kg and 167,000lb/kg respectively. A maximum weight of 342,000lbs was suggested and the LR/2 would have had a total tankage of 20,875 gallons; no major structural changes were envisaged, saving time and costs. Both the ‘LR’ ideas were rejected by BOAC.
Super VC10 ‘200’ & ‘Short Haul’ VC10
With the original 120-seat VC10 expanded to its production size as Type 1100, ideas for a longer, higher seating capacity VC10 variant were drawn up early on in the VC10 design process in 1959. Vickers suggested several ‘stretches’ to give 200, 212 and 217-seat capacities dependent on configuration. Ultimately, a Super VC10-200 – as one with 200 seats was suggested. A 28ft fuselage extension also saw repositioned and larger cabin entrance and exit doors, the fin fuel tank and extra fuel tankage from the LR/2 proposals.
Thus was born the Super VC10-200 long-range airliner, yet which BOAC rejected (and thus terminated) in favour of the curtailed ‘stretch’ that created the production standard Super model VC10 as the Super VC10.
Yet it was from the earlier suggested Super VC10-200 that the idea of a longbodied, clipped-winged, shorter-ranged VC10 ‘air bus’ type domestic highcapacity airliner that would have been ideal for US eastern seaboard intercity and interstate use came. So were conceived the ‘short-haul’ VC10 proposals prior to the final VC11 reincarnation of Vanjet.
The record of this proposal has become confused over time. A later 1966 dated short-haul version the VC10 was presaged by a 1960 dated proposal for a 200-seater Super VC10 that had, as an offshoot, a high-capacity short-haul derivation. Throw in a long fuselage four-engined short-haul VC11 and a much shorter fuselage, but later an eighty seater, VC11 Mk2 proposal, and the record is obscured.
With 221–230 passengers at 32–34in seat pitch respectively, a 44,000lbs payload, and yet still retaining performance at hot or high airfields, the long-bodied shorthaul VC10/VC11 offered that intercity ‘airbus’ type efficiency. De-rating the Conway engines to 17,000lb thrust could have further reduced costs and still preserved an ideal 1,000mile sector range capability. This was a ‘US$3 dollars a seat-mile’ airliner – just what the airline accountants demanded. If this airframe could have been fitted with two-RB211 engines, it would have been much more economical and the world’s first ‘big-twin’ airliner. Throw in automatic landing as ‘Autoland’ and the likes of BEA would have had the large, intercity express they always dreamed of, but never realised until the Boeing 757 came along (itself an apparent close ‘lift’ of a Hawker Siddeley HS 134 big-twin-jet design proposal). We might also notice the similarity to the original short-haul VC10 proposal of the later, very long-bodied 180-seat MD Super-80 series twin jet DC-9 derivatives, to see what can be done with an original airframe in terms of ‘stretching’ and highcapacity cabin configurations.
With more seats, lighter wings, less fuel weight and shorter range, a Super VC10 based intercity variant reduced operating costs – even with those thirsty Conways – but perversely, avoiding the Conway’s more expensive long-haul, cruise consumption meant a cost-saving, despite the extra take-off and landing cycles of short-haul operations. Shortening the fuselage and either fitting new engines or deleting two-engines were latterly mooted for VC11 Mk2. Trans-Canada Airlines (TCA) and NCA New Zealand both showed interest in these proposals.
Super VC10 ‘Superb’
This was double-decked with Rolls-Royce RB 178 engines (as predecessors of the ultra-fuel efficient RB211 family). This saw the VC10 fuselage deepened and an eighty seat lower deck cabin forwards of the wing, leading into a re-profiled nose; 265 seats were proposed, and a variant, also with closer seat pitch, might offer eighty seats downstairs and 200 on the main deck. All doors, windows, wings, tail parts and main structural items would be carried over and the double-bubble lower deck would effectively be a multi-arc ‘mirror’ of the existing fuselage design. Could such an airframe – one that still retained a good degree of the baseline VC10’s runway performance – have countered the developed DC-8 60 series and challenged the 747 and the wide-bodied tri-jets? The idea was fully planned and drawn up, but BOAC were against it, and at that time, there was much debate about emergency procedures and cabin evacuation from ever larger airliners and some official views were aired about these factors in relation to the sheer scale of the Super VC10 ‘265’ – or the ‘Superb’ as it has been tagged. In May 1965, yet another British aviation minister had the unenviable task of telling the House of Commons that VC10 funding – in this case up to £50million for the launch of the VC10 Superb ‘265’ seater – was not to be forthcoming.
VC10 Elevated Flight deck Nose-Loading Freighter Proposal.
A more radical reinvention saw Super VC10 wings and fuselage re-modelled with four engines, two paired under each wing; not on pylons, but underslung. This design also deleted the T-tail and had 300 seats on offer – it too presaged the ‘airbus’ concept long before Airbus Industrie made it a reality.
VC10 Freighters: F3–F4 and More
Perhaps the most intriguing work concerned the VC10 freighter or cargo versions. Most observers know that a forwards-hinged fuselage design for the VC10 was created (the F4), but few were aware of the clamshell-type, upper lobed, noseloading freight design was considered and a model made (see photo above). With its performance reserves, the VC10 airframe offered very good freight/cargo payloads. Removing the cabin seats, trims, galleys and toilets of the passenger specification VC10 reduced weight and added payload ability.
A VC10 F3 (F for Freighter) side-loading design proposal had made the most of the RAF-type reinforced floor and side cargo door; the F3 might carry an incredible 80,000lb payload. The further F4 freighter variant added a noseloading facility by having a swing-nose section. It also used a hydraulically hinged and clamped forward section and ‘plug’ type controls and services mechanisms to ensure the flight deck was secured when closed and control runs protected. Vickers envisaged special loading ramps and jacking platforms to be part of a global freight network package, allowing quick loading and unloading of the F4. A fifteen minute turnaround was quoted if using the dedicated ground equipment. The F4 could lift 79,000lb over 3,500 miles. The maximum freight package size was 82ft – at that time the world’s largest proposed air-cargo volume. A heavy duty 1000lbs/sq.ft + floor strength could also be specified – at weight penalty.
Lesser known was the VC10 clamshell-type nose loading freighter that featured a Carvair-type, or Boeing 747 style, upper deck ‘bubble’ and elevated flight deck station, below which a cavernous 95ft+ cargo deck was offered. Although it got off the drawing board to model stage, the double-decked, clamshell-nose required an expensive new fuselage structure, and although decades ahead of its time was not pursued. Only Boeing’s 747F would rival it – over a decade later.
Other 1960s VC10/Super VC10 suggested iterations included the creation of a bizarre ‘aerial yacht’ that mated three VC10 fuselages together via interconnecting wings as a giant 450-seat transatlantic ‘flying wing’ device that would use the soonto-be cancelled Rolls-Royce Medway engines. Military multi-role derivations suggested, included maritime reconnaissance airframes, a bomber, and of course a tanker. Making the VC10 a three-engined jet (using Rolls-Royce aft-fan RB 178s), with a redesigned ventral fin engine (as per the DH Trident), was a more expensive suggestion, however, having seen the Rolls-Royce high-bypass ratio RB 211 tested on a VC10, the idea of re-engined VC10s and Super VC10s as twin-jets, using the RB211, was mooted, but deemed far too expensive,
BEA Short Haul Clipped Wing VC10.
Tailpiece
If we strip away the pomp, the national ego, and just look at the product, the VC10 and Super VC10 carry their own legends of success, their own achievement of engineering design brilliance, and Vickers Armstrongs excellence. The subtleties of the story may be lost on those who just look at numbers and compare the 707s sales figures with those of the VC10 family, for this story was not just about meeting a demand or a need, but in doing things by moving the state of the art forwards into a new arena – a real step into the untried and untested. The small production VC10/Super VC10 run does not indicate or evidence any issue with the design of the aircraft, it reflects the history, the political games, vacillations, power play, and ever moving goalposts of a turbulent period in post-war British history – factors far beyond the remit of an engineering company, or one man, no matter how illustrious or brilliant.
The VC10 (like the V1000) represented a massive financial risk to Vickers Armstrong as a trading entity. As an offshoot of the plot, from the VC10 came the VC11 as a short-haul jet design, and then, from the absorption of the Hunting H 107 design into BAC, came the Edwards-influenced ‘son’ of the VC11 – the BAC 1-11 twin jet airliner that sold well in America, not just to BEA. Indeed, Freddie Laker had been the launch customer behind the BAC 1-11 and the support for it. Without Laker and the BAC 1-11, the entity that was the British Aircraft Corporation might have died.
Cancellation of the Rolls-Royce Medway engine also had its roots in the VC10-VC11 saga, and in the DH Trident’s downsize by BEA. Time has revealed the malevolent 1960s role of the European Union (EEC/EU) and British political supporters of its social science experiment, they had an effect on not just BAC, the 1-11, or ‘One Eleven’, but also the Two-Eleven and its wide bodied ‘airbus’ type ‘Three-eleven’ offshoot that BAC suggested in the midst of the 1960s story of the competing foundling child of the Airbus Industrie A300 and A300B gestation and re-birth, amid oscillating government positions over supporting it, or not. The name of the Europhile Roy Jenkins as MP and minister, can once again (as with VC10) be cited as a negative behavioural factor and a source of damage to Vickers, BAC and the plans of a certain ‘GRE’ – Sir George Edwards himself.
What of TSR-2 and any knock-on effects on that and BAC’s viability? Time has revealed that politicians stabbed TSR-2 in the back, and that a certain man of power named Louis Mountbatten delivered the final blow to TSR-2’s hopes of a sales break (in Australia). From V1000, to VC10 to TSR-2, it all seems like a very sorry saga indeed. Yet the aircraft, the Vickers /BAC designs, were potential world beaters, and all were ahead of the game.
The passing of time and the habit of the internet generation to get away with presenting opinion as fact, and gross error as truth, has impacted many historical events and stories. Some people believe what they read on the internet without question and then repeat it – often in print. Such a fate has, to a degree, befallen the VC10 story and debate; in doing so the VC10 design concept and its designers have, on occasion, been undermined by erroneous rubbish. We should clearly state that BOAC never evidenced any significant technical design problem with the VC10; nor any hidden, operational troubles. The VC10, to coin a phrase, ‘did what it said on the tin’. Some people say that Vickers might, perhaps, have designed the VC10 in a shorter time frame; but that would not have been their way, and the high-quality forensic and safety-first test-by-test approach could have been denuded. Creating the VC10 from 1958, to first flight in 1962, was not a poor record, nor outside then acceptable boundaries, indeed it seems, in hindsight, quite a short time frame for such a massive undertaking. And would you really have expected Bryce and Trubshaw to spend less time than they did making sure the thing was safe to fly? As we know, BOAC, BUA, BCAL and the RAF, never lost a VC10 and there are reasons why that proud boast can be made. Great design, superb testing and wonderful training, all leading to consistency of performance, were the answers.
Some observers have stated that the reasons why BOAC’s management ‘publicly trashed’ its own aircraft – that machine being designed to BOAC’s exact orders – have not been fully forthcoming. Although there may be some hidden, ‘smoking gun’ of historical conspiracy theory plot hidden in the archives, it is more likely that the conduct, structure and behavioural psychology of BOAC (and its predecessor Imperial Airways) as charted herein, are the more likely explanations of the mess that surrounded BOAC, its fleet procurement, and its VC10 and Super VC10 story. But we must accept that in the end, the BOAC VC10s and Super VC10s made their mark and became global favourites – BOAC did realise that, and did invoke a VC10 family brand and customer product of preference, whatever the vacillations and machinations of past politics and corporate power battles.
We can also observe that the success of the RAF VC10 operations, as both transport and tanker, revolutionised RAF transport uplift and brought new standards and new capabilities across its British military tasks. Like BOAC, the RAF never lost a VC10.
The airliner also delivered superb service to other airlines such as British United, British Caledonian, Ghana Airways, and East African. All of which proves that the VC10 and Super VC10, in concept and design, were significant, advanced, and above all, correct. The VC10 and Super VC10 changed airline travel – notably in Africa – and gave a jump start to emerging independent African nations and their airline links and status upon the world stage. EAA’s really super Super VC10 service, Nairobi-to-New York via Zurich, did, in the eyes of many, put BOAC’s attitude under some focus. Sir Freddie Laker’s brilliant promotion of his VC10 fleet and its flexible deployment also should not go unrecorded, particularly against the record of the national carrier that was BOAC. The British Royal family and many British politicians have also enjoyed an emotional relationship with ‘their’ airliner – the flag-flying VC10s that carried them around the world for several decades.
Safety First
Today we take air safety for granted. The crash of an airliner belonging to a major airline is a very rare event indeed. This was not the case in the 1960s and 1970s. Large airliners operated by serious ‘safety culture’ airlines crashed all over the world on a regular basis – several times a year – every year. Pan Am, Lufthansa, BOAC, KLM, United, Swissair – the leading quality airlines all had fatal crashes, often involving 707s, 747s, and DC-8s. Yet BOAC never lost a VC10 or a Super VC10 – not even when faced with a double engine failure on the climb-out at high weight or temperature.
We can suggest that the ‘Andes Incident’ was the closest we got to losing a VC10 in British airline service and that the VC10’s design and build, allied to good piloting, saved the day. The VC10’s inherent strength ensured that neither the tail, the wings, nor the engines, came off in-extremis.
The reason BOAC never lost a member of its VC10 fleets, and never injured nor killed a passenger on the Vickers airliner, was down to two factors – the significant and advanced safety features of the VC10 design, and the excellence and experience of BOAC/British Airways crew training and performance. The BOAC VC10 and Super VC10 fleet flew over 13 million passengers, made over 250,000 landings and accumulated over a million (1,207,106) flying hours covering an estimated 560 million miles and over 1.2 million revenue-earning hours. These statistics – free of serious accident, death, or injury – are remarkable. In an era when big jets crashed very often, the VC10 family’s crash-free record at BOAC (and with the RAF) should never be underestimated.
Sir George – the VC10 Man
Given that Sir George Edwards is famed for the Viscount, Valiant and Concorde, events such as the loss of TSR-2 and the machinations around the VC10 might be seen by some as achievements that were flawed. If that is the case in some opinions, then we should add that any such underachievement cannot be laid at the doors of Vickers or its main man – George Edwards.
Edwards truly was a hero, perhaps a ‘man of the Century’, someone from humble upbringings who made good as a self-made man and who made life good for others – workers, pilots, passengers and the national benefit. George Edwards had a calm strength of character and integrity; he could, say some, be rather strict and forthright, but was always fair, unlike many men of certain beliefs or behaviours. Edwards had an open mind and had that global future vision that saw beyond the short term expediencies of politicians, or passing design fads and fashions. We might correctly conclude of Edwards’ integrity, that his aircraft were designed and built the same way. The VC10 was designed by a talented group of men, but we should recall that the original sketches were made one weekend at home by Sir George Edwards himself.
On 29 June 2012, the VC10 celebrated fifty years of flight and a major event was held by the Brooklands Museum Trust at Brooklands to mark the event on that date. Many ex-Vickers veterans and civil and military pilots turned up, as did Sir George Edwards’ daughter, Angela Newton. Hosted by Julian Temple, the museum’s general manager, and highly respected aviation writer, Max Kinglsey-Jones, a wonderful very British day was held and a series of lectures delivered.
Speakers included Mike Salisbury who had been part of the VC10 aerodynamics team under Ken Lawson, David Haward who had worked on the VC10’s test systems rig, only subsequently to being an engineer at Boeing in Seattle. BOAC VC10 pilot and BA Concorde pilot Christopher Orlebar also attended (along with his MG BGT – blue of course). Fellow VC10 and Concorde commander Mike Bannister also paid tribute to the VC10. The RAF’s VC10 story was framed by Wing Commander Kevin Brookes, as Officer Commanding No. 101 Squadron and a man with twenty years VC10 experience. Ex-RAF VC10 pilots, Richard King and David Parsons, who both went on to fly HM The Sultan of Oman’s VC10, A40-AB, also spoke of VC10 operations. It was Richard King who was at the controls in 1987 when with Parsons, and engineers George and Wilkins on the flight deck, the Omani ex-BUA VC10 ended its twenty-five years life by returning back to Brooklands, having been so kindly donated by the Sultan of Oman, where it remains on display. Fond British Caledonian memories of the VC10 were presented by Alistair Pugh – the airline’s former vice-chairman. Former BOAC VC10 stewardess Josie Payne retold the story of the Tunis VC10 hijack.
Despite its fifty year history, the fact was that however superb in every respect, the VC10 project did, through no fault of its own, signal the end of British, large civil airframe design and manufacture. Concorde came from the same stable of course, and we can see several VC10 design themes in subsequent airliners. The loss of the potential VC10 derivatives that were all ready to go from the Vickers/ BAC drawing boards – from the true 200-seater Super VC10 proposals, the cargo and combi machines, and to the idea of an RB-2ll engined conversion – chart a failure of vision so typical of Britain in that era. In a way, the VC10 marked the end of a new beginning, and the story of a political and national process of far wider contexts and impacts than of just an airliner and an airline.
The VC10 project and its fifty-four production airframes was a unique, quality design product born into an age where accountants and corporate men did not want exquisite solutions, but rather an effective common denominator. To make an automotive analogy, the VC10 was like a Rolls-Royce, a Bentley, or an Aston Martin, or a perhaps even an early Saab, Mercedes Benz, or a Porsche; that is, as being an over-engineered device, a product with ‘build-quality’ created to the highest standards for a niche market that demanded clever performance and intelligent ingredients over and above the ‘norm’ that others in the marketplace knew would instead suffice and cost less to manufacture. In the world of the motor car circa the 1970s, Volvo, Saab, Mercedes Benz, all were built with thick steel that was corrosion proofed like nothing else, but a Ford Cortina, a Vauxhall Victor, or a Toyota Crown had thinner steel with no such protection – and were lighter and more nimble. Like the Swedish and German cars, the VC10 was thick-skinned and coated in anti-corrosion or anti-fouling paint like a liner – in true Vickers shipbuilding tradition.
That the inherent quality of the VC10 (or the cars cited above) would last longer, cost less in repairs, and retain both the performance and the hidden safety benefits, and create a loyal customer or user following, seems to have been forgotten. The VC10 was not consumer durable, it was not a short-life device, it was something different.
With the hindsight of history, we might wonder if BOAC realised just how high a quality answer Vickers would provide to BOAC’s question. Did anyone in BOAC realise that in response to BOAC’s demands, Vickers would turn out a pure bred beast that, if it was a car, would have been a cross between a Rolls-Royce and a Ferrari – one with Swedish-car standards of safety and build quality? No one else has ever achieved or tried it. And now we know why – it goes against the ‘bean counters’ ethos and lowest common denominators. Yet the fact was that in the end, BOAC’s Super VC10s cost less to operate than its 707s – despite all the claims by BOAC to the contrary. But it took time for the truth to come out, and when it did, it was far too late – a sentiment Sir George was fond of expressing.
We should not see the VC10 solely as a product of the 1960s; as the last VC10, the final airframe, an East African Super VC10, was a child of the 1970s, being completed at Brooklands in February 1970. It flew on as an RAF tanker until 2013 after being repossessed in 1977 and re-manufactured prior to RAF delivery in 1985.
Boeing’s 707 was, of course, a formidable device that Sir George Edwards respected, and it was re-engineered across the decades and served the world’s airlines and their passengers brilliantly. But it was not a second generation, advanced aerodynamic weapon like the VC10. That the RAF has recently ordered and deployed ancient, but re-manufactured 707 airframes in an airborne surveillance role, and at vast cost to the British tax payer, is a sad and damning indictment of British political history and British politicians, many of whom, be they on the political Left or Right, should hang their heads in utter shame.
VC10 Excellence
Excellence was demanded and delivered by the VC10 and Super VC10. Strength, safety and style, all took wing in the ultimate subsonic airliner of an era now passed. Perhaps we should allow the late Brian Trubshaw, VC10 and Concorde test pilot, the last word, as spoken personally to the author:
‘The VC10 was a beautiful aircraft to fly and its design and its designers went on to create Concorde. The VC10 provided a level a comfort not seen before. The 707 was indeed a fine machine, but it was not – in design, manufacturing or flight – the engineering and design advance that the VC10 represented. Many of the VC10’s innovations are now seen in today’s commercial airliner designs – for example in flight controls, aerodynamics, and even the introduction of a composite floor and tail fin researches. Concorde’s lowweight carbon brakes were also a VC10 development. The VC10 did not need to be so extensively repaired or rebuilt during its airline life, true testament to its integrity and the men that designed and manufactured it. The VC10 used dramatically less runway to take-off than any competitor and climbed away more safely. Its slower landing speed addressed very real safety concerns over ever higher jet airliner landing speeds. In RAF service, the VC10 crossed the end of one century into another, and represents a remarkable story that few, if any, other types can rival. There is no doubt that the VC10 was remarkable, and the best of British.’
So sets the sun on a critical period in British aviation history and a remarkable product from a remarkable company. The VC10 and its fifty years of combined airline and national military service represent a huge achievement. The VC10 was born from the legacy of the British in Africa and their Imperial Airways and BOAC as airlines as instruments of national policy, and from that great lost historical opportunity that was the V1000/VC7 story. BOAC was not always wrong, and not always the villain, yet its hands do bear significant responsibility for what went on and what happened to the VC10 and the losses associated with it and the end game of British airliner production. We might level the same charges at BEA (another state-owned British corporation) and what it did to the potential of the de Havilland/Hawker Siddeley Trident. Successive British Governments of Labour and Tory rule, opportunistic MPs, political chameleons and the Civil Service, all have VC10 blood on their hands. A national saga seems to have evolved and much money frittered away.
However, if you never travelled in the brilliant VC10 or Super VC10, or if you never piloted one, you do not know what you missed. It is as simple as that. It was as superb as that.
The Greatest Tail.
The VC10 can only be called a unique triumph of British engineering and industrial design, the likes of which we are unlikely to see again. An accountant would say it was over-engineered, but a pilot or passenger would say it was brilliant and safe. All we need to do amid the new world of digital design, computational fluid dynamics, and composite construction, is to remember what the VC10 men at Brooklands and Wisely, achieved by brain power, by hand, and by superb craftsmanship. Thankfully, we have the Brooklands Museum Trust to remind us of what Sir George Edwards and his band of brothers did in designing and building the incomparable VC10 and the even sleeker Super VC10.