Chapter 11

Sailing into Disaster with the British

In This Chapter

Losing fleets in Egypt and Denmark

Facing catastrophe at Trafalgar

I n preceding chapters, I discuss several of Napoleon’s most famous battles and show you why Napoleon is considered one of the greatest military commanders in history. These battles, and others that I didn’t have the space to discuss, all had at least one thing in common: They were fought on land. When it came to land battles, Napoleon had no peer.

Unfortunately for Napoleon, his greatest adversary was the island nation of Great Britain. Not surprisingly for an island nation, the British had a long tradition of having a great navy. You’ve probably heard the chorus to Britain’s unofficial national anthem:

Rule Britannia, Britannia rule the waves.

Britons never will be slaves.

Well, the Brits took that anthem seriously; they really did rule the waves. That was why Napoleon was never able to invade them; that darned English Channel kept getting in the way.

Not that Napoleon didn’t try. He built ships and made alliances with nations that had ships. But he was sailing into the wind in trying to match the British at sea. As a result, he was never able to completely dominate Europe. The lesson here is that land supremacy alone is not sufficient to conquer a continent.

In this chapter, I describe three important French naval disasters that affected Napoleon. The first happened while Napoleon was just a general, but it had far-reaching consequences. The second two came as Napoleon was busy winning battles on land. Not surprisingly, all three disasters came at the hands of the British.

Facing Denial in Egypt

Okay, so that’s one of the oldest and worst puns around. But there is no question that the French naval defeat that I am about to discuss denied Napoleon the chance for a much more successful Egyptian campaign in 1798. (For the complete story on that fascinating campaign, see Chapter 7.)

Dodging the British

To get to Egypt, Napoleon sailed from France across the Mediterranean Sea to the island of Malta. He then went on to Aboukir Bay in Egypt. The whole time, his biggest fear was that the British fleet would find the French ships. Napoleon knew that even though he had some of France’s finest ships, he was unlikely to win a confrontation at sea, and so he naturally hoped to avoid one.

The British, on the other hand, would have loved to nip that little expedition in the bud. The French tried to keep their plans a secret, but the Brits eventually found out and dispatched a fleet to find them. The fleet was commanded by then 40-year-old Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson. To say that finding the French fleet was a long shot would be a major understatement. Talk about a needle in a haystack!

The two fleets actually came fairly close to each other, probably more by luck than by design, but Napoleon managed to get in and out of Malta and to Aboukir Bay on the Egyptian coast without difficulty. As it happened, Nelson had been at Aboukir just a few days earlier. Motivated by the knowledge that Nelson might return at any moment, Napoleon quickly put ashore on July 1, 1798. He left a rear guard, including shore artillery, and moved inland.

Nelson had been searching all over the Mediterranean and was actually in Greece when he learned that the French fleet was anchored at Aboukir Bay, 15 miles east of the city of Alexandria. Nelson quickly set off for Egypt, anxious for battle.

It was a battle that probably never should have occurred. It certainly shouldn’t have turned out the way it did.

Improperly anchoring the French fleet

The fleet Napoleon used to get to Egypt was commanded by Admiral François- Paul Brueys. But Napoleon was commander of the French army and in overall command of the expedition, so he could tell Brueys what to do with his fleet after the soldiers were disembarked. He told Brueys to either put the fleet in the port of Alexandria, where it would be safe from any British attack, or take it to a port on the island of Corfu, then under French control, where it would also be safe.

For reasons that are not at all clear, Brueys chose to do neither of these. He believed that he could position his 13 ships where they were, near the coast, in a line formation that would present formidable fire power against any attacking navy. Further, one side of this line would be protected by the shore batteries that would force any attackers to run the gauntlet between the French ships and the French shore gun emplacements.

Now, all this sounds well and good, but there were huge problems with the way Admiral Brueys carried out his plan. His first mistake was in positioning his ships too far from shore, around a mile and a half to be exact. This created several problems:

His ships would no longer be protected by the shallow water near the shore that would make it impossible for British ships to maneuver.

British ships would now be out of range of the shore batteries.

Small ships bringing supplies and men back and forth between the shore and the ships would now take much longer than necessary, a fact that could be disastrous in an emergency situation.

As a result of this mistake, the British would be able to encircle the French fleet. In ideal circumstances, this may not have spelled disaster, but Brueys was shorthanded, and having to man guns on both sides of every ship was a real stretch of his capabilities.

Brueys’s second mistake was in the actual formation of his ships. He placed them in a long line that stretched for at least a mile and connected each ship with a cable. So far, so good, as the line formation was the traditional way of presenting to an attacking navy (allowing all the guns on one side to blast away), and the cable was designed to keep the British from weaving in and out between ships. The problem was that the ships were too far apart from each other, making assistance and communication more difficult. Moreover, Brueys had not allowed for any need to maneuver or, if necessary, try to beat a hasty retreat. Brueys had served honorably and with distinction throughout his career; there was no excuse for these mistakes, for which the French would pay dearly.

Getting surrounded

Nelson and his fleet arrived shortly after noon on August 1, 1798. A lesser commander may have decided to wait until the next day to attack, but Nelson ordered an immediate attack, not wanting the French to have the chance to redeploy or escape. The French first saw the British masts around 2 p.m. and quickly sounded the alarm. Because of the distance involved, many of the sailors on shore were unable to return to their ships, further reducing the available number of gunners and other important positions.

Given the problems with the French fleet’s position, the outcome was never really in doubt. Several British ships sailed between the shore and the French ships, dropped anchor, and opened fire at very close range. Other British ships got equally close on the opposite side of the French, who now found themselves surrounded and under awful fire. Admiral Brueys was killed shortly after the action commenced, and many others would follow him to a watery grave.

The French ships at the front of the line were hit hardest and earliest. Several of them were knocked out of action very early in the conflict. And the British did not escape major damage, either, as several ships were severely damaged and Nelson himself was wounded and briefly convinced he was dying.

The battle raged, and the French got the worst of it by far. At a little past 10 p.m., the French flagship l’Orient , which had been on fire for some time, blew to smithereens in an explosion that could be seen and heard for many miles (see Figure 11-1). It was an awesome sight that stunned the rest of the combatants. All fighting stopped for at least ten minutes, possibly longer, before both sides returned to the grim task at hand. The battle raged throughout the night.

Figure 11-1: This snuffbox from the period shows the French flagship l’Orient exploding. Note the British lifeboats rescuing survivors, both British and French.

The French may have fared better but for the action, or rather the inaction, of French Rear Admiral Pierre-Charles de Villeneuve. He commanded several ships at the rear of the French line and never suffered a direct attack. On land, generals are bound by the adage to “march to the sound of the guns,” but apparently Admiral de Villeneuve felt no such need. Instead of sailing forward in support of the other French vessels, and possibly putting some of the British in the same two-front battle being experienced by the French, he chose to sail away with four ships, claiming that he was simply preserving what he could of the now decimated French fleet.

The battle continued until late on August 2nd. When it was finally over, Nelson and the British had achieved an overwhelming victory, the likes of which had scarcely been seen before.

Dealing with long-term effects

The implications to Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt and beyond were enormous. After the Battle of the Nile, as this engagement is called, the French would no longer be able to dream of dominating the Mediterranean. The French fleet suffered damages that would take years to repair. Napoleon was effectively cut off from France, so precious few supplies and reinforcements would make it to Egypt. (Only small, fast ships would be able to run the British blockade, and not all of them would be successful.)

As a result, Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt would be far different than he had hoped and imagined. He would lose the Battle of Acre largely because the British ships were there and his were not (see Chapter 7). And any hopes of continuing to the east, a la Alexander the Great, were quashed by Nelson’s victory. It is interesting to speculate on the effect such a campaign would have had, both on Napoleon’s career and on the French-British rivalry. But it was not to be.

Rediscovering the Battle of the Nile

The Battle of the Nile made an unexpected reappearance 200 years after the fact. Land archaeology is well-known to most people, but underwater archaeology is far less known. In 1983, divers discovered the wreckage of l’Orient, and 13 years later serious exploration of the area began.

In the years since, countless priceless arti- facts have been brought to the surface and displayed in museums. The story of the underwater exploration, and the artifacts, were pre- sented in a Discovery Channel program and in an accompanying book by Laura Foreman and Ellen Phillips, Napoleon’s Lost Fleet (Discovery Books). The book also does a nice job of telling the details of the battle, though the authors clearly have a low opinion of Napoleon.

The archaeological “dig” also allows historians to see the actual position of the ships, especially those like l’Orient that sank quickly and pretty much straight down. Several ships have been discovered, and their position confirms the arguments of those who criticize Admiral Brueys’s battle plan.

It was a complete disaster for the French.

Destroying the Danish Fleet (Twice)

British action against the French fleet in 1798 was understandable and within the accepted rules of war. But the British actions I describe in this section, taken against Danish fleets in their own harbor of Copenhagen, were not quite so appropriate.

Engaging in trade wars

By 1800, England and France were engaged in a rather serious trade war. Each side sought to keep its allies from trading with its archenemy. Great Britain, however, seemed willing to go beyond that. She felt justified in attacking ships of neutral countries to prevent their trading with France. This was a questionable policy at best and prompted reaction from some of those neutral countries. Tsar Paul I of Russia formed the Armed Neutrality of the North Agreement (also called the Armed Neutrality League ) between Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia in December 1800. These countries agreed not to trade with England and to protect each other against English actions against their shipping.

England was outraged and felt quite threatened. She was dependent on trade for her very survival, and it didn’t take long before she began to feel the consequences of this embargo. Rather than negotiate a treaty or change her policy of stopping neutral ships on the open sea, England decided to make a preemptive strike against the best navy of the group, namely Denmark.

Forcing Denmark out of the League

The British tried to coerce the Danes into deserting the Armed Neutrality League. To assist in the “negotiations,” they sent a fleet of 56 ships to lay siege to Copenhagen’s harbor. Inside the harbor were 18 Danish warships, as well as substantial numbers of commercial vessels. The harbor was guarded by a major battery on an island near its entrance. The British fleet was commanded by Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, and his second in command was none other than Vice Admiral Nelson, of Battle of the Nile fame. Parker was not known for his aggressiveness, but Nelson was. The British fleet arrived on March 21, 1801 and awaited further developments.

British efforts to intimidate the Danes failed, so on March 30th the British navy moved into position outside the entrance to the harbor. On April 1st, Nelson was sent into the harbor with a squadron of about a dozen ships with orders to destroy the Danish fleet. The wind was right on April 2nd, and the battle began early in the morning. Successful at first, the British soon began to encounter problems. Several ships ran aground, and British casualties were mounting.

Nelson’s superior, Admiral Parker, tried to render assistance but was unable to enter the harbor due to improper winds. Convinced that Nelson was headed for disaster, he signaled him to withdraw. When Nelson was informed of this by subordinates, he rather famously put his telescope to his blind eye and claimed he couldn’t confirm the signal!

As a result, the fighting continued with heavy losses on each side. The Danes finally agreed to an armistice and to leave the Armed Neutrality League soon. The Danes lost a little over 1,000 men and the British a little under that number. But the British gained possession of a number of ships and achieved their diplomatic goal as well.

The British were prepared to next turn against the Russians, but the death of Paul I and the ascension of Alexander I, who cared little for the League, made that unnecessary. However, the League had taught England that she was clearly vulnerable to economic warfare, and her problems with the League were part of her motivation for eventually agreeing to peace with France later that year (see Chapter 21).

Bombarding the Danes

Denmark, it seems, cannot catch a break. She remained neutral in the conflict between France and England, but the Brits continued to harass her shipping, in violation of international shipping law and British/Danish agreements. In 1807, after Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit with the Russians (see Chapter 10), he began to pressure Denmark into joining economic warfare against England in the form of the Continental System, which I explain in Chapter 21. The Danes were not excited about the idea, but neither were they pleased with England, which was pressuring Denmark to join her in opposition to France.

What’s a crown prince to do? For a time, Denmark’s Crown Prince Frederick seemed to do nothing. His inaction didn’t please the Brits, who sent a massive fleet of 25 ships of the line (the major warships of the day) and almost 30,000 marines to invade Copenhagen. The Danes were furious (and who can blame them?). They refused to simply roll over and play dead. The Brits responded on September 2, 1807 by bombarding and invading the city and the port, burning much of the city and killing at least 2,000 civilians.

The Danes were no match for the Brits and soon surrendered. The British action gained them the entire Danish fleet and many supplies. Happy with their victory, they sailed away.

The Brits may have won the battle, but they suffered greatly in the war of public opinion. People throughout Europe, and even some in England, were outraged at the idea that a nation could, without a declaration of war or any reasonably just cause, take military action against a nation that had taken no action against her. The question of the justification of a preemptive strike continues to be a factor in international relations even today.

Great Britain had always attempted to seize the moral high ground, claiming that France was a threat to peace and freedom. That argument was now much harder to make. Napoleon would have dearly loved to have those Danish ships on his side, but he was probably equally glad with the end result: Denmark agreed to join the Continental System against Great Britain. Another door into continental Europe was closed to France’s greatest enemy.

Sinking the Spanish and French at Trafalgar

The most famous naval battle of the Napoleonic period took place on October 21, 1805. It was the final result of a convoluted effort to use a combined French and Spanish armada to draw the British navy all the way to the West Indies. The initial plan was that the French and Spanish were to dash back to the English Channel to support an invasion of England. Napoleon was a master of war on land. His understanding of the capabilities and condition of his navy was less complete.

Lacking leadership

The French lacked strong naval leadership. The main French fleet, harbored at Toulon in the Mediterranean, was commanded by our old friend Admiral Villeneuve. Remember him? At the Battle of the Nile, he hemmed and hawed for awhile and then decided to sail away rather than taking the fight to the British. Mr. Indecision himself.

At first, things went more or less according to the French plan. Admiral Villeneuve managed to slip out of Toulon harbor, meet up with some other French and Spanish ships, and sail away to the Caribbean. Somewhat belatedly, the English navy followed, led by another of our old friends from earlier in this chapter, Admiral Horatio Nelson. The French and Spanish reached the island of Martinique, then turned around and sailed all the way back to Europe, keeping several days ahead of the British.

On the way back, the French and Spanish fought a short engagement with British ships on July 22nd, and then they sought shelter in several harbors. They eventually ended up in the Spanish harbor of Cadiz, where Villeneuve was well-protected by shore batteries. This situation suited him just fine, but Napoleon was furious with Villeneuve’s lack of decisiveness and ordered him replaced. Napoleon was a man of action and expected his subordinates to take the battle to the enemy rather than seeking safety. Of course, Napoleon never really understood naval warfare all that well, but it is reasonable to say that Villeneuve should have been more aggressive.

By this time, Napoleon had abandoned his plans to invade England and was preparing to move his Grande Armée into central Europe. To assist in the coming campaign, Napoleon planned to move his navy (under new leadership) from Cadiz to Italy, where it would land soldiers and await further orders.

Battling Nelson again

Meanwhile, Nelson had reappeared and instituted a blockade on Cadiz harbor. Clever lad that he was, he put many of his ships out of sight so that the French and Spanish would have reason to believe they could escape and fulfill their mission. If you read about the Battle of Austerlitz in Chapter 9, you may realize that Napoleon did much the same thing with his ground forces there. Great minds think alike.

Admiral Villeneuve would probably have preferred to stay where he was, but he was quite concerned about his career and had heard that he was about to be replaced. In a desperate bid to save his reputation, he sailed out of Cadiz harbor on October 19th, and in so doing, he played right into the hands of Admiral Nelson, who caught up to them two days later off nearby Cape Trafalgar.

The British held off engagement until the French and Spanish ships were well out of the harbor and beyond the range of the harbor guns. Then, the Brits sent in the ships of the line, the main warships of navies in those days. (They were called that because naval battles were usually fought by the two sides lining up against each other and then just blasting away until someone cried “Uncle.”) Nelson had his flagship hoist the famous flag signal, “England expects that every man will do his duty.” And his men most certainly did theirs.

When the French and Spanish saw the British ships approaching, they attempted to turn and return to the safety of Cadiz. This action only served to break their line of battle, and the engagement soon turned into something of a one-on-one. The battle continued for much of the day, with a number of the French and Spanish ships sailing off to safety rather than turning and fighting. (Hmmm. Does that sound familiar?)

The ships that stayed paid a heavy price. By the end of the day, the British had captured 18 ships and lost not a one. It was an overwhelming victory, though most of the captured ships would be destroyed in a big storm shortly thereafter. Admiral Villeneuve was taken prisoner. A broken man who was now associated with both of France’s overwhelming naval defeats at the hand of Admiral Nelson, he committed suicide in 1806, just as he was about to be sent to France on parole.

Villeneuve was not the only admiral to lose his life as a result of Trafalgar. Admiral Nelson’s flagship, Victory, was heavily engaged in the action. Shortly after 1 p.m. on October 21, 1805, a sharpshooter on the French ship Redoubtable shot Nelson, who died a few hours later. One of England’s greatest heroes, Nelson is remembered and respected by all. England erected a huge monument to Trafalgar — and Nelson — in London, called Trafalgar Square.

Facing reality

In some ways, the Battle of Trafalgar changed nothing. France was never likely to challenge Great Britain for dominance of the seas. True, if Napoleon’s scheme had been instituted while his Grande Armée was still on the French coast opposite England, and if sufficient troop carriers had been available, then perhaps Napoleon could have carried out the long-planned invasion. But by the time of Trafalgar, those plans had been scrapped, and Napoleon had pretty much given up ever being able to invade his greatest foe. In fact, he said as much as early as 1798, before he turned his attention to Egypt.

But Napoleon still had a fleet and still had allies who had fleets, most notably the Spanish and the Danes. Those fleets would, from time to time, keep the British occupied and even at bay, and they did prevent the various coalitions against France from having much success in invading anywhere but Portugal (see Chapter 12).

On the other hand, the Battle of Trafalgar set both physical and psychological limits on French expansion. No longer could Napoleon convince anyone, including himself, that an invasion of England was possible. This set the British people’s minds to rest and allowed them the luxury of opposing Napoleon at every opportunity, secure in the knowledge that the French would never be able to take the battle to them.

If Trafalgar was a boost to the spirits of the British, it was quite the opposite to the French, Napoleon in particular. It meant that Napoleonic France would be restricted to being a great land power, with an empire restricted to continental Europe. Foreign colonies were unlikely, as were any expeditions to the far east, other than by following in Alexander the Great’s footsteps and marching there.

As a result, Napoleon would turn to other ways to defeat England. Earlier in this chapter, I mention the economic blockade known as the Continental System, which I discuss further in Chapter 21. That effort at economic warfare was one of the outcomes of the Battle of Trafalgar. Unfortunately for Napoleon, it would be no more successful.