Chapter 13

Reeling from Russia

In This Chapter

Feeling the tension between Russia and France

Marching forward to victory

Winning the only real battle

Capturing Moscow and watching it burn

Waiting for nothing

Leaving a disaster

A fter the Treaty of Tilsit between France and Russia in 1807 (see Chapter 10), those two nations became allies. Equally important was the fact that the two emperors, Napoleon of France and Tsar Alexander I of Russia, became friends. Napoleon saw this friendship as a very important move toward peace on the European continent. After all, what country would possibly want to take on both France and

But it soon became evident that the friendship, both personal and political, had its limits. Alexander didn’t provide France much help against Austria in 1809 (see Chapter 10), and in the years that followed there were other signs of growing disillusionment on both sides.

In this chapter, I tell you about some of the issues that divided the two countries and what they tried — and didn’t try — to do about them. Then I describe France’s 1812 campaign in Russia and discuss that campaign’s long-term implications for Napoleon.

Watching Storm Clouds Gather

The Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was much better to France than to Russia. That’s fair, because France had just defeated Russia for the second time in two years. But a one-sided treaty can sometimes lead to problems, and that is exactly what happened. Two things in particular created problems for Russia, and thus for the alliance between the two nations. I discuss these two things in the following sections.

Polish pain

The Treaty of Tilsit created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of what today is part of Poland. This step elated the Poles and made them steadfast allies of Napoleon, but it deeply concerned the Russians. Here’s why:

The Russian nobility, and some people in Alexander’s family, had hoped to expand Russian borders to the west. In fact, they wanted to swallow up most of Poland and were not at all happy when Napoleon created an independent state, under his protection, right on their border.

Worse yet, creation of the Grand Duchy gave Napoleon an excuse to station French troops alarmingly close to Russia. This fact did not sit at all well with the Russian nobility, and they let Alexander know it at every opportunity.

Another reason the Russian nobility didn’t like the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was that Napoleon instituted many of the same reforms he had brought to France. He abolished the old feudal system, freed the serfs, and brought other legal and social reforms to the Poles. He promoted religious freedom and tolerance, and he opened the Jewish ghettos.

Not surprisingly, the feudalistic nobility of Russia was not at all pleased with this development so close to home. If the serfs on one side of the border could be freed, why not on the other side? And religious freedom was not exactly at the top of their priority list either, as the relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church was, shall we say, quite close. In short, the Russian nobility looked across the border and didn’t like what they saw one little bit. They pressured Alexander to get Napoleon to desert the Poles, but Napoleon refused to cooperate. He never gave the Poles the completely independent state they really wanted, but neither did he desert them to the whims of their Russian neighbor, and for this they were exceedingly grateful.

Napoleon felt compelled to keep his word to the Poles, but he had other concerns as well. If he deserted the Poles, Russia would move in, sooner rather than later. Then she would likely try to expand further west, causing tension with Napoleon’s other allies. That circumstance would likely lead to war, but on Russia’s terms rather than on France’s. This would not be good news for France, and Napoleon knew it. Thus, Poland was in several ways at the heart of the eventual war between Russia and France.

Continental divide

The other major problem was the provision of the Treaty of Tilsit that brought Russia into the Continental System. That system was an economic blockade of Great Britain, which meant that Russia was not allowed to trade with the British. Again, the Russian nobles were upset, along with the merchant class. Russia depended a great deal on trade and had historically had substantial trade with Great Britain. To have this source of income removed just so Napoleon could bring the British to terms was more than many people in Russia could swallow.

It’s important to understand that while Tsar Alexander I was, well, a tsar, he couldn’t completely ignore the wishes and needs of his nobility or his merchants. Tsars who fell out of favor were susceptible to sudden illness and death, among other things. (After all, Alexander’s father, Paul I, met an untimely death.) Indeed, some nobles were less than subtle in their pressures on Alexander to abandon his friendship with Napoleon. Absolute rulers are never as absolute as they may like to be, or as their image may suggest. (The term tsar is based on the name Caesar, as in Julius Caesar, and we all know what happened to him!) It didn’t help Napoleon’s cause that Alexander’s mother was completely opposed to Napoleon and to any good relations between the two countries. Even a tsar must listen to his mother!

The Continental System was almost as harmful to its participants as it was to England, and Russia suffered as much as (or more than) anyone. As a result,

By 1810, Russia was opening its ports to neutral ships carrying British goods. This was a sham, as many of the ships were simply flying bogus flags, including American.

At about the same time, the Russians also began to put prohibitive tariffs on French goods. These taxes made it very difficult for French merchants to sell items to the Russians, and it was tantamount to an act of economic warfare by Russia.

Alexander also made threatening moves toward Warsaw, but the presence in that city of Marshal Davout and his army prevented further Russian adventures.

Each side continued posturing as 1812 approached. In April of that year, Tsar Alexander offered to reinvigorate his efforts (such as they were) to enforce the Continental System, but his offer came with conditions that were unacceptable to Napoleon. He wanted Napoleon to give him part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and allow Russia to continue to trade with so-called neutral ships. Napoleon wasn’t about to do either of these. Both sides wanted peace, but both sides realized that war was inevitable and began to make preparations.

Getting Russia Ready for War

When Tsar Alexander realized that war with France was just over the horizon, he began to get his ducks lined up:

To secure his northern flank, he cut a deal with Swedish Crown Prince Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (see Figure 13-1). This is the same Bernadotte who married Napoleon’s first love, Désirée Clary (see Chapter 5). Bernadotte had previously asked Napoleon to help him regain control of Norway, but Napoleon had declined. When Alexander showed signs of cooperation in that area, Bernadotte offered to support him in any war with France. The Convention of St. Petersburg, signed in April 1812, tied Sweden and Russia together and secured Alexander’s northern border.

Figure 13-1: Marshal Bernadotte, seen here in a 19th-century engraving, married Napoleon’s first girl- friend and was a thorn in his side ever after.

Russia had been involved in a war with Turkey since 1806, but Alexander managed to bring it to an end by May 1812.

Alexander negotiated a trade treaty with England, which was finalized in July.

Also, since 1810, Alexander had been working hard to reform the Russian army — not one of the finest armies in Europe. Alexander followed Napoleon’s lead in organizing his army in an efficient corps system (see Chapter 17). He also improved its weaponry, as well as its level of artillery support. While it was not as good an army as that fielded by Napoleon, it was an improvement over the Russian armies that fought at Austerlitz and Friedland (see Chapter 10).

Preparing France for War

Napoleon had long anticipated the possibility of war with Alexander and had planned accordingly. For two years leading up to 1812, he reinforced his military outposts in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and in Germany. In 1811, he even tried to negotiate a peace with Great Britain, anticipating that her difficulties with the United States might make her, finally, willing to come to terms with France. Great Britain’s troubles with the United States did worsen, leading to the War of 1812, but that wasn’t enough to get her to agree to peace with France. Instead, she threw in her lot with Russia. Very few people were surprised by this development.

Growing the army

One advantage of Napoleon’s system of empire and alliances was that countries other than France got to provide soldiers for the Grande Armée. This was just as well. France’s war with Spain, which I discuss in Chapter 12, was tying down a quarter million troops, and conscriptions were both unpopular and increasingly unproductive. Napoleon had to fight a two-front war, and he needed soldiers.

To augment his army, Napoleon signed treaties with Austria and Prussia that gained him a total of at least 50,000 men and assured him that neither country would take advantage of the situation to move against Napoleon. Naples, various states in the Confederation of the Rhine, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and other allies would further increase Napoleon’s effective fighting strength.

Napoleon’s efforts to bolster the size of his army were hugely successful. He amassed an army of almost 600,000 men for this campaign. It was the most massive army in history up to that point, and it seemed capable of simply rolling over any opponent, especially because it was commanded by the greatest military commander of his (and perhaps of any) time. However, it was not without its problems:

This was an allied army, no more than half of which was French. This meant that

• Twenty different nations were represented.

• Each nation had its own uniform and its own flag.

• Each army also had its own language, making communication difficult and slow. (Luckily, French was the language of the educated classes, which included the officer corps of virtually all armies.)

• Non-French soldiers were not as motivated and dedicated, to say nothing of loyal, as their French counterparts.

Some of Napoleon’s leaders were not all they could be:

• Field Marshal Prince Karl Schwarzenberg of Austria and other foreign commanders were only fair generals, and their loyalty to Napoleon was more than likely limited.

• While some of Napoleon’s marshals and generals, such as Louis Davout and Joachim Murat, were among his very best, others were mediocre.

Stocking supplies

While Napoleon may have preferred that Alexander attack the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, thus giving Napoleon the moral high ground, he knew that he would likely have to invade Russia. It made some sense to take the war to Russia rather than allow it to be fought on allied territory. Accordingly, Napoleon began to increase his stores of supplies at all of his most forward positions. Everything from medical supplies to food, from ammunition to wine was sent as far east as possible. Napoleon was determined that his soldiers should not want for anything.

One thing that they did want for, unfortunately, was horses. For at least two years, the French army and its allied forces were short of horses. Napoleon did all he could to purchase horses from any possible source, but his effort was just barely successful. There would be no spare horses for the Russian campaign, which would eventually impact his soldiers greatly.

Hoping for a quick battle

A final problem faced by Napoleon and his army was the very nature of the war they were about to fight. Napoleon understood history, and he knew that no recent invading force had been successful in Russia. Still, he anticipated that the Russians would defend their country by giving battle right away. Napoleon expected to win that battle, and any others that followed, and quickly achieve victory. Had Russia done that, his expectations would have likely been fulfilled.

But Napoleon should have paid attention to what Alexander was saying (and to what made perfect sense). If he had, he may have realized that the Russians wouldn’t engage the French allied troops in an immediate battle. Instead, Alexander would withdraw his forces deeper and deeper into Mother Russia, stretching the French lines of communication and running them low on supplies.

In looking at all the problems facing Napoleon, it is easy to fall into the trap of believing that the Russian campaign was a foolish mistake. But at the time, to the casual observer and careful analyst alike, it seemed that Napoleon would most likely succeed. His allies thought so, and many people in Russia thought so as well. Indeed, some thought Napoleon would not stop with Russia. These people believed that after Napoleon defeated Russia and once again secured Alexander’s friendship, he would follow in the footsteps of Alexander the Great and march all the way to India. Things just didn’t turn out that way.

Invading Mother Russia

For all the causes of concern, it was clearly an impressive and optimistic sight when Napoleon’s Grande Armée marched across the Niemen River on June 24, 1812. Any Russian on the other side would have certainly wondered if anyone could stand up to this mass of military might. What’s more, the Russians seemed to be playing right into Napoleon’s hands. Their force was divided into three armies:

The First Western Army, commanded by General Barclay de Tolly, fielded about 127,000 men.

The Second Western Army, commanded by General Peter Bagration, had a little under 50,000 soldiers.

The Third Western Army, commanded by General Alexander Tormazov, was just being organized and would eventually have perhaps 43,000 men.

Seeking a battle

Napoleon’s basic plan was simple: He would try to position his main force between the two Russian armies and defeat each of them in turn. It was the old divide-and-conquer approach that had worked so well in the past, and it was a perfectly reasonable approach here as well. Unfortunately for Napoleon, it didn’t work out as well as he had expected.

We may never know if the Russian strategy was predetermined, but there is no question as to its success. Rather than standing and fighting, the Russians simply continued to withdraw in the face of overwhelming odds. The French managed to force some skirmishes and won them all, but Napoleon initially was frustrated in his desire to seek a major battle.

Napoleon and his commanders were partly to blame for the turn of events. Exasperating delays were the order of the day. Because of the sheer size of the Grande Armée, it moved very slowly, and the roads became so clogged that supplies could hardly get to the front. In some cases, soldiers were near starvation because of the supply problems. Communication, usually a strong point in Napoleon’s campaigns, was slow at best. Add to that some indecisive leadership by certain subordinates, as well as uncooperative weather, and already things were not going well.

That uncooperative weather deserves a mention. Later in this chapter, I discuss how awful the weather was during Napoleon’s withdrawal from Russia. But the weather on the way in was just about as bad. It was so hot that many soldiers died from exhaustion or thirst.

Horses were especially hard-hit by the weather — thousands of them died along the way — and Napoleon had no extra horses to spare. Horses pull baggage carts and cannon, as well as carry cavalry, so in some ways men were more expendable than horses. In the entire Russian campaign, Napoleon would lose as many as 200,000 horses, and in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 (see Chapter 14), he would dearly miss them.

All the delays cost the French several chances for an important victory. For example, General de Tolly had been surprised by the French advance and may have been caught in an open and isolated position. But Prince Eugène de Beauharnais (Napoleon’s stepson, who was Prince of Bavaria) was unable to get his force into position in time, and de Tolly escaped. General Bagration was similarly able to evade the forces of Prince Jérôme (Napoleon’s brother), and he later avoided major contact with Marshal Davout’s forces when Eugène and Jérôme each failed to arrive with timely support.

Waiting for Alexander

Napoleon continued to push forward into Russia, and on June 28th he entered the town of Vilna. So far, he had won several skirmishes and pushed the Russians back. By most standards, he was doing fine. So fine that he figured Alexander, knowing what he was up against, would seek peace terms. Or, if not peace, Alexander would offer a battle to decide the issue once and for all.

Napoleon sat in Vilna for 18 days, but nothing came from Alexander or any of his commanders. By mid-July, it was clear that Alexander wasn’t sending any envoys seeking peace and the Russian armies were not coming to give battle. Napoleon had to make a decision. He considered staying in Vilna until the next spring (almost a full year). He could use that time to

Consolidate his position.

Reorganize his army.

Bring supplies forward.

Fortify the town to serve as a safe base for future operations.

Prepare for a spring push, either to St. Petersburg (where the tsar was) or to Moscow.

But Napoleon scrapped the plan to stay in Vilna, fearing that an idle army would be of little use by the next spring. Instead, he began to move forward, still seeking that one, decisive battle with the Russians.

As he moved toward the Russian town of Vitebsk, on his northern, or left, flank, Napoleon found out that General de Tolly had been isolated there, with Marshal Davout keeping General Bagration from coming to his support. This situation was just what Napoleon wanted, and he pushed forward quickly.

Then, just when he had his chance for victory, Napoleon delayed his action against General de Tolly by a day, waiting for reinforcements. General de Tolly took full advantage of this delay and beat a hasty retreat. Napoleon took the city after some minor engagements, but the main Russian force had once again eluded him. Both Russian forces moved toward the city of Smolensk, where they could finally unite.

His army exhausted and the summer fading fast, Napoleon again gave thought to calling a halt to operations until the following spring. He had defeated the Russians in their major encounters and now controlled much of their western territory. If he made it clear he was in Russia to stay, perhaps Alexander would come to his senses and seek peace. But staying there and doing nothing might look weak, and declaring victory and going home might look weaker yet. So, after a two-week stay to rest the soldiers and bring up supplies and reinforcements, onward the allied army went.

Taking a city by storm

Napoleon moved on Smolensk and discovered to his pleasure that the two Russian armies were there. Though they had combined forces, Napoleon was happy because he was finally going to get the battle he wanted. Had he moved immediately, he could have fought them in front of Smolensk. Instead, he declared a cessation of hostilities for one day. That was August 15th, his birthday. But the birthday present was to the Russians, who withdrew into Smolensk and prepared its defenses.

For the next two days, fighting raged in the suburbs of Smolensk. On August 18th, there was a lull in the action. During the lull, and rather amazingly, from the French point of view, Bagration’s army withdrew, leaving General de Tolly to fight an overwhelmingly superior French force! Napoleon, perhaps unable to believe his good fortune, failed to quickly pursue the retreating Bagration or to attack General de Tolly’s remaining forces. As a result, both Russian forces faded from the scene, leaving Napoleon with a sacked and partially burned Smolensk.

While the engagement in Smolensk was going on, French forces under Marshal Nicolas Oudinot and General Gouvion St-Cyr pushed back Russians led by General Ludwig Wittgenstein in what is known as the First Battle of Polotsk on August 17–18, 1812. This battle, depicted in Figure 13-2, led Napoleon to believe that all was going well and that it was safe to move further into Russia. (The Russians and French would fight there again in November, with the French winning again.)

Figure 13-2: The First Battle of Polotsk. This 19th-century engraving shows the second day of the battle with General Gouvion St-Cyr leading a charge.

Decisions, decisions

Now Napoleon had some really tough decisions to make. It was moving on toward late August; summer was fading fast. He had had limited success against the Russians, but they had had no success against him, save their success at continually retreating. Napoleon could stay in Smolensk and crank out publicity saying that he had conquered much of western Russia and had two Russian armies on the run. He was not too overextended and would be fairly secure in Smolensk.

While he was there, he could really stick it to Alexander by declaring Poland a fully independent nation. This would make him an even greater Polish hero, and Russia would really have a hornet’s nest on its border. Napoleon could do that, declare victory, keep his captured territory, and dare Alexander to do anything about it. And if Smolensk was not a good place to winter, having been burned and sacked by the retreating Russians, it would have been easy to move his army to Vitebsk, where he would have had plenty of everything and his supply lines would have been shorter. (Since his soldiers did not have winter uniforms, supplies were an important consideration.)

The allure of these options notwithstanding, Napoleon became convinced that the only real option was to take the fight to the Russians. He still wanted to win a peace and get back to Paris in 1812. So he had to decide whether to move on St. Petersburg, where the tsar was headquartered, or on Moscow, in which direction the Russian army had withdrawn. Seeking a fight, Napoleon moved toward Moscow. That city was the emotional center of Russia; surely the army would not surrender it without a fight.

Giving a beating at Borodino

For once in this campaign, Napoleon was right. The Russian people would not tolerate a tsar who simply yielded the holy city of Moscow to the infidel French. Alexander sent Field Marshal Prince Mikhail Kutusov to assume command of the two Russian armies, with orders to finally confront the French. That confrontation came near the town of Borodino, only about 70 miles from Moscow.

By this time, Napoleon was down to 130,000 men and 600 cannon. A fair number of soldiers had died or deserted along the way, and Napoleon had to leave a number of units to guard his flanks and his supply lines in the rear. Several of these units were involved in significant action against smaller Russian forces. Garrisons also were stationed at several cities, including Smolensk and Vitebsk. Opposing him was Kutusov with 154,000 men and 624 cannon. Moreover, the Russians had the advantage of having selected their positions and fortified them.

On September 5th, heavy fighting gained the French control of the Schevardino Redoubt, a key element to their forward progress. (A redoubt is usually a fortified hill with a trench around it, a very good defensive position.) On September 6th, both sides rested and reorganized for the battle that both knew would come the next day.

Fighting began on the morning of the 7th, and at first it went well for the French. Prince Eugène captured the village of Borodino, and Marshal Michel Ney grabbed portions of an important defensive site known as the Three Arrows. Ney asked Napoleon to send in the Imperial Guard cavalry to deliver a crushing blow, but Napoleon declined. (Criticism of Napoleon for this decision is misguided second-guessing. Had he thrown in the Imperial Guard and had it been defeated, the Grand Armée would have been finished, and Napoleon with it. It would have been the ultimate gamble: Thousands of miles from home, toss the dice for either a complete victory or a complete disaster.)

The major battle was fought over what was called the Great Redoubt (see Figure 13-3). The Russians were dug in, and they poured grapeshot and musket fire on the attacking French. The French soldiers were tenacious, and by late in the day the Great Redoubt was in French hands. As the Russians withdrew from the redoubt, they were fired on by their own cannon but not pursued by Murat’s cavalry. During the night, the Russians left the field of battle with little interference by the French. Napoleon chose to consolidate his victory rather than try to destroy the Russian army. (If you want to criticize any of Napoleon’s decisions, this one may deserve it.)

Figure 13-3: This 19th-century engraving shows French soldiers charging a Russian redoubt at the Battle of Borodino, also known as the Battle of the Moskova.

On paper, the Battle of Borodino was a French victory. Russian losses were over 44,000, compared to 33,000 French. But the battle was a bloodbath for both sides, with the French much less able to replace their losses.

One major loss for the Russians was Prince Peter Bagration. One of Russia’s finest commanders, he had been responsible for saving much of the Russian army at the Battle of Austerlitz in 1805 (see Chapter 9). He fought bravely at Borodino but was fatally wounded, dying a few days after the battle.

Entering Moscow

The Russians retreated to Moscow but quickly decided not to attempt its defense. The Russian rear guard was leaving as Murat’s cavalry was entering, but neither side sought a confrontation. By all normal standards of war, the French had won. They had defeated the Russians at every encounter, captured several important cities, and were now moving into the Kremlin itself. (The Kremlin is a huge walled city within a city, a major fortress that is still the most dominant feature of Moscow.) Both the French and the Russians anticipated that Alexander and Napoleon would agree to peace terms and that the war would shortly be over. No one wants to be the last soldier killed in a war!

Count Fyodor Vasilievich Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow, had also deserted the city, but he had left orders to destroy everything that could possibly be of any use to the French. He took with him all available firefighting equipment. Shortly after Napoleon entered the city on September 15, 1812, the Russians set fire to their own city. Napoleon was forced to abandon the Kremlin (which ultimately was not harmed by the fire) and watch 80 percent of the city go up in flames from a vantage point on a nearby hill. For much of the 200 years since the campaign, people have blamed the French for the fires. But the French were ill-served by the destruction of the very city upon which they then depended for food and shelter, and we now know that the Russians themselves burned Moscow.

Burning the city was probably a brilliant move, as it effectively removed Moscow as a likely winter home for the French army. Napoleon stayed there for 35 days, sending peace overtures to Alexander, as well as to Kutusov. Neither man gave Napoleon the courtesy of a reply. Napoleon considered wintering in Moscow, but that option was finally rejected; they were just too far from home. The supply lines would be a nightmare to maintain, and there was too great a risk of political intrigue in Paris if Napoleon were gone that long. When Murat’s cavalry, which had been living in extremely poor conditions outside of Moscow, was surprised by a Russian attack and handed a defeat on October 18th, Napoleon quickly decided to leave. The next day, the first elements of the no longer so Grande Armée began to leave Moscow.

Making the Long Return Home

Napoleon wisely decided to return by way of a more southerly route, rather than go back through Borodino. This decision would avoid returning through land that had already been stripped bare. There was only one problem: Kutusov stood in his way. The two faced each other at Maloyaroslavets, 68 miles southwest of Moscow. Napoleon won that engagement but was concerned that Kutusov would be able to regroup his forces and attack again. Had Napoleon reconnoitered over the ridge in front of him, he would have discovered that the Russians had melted away and the way was relatively clear. But Napoleon didn’t do that. Instead, he turned north, where eventually he would retrace his steps through Borodino and on to Smolensk.

Borodino was a ghastly sight, with tens of thousands of bloated bodies still strewn about the field and on the roads. On November 6th, winter struck hard, and the withdrawal became more and more a desperate fleeing to safety. On the 9th, Napoleon reached Smolensk, but supplies there were almost immediately devoured by the first soldiers to arrive. There would be no winter quartering in that city, and Napoleon pushed on.

Fighting “General Frost”

The winter soon became the greatest enemy. Men froze to death while walking or while asleep. Warm clothing and food were at a premium; horse meat was a delicacy. What few horses they still had left were unlikely to survive, and the consequent loss of cavalry made their military situation precarious. Only reuniting with several rear-guard forces gave the men any hope at all.

The horrors of the winter withdrawal from Russia provide one of the most lasting images of that campaign and, indeed, of all of Napoleon’s campaigns. The British caricature shown in Figure 13-4 (which, ironically, I bought in Moscow) pretty much tells the story of Napoleon’s real enemy, “General Frost.” As I explain in Chapter 21, this kind of caricature was quite common during Napoleon’s time.

Figure 13-4: This British caricature from 1812 shows “General Frost” wearing a hat labeled “Mountains of Ice” and threatening to bury “Little Boney” for having invaded his country.

The last major obstacle to Napoleon’s withdrawal from Russia was the Beresina River. As bitter as the winter was, it was not bitter enough to freeze the river sufficiently to allow crossing on the ice. Existing bridges had been destroyed by the Russians, and Napoleon has jettisoned his pontoon bridge building equipment just days earlier, as he had expected the river to be frozen solid. Under these circumstances, Napoleon and his engineers really proved their mettle. With Napoleon directing and providing inspiration, his engineers built two bridges, one for men and one for horses and carts. In spite of Russian efforts and a last-minute panic by some soldiers and many camp followers (women, pro-French Russians, and other hangers on), most of the army got across the river (see Figure 13-5), and the bridges were then destroyed to keep the Russians from following. Thousands died or were wounded in the crossing, but the army was saved.

With the army now reasonably safe from the Russians, though not from the bitter cold, Napoleon determined that he was needed in Paris to counter fears that he had been killed. Napoleon had already been told of an unsuccessful plot to overthrow his government that had used as its excuse Napoleon’s alleged death. The plot, led by General Claude-François Malet, had failed, but it was enough to convince Napoleon and his staff that he needed to get to Paris as quickly as possible. The next several Bulletins would end with the phrase, “The Emperor’s health was never better.”

Figure 13-5: This period engraving by Raffet shows both the tenderness and horror of the French situation at the cross- ing of the Beresina River.

Very few heroes were created during the Russian campaign. One of the few was Marshal Michel Ney, a tall, red-headed cavalryman with unequaled bravery and a fondness for profanity. Already one of Napoleon’s best marshals (though he was less than bright and not much good at thinking for himself in certain situations), Ney had been given the title Prince of the Moskova for his bravery at Borodino. During the march back to France, Ney commanded the rear guard and tenaciously defended against Russian attacks, allowing what little was left of the Grande Armée to get safely out of Russia. Ney, it is gener- ally believed, was the last French commander to leave Russia. For all this, he received another well-deserved title: The Bravest of the Brave (see Figure 13-6).

Understanding the consequences

The Russian campaign of 1812 was a disaster. Napoleon probably had little choice in undertaking it, as he could hardly let Russia do as she pleased regarding Poland and the Continental System. But Napoleon had several choices along the way, and he often made the wrong one. His delays and indecisions, and those of his subordinates, kept him from wrapping up the campaign in the summer or fall, when there would still have been time for his army to establish suitable winter quarters. He allowed himself to be drawn far deeper into Russia than he had ever planned; even Smolensk was beyond what he had anticipated. His delay in Moscow was inexcusable and was the single greatest error of the campaign. Had he left after only two weeks, his trip home would have been far, far different.

Figure 13-6: Marshal Michel Ney, Prince of the Moskova, Bravest of the Brave, is shown in this period engraving returning from Russia.

Napoleon never really recovered from the debacle of 1812. He lost half a million men, French and allied, and as many as 200,000 horses. In the campaigns to come, he would miss them all, especially the horses. The loss in cannon and supplies was immeasurable and would take a long time to replace.

But the worst consequence for Napoleon was the loss of his reputation. Spain had tarnished it, but much of the problem in Spain was that Napoleon was not there in person. He was there in Russia and had shown the world that he was not invincible after all. Still tough, still determined, still brilliant, but not invincible. That knowledge was all that some of his old enemies needed, and as the year 1812 drew to a close, some of them were about to start settling old scores.