Chapter 14

Defeat and Resurrection

In This Chapter

Defending an empire and a nation

Winning and losing, but mostly losing

Coming so close but yet so far

Gaining a new “empire”

Returning as Caesar

Preparing for Armageddon

A fter the disastrous 1812 campaign in Russia (see Chapter 13), Napoleon returned to Paris and organized a new army to prepare to defend the core of his empire: France and Germany. Tsar Alexander I of Russia seemed intent on pursuing the French army far beyond the Russian borders. The tsar began to see himself as the leader of a holy crusade, and we all know how determined people can be when they feel they are fighting for God.

But Napoleon still had a decent army and quite a few allies, so the result of Russia’s crusade was not a foregone conclusion. And besides, Napoleon was, well, Napoleon. Anyone who thought defeating this master of war was going to be a cakewalk might find himself being served up on a platter!

In this chapter, I explain how Napoleon spent 1813 defending Germany and much of 1814 defending France. I show you that military opposition isn’t the only thing he had to face at the time — there was also plenty of politics to go around — and I take you with Napoleon into exile on the island of Elba. After a short visit (sorry, no time to lie on the beach), we join Napoleon as he returns to France for one last throw of the dice.

Trying to Keep the Wolves at Bay

In Chapter 13, I mention that while Napoleon was busy in Russia, there was an attempted coup in France led by a somewhat crazy general named Claude-François Malet. That coup was based on the rumor that Napoleon was dead. Although the coup failed, it raised the question of why no one tried to rally behind Napoleon’s new wife, the Empress Marie Louise, or the son they had together in 1811, who held the title of King of Rome. (Yes, I know, last you checked Napoleon was married to Josephine. See Chapter 20 for how all of that changed, and why.)

Napoleon’s appearance in Paris put an end to the rumors and to any further coup attempts. Still, Napoleon had discovered just how fragile his empire was and how much it depended on his success on the battlefield.

Facing a Sixth Coalition

Napoleon’s invasion of Russia failed, as I explain in Chapter 13. But most of Europe was still, at least on paper, allied with Napoleon or part of his empire. Thus, it was entirely possible that Russia would advance to her borders, look across at the French, cry out “Take that, sucker,” and go back home.

There were two problems with that scenario:

Tsar Alexander I did not like the Grand Duchy of Warsaw — the independent Polish state created by Napoleon. At the very least, he was determined to incorporate all or most of it into Russian territory.

Napoleon’s reputation had been tarnished so badly by the problems in Russia that at least two of his so-called allies — Prussia and Austria — were thinking seriously of jumping ship.

Losing Prussia as an ally

The first of these erstwhile friends to jump ship was Prussia. She had been bitter toward Napoleon ever since her defeat in 1806 (see Chapter 10), and her loyalty to the French Empire was tenuous at best. Indeed, as the Russian army advanced, more than a few Prussian soldiers simply switched sides.

The government of Prussia declared war on France on March 13, 1813, and by spring a Sixth Coalition was forming, consisting at first of Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, and Prussia. (As I explain in previous chapters, the first five coalitions had each been formed with the goal of defeating France as well. None had succeeded.)

Anticipating the coming conflict, Napoleon worked hard to reform his army. He had factories working overtime to make more cannon, and he recruited everyone he could lay his hands on. He tried to get as many horses as possible, but they were especially difficult to obtain. Trained horses were just about nonexistent, at least in the numbers he needed.

Some of the major players in the Sixth Coalition, including Prussia and, later, Austria, were not as intent on destroying Napoleon as they were on driving the French out of Germany. For that reason, Napoleon suspected that his allies in Germany, particularly Saxony and Bavaria, might be willing to jump into the Coalition. Russia, on the other hand, was on a holy war that would end only in Paris itself.

These differing views of Coalition goals left an opening for Napoleon. If he could achieve some quick victories, his alliance might hold, and the Coalition might falter. If not, anything was possible.

Taking on the Prussian troops

By May 1813, Napoleon’s army was in pretty good fighting condition. He took personal command as it moved east to fight the Coalition at the Battle of Lützen on May 2 in the northern German region of Saxony. Marshal Michel Ney was taking on a sizable, allied, Prussian-Russian force, led by Russian General Prince Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ney fought bravely, and when Napoleon brought up troops to reinforce him, the rout was on. Unfortunately, Napoleon’s lack of horses meant that he had precious little cavalry. His pursuit of the fleeing enemy was mediocre at best, and the combined forces withdrew.

Each side lost around 20,000 men at the battle, but the French held the field and claimed the victory. Even with such high losses, the victory did wonders for French morale and made the Coalition allies wonder at least a bit if they had made a mistake taking on Napoleon again.

Napoleon well understood that he had to maintain what advantage he had, so he had his army press on after the allied Prussian and Russian forces. He caught up to them at Bautzen. Napoleon had 150,000 men, while the Coalition forces, led by Field Marshal Gebhardt Lebrecht von Blücher, had just under 100,000 in a defensive position. Even with that advantage, Napoleon’s lack of adequate cavalry, plus some mistakes made by Ney in getting his forces lined up, caused the French to take their time in preparing for battle.

The battle commenced at noon on May 20, and by nightfall the French had made significant advances. The fighting continued the next day, with the French pushing the Coalition back. Ney took forever to get into position and, as a result, was never able to outflank the Coalition forces, which allowed them to again escape with their army pretty much intact.

As at Lützen, each side lost around 20,000 men. Napoleon had won two decisive victories but would end up with little to show for it. Napoleon may well have cried out, “My kingdom for a horse,” as in both battles the lack of horses kept his victories from being complete routs of the enemy.

The Coalition allies, on the other hand, had just suffered two defeats and were pretty fed up. They decided it would be a good idea to have at least an armistice (a temporary lull in fighting while each side explores the possibility of peace). Austria, in theory still an ally of France, agreed to mediate between the two sides.

Things seemed to look reasonably good for Napoleon. He had won two victories, the leadership of the Coalition forces against him was unable to agree on strategy, and his reputation as a great commander was on the mend.

Being undermined by Austria

Napoleon was also confident that he had the support of his ally Austria. His wife, Marie Louise, was the daughter of the Austrian emperor, Francis. The purpose of the marriage was in large part to tie Napoleon’s new French Empire to one of the oldest empires in Europe, the Hapsburg Empire. The marriage in 1810 seemed a good idea for both Austria and France, and Francis was quite pleased with the arrangement. (See Chapter 20 for more on Napoleon’s second marriage.)

Austria hadn’t been the greatest of allies, but she had provided soldiers for the disastrous campaign in Russia. Most of her troops had not been involved in the heart of the campaign, instead playing flanking and rear-guard roles. When the Russians chased Napoleon out of Russia and then kept on coming, they didn’t pay much attention to either the Prussians or the Austrians, hoping in both cases to gain them as allies against Napoleon.

Napoleon was quite aware of Austrians’ general lack of enthusiasm for their alliance with France, and he did everything he could to cement the relationship. He had named his son his heir and also named Marie Louise as regent (someone who runs a country until the legitimate ruler is old enough to take charge for himself). In short, Napoleon played the family ties thing for all it was worth. As it turned out, it wasn’t worth very much at all.

Francis had promised to provide soldiers to help Napoleon take the fight to the oncoming Prussians and Russians. Had he done so, Napoleon’s victories may well have been overwhelming, and the Prussians, at least, may have decided to duck out of the action. But Francis’s soldiers were phantoms: They never materialized.

Holding talks that lead to nowhere

When Napoleon defeated the Coalition forces for the second time in 1813, both sides were interested in an armistice. Emperor Francis, anxious to get involved, offered his foreign minister, Count Clemens Metternich, to mediate between the two sides. Both sides were pleased with the chance to rest their armies and train raw recruits. (Many of Napoleon’s new recruits were just in their teens, but they proved loyal to the end. They were frequently referred to as Marie-Louises, after the young empress.)

It soon became clear that Metternich was less interested in mediation than he was in forcing an unacceptable peace down Napoleon’s throat. He joined Prussia and Russia in insisting that Napoleon give up virtually everything he had gained since 1800. While Napoleon may have received at least a temporary peace in return, his acceptance to these terms would have been a disaster at home. All the fighting, all the wars, all the deaths would have been for almost nothing. The people of France would not stand for it, and Napoleon — and Metternich — knew it. It was a fool’s bargain, and Napoleon was no fool.

The offer had one big advantage for the Coalition partners: They could claim that the subsequent war with France was the result of Napoleon’s ego and refusal to make peace. The truth was that the Coalition was determined to destroy him. Nonetheless, the image of an egotistical and war-mongering Napoleon has lingered for 200 years. It is one reason that so many people, incorrectly, refer to the Napoleonic Wars rather than the Wars of the Coalitions Against Napoleonic France.

The armistice and talks led to the final break between France and Austria. Despite Marie Louise, despite the alliance, despite all that Napoleon had done to maintain good relations with Francis, Metternich and Francis determined that Napoleon’s star was no longer rising and that they would be better off joining the Coalition. So, on August 12, 1813, Austria declared war on France. The armistice was over, and war would commence.

Trying a new Coalition tactic

Napoleon’s reputation had been somewhat restored by his victories against the Prussians and Russians, so the Coalition partners agreed on at least one thing: They would try to avoid facing Napoleon directly, instead concentrating on defeating his marshals and generals who were detached from Napoleon’s main force. This could be a risky approach, as Napoleon might win some great victory that would negate Coalition victories elsewhere. But the strategy ended up being just about perfect.

Napoleon was able to relieve besieged French forces at Dresden and win a decisive victory on August 27, 1813. This was very important, as Dresden was a major supply depot for Napoleon and was located in Saxony, one of his key allies. It was a major victory, with at least 38,000 Coalition casualties compared to about 10,000 French losses. But French General Dominique Vandamme was unable to trap and destroy the retreating Coalition army, and Coalition victories over other French marshals took the shine off Napoleon’s victory.

Napoleon wanted to capture Berlin and perhaps drive the Prussians out of the Coalition. But every time he made moves in that direction, Coalition forces elsewhere required his attention. For much of the time, Napoleon was kept off balance and unable to isolate and decisively defeat any of his opponents. On October 6, Bavaria switched sides, joining the Coalition in return for guarantees of her independence. Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine — the collection of small German states that were allied to France — was starting to come apart.

Napoleon marshaled his forces at Leipzig, having perhaps a quarter of a million men at his disposal, though less than that in the immediate vicinity. He managed to catch Marshal Blücher at Düben on October 9, but the Prussian commander had already begun to withdraw, and Napoleon was only able to claim victory over a rear guard. By that time, Coalition forces were converging on Leipzig, setting up the major battle of the campaign.

Facing disaster at Leipzig

Napoleon had almost 200,000 soldiers in Leipzig and the surrounding area, but the Coalition forces numbered over 200,000 with more on the way. It was a difficult situation, but Napoleon was determined to make the best of it. He ordered his army to strike at forming Coalition forces before they could completely unite against the French. French attacks, and counterattacks against moves by the Coalition, worked for a time, but Napoleon’s outmanned forces were constantly kept off balance. The lack of cavalry continued to haunt French efforts.

The first day of conflict, October 16, 1813, was indecisive. The French lost fewer soldiers, but little territory changed hands. Worse, the Coalition was awaiting the arrival of about 150,000 soldiers, while Napoleon could only hope for 10 percent of that total to arrive in his support. It was a bad situation and about to get worse.

October 17 saw little action, as both sides rested and consolidated their positions. This was much better news for the Coalition than for Napoleon, as major reinforcements arrived throughout the day. Napoleon was aware of the situation and belatedly decided to withdraw in the early hours of October 18. Heavy rain hampered the withdrawal efforts, but as the day progressed much of the army managed to get across some bridges near the Leipzig suburb of Lindenau.

French forces were stunned by the sudden defection of two divisions of the Saxon army, who literally turned around and started firing on their allies of moments ago. The defectors were repulsed by the French, but the significance of their actions was not lost on anyone.

Napoleon attempted to buy some time by offering an armistice to Austria and the Coalition. The Coalition forces, smelling blood, refused to show much interest, though the effort did delay major military moves on their part until mid-morning of October 19.

Napoleon had decided that his supplies were too low to continue fighting and had ordered a general retreat across the one remaining bridge, with Marshal Nicolas Oudinot and Prince Marshal Joseph Poniatowski (who had achieved that rank just the previous day) directing the rear guard. All was going reasonably well, and the rear guard was about to be evacuated. The retreat would have signaled a French defeat, but Leipzig would not have been considered a disaster.

Unfortunately, some underling who had been put in charge of blowing up the bridge after the French had all escaped instead blew it up before the French were across. Indeed, the bridge was full of French soldiers when the explosion hit. Some of the French managed to swim across the river to join their comrades, but at least 15,000 were captured as a result of this tragic mistake. Many others died in the resulting action.

The saddest of these losses was Prince Poniatowski, who attempted to get across the river on his horse but drowned in the effort. A symbol of the loyalty of the Poles to Napoleon’s cause, Poniatowski was one of the true heroes of this period and is still a revered figure in Poland. You can see him in Figure 14-1.

Figure 14-1: Polish Prince Poniatowski was one of Napoleon’s most loyal supporters.

Leipzig was a disaster of monumental proportions for the French, in some ways worse than any others they suffered during the Napoleonic period:

France lost almost 40,000 killed or wounded and another 30,000 captured.

Napoleon’s supplies were mostly destroyed or captured, and he lost several hundred vital cannon.

Bavaria and Saxony were gone, and most of the rest of the Confederation of the Rhine would soon follow.

Napoleon had spent most of his career fighting enemies of France on foreign soil. Now, he would be forced to defend France on her own soil.

Defending the Homeland

As 1814 opened, Napoleon was in tough shape, to say the least!

He had lost tens of thousands of troops and countless horses, supplies, and cannon during the campaign for Germany in 1813.

His reputation was greatly tarnished and erstwhile allies were, or soon would be, leaving him like rats leaving a sinking ship.

His son-in-law, Prince Eugène, was being defeated by the Austrians in Italy.

Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington (known just as Wellington), was no longer fighting the French in Spain; he was fighting the French in France. His forces had driven quite far into the southwestern region of the country, with no end in sight.

France was being weakened by a British economic blockade, and there was considerable political unrest in Paris, largely fomented by the treacherous Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (otherwise known as Talleyrand), Napoleon’s one-time Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Napoleon was outnumbered and had precious few additional resources on which to draw.

But Napoleon was not without a few cards of his own to play:

For starters, his enemies were not entirely sure just what they wanted to do. Austria had not paid a whole lot of attention to the fact that her emperor’s daughter was on the French throne as empress, but that inconvenient fact did carry some weight. Emperor Francis wasn’t sure how far he wanted to carry the campaign against Napoleon.

Napoleon’s one-time marshal Jean Bernadotte, now the Crown Prince of Sweden, likewise had some misgivings about attempting to crush Napoleon, or at least France, completely. For one thing, he was French, so a little loyalty to the homeland might be in order. He also had the (delusional) hope that France might depose Napoleon and put him, Bernadotte, on the throne. (Not bloody likely.)

Even Great Britain was not as intent on destroying France as may be expected. Her greatest fear had always been that a Continental power would become so powerful that it could challenge England for supremacy, even on the high seas. For years, France had been the embodiment of this fear, but a resurgent Austria or, worse yet, Russia, could be just as dangerous. Better for England to find a way to obtain a peace that left France in decent shape, though preferably without Napoleon in charge.

Preparing Paris

Napoleon returned to Paris and immediately set about preparing to defend the motherland. His brother, Joseph, had been ousted as King of Spain by the combination of Spanish insurgents and Wellington’s soldiers (see Chapter 12). He had done such a good job there (choke!) that Napoleon placed him in charge of governing France from Paris while Napoleon was away on campaign with his army. Joseph was no match for Talleyrand when it came to politics, so Napoleon’s support in his capital city was less than he may have expected.

Nevertheless, Napoleon did what he could while he was there. He organized the defense of Paris against an anticipated attack, and he publicly reaffirmed Marie Louise as regent for his son, who held the title of King of Rome. Napoleon clearly hoped that even his defeat would not destroy his hereditary rule and that his son would be allowed to replace him with the daughter of Austria as regent. It was a pipe dream, but Napoleon could be excused for the hope, which was in keeping with how these sorts of things usually worked.

With Paris prepared as well as could be, Napoleon left on January 25, 1814 to rejoin his army and seek a major victory that might still turn the tide in his favor.

Seeking an elusive peace

The Coalition forces were still divided as to their ultimate goal — so much so that they decided to offer Napoleon an out. On November 16, 1813, they had offered Napoleon peace if France would withdraw to her borders of 1799. These were her so-called natural frontiers, which included the western bank of the Rhine River. Napoleon at first stalled and then provisionally agreed to the terms, calling for an international conference to work out the details.

If the forces allied against Napoleon had been serious, they may well have seen to it that this offer became the basis for peace. At that point, there was little likelihood of Napoleon becoming an aggressor again. The natural frontiers would keep France as one of the major, but not dominant, powers on the European continent. Napoleon may have been content to solidify his domestic reforms (which I discuss in Chapter 19), and the people of France may have been willing to accept the loss of their empire for a lasting peace.

Perhaps it was fear that their proposal might be accepted, perhaps it was simple distrust of Napoleon, or perhaps it was bloodlust toward the man who had defeated them so many times. Whatever the reason, the Coalition allies withdrew their offer on February 6, 1814 and made the absurd offer of peace if France would withdraw to her 1792 borders. They wanted to pretend that over 20 years of history simply didn’t exist. The French people would never tolerate that, and Napoleon couldn’t agree to it. The Coalition allies knew that quite well. The entire process was a sham, and hostilities soon commenced.

More bad news for Napoleon soon followed. Brussels fell in the north, which was not unexpected. What may have been unexpected was the desertion of King Joachim Murat of Naples. Murat was married to Napoleon’s sister Caroline and was one of Napoleon’s major marshals. Murat was expected to keep pressure on the Austrians in northern Italy. Instead, he cut a deal with the Austrians and withdrew as a French ally.

By this time, the people of Paris were beyond nervous, and many were deserting the city, fearing the worst. Talleyrand was in his treacherous element and was negotiating on a regular basis with the future Louis XVIII.

Reliving the good old days: The six-day war

For all the bad news surrounding him, Napoleon never gave up hope and never stopped trying. The Coalition forces were moving toward Paris, but they were split into forces led by Prince Karl Schwarzenberg and forces led by Marshal Blücher. The Austrian Schwarzenberg (not to be confused, as my spellchecker sometimes is, with the Austrian Arnold Schwarzenegger) was further away, so Napoleon moved to pounce on Blücher’s forces, which were spread out rather thin. The campaign that followed, generally called the Six Day Campaign, is often considered one of Napoleon’s finest, though some of the credit goes to ineffective Coalition action.

Napoleon had only about 30,000 men, but one Russian attachment to Blücher’s forces had only 5,000 near the town of Champaubert. Marshals Auguste Frédéric Louis Marmont and Michel Ney defeated the Russians on February 10, 1814, killing or capturing 4,000 of the Russians. Napoleon arrived shortly thereafter to discover that his forces had lost only around 200 casualties and were now in Napoleon’s classic position between the two wings of Blücher’s forces.

Napoleon knew he had no time to lose; any victory would depend on speed. He led his soldiers on an overnight forced march in rain and mud to catch another Russian corps. Napoleon routed that corps the next day, February 11, enjoying a one-to-two advantage in casualties. The victory wasn’t as decisive as Champaubert, but it did put Blücher on the defensive.

Determined to keep the momentum going, Napoleon turned to pursue the retreating Russians. He caught up to them near the village of Château-Thierry, and on February 12, he managed to rout them. Unfortunately for Napoleon, his lack of cavalry and the failure of a corps led by Marshal Jacques Macdonald to follow instructions allowed most of the Russians to escape. Still, it was yet another victory for Napoleon, and people were beginning to take notice.

Napoleon left with part of his force to face Prince Schwarzenberg’s troops (see Figure 14-2). Blücher attempted to take advantage of the situation by attacking French forces under Marshal Marmont on February 13. The attack stalled, and Napoleon quickly brought over the Imperial Guard (Napoleon’s elite fighting force) to reinforce Marmont. On February 14, the combined French forces routed Blücher’s forces, though the poor (muddy) conditions of the field prevented proper use of French artillery. Even so, Blücher lost at least 7,000 men while Napoleon lost no more than 600.

Figure 14-2: Prince Schwarzen- berg com- manded the Austrian forces and was tem- porarily defeated by Napoleon.

The good news just kept on coming, at least for a little while longer. Prince Schwarzenberg had taken advantage of Napoleon’s departure to fight Blücher to make his own move on Paris. He was blocked by French forces at Valjouan (whose numbers he couldn’t immediately determine), so he stopped to review the situation. Big mistake. Napoleon and his Imperial Guard moved quickly to join those French forces, and on February 17 they chased away the corps led by General Carl Wrede and gained yet another French victory. Suddenly, Schwarzenberg was no longer attacking; he was on the run. Napoleon had seemed to stymie both wings of the attacking Coalition army.

Napoleon pursued Schwarzenberg’s army and caught up to it near the town of Montereau, on the Seine River. Napoleon tried to cross the river first and cut the army off. Unfortunately for the French, Marshal Claude Victor failed to follow orders, and the French army failed in its goal. Napoleon was justifiably furious and replaced Victor with General Maurice Etienne Gérard. On February 18, the French stormed Montereau, which was held by forces led by General Württemberg. The French captured all the bridges and then the town itself, and they sent Württemberg’s forces retreating in extreme disarray. Württemberg lost 6,000 troops, and Napoleon less than half that number.

Failing peace

Throughout all this action, the peace talks had been off again and on again. First, the Coalition allies seemed willing to talk peace; then they suspended the talks. Napoleon initially demanded that France maintain its 1799 borders, but when he realized that his position wasn’t as strong as his string of victories made it seem, he decided to settle for the borders of 1792 (an offer he had refused just a few months earlier). But by then, it was too late. The Coalition forces had finally reached an agreement to continue the war until Napoleon had been deposed.

The two sides parried at each other, but Napoleon was more and more on the defensive. His marshals and generals were unable to achieve victory without Napoleon’s presence, and Napoleon simply could not be everywhere at once. Those marshals were beginning to lose heart, and Napoleon knew it. Still, he and his army fought on, hoping against hope to somehow inflict a decisive blow against an enemy that was becoming increasingly bolder.

Some marshals lost more than heart. Marshal Pierre-François-Charles Augereau had been placed in command of forces near Lyon. Defeated on March 18, 1814 and again on March 23, he abandoned Napoleon and called for the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. Napoleon was sickened by the news, but it was a portent of things to come.

By late March, the two Coalition armies were moving toward Paris. Napoleon had to make a choice. He had a decent army, and by consolidating with forces led by Marshals Marmont and Eduoard Mortier (as well as forces in assorted fortresses), he could rampage on the enemy’s lines of communication and supply and overwhelm the occasional isolated unit. He could even consider marching to join his stepson (Josephine’s son) Prince Eugène in Italy, where he would have the support of the local population and maybe even the turncoat Murat.

Tsar Alexander had abandoned Moscow in 1812. Could Napoleon do the same to Paris in 1814? The answer was a resounding non! The French would never stand for it, nor would Napoleon’s military commanders. Napoleon must beat the Coalition forces to Paris. If everything worked well, he might possibly trap many of them between Marmont’s forces and his own. The race was on!

Racing to Paris

It was a race he’d lose. Word of the approach of the enemy reached Paris, and its citizens panicked. Marie Louise and her son with Napoleon, the King of Rome, left the city on March 29, and with them left any possible imperial symbol to rally the citizens of Paris. Had she stayed, perhaps Paris would have rallied to the cause; it is impossible to say. She may also have been a counter to the move to restore the Bourbon monarchy to the throne; after all, there she was, with the King of Rome, ready to take charge if Napoleon fell. (The Coalition allies didn’t have a great desire to put another Louis on the throne; they were united by the desire to bring Napoleon down.)

Lest you assume Marie Louise was not loyal to her husband, she actually objected to leaving Paris but was told to do so by Napoleon’s brother, Joseph, who had been left in charge. She wrote to her father, Emperor Francis of Austria, and tried to convince him not to support the deposing of Napoleon. Unfortunately, he was not swayed.

One of Napoleon’s biggest problems was that Talleyrand had stayed behind and was working hard to pave the way for a Bourbon restoration. For whatever reason (including, most likely, what he saw as good for his own future), Talleyrand was determined to prevent Marie Louise and the King of Rome from replacing Napoleon on the throne of France. He had encouraged Marie Louise and Joseph to leave town, leaving the way open for his treachery.

On March 30, Joseph and what few loyal government officials remained joined in the exodus. The Coalition forces moved into the capital. Napoleon had left orders that no one was to negotiate with or even greet them. Never one to pass up an opportunity to promote his own importance (along with his current vision of what was best for France), Talleyrand had stayed behind. Claiming to speak for France, he soon declared the French Empire at an end.

When Tsar Alexander of Russia entered Paris (see Figure 14-3), he stayed at Talleyrand’s home. The tsar was actually quite willing to consider putting the King of Rome on the throne with Marie Louise as regent. But Talleyrand was determined to bring back a Bourbon monarchy in the person of Louis XVIII, and Talleyrand had the tsar’s ear.

Figure 14-3: This engraving, done in 1814, shows Tsar Alexander I of Russia as he looked when he entered Paris.

Napoleon arrived in Paris a few hours after the Coalition had moved in. He was four hours too late to defend Paris, four hours too late to rally its citizens to the cause, four hours too late to negotiate in favor of his son from a position of at least some strength. Instead, he moved into Fontainebleau Palace to await developments. He hoped to rally his army and his marshals and find a way to carry the fight to the Coalition. It was a fight that would not happen.

Losing his marshals

On April 3, a group of Napoleon’s marshals, including Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, Louis Alexandre Berthier, and Francois Lefebvre, met with Napoleon and demanded that he abdicate his throne in favor of his son. This meeting is usually called “the revolt of the marshals,” though Napoleon may have called it “the revolting marshals.” Whatever you call it, the marshals made it clear that they would not fight for him any longer and that any further efforts on his part would be seen as fighting for the cause of Napoleon rather than for the cause of France. Reluctantly, Napoleon agreed, and the marshals took his agreement to Tsar Alexander, who had assumed overall leadership of Coalition forces.

Tsar Alexander was quite prepared to accept a solution that secured a quick peace and had the potential for unifying France under someone other than Napoleon or Louis XVIII. But Talleyrand was determined to have a Bourbon king, and Talleyrand was resourceful.

Under Talleyrand’s arrangements, Marshal Marmont took his 11,000 soldiers straight into the Austrian camp, where the Austrian soldiers were waiting for them. The French soldiers were livid when they realized what had happened, but they had no choice but to lay down their arms. Marmont’s treachery ranks with the worst in history.

Napoleon was now pretty much without an army, which meant he was pretty much without any negotiating strength, which meant any hope for the King of Rome was gone. On April 5, the provisional government (which meant Talleyrand for all practical purposes) asked Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, brother to King Louis XVI, to assume the Bourbon throne of France.

Losing his position

No longer fearful of Napoleon’s ability to continue to wage war, the tsar demanded Napoleon’s unconditional abdication. Napoleon was finished; even some of his closest friends and companions, such as his chief of staff, Berthier, and his first valet, Wairy Constant, left him, never to return. Despondent, Napoleon knew he had no choice. On April 11, Napoleon abdicated unconditionally. The next day, he received a copy of the Treaty of Fontainebleau. He was to be exiled as Emperor of Elba, a small island off the coast of Italy.

One extremely important issue for Napoleon was his desire to be reunited with his wife and son. It seemed a reasonable request, but many of the Coalition leaders did not want the former Emperor of the French reunited with such a close tie to the current Emperor of Austria. Napoleon also understood that Elba was small, so he asked the Coalition to grant Marie Louise dominion over Tuscany, a part of Italy just across from Elba. Instead, the treaty gave her the Duchy of Parma, a landlocked territory north of Tuscany and substantially further away. It seemed clear that they had no intention of ever allowing the two (and their son) to reunite. On its surface, the treaty seemed honorable, but its treatment of Napoleon and his wife gave reason to wonder what its ultimate result would be.

To her credit, Marie Louise tried to rejoin Napoleon right away. But politics intervened, and Count Clemens Metternich, Austria’s foreign minister, convinced her to go visit her father first. She would never see Napoleon again, nor would their son. The letters she exchanged with her husband during this period are some of the most poignant I’ve ever read.

On April 13, Napoleon tried to kill himself by taking some poison that he always carried with him. He was fearful of what the Coalition really had in store for him, and he preferred death to the indignity and worse that lay ahead. But the poison was old and weak, and Napoleon’s doctor was able to save him. The next day, feeling more optimistic, he received a hopeful letter from Marie Louise and wrote a letter to Josephine, who was still living at their former home at Malmaison.

Becoming the Emperor of Elba

For a man who had been defeated at every turn, Napoleon got what, on the surface at least, seemed a pretty good deal:

He kept the title of emperor, albeit of a small island rather than of a vast empire.

His family members kept their titles and estates.

He was given a military guard and a pension of 2 million francs from France.

Contrary to what most history books will tell you, he was not forbidden to leave the island; he was not a prisoner.

What he didn’t get, of course, was his wife and child.

Prior to leaving for Elba, Napoleon visited with friends, made arrangements, and read books on his new dominion. On April 20, 1814, he assembled his Old Guard (the longest-serving members of the Imperial Guard), the elite of his army who had been with him for most of his campaigns, in the courtyard of Fontainebleau Palace a few miles from Paris. The scene is one of the most famous, and emotional, in all of the Napoleonic legend. Napoleon addressed his soldiers, who were standing at attention, reminding them of their years together and of their steadfastness and glory throughout it all. “Goodbye my children,” he said. “I should like to press you all to my heart; at least I shall kiss your flag . . .” When he symbolically kissed the flag, there wasn’t a dry eye in the courtyard, including among the foreign commissioners who were to escort Napoleon to Elba (see Figure 14-4). The ceremony over, Napoleon left in his carriage for the long ride to the south coast of France.

Figure 14-4: This engrav-ing, made shortly after the event, shows Napoleon kissing the flag as a symbolic farewell to soldiers at Fontaine-bleau Palace.

The trip to the coast was an unhappy one for Napoleon. He passed through areas where his support had waned, and there were moments when he feared for his safety. But he made it to the coast and set sail for Elba on a British ship on April 28, and he arrived at his new home on April 30. The British assigned Colonel Sir Neil Campbell to be their commissioner on the island. His job was to keep an eye on Napoleon’s activities, as well as to be of some protection to Napoleon by providing a British presence that would remind all that Napoleon was there with the support of the British and their allies.

Losing Josephine

Shortly after arriving on Elba, Napoleon received sad news. His beloved Josephine had died of pneumonia. She had led an active social life and had become chilled while hosting a party for the tsar in Paris. Alexander had even provided his personal doctor, but it was all for naught. Napoleon and Josephine had remained friends after their divorce and perhaps still loved each other. On top of all his other problems, this news was a real blow for Napoleon. He was in mourning for two days.

Creating a new life

Napoleon did everything he could to keep busy on Elba and to be a good emperor. He made numerous improvements to the island’s infrastructure, such as roads and defenses, and he actually made it a defensible island. As he had done in France and across Europe, he reviewed and revised the legal codes and tax system, making both a reflection of the progressive systems he established in the French Empire (see Chapter 19).

Although Napoleon could not see his wife and son, he did not lack for company. His sister Pauline came to live on the island, and she soon became the center of social attention, playing hostess to many social events. Napoleon’s mother came to live there also; Corsican family ties are strong, and at least some of Napoleon’s family rallied around him.

Also rallying around him was his Polish mistress, Marie Walewska, with their son. Napoleon and Marie had kept touch over the years, and she offered to stay. It probably would have been good for Napoleon to have her there, but he feared a scandal. Besides, he still entertained hopes that his wife would be allowed to return to him.

Such was not to be. Marie Louise’s father had ordered the dashing General Count Adam Adalbert von Neipperg to seduce her, which he did. She soon turned her attentions completely to him and stopped writing Napoleon. (After Napoleon died, Marie Louise and Neipperg would marry and rule as the Duke and Duchess of Parma in Italy. Napoleon’s son lived as the Duke of Reichstadt in Vienna until he died of tuberculosis in 1832 at the age of 21.)

Being the center of attention

Napoleon had once been at the center of the European stage, and much of his old audience still held a deep fascination with the man. As a result, Napoleon found that many people, important and not so important, beat a path to his door. He maintained a court, a small-scale version of the one he had had at Paris, and received political leaders, scientists, and other important people. He especially enjoyed meeting with British visitors, and the descriptions that some of them wrote of their interviews make for quite interesting reading. Colonel Campbell frequented Napoleon’s court, and the two got along well.

Tempting fate

But there was a problem. Actually, there were several problems. For starters, Napoleon was soon quite bored. This is a man who had ruled Europe and traveled across most of it several times. Elba was a small island with only a few thousand people. Hey, even I’d be bored after awhile!

Confining Napoleon in this way was a fatal miscalculation by the Coalition. If they had put Marie Louise on the Italian coast, or even let her reunite with her husband, he may have been content to write his memoirs and live out his live in luxury, visiting Italy from time to time. (He had planned to write his memoirs on Elba, and said so many times, but he never even started on them.)

Worse than boredom was fear. Napoleon soon came to believe, with some justification, that the Coalition leaders would not be content having him living comfortably so close to them. He — and they — knew that he still was popular in France and elsewhere (most notably in Poland and Italy). Napoleon knew that Louis XVIII had spies on the island and that Talleyrand was probably up to his old tricks. Also, the British press was still attacking Napoleon at every opportunity, and there were rumors of assassination or prison. Napoleon had fortified the island and had about 1,000 men to guard him, but that could hardly keep all of Europe at bay.

All these rumors were floating around a meeting of the Coalition leaders in Vienna, called the Congress of Vienna. Talleyrand represented France, and that couldn’t be good for Napoleon. Napoleon’s spies there told him that exile to the remote island of St. Helena was a much-discussed possibility. The rest of Europe, he feared, was not prepared to let him alone.

Then disaster struck. Louis XVIII (see Figure 14-5) was obligated by treaty to pay Napoleon 2 million francs a year and to pay very large sums to Napoleon’s mother and his sister Pauline, along with the rest of the Bonaparte family. These sums, along with the wealth that the Bonapartes could tap into, would have been enough to keep Napoleon — and his small army — in good condition.

Figure 14-5: Louis XVIII, shown here in a period engraving, probably never looked better!

But in a move that defies all logic, Louis refused to pay Napoleon so much as a thin dime. I have never been able to figure out why he did this. Maybe he just figured he’d save the money and that Napoleon didn’t need it. A more sinister possibility was that he was trying to drive Napoleon into poverty so he couldn’t afford his army, making him a sitting duck. Whatever the case, it was really dumb, and Louis’s allies knew it. They told him to pay it, but he refused. (I suppose they could have paid it themselves, but that didn’t happen either.)

Napoleon, naturally enough, was not pleased, and he could easily see the possible results down the line. It’s likely that he would have enough money to live comfortably if he didn’t have to fear for his safety, but, of course, he did. So the lack of funds wasn’t just inconvenient; it was dangerous. His exact financial picture is unknown, as we don’t know precisely how much money he brought with him to Elba. But he was facing a bleak financial future, which was likely the reason he took the drastic measure he did.

Considering options

Napoleon was Emperor of Elba with a small army (if you can even call 1,000 men an army!) and a few ships. Given the right circumstances, he may have been content to stay on the island. But he had other options as well:

Napoleon may have considered making a run for the United States. He could have lived as a wealthy gentleman in the very French city of New Orleans or even in Washington, D.C. He would certainly have been the center of attention there, and the leaders of Europe may have been content to leave him alone. Then again, they may have sent assassins after him, just as he feared they’d do on Elba.

He could have considered taking his army and moving into Italy. He had always been very popular there and could probably count on the support of the locals as well as of the military forces. Despite the previous betrayal of his brother-in-law, Prince Joachim Murat, King of Naples, the two had gotten on better terms, and Napoleon’s wife controlled the Duchy of Parma. With a base of strength and popular support, backed by Napoleon’s pledge to stay put, a war-weary Europe may have been willing to give that situation a try.

Napoleon could consider trying to regain power in France. It had not taken long for the people of France to become disillusioned with Louis XVIII. That king was well-meaning — he had even granted the French a Charter of Rights, a document meant to assure French citizens that they would not lose all the rights they gained as a result of the French Revolution and Napoleon — but his advisors and the hordes of returning exiled nobles were not. They wanted their lands returned to them, never mind that other people had lived on them for 20 years. They also wanted Church lands returned. Worst of all, they wanted all their old privileges back. In other words, they wanted to pretend that the French Revolution and 25 years of history had never happened.

The veterans of Napoleon’s army had not been treated well either, with many of them discharged or put on half-pay. Many had begun to really miss the glory days of the French Empire and longed for Napoleon’s return. He had always been their hero, and nothing had happened to change their deep feelings of affection for their emperor.

Returning to France

It was this last option that most excited Napoleon’s imagination and which he eventually chose to follow. Fearful of assassination, prison, or a more remote exile, Napoleon decided to roll the dice one more time and make another bid for power in France. Encouraged by his mother and some of his advisors, Napoleon organized his army, prepared his ships, and waited for the right moment. When he heard that the English commissioner, Sir Neil Campbell, was leaving for a long trip to Italy, he took advantage of the resulting lack of English observation.

On February 25, 1815, Napoleon and his small army set sail for France in his “armada” of three ships. He had 1,100 men, 40 horses, and a grand total of 4 cannon. He prepared Bulletins for distribution to the people of France, including his old army. “Soldiers! In my exile I heard your voice!” he wrote. “I have arrived, despite all obstacles and perils! Your general, called to the throne by the peoples’ choice and raised upon your shields, has been returned to you; come and join him!”

Napoleon understood that he needed to retake power without firing a shot. As soon as there was any outward sign that the people, and especially his old army, opposed his return, he was finished. His Bulletins reminded people that he had been defeated by the treachery of some of his generals (Augereau and Marmont, in particular) and of politicians in Paris (especially Talleyrand). He assured the leaders of Europe of his intention to rule only France, and he reminded his soldiers that they needed to forget that they had once ruled most of Europe.

On March 1, Napoleon landed at Golf Juan on the French Mediterranean coast. There was no opposition to his landing. One of the great adventures and legends of his career (or anyone else’s career, for that matter) had begun. Think about it. Napoleon with 1,100 men was going to march all the way to Paris and depose a king who commanded a major army and who was supported by the other countries of Europe? Madness! Well, madness it may have been, but it worked (see Figure 14-6).

Figure 14-6: This engraving from the One Hundred Days shows Napoleon returning as Caesar, with winged victory above and a list of his accom- plishments below.

The One Hundred Days

When Napoleon set foot on French soil on March 1, 1815, he began a period known as the One Hundred Days. That period included his march to Paris, his becoming emperor again, and, as I discuss in the next chapter, his final defeat at Waterloo. (Okay, so now you know that it doesn’t end all that well, but things did start out promising enough.)

Marching on the Route Napoléon

Napoleon understood that he was not universally loved in all areas of France, so he planned his march to Paris so as to avoid some of the most royalist areas. This meant that instead of marching straight north through the province of Provence, he took a much more difficult mountain route toward Grenoble. (I have driven that route and can tell you that even now it is much slower than the direct route.)

It would be a great story if I could tell you that Napoleon was immediately acclaimed as France’s savior by all the people he met along the way. But that isn’t what happened. Some folks were bemused by his presence, some delighted, and some rather alarmed. This latter group feared renewed hostilities and possible retribution by the Coalition forces. No one opposed him directly, but there was no groundswell of support, either.

Slowly but surely, Napoleon did pick up supporters. The odd soldier would fall into formation, the odd citizen would offer support. As the slowly expanding force marched up and down mountain trails, their cannon and wagons long since abandoned due to the nature of the roads, the idea of Napoleon’s return began to capture the imaginations of people along the way. Napoleon sent messages to his supporters in Grenoble and elsewhere, trying to lay a groundwork for his plan to return without a fight.

By March 5, King Louis XVIII was told of Napoleon’s adventure. Louis was in Paris and controlled a massive military machine. Napoleon was nearing Grenoble with only a few thousand troops at most. At this stage, Napoleon hardly seemed a major threat, but Louis nevertheless began to organize forces to capture the Corsican Usurper, as some of the British cartoonists had labeled him. Marshal Ney promised to bring Napoleon back in an iron cage, and other marshals were sent to block Napoleon.

It was at the town of Laffrey, near Grenoble, that Napoleon met his first real challenge. By then, each village was producing crowds of cheering people and new recruits for his army. At Laffrey, however, Napoleon would face a battalion of the 5th Regiment that had been given orders to capture or kill him. Napoleon had gotten wind of this, and his spies suggested that the soldiers were not likely to fire on their old commander, but the situation was still quite tense — and dangerous. Napoleon walked in front of his troops, whom he had ordered to carry their weapons at rest. The order was given to fire at Napoleon, but no soldier complied. There was an uneasy silence. Then Napoleon cried out, “Soldiers! I am your Emperor. Do you recognize me? If there is one among you who would kill his general, HERE I AM!”

Today, this site is a small park with a monument to the occasion, and a commemorative plaque contains that statement. Of course, no one fired. Instead, there were cries of “Vive l’Empereur!” (“Long live the Emperor!”), followed by cheers and a rushing of the two sides to embrace each other in their mutual joy of being reunited under their old leader. It was a scene like none other in history. Later that same day, another major unit defected to Napoleon’s cause. Napoleon now had momentum and would prove unstoppable.

Receiving the gates of Grenoble

Napoleon’s next obstacle was Grenoble, whose military commanders refused to open the gates. No problem. The citizens tore down the gates and carried Napoleon to the Hotel of the Three Dauphins. Later, they presented him with the remains of the gates. He addressed the citizens from a balcony on the city hall in a park across from the hotel.

Napoleon was on a roll. He had turned back all opposition without firing a shot, and his army was expanding by leaps and bounds. Now, all over France there was excitement at his return, though that excitement was not universal, to be sure. Napoleon sent out countless declarations, all of which made the basic point that he did not want any war and had no intentions of any further conquest. He portrayed himself as the embodiment of the French Revolution and protector of all that France had accomplished in the years since the Revolution’s beginning in 1789. It was a popular approach to take, as France no longer wanted war, and many people did resent the rolling back of the gains of the Revolution by the newly reinstated nobility.

Years later, Napoleon wrote that before Grenoble he had been an adventurer, but afterwards, a reigning prince.

Napoleon continued his march, and the result was always the same. When units sent by the king met units sent by Napoleon, they were likely to drink together, and they never fought each other. Marshal Macdonald tried to defend Lyon, but his troops refused to fight, instead switching to Napoleon’s side.

Marshal Michel Ney also tried to inspire his troops to defend the king but got nowhere with that effort. Suffering an acute case of torn loyalties, Ney switched sides himself, issuing a proclamation to his soldiers to join him in the “immortal phalanx, which the Emperor Napoleon is conducting to Paris.” On March 18, Napoleon and Ney met at Auxerre and joined forces. At this point, there was no hope for the king, who left the country on March 19.

Paris was alive with excitement at Napoleon’s return. Broadsheets and other items celebrating his arrival in France were issued every day. Marshal Macdonald’s memoirs (I use the first English edition from 1892) and other sources relate the following set of broadsheet headlines, which wonderfully portray what was happening:

The Tiger has broken out of his den!

The Ogre was three days at sea.

The Wretch has landed at Frejus.

The Brigand has arrived at Antibes.

The Invader has reached Grenoble.

The General has entered Lyons.

Napoleon slept last night at Fontainebleau.

The Emperor proceeds to the Tuileries today.

His Imperial Majesty will address his loyal subjects tomorrow!

Entering Paris

Napoleon entered Paris on March 20, 1815. His journey had been nothing less than a spectacular event in history. Only Caesar’s march across the Rubicon River to take power in Rome seems to match Napoleon’s march along the Route Napoléon for dramatic effect. And Caesar’s march happened 2,000 years ago!

When Napoleon entered Paris, he was met by thousands of people who were shouting his name and slogans of the Revolution. Unfortunately, Marie Louise and their son, the King of Rome, had not been allowed by Austrian Emperor Francis I to return to Paris (see Figure 14-7). That fact no doubt took some of the edge off Napoleon’s celebration — and provided a clue of what would soon follow. Other than that, however, it seemed as though Napoleon had returned from a great victory or had secured a lasting peace. It seemed that the good old days had returned.

Figure 14-7: This gold snuffbox shows Napoleon, Marie Louise, and their son reunited on March 20, 1815, their son’s birthday. Too bad it didn’t happen that way.

Except they hadn’t. Napoleon had some very difficult work to do, and he knew it:

Not everyone in government, or in the nation as a whole, was all that pleased with his return. Napoleon had to win over the old Revolutionaries who probably would not support a return to the more or less absolute power that he had enjoyed for much of his reign.

He handled this situation brilliantly by convincing one of his fiercest critics, Benjamin Constant, to join in writing a new constitution. Constant was a great intellectual who had led much of the liberal opposition to Napoleon’s becoming emperor. When Constant agreed to Napoleon’s request, liberal support was assured. On April 22, the people ratified a new constitution. For the moment, Napoleon was secure on his throne.

Napoleon needed to guarantee peace. He could not afford to have any nation attack him: The people of France would not support another war, and his army was hardly in top fighting condition. He wrote the leaders of all the major nations that had once been allied against him, pledging to keep France within the 1792 boundaries and giving up all claims to Belgium and Holland, which had been England’s biggest concern. Unfor- tunately, none of the leaders he wrote to gave him a positive response.

Suffering a fatal, if unavoidable, flaw

For all the good things that happened as Napoleon returned to power, there was one thing that was decidedly unfavorable to his continued success. The leaders of Europe had been meeting in the Congress of Vienna, making an effort to secure a lasting peace and maintain a balance of power on the Continent. Napoleon knew this and was not happy that all the Coalition leaders, including his now archenemy Talleyrand, would be in one place. Napoleon had had no choice, however. The Congress, which was essentially one great party after another, seemed to be never-ending, while Napoleon was convinced that his days on Elba were limited and that he needed to act with expediency. If he waited for the Congress of Vienna to end, he may have waited too long.

Napoleon’s concerns were well placed. When the leaders of Europe heard of Napoleon’s return, they were furious. Had they been each in their respective capital cities, it would have taken a long time for them to communicate and to agree on a plan of action. And perhaps Napoleon’s pleas to his father-in-law, Emperor Francis of Austria, or to his old friend Tsar Alexander of Russia may have had some positive effect.

But the European leaders were not in their capitals; they were in Vienna. And Talleyrand was there, waving the Bourbon flag, calling for Napoleon to be declared an outlaw.

Possibly working in Napoleon’s favor was the fact that Austria and England were now allied to France by treaty. Treaties do not specify the names of rulers, only of governments. Thus, to declare war on France, they would have to break the very treaty they had signed just months earlier. Add to that the family connection and the fact that Belgium and Holland were off the table, and those two powers should have remained neutral or even taken France’s side.

Yeah, right, like that was going to happen! Austria and England sidestepped the issue by declaring war not on France but on Napoleon! I know of no other time that people declared war on a person rather than a country, but such was their hatred or fear of Napoleon. The assembled leaders quickly formed a Seventh Coalition against Napoleon.

With friends like this . . .

If all this weren’t bad enough, King Murat of Naples decided that he would “help” Napoleon by trying to drive the Austrians out of Italy. Austria couldn’t know for sure if Napoleon was behind this action or not (he most definitely wasn’t), but it sure gave them a reason to feel that Napoleon couldn’t be trusted. I don’t know if Austria would have behaved differently without Murat’s interference, but she not only beat back his rather pathetic effort but also joined the Seventh Coalition against Napoleon.

The Coalition decided to move in a coordinated attack on Napoleon. The British and Prussians were in nearby Belgium, but the Austrians were not yet mobilized and the Russians were easily the farthest away. They agreed not to attack Napoleon until all their forces were ready. The Coalition forces were on the move, but Napoleon would have the chance to strike first.