Modernizing an army’s structure
Developing the Marshalate
Fighting a modern war
I t is fair to say that Napoleon’s reputation is largely based on the fact that he was one of the greatest military commanders in history. He went to military school and rose through the ranks in the artillery branch of the French army. He fought in about 60 battles and won most of them. He could inspire his soldiers and convince them to fight well under almost any conditions.
But Napoleon’s reputation as a great commander depends on far more than his ability to lead men into battle:
Napoleon was a great military planner whose command of the ebb and flow of a battle was key to his success.
He was also a great military organizer; his organization is still reflected in today’s military.
He was a micromanager who knew the details of every aspect of his army; few things escaped his attention.
Napoleon revolutionized the art of war and kept his opponents off balance, until they finally began to copy his approach to war.
In this chapter, I show you what Napoleon did to reorganize the army, and I discuss some of his basic battle tactics.
When you read about massive armies facing each other (perhaps 100,000 on one side, 125,000 on another), you may have an image of one person on a horse leading a massive number of troops behind him. While that image is generally fictional, European armies of the 18th and 19th centuries were loosely based on a system that depended on a centralized command, the head of which was often far to the rear. Moreover, many of the individual units of an army were specialized. That is, there was a heavy cavalry unit, a light cavalry unit, an artillery unit, various types of infantry units, and so forth. All units were under the centralized command of a general, a field marshal, or an emperor.
There were several problems with this kind of military structure:
Large armies were often spread out over a wide area, making communication very difficult and slow.
With a centralized command structure, it was sometimes difficult for one unit to come to the aid of another.
Worse, if the cavalry units were mostly, say, in the north, and they were suddenly needed in the south, well, lots of luck!
This type of structure led to slow advances with little ability to maneuver to respond to a rapidly changing situation.
Napoleon looked at the situation and decided there had to be a way to improve the structure of his army to make it a more effective fighting force. Antiquity provided an example for all to see: The Roman legions (which won a battle or two in their day) were largely self-contained units. But few armies since the Romans had attempted to copy that model. Napoleon took that model and perfected it. It was, in many ways, his ace in the hole, the single biggest military advantage he had over his opponents.
Each corps usually had the following elements:
A full allotment of artillery, usually including heavy guns and more mobile horse artillery, a Napoleonic specialty
Heavy or light cavalry, or both
Infantry (usually called grenadiers)
Other logistical and support units
A command staff
A marshal in overall command
When you put all these pieces together, you have a miniature army capable of holding off a larger force of a less complete enemy. As to size, flexibility was again the word, with a corps size of anywhere from 9,000 to 25,000 men possible.
Napoleon believed that any corps could hold off virtually any enemy for at least a day. Thus, he tried to have his various corps no more than a day’s march from their nearest counterparts. This flexibility allowed his army to take full advantage of varying road conditions, the availability of forage opportunities, and other aspects of a military command. It also allowed for Napoleon’s tactics of encirclement, speed, mobility, and a flexible response to changing battlefield conditions.
On May 19, 1804, Napoleon created a new level of the social and political hierarchy called the Marshalate. The men who were chosen as Marshals of the Empire were among the highest in the social pecking order and were usually given additional titles, such as duke or prince, to go along with the lands and wealth that came with the position.
This marshal business does get just a little bit confusing. Many of the marshals were given additional titles, often based on their performance at one battle or another. Thus, Marshal Ney also had the title Prince of the Moskowa, Duke of Elchingen for his role in those two battles. And Marshal Joachim Murat was a prince, the King of Naples, and the Grand Duke of Berg (a small German principality). When you read Napoleon’s military Bulletins and other official pronouncements, rather than saying “Marshal Ney” did such and such, they are more likely to say, “The Prince of the Moskowa” did such and such. With no last name given, it’s easy to forget who is who. (You should be pleased that in this book I just call them “Marshal so and so” and let it go at that.)
Oh, and how many of these exalted folk were there, you ask? The initial group contained 18, but by Napoleon’s final fall in 1815, the number had risen to 26.
Napoleon brought far more than military organization to his military campaigns. He also brought a set of tactics that allowed him to defeat his less modern opponents up until the very end of his career. Some of these tactics were based on developing technology. Others were based simply on Napoleon’s military genius.
Napoleon’s branch of service was the artillery, so it is not surprising that much of his success was due to his expert use of that branch of arms. Both sides of any conflict had cannon, of course, but Napoleon excelled at its use. (By the way, in this book and elsewhere, cannon are also called field pieces, artillery, guns, or heavy guns. Cannon is one of those words that is both singular and plural.)
As Napoleon entered the military, the technology of cannon was changing, and he was quick to take advantage of it. Before that time, cannon were generally massed into huge batteries, or artillery parks. They would blast away from long range at an enemy’s position or at attacking cavalry or infantry. Throughout his career, Napoleon was quite willing to use this tactic, often to great advantage.
But smaller, lighter, and more mobile cannon were developed in Napoleon’s lifetime. These cannon could be rapidly pulled behind a horse and brought into position to turn the tide of battle. The sudden and unanticipated appearance of such guns could terrorize an attacking army, inspire a defending army, or destroy a retreating army. Retreating armies were especially vulnerable, as they were likely using roads that compressed their numbers, making them sitting ducks for suddenly-arriving horse artillery. Napoleon recognized very early in his career the potential of light artillery and used it effectively throughout his campaigns. For most of this time, his opponents simply did not get it.
Napoleon is often called a micromanager, and nowhere was this more true than in planning his military campaigns. Napoleon didn’t want to leave anything to chance. He read everything he could find on his opponents: Not just their military tactics, but the nature of their countries, their economies, their individual leaders (both civilian and military) — all were of interest to Napoleon.
Napoleon knew almost to the man the size of his various units and their fighting capabilities. He could move army corps or artillery parks on a battlefield like you or I may move chess pieces on a board.
While it was important to know as much about the enemy as possible, it was also important that they know as little about Napoleon’s movements as possible. Napoleon would routinely send out cavalry screens to shield his own movements from enemy eyes. He would also send small units elsewhere to misdirect the enemy’s attention. Napoleon would even, as he did in 1805 (see Chapter 9), use the media to disseminate false information on the movements of his troops.
Figure 17-1: This 19th-century miniature on ivory shows Napoleon studying his maps while his staff awaits his orders. |
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I don’t know when the old adage “The best defense is a good offense” came to be, but Napoleon certainly believed in it. He had little interest in sitting around and waiting for his enemy to attack him, much preferring to take the fight directly to the enemy instead. At its worst, this philosophy of war could be reckless. But Napoleon waged war at its best, and his planning and security measures seldom let him down. Taking the offensive was almost always the right thing to do militarily, though it did allow people to see him as an aggressor.
If you are going to move forward, you may as well go quickly. Napoleon believed in moving his forces as fast as possible in order to catch his enemy unawares. The army corps system I discuss earlier in the chapter was designed in part to allow for rapid movement.
In battle itself, Napoleon liked to mass his forces against the opponent’s center and then defeat each wing in turn. Napoleon’s rapidity of movement often allowed him to reach an enemy before it had been able to concentrate its forces. At Austerlitz, for example, Napoleon was able to gain control of the center of the allied position and then turn on the Russian left flank and utterly destroy it (see Chapter 9). At the Battle of Ligny, part of the prelude to Waterloo (see Chapter 15), he did much the same thing against the Prussians, and only the lack of adequate pursuit prevented a similar result.
Austerlitz provides us with an example of a related aspect of Napoleonic strategy. Napoleon would not only attempt to defeat his opponents piecemeal, but he would also try to envelope them, thus cutting off their communications with other units and stopping their line of retreat. Enemy soldiers, often demoralized by Napoleon’s sudden arrival on the scene, were then devastated to discover that they were surrounded. (If you don’t believe me, just ask “the unfortunate General Mack” at Ülm!)
This approach also was effective if Napoleon could catch part of an enemy army temporarily isolated from its main force. He would use forced marches (marching quickly, usually with few if any breaks and often at night) to suddenly appear before — or behind — his enemy, who he would then force to either surrender or be crushed. (Again, talk to General Mack about the effectiveness of this tactic.)
Part of planning involves, of course, making sure that your army has everything it needs to carry on a campaign. This involves far more than adequate ammunition and weapons. It also involves food, clothing, medical supplies, and other such necessities.
Napoleon was determined that his soldiers would have everything they needed, and he always sought to guard against shortages, either inadvertent or the result of fraud. One story relates how he would stop a wagon and ask to see the manifest (the list of what was on board). The wagon master would then be asked to empty the wagon to check the actual contents against what was promised on the manifest, and woe to anyone who came up short!
Carrying food for a long time is problematic: How do you keep the food in good condition? Napoleon recognized the problem and was anxious to find a solution. Before that time, the only way to preserve meat was through packing it in salt or using vinegar to pickle it. Napoleon, who was himself very scientifically inclined, held a competition to seek a more palatable method of preservation. The forerunner to modern canning was the result.
There were no railroads in the early 19th century, just long lines of wagons called baggage trains. Baggage trains were necessary, but they could be very slow. To maintain their speed, Napoleonic armies generally depended on their ability to forage from fields and procure necessary supplies from locals. This method often worked quite well, allowing the armies to depend less on baggage trains and to move more quickly.
One area where Napoleon did not scrimp was in caring for his sick and wounded. Napoleon made sure that his field hospitals were fully stocked and that there were adequate doctors to attend to the often large numbers of wounded. His attention extended beyond his own men: He would order his doctors to attend to enemy wounded as well.
Logistics, planning, and organization are all important to the success of any army, and they contributed greatly to Napoleon’s many victories. But Napoleon had one more ace up his sleeve: He was a true inspiration to his men. While the leaders of the opposing armies were conservative, often stodgy, aristocrats who had no way of connecting to their soldiers, Napoleon was positively inspirational.
For starters, Napoleon had risen on the basis of his own talent and ambition, and he made it clear that other soldiers could do the same. This was a far cry from the armies of Russia and Austria, for example, where soldiers had little hope of any real advancement and where officers were all members of the arrogant nobility.
Napoleon also understood that men would not fight and die only for a just cause or even for an inspirational leader. Throughout history, armies have rewarded their men with medals and other awards, and Napoleon was careful to do so as well. He instituted a wide range of medals and awards, including swords or muskets of honor. He gave cash awards and, to his top leaders, various titles of nobility. For the common soldier and officer alike, appointment to the Imperial Guard (his elite fighting force) was a great honor.