Bardia: Brilliance and Blunders
1941
The attack on Bardia began at 5.30 a.m. on 3 January 1941 with a barrage from 118 big guns, which elicited a similar response from the Italians. At 6 a.m., 16th Brigade lumbered forward for about a kilometre, weighed down by their 35 kilograms of clothing and equipment. Their greatcoats made them appear monster-like as the dawn light filtered over the flat terrain.
It was an adrenalin-pumping moment that took many minds back to 25 April 1915, when the Anzacs first hit the beaches at Gallipoli. There were differences, though. These 6th Division troops were heading towards the beaches from inland, not the sea. And the latter-day diggers expected to win, although as for their predecessors there was a nervous uncertainty about what sort of fight the enemy would put up.
The 16th Brigade had a fair idea inside half an hour, when it captured eight posts of Italian soldiers. This created a gap of 3 kilometres in the enemy defences. Twenty-three British tanks, much improved in design since the Great War, were able to roll forward, and the rest of the attacking force passed through, but not without resistance.
By 7 a.m., dawn had exposed the Australians, despite the dust created by intense shellfire and the graceless but frightening tanks. Several battalions plunged forward, taking more posts after fierce firefights. The 6th Division’s machine-gun carriers came into the fray, while its Anti-Tank Company knocked out six tanks.
***
Against his better instincts and much of what he had learnt between 1916 and 1918, Savige sent his battalions into the action in full daylight. This meant an uncomfortable exposure, in inhospitable terrain and with a lack of support, as set out in the plans that he had not seen until it had been too late to change them for his brigade’s greater protection.
When the tanks returned to base to refuel, 17th Brigade had even less support and cover. The Italians concentrated their 12 artillery field guns and hundreds of machine guns on the increasingly isolated troops. Savige’s men were caught.
In one company, B, all officers but one and all NCOs were killed inside the first five minutes of their moving into the battle zone. About half the company was wiped out. C Company came to their rescue. With great skill under fire, they used a favourite Savige tactic learnt in the Great War of flanking around to the right of the more intense field exchange while still keeping up solid rifle and machine-gun fire. This relieved pressure on their comrades in B Company, and both companies were able to withdraw to less susceptible positions.
D Company had the toughest assignment of all in taking Post 11. It was more a fort than a post, with concrete bunkers linked by covered tunnels, the strongest Italian defence position of all. Instead of the usual 30 soldiers, it had 350.
D Company cut their way through barbed wire around an outer rim, then bustled through Wadi Muatered under heavy fire to the wire around the post itself. They sliced through that too, but then faced the heaviest gunfire of the battle to that point. Twenty-seven light machine guns, 12 medium machine guns and 2 field guns opened up on the diggers. Twenty-two men were killed and 45 were wounded before they were finally able to take the post.
Savige was furious when he heard about the slaughter of D and B Companies. It reinforced his complaint that the planning for his brigade had been poor. He had argued that the positions his force would move through were heavily defended by artillery, but the staff planners, under 6th Division artillery commander Edmund Herring, claimed they were mostly empty.
Savige, the expert battlefield cartographer and reader of intelligence, had proven correct in wanting to err on the side of caution. The careless preparation and resultant casualties were horrible reminders of the sort of destruction he had been through before.
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Meanwhile, Allen’s 16th Brigade, out first, had won through.
At divisional HQ, Berryman was quick to summarise the day’s fighting with a negative assessment of Savige’s force: ‘Thus the first day ended with 16 Brigade most successful. [The] location of every company was known. 17 Brigade [situation is] NOT known, exactly. Two Battalions were mixed up. Doubt about post 11 . . .’1
The division had been successful overall, but Savige believed that his battalions had gone in too hard and too soon in trying to take the well-fortified Italian position. On top of the problems in the battle plan, Savige had had trouble reining in what he saw as the over-enthusiasm of the young, academy-trained staff officers. The result of the pull from him and push from the young staffers had been disorganisation. As a consequence, the brigade had gone through a rough period before prevailing. The new breed had been more concerned with a quick and decisive tactical victory, whereas Savige thought that slower, flanking approaches would still see wins, with fewer of his men becoming casualties. He received criticism from above and beneath him.
Whether intentional or not, Savige had been set up for a fall, and the regulars, led by Berryman, were quick to judge and record it. Later the official war historian Gavin Long would correct Berryman’s over-eager and biased analysis, writing: ‘If the 17 Brigade was disorganised [as Berryman was quick to surmise] that disorganisation had been imposed only partly by the enemy and partly by a divisional plan which had split the brigade into two widely separated groups, and to inadequate tank and artillery support.’
In short, according to Long, the staff planning for 17th Brigade had been dismal and had left it partly in disarray. Berryman had adroitly covered up his own glaring failures while downgrading Savige’s performance.
But these words were written well after the event, and by a non-participant in the battle. The real-time summary was damning of Savige, and painted an image of incompetence from the very first day of Australia’s entering the war. The regulars had won the first round in the internecine war between the 2nd AIF’s commanders.
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On day two, 4 January, Savige found himself further ostracised as Berryman hastened to involve Brigadier Robertson’s 19th Brigade before 9 a.m. The 17th was restricted in its movements so the 19th had a free rein. To make matters worse for Savige, any of his troops left in the 19th’s assembly area were to come under Robertson’s command. This was normal army practice, but it added to Savige’s feeling of being under siege from within.
On day three, 5 January, Robertson launched his attack at 9 a.m. against a softened-up and deflated enemy, and had a more than satisfactory breakthrough that relieved the pressure on Savige’s force.
By 11 a.m., the bulk of the Bardia defences were controlled by 6th Division. The 16th entered the town and the battle was over.
The casualty figures hurt Savige personally. Fifty-six of the 130 killed and 165 of the 326 wounded were from his brigade. Savige knew every single one of the fallen and wounded by name. He had trained, readied and encouraged them. Now they were dead.
Despite his experience, the shock of the numbers hit him as much as anything had in the past. He had not expected such a quick debacle.
At a glance it seemed that he had failed to adhere to, or had even forsaken, his mantra about protecting his men. That was the way the regulars would portray it. There would be no mention of their own incapacities.
Mackay, who had tried to put a positive spin on the 17th’s less-than-stellar end result, visited Savige on 6 January.
‘I wish to be relieved of my command,’ Savige said to him.
‘But why, Stan?’ a most surprised Mackay asked.
‘Clearly I have not got the confidence of Command [the staff officers].’
‘What makes you say that?’
‘For a start, the lack of information before the battle. Second, my battalions were named for roles, which I believed was my prerogative as brigade commander; third, holding [freezing] my advance on 4 January to accommodate Robertson’s 19th Brigade; and fourth, handing my 5th Battalion to him, among other things.’
‘I am terribly sorry about all that, Stan,’ Mackay said. He had been unaware of Savige’s feelings about the treatment of 17th Brigade. ‘I can assure you right here and now that you will not be subjected to a similar experience in future.’2
After further discussion and complaints from Savige, and Mackay’s repeated reassurances, Savige withdrew his request to be relieved of his command. Yet attitudes were now fixed. Alan Vasey summed up the thoughts of fellow staff officers Berryman and Robertson when he wrote: ‘Tubby [Allen] and his fellows [16th Brigade] did excellently, not so Stan and his. Had Iven any real go [in him], Stan would get a bowler hat [that is, be fired and given a desk job].’3
This thinking justified Savige’s sense that the staff corps were out to remove him. These internal squabbles were more reminiscent of a force that had failed. Instead, 6th Division had won a grand victory first up, taking 40,000 prisoners from a strong fort of 45,000 Italians. They had captured 462 guns of all descriptions. Mackay took all accolades at the division level and Allen at the brigade level.
Savige was looking for his brigade to do better in the next battle, but because preparations began immediately, there was not much room for manoeuvre. Mackay and his assiduous staff had only one precedent to go on, and that was at Bardia, which worked in favour of those who wanted to dump Savige.