1941
British General Wavell wanted a far better naval supply port than the bay of Bardia, which was sheltered but not deep enough for big warships. He decided on Tobruk, 100 kilometres further east on the coast of Libya, which had a sizeable harbour. The wily old Great War veteran, who had featured in the previous desert conflict, thought of the cost in men and equipment if the British force had to trek hundreds of kilometres to Bardia. He gave a simple command to the Australians: take Tobruk.
Mackay, like a cricket test captain facing back-to-back encounters, decided to go with the team and the same basic plan of attack for Tobruk that had been so strong at Bardia.
On 6 January 1941, he ordered the 16th and 19th Brigades, and 6th Division’s motorised cavalry regiment, on the path to Tobruk. They were supported by Australian artillery and Northumberland Fusiliers machine gunners. They were to pave the way for the rest of the force and set up a defence in advance.
Three days later, after dark, the main convoy rumbled out of Bardia, past its modest number of white buildings. The army looked very much like an Italian caravan, with so many captured big trucks and other vehicles, including tanks. There were no encounters for most of the convoy at night, even though the moon made the long snake of vehicles easily visible for some distance.
The 17th followed more slowly, with orders to search for Italians in the string of wadis that threaded the escarpments en route.
The main convoy reached its destination, a deep valley. The diggers scrambled to find suitable caves in which to reside for however long the fight at Tobruk would take.
The Australians were encouraged from the first reconnoitre. The 50-kilometre city perimeter was almost twice as long as that at Bardia, and therefore less easily defended by the enemy.
The attack began early on 21 January. The plan was for Allen’s 16th to smash a hole in the defences once more, then the 19th would swoop in to take the town itself. Savige’s 17th was then to be broken up again and dispersed over a wide front.
The tactics were better thought through this time, with Savige accepting, reluctantly, the lesser role for his battered force, which could not stand more losses on the scale of Bardia.
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Savige’s skill and flexibility as a fighting brigadier were apparent when his 2/5th Battalion were moving forward under orders. They received a late instruction from staff corps to come in on the 19th’s right flank to give it protection.
Savige observed in his diary: ‘They [2/5 Battalion] were extended beautifully and moving at a steady rate under continuous shell fire. [Lieutenant Colonel Roy] King led in his [armoured] car as he controlled the movement of his battalion . . . Without halting a moment the whole battalion veered half right without bunching or losing a beat in their resolute and steady march. It was the most thrilling spectacle I ever saw in battle. Despite the enemy shell-fire, they suffered two casualties only.’1
The minimal losses were what meant most to Savige.
By nightfall on the opening day of the fight for Tobruk, it seemed to be all over, although the city itself had yet to be secured. This happened the following day, with the 19th given the honour of finishing off the final phase. Its commander, Robertson, accepted the sword of the highest-ranking Italian officer.
During the afternoon and evening, the diggers were able to explore Tobruk. They noted the Italians had looted the city and wrecked three large ships in the harbour. Despite this, it took just three days to restore the area to working order.
Wavell had his port in ultra-quick time. He also had 25,000 Italian prisoners, 208 guns, 23 tanks and 200 vehicles to add to his growing convoys.
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The speedy outcome of the second major battle for 6th Division left no room for different analysis of the Bardia encounter. Berryman once more was disparaging about Savige, saying in private that the Tobruk plan had been predicated on the belief that Savige’s brigade could not be relied on. Savige, in turn, was annoyed that his formation had once more been cannibalised and broken up. He was rightly sensitive to the commandeering of bits of his force for use by other brigadiers, which was hardly going to develop a sense of unity within his brigade.
The personal animosity between Savige and Robertson had been exacerbated by the way the two battles had panned out, with Savige being forced to play second fiddle to a brigadier he felt was inferior in command skill and experience. Berryman and his staff favoured Robertson on all occasions when there was a choice.
Berryman’s less-than-subtle targeting of him for removal from the division put Savige on the back foot at the beginning of the war. Yet he’d had greater challenges, and would endeavour to redeem himself, if he could engineer the chance.
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The next stop for the big cavalcade was Libya’s Derna, another 240 kilometres along the coast. It had a population of 10,000 and was a thriving town at the edge of the Sahara desert’s eastern stretch, before more hospitable territory of mountains leading to rich plains.
The 17th was meant to lead the way in taking Derna. Mackay, trying to be fair, was giving Savige a chance. But after Tobruk, Mackay was influenced by Berryman and his officers; he changed his mind and let the 19th have first crack.
It was a further blow to Savige, who was now most concerned with the morale of his officers and men. They were doing a lot of footslogging, without the chance of a win at the other end. It caused the friction between him and Robertson to intensify as the two brigades moved along the coast in sight of each other.
On 28 January, Savige criticised Robertson’s delayed progress, caused by some ‘trivial demonstrations’ – unnecessary attacks on villages to ferret out stray Italian soldiers. Savige believed that such unscheduled stops gave the enemy a chance either to fortify their positions at Derna and elsewhere, or to evacuate.
They trudged on to Derna. The 19th hived off to take the town, while Savige, going on fresh intelligence, moved south and inland 65 kilometres to Fort Michili. Reports suggested that a strong Italian force was there.
When the 17th arrived, instead of encountering 9000 soldiers with three tank battalions, two armoured car divisions and two artillery regiments, as expected, they found the fort had been evacuated a day earlier. Savige was irritated. He believed the 19th’s tardiness along the way had let the Italians off the hook. Yet he took it as another disappointment and moved his force back on track for the coast.
The 19th moved on Derna on 30 January, and had sharp encounters before the town was taken, causing the Italians to leave post haste.
Both brigades began their next stage of 100 kilometres to the town of Giovanni Berta. Savige was determined to arrive first. He knew his troops were fit, but he pushed them harder than ever to cover the distance in three days through tangled mountain country interspersed with deep, rocky ravines. The dust, stones and cold were further trials.
‘This is war, men,’ Savige told his charges, ‘not playtime in the bush.’
He was pleased with their progress, toughness and spirit. The 2/6th Battalion struck first in the Wadi Derna, establishing a bridgehead over the wadi and capturing 395 prisoners. Savige ordered 2/7th Battalion to form a human chain across the wadi to supply its brother battalion with water and rations. After consulting with the 2/7th’s commanders and finding the troops ready and willing, on 2 February Savige sent it to take Fort Eluet and Giovanni Berta.
‘Boys, this is our great day,’ Savige told his officers, ‘and I know we will accomplish what we have in hand.’
What he did not say, but everyone guessed, was that he was going to upstage Robertson.2