Australia’s War with the Vichy French
1941
Savige was mortified about battling the French in Syria and Lebanon. He had risked everything for them during 1916 and 1917, and watched thousands of Australians die in their defence.
After that war, the French had been given a mandate over Syria and Lebanon. They ceded autonomy to Syria in September 1936, yet retained treaty rights to maintain armed forces and two airfields in the territory. Now Vichy French forces, controlled by the Nazis since the fall of France in mid-1940, were occupying Syria and threatening British oil interests in the region. After the 1 April 1941 coup d’état in neighbouring Iraq, that country had come under the control of pro-German rebel forces led by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. But the coup had lasted less than two months, before the Anglo-Iraqi War in May had led to the installation of a pro-British government.
In the same month, the Vichy French had signed an agreement with the Germans – the Paris Protocols – that granted Germany access to military facilities in Vichy-controlled Syria. The Nazis were also allowed to use Syrian railways to send arms to German-backed Iraqi nationalists in Mosul, in Iraq.
The terms of the Paris Protocols alerted General Wavell, who saw a threat and warned Churchill. The British Prime Minister decided that Syria and Lebanon had to be secured before Germany could recover from the drain on resources that its air operations in Crete had imposed. German paratroopers had been mauled, and were not ready to take on anyone else quickly. And Hitler was not prepared to push further troops into the Middle East at this point.
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There was a news blackout concerning the British mission, known as Operation Exporter, and it would remain in place during the coming encounter. Churchill and other senior Allied commanders and politicians believed that fighting against French forces would not be taken well in Allied countries. Some would be confused by it; others, like Savige, would be sickened by the notion that the Allied sacrifices on behalf of the French in the Great War would appear pointless.
At first the plan was for a depleted Australian 7th Division, an Indian brigade and a Free French contingent, without tanks, armoured cars or air support, to do battle against 35,000 Vichy French troops supported by 95 medium tanks, 289 aircraft and a big artillery force. The Vichy armed forces included a Foreign Legion regiment, a colonial regiment and 11 special forces infantry battalions. There were also two French destroyers and three submarines. General Henri Dentz, the Vichy High Commissioner for the Levant (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan), would be in command.
The combat would take part in rugged mountain ranges, which provided the defending forces with a huge natural barrier. The attackers would have to improvise in crossing Damour River, the waterway leading to the town of the same name on the Mediterranean coast. Steep hills protected the inland flank. The banana plantations between the sea and the town offered perfect concealment to the defenders, and no protection to the invading, mainly Australian forces.
Blamey, who had been most unhappy about the outcome of the Greek campaign, prepared Prime Minister Robert Menzies for another failure, by cabling him that ‘Syria is largely a gamble.’
The 7th Division was commanded by Major General John Dudley Lavarack. Initially 6th Division, including Savige and his 17th Brigade, were to be largely rested in Palestine after the Greek and Cretan campaigns. Lavarack’s part in the attack was to advance from northern Palestine, close to the Sea of Galilee, north towards Beirut, and also inland. Further east, the Indians and Free French were to advance on Damascus. (In 1918, the British Desert Mounted Corps, commanded by General Sir Harry Chauvel and composed of 75 per cent Anzac troopers, had captured the city after 400 years of Turkish rule.)1
Lavarack’s force began well, and after marching 30 kilometres took the town of Merdjayoun, about 15 kilometres from the coast. But on 15 June the Vichy French counter-attacked hard and retook the town, stopping Lavarack’s advance.
In the crisis, swift changes at the top were made. Lavarack assumed command of the I Australian Corps HQ and Tubby Allen was asked to lead 7th Division and retake Merdjayoun, which proved to be a tough assignment. Meanwhile, the Indians and Free French, now backed by a British contingent, took Damascus on 21 June 1941.
Allen called for an extra effort, and by 24 June, after bloody fighting in the mountains, Merdjayoun had been recaptured. He was then able to continue the original march north towards Beirut.
Lavarack, with his fresh perspective, realised that Allen’s 7th Division was a brigade short if it were to achieve its aims of taking Beirut and securing Syria and Lebanon. He and Allen wanted Savige to come into the fray with elements of his 17th Brigade. So Savige and his reduced contingent of just 600 soldiers were moved forward from Palestine.
On 26 June, Savige wrote to Gellibrand: ‘Well, today I am 51 and feel fine. I am physically and mentally fitter than I have been for years. I continue without undue suffering when my younger colleagues are bothered, buggered and bewildered.’
Savige had to concentrate on Damour, a Vichy French-controlled town on the coast, 22 kilometres north of Merdjayoun and 10 kilometres short of Beirut. He carried out reconnaissance of the proposed Damour battlefield on 30 June and 1 July.
Savige believed that a right-flanking attack, moving through the hills to cut off the town from the north, was the best option, rather than the direct frontal attack on Damour favoured by the regular officers. As ever, he wanted to minimise the loss of troops. But this time he was well supported by Brigadier Jack Stevens, the commander of 21st Brigade, which would also be in this battle. Stevens suggested that his brigade corner the town from the south and east, while Savige drew the noose around the town from the north.
Allen accepted the plan.
The 21st Brigade attack began at 4 a.m. on 6 July, but it took another three hours for Allen to confirm Savige’s role. At 7.30 a.m. the two conferred.
Tubby told Savige: ‘Stan, I want you to use one battalion to attack from the banana plantation [a kilometre wide, between Damour and the coast].’
‘That’s east,’ he replied. ‘I need my three battalions coming from the north.’
‘The 21st is going to need backup.’
‘That would commit me to a full frontal attack [through the plantation]. There is no other way around it.’
‘Yes, it would.’
‘Tubby, I’ve done the reconnoitring,’ Savige said, and after a moment added, ‘thoroughly.’
That gave Allen pause. No one was better than Savige at mapping and terrain preparation.
‘Stan,’ Allen persisted, ‘the plantation has to be taken. It’s the high ground that dominates the area.’
‘It’s extremely well fortified. We saw strong wiring and well-sited fire positions.’
‘Exactly. It has to be taken. I know your boys can do it with the 21st [Brigade].’
‘I will let go the Pioneers [2/2nd Battalion] and the cavalry [vehicle squadron]. But that’s all. The [enemy] strength there [in the plantation] reminds me of Mouquet Farm. I’m not prepared to put any of my command through that.’
‘But Stan . . .’
‘I was there, Tubby, I was there.’
It had been very late for Allen to attempt this switch, and too late to force a stubborn Savige to change his plans.2
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The toughest thing for Savige’s men was the mountainous terrain they had to traverse. The mission to cut the road north of Damour demanded exceptional stamina and courage. They had to cross the Damour River to reach the forming-up position for the attack, and that took them all night and most of the next day. The men were so exhausted by the end that their commanding officers recommended they be rested.
Roy King, the 2/5th’s commanding officer, reached Savige by wireless at around 5.45 p.m. ‘They are in no state to go on, Brig.’
‘They must go on, Roy. Surprise is our chief weapon. Must press the advantage. If you stay where you are now our losses in advance tomorrow will be heavy.’
‘We have to negotiate the toughest wadi . . .’
‘I know. I’ve seen it. But we must establish a roadblock west of En Naame. Then we’ll have Damour surrounded.’
‘We’ll need ropes to get over the wadi . . .’
‘I am aware.’
‘I need an artillery observer to subdue enemy machine-gun fire. It needs daylight to do that.’
‘It will be done tonight, Roy. I appreciate the men are exhausted. It’s up to you to make sure they endure further strain. That’s better than have them lose their lives.’
‘Brig.! They’ve been falling asleep at every stop!’
‘Tired men who have won through are better than fresh men killed in storming occupied positions!’3
King and the other commanders did as Savige directed. The diggers scrambled over rough, high country. As Savige had predicted, there was a succession of minor encounters with 100-strong groups of Vichy French. The minor drawback was that the sharp ravines and turns in the mountains caused many diggers to disappear from sight in the dark, so that it was difficult to keep in touch with them. Another issue, also accepted in advance, was that men would fall because of their exhaustion. Better that, Savige reflected again, than be massacred in daylight.
Meanwhile 2/3rd Battalion took the high ground to the east. Both the 2/5th and the 2/3rd absorbed fierce counterattacks, and by the end of 8 July, 17th and 21st Brigades had surrounded Damour. The town fell early on 9 July, justifying Savige’s approach, which had turned out to be the best for his men and the overall battle itself. Using his exceptional nous, he had persuaded Allen to let him have his infantry battalions for the flanking attack and encirclement of the target town, which had made the difference in taking it. And Savige’s pushing of his troops during the night of 7 and 8 July had also played a huge part in the success, along with minimising digger casualties.
Savige’s mantra had always been endurance, resilience and courage, and he had trained his men accordingly for just this kind of encounter. Even though they had been sick with exhaustion because the ‘Old Brig’ had commanded they drive themselves on, it had turned out to be the correct move; they had been up to the huge physical demands.
The 17th Brigade’s casualty figures for the full period of operations were proof of Savige’s wisdom. Just 14 were killed and 17 wounded, whereas waiting until daylight would have seen probably 300 wiped out.
Damour, more than any other battle Savige had been involved in until that point, was the embodiment of his doctrine of war, which had been born out of the terrifying experience of the Great War. He acknowledged this himself, later judging the victory at Damour to be his finest military achievement. Tubby Allen supported Savige’s assessment, noting that the efforts of the two brigades had broken the enemy’s defences and their spirit of resistance.
The most telling praise came from the Vichy French observation that they thought no troops in the world were tougher than their own Foreign Legion. The Australian performance at Damour made them revise that assessment.
Only one person, Berryman, contrived fault with Savige in the conduct of the operation. But it was hollow criticism, from someone nowhere near the action at Damour.
Savige had maintained his disdain for full-frontal attacks. He believed them futile after his World War I experience. But the new regular army ‘elite’ thought differently. Head-on battles were integral to their overall approach. This was a major point of contention between Savige and some of his staff, whom he invariably inherited from the new officer class.
Savige later said that ‘with more freedom of movement in this war I always sought to flank and encircle rather than attack frontally. This was particularly at Derna in the Libyan campaign and at Damour.’4
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After Damour there were no big, natural obstacles protecting Beirut as Savige pushed north towards that city along the coast, and Brigadier Stevens moved inland in the same direction. It was only now a matter of time before the Vichy French capitulated.
They effectively did so by asking for an armistice, which came into effect on 12 July. Tubby Allen wrote: ‘Sheer grit, determination and courage made the victory at Damour possible.’5
Thus Savige had the notable distinction of being the most effective battle commander in Australia’s only ever fight against French forces. Despite his misgivings about taking on the French, he had a job to do for his country. His success would not be immediately recognised anywhere, not even in Australia, where there was no reporting concerning Damour beyond the news that there had been an armistice over battles against ‘German-controlled forces in the Levant’.
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Savige had one further duty in Lebanon, and that was to arrest the Vichy French commander, General Henri Dentz, after he failed to return Commonwealth POWs. Savige used tact and diplomacy to convince the defiant and proud Dentz to submit quietly.
He personally escorted the general to Jerusalem in a four-vehicle convoy. At one point they stopped at a village for water. He and Dentz entered a shop with other Australian officers.
Suddenly aware that the car drivers had been left in the hot sun, Savige turned to one of his officers and, blasting him, said: ‘What about the bloody drivers?! Haven’t they got throats too?!’6
Aloof and self-important Dentz, who understood English, was stunned at this burst of Australian egalitarianism.