1943
With conflict heating up in the Wau–Salamaua area, Savige received further information about his role. First, he was tasked with driving the Japanese north of the Francisco River, 60 kilometres from his HQ, as soon as possible. Second, as mentioned, he had to establish a beach-head for the proposed US landing at Nassau Bay, 90 kilometres west. Once these things were done, he was to develop a communication link with a battalion combat team from the US 41st Division and continue to push the Japanese north of the Francisco.
The wording of the instruction was cautious. In effect, the Americans would be under his command. That seemed clear enough overall. But he was not informed of the greater plan, which was to distract Japanese forces inland from Salamaua with what would be more raids than battles. Blamey did not want Savige to take Salamaua. The chief had plans to use two of his best battle commanders, Vasey with 7th Division and Major General George Wootten with the 9th, to make an amphibious attack on Lae, 60 kilometres further north. Blamey wanted Savige and his diggers to draw the enemy from Lae, which would make the Japanese an easier target for the main assault.
The secrecy of the master plan was such that even Major General Herring, commanding Australia’s I Corps and based at Port Moresby, was confused. He had been trying to persuade other officers, including Berryman, that Salamaua should be taken before Lae, yet he was concerned about Savige’s intentions. He could have overcome this by flying to Wau for chats with his command. But neither he nor any member of his staff made the trip. It was a major error and caused resentment towards Port Moresby corps HQ among all in the Wau–Salamaua operation.
Herring did have the problem of dealing with both (majority) Australian and (minority) US forces, which he had to coordinate. The added complication was that MacArthur and his staff had disproportionate influence. They wanted to have their say, which was often contradictory of Herring, ignorant of conditions or superfluous.
But even with all this considered, Herring was not a good communicator. His instructions on this occasion were unclear. Savige was to ‘threaten’ Salamaua. Was he to isolate it? Was he to ‘secure’ it? Absorbing all the incoming commands, communiqués and intelligence, Savige understood that he was not to go ‘too hard’ at the enemy in the drive to shove them over the river. He directed his officers to avoid frontal attacks. He reined in commanders who were keen to move with too much force, which to the more adventurous among them seemed an odd order.
But under the prevailing hesitant instructions from Herring, who was not taking Savige into his full confidence, he was firm. If officers were too gung-ho and caused loss of life in unnecessarily forceful confrontations, they would be shipped out.
***
Savige continued his role, with its murky constraints – reading all patrol reports, asking for further details and watching every move in the forward areas. He offered suggestions to his commanders, and sometimes gave orders, which he knew would have been interference in ‘ordinary’ warfare. Yet Savige knew he could meddle this way. The team spirit he had engendered allowed him such liberties.
He began the attack on the important Japanese stronghold of Mubo on 7 July 1943. This was followed by heavy RAAF ‘softening-up’ airstrikes on surrounding enemy positions in the hills and creeks. The 2/6th Battalion captured the western side of Observation Hill and with 2/5th Battalion’s support snared all but a few enemy posts.
On 10 July, the encirclement of Mubo, just 50 kilometres short of Salamaua, was completed by the US 162nd Regiment, aided by 2/6th Battalion. The next day the battle for this important enemy position was over.
***
Savige was summoned to Port Moresby for a conference with Herring on 19 July. Again, Herring was vague about Salamaua, but there was an extra reason for this, which he would not share with Savige. MacArthur was interfering again, as was his wont and right. This time he was directing that Salamaua should be taken before Lae, which was what everyone seemed to want except Blamey. Herring did not have the will or ability to clear up the plan. Nor did he know how to handle Savige. They were worlds apart.
Herring, educated at Melbourne Grammar and a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, had fought in the British artillery in World War I. Herring was all privileged background and connections. He would never have countenanced anything but a top position in any field of endeavour. He was too aloof for Savige’s tastes, and did not know how to relate to the rank and file. Consequently there was a stiffness in their relationship.
Savige had begun with very little except innate intelligence and an exceptional ambition to advance in life. He had never lost a veiled contempt for those who floated into positions on the basis of their class. For Herring, becoming a senior officer was linked to his inborn social status. For Savige it had been his own achievement.
Savige and Herring would never feel inclined to meet each other halfway. In the British structure, class ruled and was accepted. In Australia, someone like Savige would never tug the forelock or genuflect. This would always bring friction between two such characters.
***
After his meeting with Herring, Savige returned to the front none the wiser but determined to carry on with the overall directive of pushing the Japanese back over the Francisco River. He continued striking at the enemy’s strongest defensive positions and repulsing counter-attacks. It was non-stop, fluid warfare, made even more dangerous by the jungle terrain, which created nasty surprises. Savige drew on all of his long experience, stretching right back to Sniper’s Ridge on Gallipoli in 1915. His fighting touch had not diminished, and he preserved his manpower resources with sound decisions that limited losses and fatigue.
The most important moment of the entire Wau–Salamaua operation came on 16 August, when 2/6th Battalion moved to take Komiatum Spur, just 13 kilometres from Tambu Bay on the New Guinea coast. The spur was well defended by the enemy, and if it were not taken, the battle would be in stalemate.
Almost the full strength of the 2/6th Battalion moved along a track made by patrols two days earlier. The diggers communicated in whispers, in case a Japanese unit located and foiled their plan.
It took them 10 arduous hours to come within 400 metres of the Japanese position undetected. The diggers then settled down to wait at the foot of the ridge in the darkness until 5.45 a.m., when they would attack.
At about 5 p.m., one soldier forgot the rules. He struck a wax match to light a cigarette.
‘The noise of the striking match could be likened to an express train; the flare of the match to a searchlight,’ one member of 6th Battalion would write. ‘I wonder how many years we aged during the following hour or so before Zero Hour.’1
Allied artillery on the coast that Savige had protected opened up on the spur right on time and with unerring accuracy. The diggers crept off, the shells whistling in and providing noise cover as they scrambled up the sides of ridges, almost unopposed.
‘The Japs were taking cover in a big way,’ the 6th Battalion digger recalled. ‘They had dug in on the other side of the ridge. One raced towards the pillbox to man his machine gun. But Sergeant “Smoky” Hedderman interfered – with his tommy gun.’
The Australians took and held the spur, pushing back three days of counter-attacks.2
‘We found solutions to win through at Mount Tambu, Komiatum and Bobdubi Ridge [all with razor-back features, some with impossible slopes],’ Savige later noted. He mentioned the ‘heroism’ of his charges. He also praised ‘the supporting fire given by the 42nd Militia Battalion, elements of the 2/5th Battalion, and the artillery’.
Savige forgot no one.
‘The guts displayed by the men of other companies of 2/6th Battalion, who manhandled five tons of stores to the two companies forward, across rough country, defies description.’3
After the breakthrough over the main ridges and spurs, the first objective was from the junction of the Bobdubi and Komiatum Tracks to Salamaua on the south bank of the Francisco River. The heavily laden diggers strained, sweated and swore their way up the final slopes to the rough Komiatum Track.
***
Blamey and Berryman, now a major general, had arrived in the middle of this campaign. Blamey sent Berryman forward to visit Savige.
‘I want you to evaluate his conduct of the campaign,’ Blamey said, ‘and if he is not up to it, you will relieve him.’
Berryman did as instructed and was astonished to see that Savige’s performance was first-rate.
‘I never thought I’d have to admit that Savige was right [in the execution of the campaign],’ Berryman told Lieutenant Colonel John Wilton, his chief staff officer.4
After his years of criticism, Berryman showed some integrity, albeit condescendingly, by reporting to Blamey and Herring that Savige had been misjudged. He was doing an excellent job.
***
The main threat to the Australian thrust was Japanese planes based at Wewak, further along the coast, to which the enemy army had moved from Rabaul and Ambon to counter Allied progress. American General Kenney established an airstrip in the Markham Valley, 100 kilometres west of Lae. On the night of 17 to 18 August 1943, Kenney ordered an air strike on Wewak, with bombers supported by Lightning fighters.
They destroyed 175 Japanese planes on the ground.
***
On 19 August, the Japanese began to abandon their Bobdubi, Komiatum, Mount Tambu and Goodview positions.
‘We were “mates” in a team,’ Savige later said, commenting on the breakthrough. ‘Plans to obtain victory were the outcome of discussions on the level of Company Commander to Divisional Command, rather than on a plan formulated only at the headquarters of any one.’
Savige here was justifying his management style, which differed from the staff college approach. It was working. Mubo had been taken. Bobdubi Ridge had been taken, and was only a few kilometres from the river and about 20 kilometres southwest of Salamaua. No matter what the Japanese attempted, he curtailed, held back, countered and defeated. If he couldn’t see a way over the razor-back ridges, he encircled the area, cutting off the Japanese.
On the coast at Nassau Bay, the enemy moved to destroy Australian–US artillery. Savige sent a patrol to defend the weaponry before the Japanese could lay demolition charges under all the guns. It was not his role to protect artillery, but he did anyway, despite some rebuke.5
***
Savige was now close to his objective of the Francisco River. He moved fast to capitalise on the success, directing 15th Brigade to patrol across the river for the first time. The diggers were ordered to pursue the Japanese, who fought hard in their retreat. Savige made sure that the high ground across the river was occupied by his forces. The Japanese would not be coming back. Soon the Australians would be within 1.5 kilometres of Salamaua aerodrome.
Although the Japanese were active throughout the battlefield area, Savige had them under control. He was confident that he could take Salamaua and Lae from the hinterland if so ordered. He and his commanders were more than keen to do it, even though they and their men had been through hardship for up to four months, some longer.
Salamaua remained the prize that Savige wanted and deserved, but would never take. Once his mission of pushing the Japanese back from the river was accomplished, Blamey replaced him in early September. This was what Herring, unable to control Savige, had originally advocated.
Savige had known this was likely to happen, given his disregard for Herring, but he was still disappointed. Even though the campaign was essentially over, he had wished to see it through to the end with his men.
Nevertheless, he ‘celebrated’ the fact that the operation had ended for him by visiting the front line at Laver’s Knoll, where D Company of 6th Battalion was making a counter-attack. The company’s commander, Major Laver, was none too pleased to see Savige in such a hot area, and complained. He didn’t want a dead general on his hands.
‘To hell with you!’ Savige replied with good humour, ‘Get on with your battle and forget us [Savige and his staff]. We won’t interfere. You are the boss.’6
It was a typical, fitting last gesture from Savige.
***
He returned to Port Moresby, having contracted malaria (and hookworm, it was discovered later). Blamey tried to bully him about having pressed for Salamaua too hard, which, he said, had endangered Blamey’s plans for taking Lae. Savige pulled out the files and orders to make his case and refute the chief, who lost the argument. Blamey told Savige that he (Blamey) had overridden MacArthur’s decision. Lae was still the first main target, with a fresh force directed to take the town from the Huon Gulf.
Savige left Papua and New Guinea satisfied with his impact on the fourth major battle over its territory. He and his men had done the hard yards that would make an assault more than likely to succeed. Blamey acknowledged his performance and recommended him for a Companion of the Order of the Bath for his efforts in the Wau–Salamaua campaign.
The citation was glowing. It read in part:
The credit for victory at the Battle of Salamaua must rest with Maj-Gen. Savige. During his command the back of the enemy’s defence was broken. The nature of country rendered great assistance to the defender. Careful planning alone enabled the defences to be overcome. The supplying of our forward troops was also a terrific problem . . .
Savige triumphed over all these difficulties. His men were kept supplied; they were encouraged to endure the most dreadful hardships, and over great difficulties in the terrain. His plans were well conceived and he saw them carried through. The success achieved is of the greatest importance to the allied cause . . . Savige’s fine leadership has made a very real contribution to the ultimate success of the united nations . . .7
In this Blamey was making it clear to Herring and other detractors that the victory had mainly been due to Savige. The Commander in Chief was also setting up a promotion for this favoured fighting general.