1944
On 10 February 1944, the Australians, who once more had done the tough fighting and clearing, linked up on the New Guinea coast at Saidor with the American troops who would take over the patrolling in the region. The bulk of the Australian force took their leave of New Guinea, pleased to be done with the place.
The Huon Peninsula Campaign, begun by Savige and ended by Vasey, was over after five months of fierce encounters. It had been as demanding as the other three major Papua and New Guinea battles on the Kokoda Track, at Milne Bay and at Gona, Buna and Sanananda. American airpower, along with RAAF operations, had made a considerable impact. But in the final analysis, the Australian ground troops – the militia and the three divisions that Curtin had fought so hard to bring back to the region – made the difference. They held, repulsed then defeated the Japanese in the nearly two-year war for control of Papua and New Guinea.
If the diggers had not been successful, Port Moresby would have fallen to the Japanese. This would have been devastating for the Australian mainland’s northern region. More cities than just Darwin and nearby bases would have been targeted for intense bombing. The big US and Australian bases and contingents of soldiers in Brisbane and other Queensland centres would have been pinpointed too. Extrapolating further, the Japanese might well have then reconsidered Yamashita’s plan for invading the Australian mainland.
Curtin never had time for reflection, or diary scribbling. But if he had taken a moment to ruminate in February 1944 on his decisions as prime minister, his standing up to Churchill and Roosevelt on the weekend of 21 to 22 February 1942 over the return of the divisions from the Middle East and North Africa would be judged as the most important. It saved Australia from a far worse fate than it endured over those two dark years.
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Blamey was not thrilled with the performance of Herring, who he didn’t think related well enough to his staff and frontline soldiers. What hurt Herring most was his mistakes in dealing with Savige. Blamey wanted him out, and so helped engineer a fortuitous offer for Herring to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This left a vacancy for a commander of I Corps. Blamey considered Vasey and Savige for the role, and chose the latter.
Savige was more than pleased. Blamey’s decision had allowed him to upstage two strong rivals in Herring and Vasey.
Blamey was diplomatic in explaining it to Vasey: ‘Savige’s appointment is a back-area one. You always indicated you’d rather be a major general in command of a front-line division than a lieutenant general in a rear post.’
‘I still would,’ Vasey replied, satisfied with Blamey’s words. But, like all the ‘alpha males’ at the head of the macho Australian Army, Vasey was miffed at being passed over for a rival he had long denigrated.1
Savige was now a lieutenant general and Commander of I Corps, responsible for all Australian activities in Papua and New Guinea. His corps HQ was transferred to Finschhafen, replacing Berryman’s II Corps, which would have given Savige further satisfaction. The two corps then swapped designations, so that ‘I Corps’ remained based in Queensland. Savige then had ‘II Corps’, which was the corps that would see further action.
There was justifiable merit in Savige’s promotion, but critics claimed it was Blamey’s most transparent political appointment. They suggested that he would not place powerful contenders anywhere they could shine and threaten his position. Morshead, Lavarack, Bennett and Robertson were ignored just as Vasey was.
However, Blamey judged that Savige was the best commander for what might lie ahead.
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By mid-1944, with the Japanese driven out of New Guinea, MacArthur had begun planning a ground attack on Japanese forces in the Philippines. He decided the push would go ahead without Australian troops after becoming convinced that Blamey was trying to undermine him and become the commander in chief of Allied Pacific forces. MacArthur had as good as asked Curtin to remove Blamey, but when the Prime Minister ignored the request, MacArthur dumped the Australians. He did not wish to share the glory of his much-vaunted promise of ‘I shall return’. (MacArthur had been based in the Philippines – a US territory – before the Japanese invaded, and had been forced to make a hasty departure and leave his force there in March 1942.)
To free up as much manpower for the Philippines invasion as possible, MacArthur removed his troops from Bougainville Island. Bougainville, 180 kilometres long and 40 to 75 kilometres wide, along with Buka Island just to the north, was Australian territory, although geographically the two islands were part of the Solomon chain. Because they were Australian mandated areas, the Americans on Bougainville were replaced by Savige and his II Corps. His force was made up of militia contingents: the Australian 3rd Division and 11th Brigade, reinforced by a Fijian infantry regiment. Savige also used 23rd Brigade to garrison neighbouring islands.
Savige was now on a major war front again, and Vasey was miffed. Bougainville was hardly the ‘back area’ that Blamey had mentioned when salving Vasey’s feelings at having been overlooked as commander of I (now II) Corps.
With the Americans’ departure northwest, two-thirds of the Australian Army were involved in fighting and containing Japanese garrisons, some of them huge. The Americans in Bougainville had fought off a major Japanese counter-attack in March 1944, killing 5000 enemy soldiers. After that the Americans did little except develop the base at the village of Torokina, protect their perimeter, and build outposts on the major tracks leading to the village.
Blamey ordered offensive campaigns on Bougainville, which had been approved by Curtin and his Cabinet and endorsed by the bipartisan Advisory War Council. Yet there were caveats. Savige could not commit ‘major forces’, though Blamey added that it might be possible for II Corps to ‘undertake the elimination of the Japanese forces in the area’.2
The directive was based on the American estimate that there were as few as 13,400 Japanese on the island, but there were in fact around 40,000. Any effort to destroy the enemy would need major force.
Savige would have been ready to carry out any order to take on a force of that size. But he was aware that he would have to undertake his role within limits that would not upset his military and political masters. In other words, there were to be no massive battles that would lead any of his men to be killed. But such directives in war are given to correction. As the war dragged on, Blamey kept an open mind about his options.
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Savige ascertained that there were about 8000 Japanese in posts well forward of their southern base of Buin. He decided on three separate drives.
First, he planned to push the Japanese in the north into the narrow Bonis Peninsula and contain them. Second, he aimed to seize the centre at Earl Ridge. This would give the Australians control of east–west thoroughfares and protect them against counter-attacks. Taking the centre would also open the passage for a drive to the east coast. Third, Savige would drive, with his usual caution, towards the bulk of the Japanese at Buin.
The campaign would have further handicaps. Savige wanted to make an amphibious attack on the south. But 1st Australian Army Commander Vernon Sturdee put such an ambition in perspective: ‘GHQ [meaning essentially MacArthur and his staff] controls all shipping. I doubt whether they are the least bit interested in what goes on in Bougainville now that the US troops are out of it.’3
No shipping meant no artillery or other replacement equipment, which would further hamper Savige’s campaign. He would have to develop land supply routes for his trip south.
Sturdee became concerned that some of Savige’s commanders would be spoiling for an all-out fight that would lead to the wholesale loss of soldiers. Savige understood the message. He began to ‘micro-manage’ to make sure there were not unnecessary risks and casualties, which upset some of his command staff.
Berryman was forever looking for excuses to attack Savige. ‘[Third Division Commander] Bill Bridgeford,’ he wrote, ‘finds Stan Savige’s interference in detail most trying.’
Arnold Potts complained ‘bitterly’ about the restrictions on his 23rd Brigade. He was looking to restore his reputation following his sacking by Blamey for not showing enough aggression against the Japanese in the Owen Stanleys. Potts was more enthusiastic than any other commander about charging ahead and engaging the Japanese in major battles.4 Savige had to stop him from undertaking ‘unnecessary adventures’ on three occasions.
After the last such incident, Savige wrote to Sturdee: ‘Potts feels he must redeem his name after the events on Kokoda Trail by the full employment of his Brigade in one area.’ Savige believed this would lead to big losses, and refused to endorse it.
Sturdee replied: ‘Potts must be strongly restrained from embarking on wild cat schemes in either the Northern or Central Sectors in order to redeem his reputation,’ Sturdee replied. ‘We are not interested in personal reputations at the expense of unnecessary loss of Australian lives in operations that do not contribute to the attainment of the main objective.’5
Potts was more than peeved. He had been pilloried by Blamey for not being more offensive against the Japanese in the Owen Stanleys. Now he was being held back for thinking too offensively. But in this case, he was at odds with how the main objective had to be attained.
For a corps commander like Savige to reach down so far into his subordinates’ responsibilities might have curtailed, even ruined, any other campaign. But Bougainville was different from any other mission in the Pacific. To please both Blamey and Sturdee, Savige had to keep casualties low. Blamey’s directive not to use ‘major force’ in this assignment meant that discretion and caution were as important to him as valour.
The conditions on the island helped his aims. The thick jungle ensured that battles would be intermittent affairs in shadowy half-light, under dense foliage canopies. Equipment shortages, especially of artillery, would limit advances and breakthroughs. On top of that, Savige did not believe the Japanese would capitulate easily. Progress south to Buin and ultimate victory would be slow. But he was his determined, patient, persevering self, and he had the assistance of a first-class chief of staff, Ragnar Garrett, with whom he had worked in Greece in 1941 and more recently New Guinea.
Savige still had to keep a close eye on tactics and plans to ensure no unnecessary risk was taken or needless casualties incurred. But the good management under him meant he could continue to do what he loved, and that was to tour the front lines. Savige was still wearing his brigadier’s hat with the blood-red band, and flying his car flag. He couldn’t care less that they made him more likely to be targeted by snipers, believing it was worth the risk to inspire his troops.
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On 4 August 1945, US aircraft dropped leaflets on Hiroshima, the headquarters of the Japanese 2nd General Army, warning the citizens to expect terrible destruction because Japan would not surrender. This was ignored.
The first atomic bomb – ‘Little Boy’ – was dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima on 6 August. The Emperor and the Japanese military chiefs remained mute, where any official sign of surrender would have seen the US stop using this most terrible weapon.
The next target, on 9 August, was set down as the city of Kokura, the base for a huge army arsenal. Thick clouds over that city caused the B-29 carrying a second nuclear weapon to be diverted to Nagasaki, a port with naval installations.
More than 210,000 Japanese in total were killed by the two weapons. Many more would die later from ‘radiation sickness’, as it was known.
On 14 August, more than 800 US bombers struck military targets on Japan’s main island, Honshu. A badly shaken Emperor Hirohito met his government in a bunker at the Imperial Palace. New pressures on him were manifested every hour. There were reports that the Russian Red Army was pressing Japan’s northern borders. His subjects were restless over the incompetence of the Japanese Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the imperial chiefs. The people were hardly rebellious, but they were complaining enough for the Emperor to take notice.
Hirohito told his government: ‘The unendurable must be endured.’ Translated, this indicated that they must surrender.
The government contacted the Allies and accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The Emperor recorded a capitulation speech from the palace that was broadcast to the nation the next day, 15 August. The moment was most uninspiring for all listeners, even though it was the first time the nation had heard his voice. It trembled, and was high-pitched and weak.
Hirohito, speaking in the language of the Royal Court, which was barely understood by his subjects, blamed the atomic weapons for the fact that Japan had given up the fight. He tried hard to mask a speech defect as he built towards the central point of his message: ‘The enemy has now begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, whose power to do damage is incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.’
When the nation’s comprehension caught up with the words, it wept. There was a mix of shock, relief and humiliation, and not a little fear about what their conquerors might do to them.
The Pacific War was over.
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The end was a huge surprise and massive relief for all Allied forces. The war ground to a halt over the next few weeks all over Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Fighting and ‘mopping up’ ceased in China, Burma, Thailand, French Indochina, Malaya, Sumatra, Okinawa (part of Japan), Formosa, the Philippines, Borneo, Java, the Celebes, Timor, Papua, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, the Caroline Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Bonin Islands, Truk, and many other Pacific islands further east.
Hundreds of thousands of POWs and enslaved people were liberated, although many still suffered in this winding-down period. In northern Borneo, the last 38 of the POWs marching to Ranau were murdered by the Japanese two weeks after the official end of hostilities.
On Bougainville, Savige called off revised plans by Blamey for a last push south to Buin with his considerable force of 32,000 soldiers, which had been set to attempt one of the biggest operations the Australian Army had undertaken.
Blamey had become frustrated by the way the Japanese were hanging on so grimly. The two atomic bombs dropped on Japan changed all that.
Savige was relieved that he would not have to order such a horrific battle. Many would have been killed in this final clash with the larger Japanese garrison force. As it was, 516 Australians lost their lives in the campaign and a further 1500 were wounded. Savige’s restrained mission remained that way, thanks to torrential rain and flooding in July and the end of the war in August.
The Japanese lost 8500 men in action after the Australians occupied the island. Another 9800 of the enemy died through illness, and 23,571 survived to see the end of the war.
On 8 September, Savige presided as Lieutenant General Masatane Kanda surrendered Japanese forces on Bougainville.
Savige curbed adventurism and reckless attacks. The Japanese were controlled, taken prisoner and shipped back to Japan without needless bloodshed on either side. With his good management, thoroughness and care for his troops, Savige had been an insightful choice by Blamey for a tricky assignment.