OVERVIEW
III. The Nature and Characteristics of a Miracle
Miracles Are Supernatural Events
Miracles Cannot Be Tested by Scientific Means
Miracles Always Promote Good and Glorify God Alone
Miracles Are More Than Astonishing
Miracles Are Not Contradictions
Miracles Can Confirm a Message of God
Miracles Can Confirm a Messenger of God
V. Objections Raised Against Miracles
The Objection That Miracles Are Impossible
The Objection That Miracles Are Unscientific
The Objection That Supposed Miracles Are Natural, Not Supernatural
Years ago I (Sean) was speaking with a physics PhD student who considered himself an atheist. He asked me, “How can you believe in miracles like the resurrection of Jesus? Hasn’t science shown that when people die, they stay dead?” I simply responded by saying, “You’re right, science has shown that under normal conditions dead people stay dead. But the Christian claim is that Jesus rose supernaturally, that is, that God has acted in history by raising Jesus from the dead. If there really is a God who created the world and designed its laws, then the natural norm of dead people staying dead can’t restrict God from supernaturally raising his Son.”
Here’s the simple point: if God exists, then miracles are possible. As C. S. Lewis wrote, “But if we admit God, must we admit Miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the bargain. Theology says to you in effect, ‘Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events.’ ” (Lewis, Miracles, 109)
Some skeptics want to dismiss the possibility of miracles unless God’s existence can first be proven. But this is backwards. It is not up to the theist to prove God’s existence, for if God even possibly exists, then miracles are possible. To reject miracle claims outright, the skeptic needs to prove that God does not exist. But the nonexistence of God has never been shown. Yet, since the mid-nineteenth century and ever more frequently, God’s nonexistence has simply been assumed to be the case. In fact, there are powerful reasons to believe God does exist. (For more information, turn to the prologue to this book, “A Theistic Universe.”)
Philosopher and apologist William Lane Craig remembers that the evidence for God’s existence shaped how he viewed miracles on his journey to faith:
In my own case, the virgin birth was a stumbling block to my coming to faith—I simply could not believe such a thing. But when I reflected on the fact that God had created the entire universe, it occurred to me that it would not be too difficult for Him to make a woman become pregnant. Once the non-Christian understands who God is, then the problem of miracles should cease to be a problem for him. (Craig, AI, 125)
But if we admit God, must we admit Miracle? Indeed, indeed, you have no security against it. That is the bargain. Theology says to you in effect, “Admit God and with Him the risk of a few miracles, and I in return will ratify your faith in uniformity as regards the overwhelming majority of events.”
C. S. Lewis
What is meant by the term miracle? T. H. Huxley, who coined the term “agnostic” to define his own principle of suspending judgment about statements for which he had no evidence to give them certainty, states:
The first step in this, as in all other discussions, is to come to a clear understanding as to the meaning of the terms employed. Argumentation about whether miracles are possible and, if possible, credible, is mere beating the air until the arguers have agreed what they mean by the word “miracle.” (Huxley, WTHH, 153)
Defining a miracle can be a difficult task. If the scope of the definition is too narrow, one can risk excluding what might actually be the occurrence of a miracle. Or, if the scope of the definition is too broad, then anything could be considered a miracle. For example, people often use the word miracle in a generalized or figurative way without meaning that a literal miracle has occurred. In a figurative sense, someone might be speaking of the low probability of an event, “It was a miracle he survived the car crash.” Or, addressing a natural phenomenon, someone might say, “It is a miracle that birds can seemingly escape gravity.” Someone might even say, “It is a miracle I made it through the day.” However, when the term miracle is taken in a literal sense, we speak of special acts of God in the world.
David Hume wrote in the eighteenth century, in an era called the “Enlightenment” by thinkers such as Immanuel Kant who declared that people had until then largely lived as if they were underage thinkers to be mentally shaped by authority and tradition. Shaking off his own Scots Calvinist upbringing, Hume wrote the classic analysis that ruled out any speculation that supernatural intervention in the world would produce a miracle. His definition of a miracle argues that the laws of nature operate inexorably—and modern definitions typically also refer to the laws of nature. Hume defines a miracle as a violation of the laws of nature.
In a definition similar to Hume’s, famous atheist turned theist Antony Flew states that to most people, a miracle is “a term that has been variously understood, but is most commonly taken to mean an act that manifests divine power through the suspension or alteration of the normal working laws of nature.” (Flew, DP, 234)
However, philosopher Tim McGrew reminds us that the idea and definition of a miracle existed long before the modern concept of a natural law and that intervention (or the “productive power” that enables miracles) could be reframed in a more positive way.
Bringing the concept of natural laws into the definition of “miracle” is . . . problematic, and for a variety of reasons many writers have found it untenable. First, the concept of a miracle predates any modern concept of a natural law by many centuries. While this does not necessarily preclude Hume’s concept, it does raise the question of what concept or concepts earlier thinkers had in mind and of why the Humean concept should be thought preferable. One benefit of defining miracles in terms of violations of natural law is that this definition entails that a miracle is beyond the productive power of nature. But if that is the key idea, then it is hard to see why we should not simply use that as the definition and leave out the problematic talk of laws.
Second, it becomes difficult to say in some cases just which natural laws are being violated by the event in question. That dead men stay dead is a widely observed fact, but it is not, in the ordinary scientific use of the term, a law of nature that dead men stay dead. (McGrew, “Miracles,” website)
Since there are serious questions regarding the definition provided by Hume, one might opt for a different definition, one that focuses on the connection to the event in question. Philosopher and apologist Francis Beckwith states a miracle is: “A divine intervention that occurs contrary to the regular course of nature within a significant historical-religious context.” (Beckwith, TMMM, 221, italics in original)
Beckwith continues:
First, a divine intervention refers to the action of a nonnatural agent. Second, that which occurs contrary to the regular course of nature refers to an event that overrides scientific laws, that cannot reasonably be accounted for either by the actions of natural agents (e.g. human beings, extraterrestrials) or by nature left to its own devices. Third, a significant historical-religious context refers to the purpose attached to the miracle because of when, where, and to (or for) whom the miracle occurs. That is, the historical-religious context of the event typically grounds the event’s existential and teleological significance, and may serve as the basis by which to infer agent causation. (Beckwith, TMMM, 221)
If an event occurs that fits this definition and the characteristic criteria mentioned below in section III, it seems reasonable to conclude that a miracle has occurred. Beckwith’s definition—by shifting to “a significant historico-religious context” and the “connection” (or application) to an event—in fact sets up an alternate arena rather than staying with the one Hume has set up. The fundamental factor that separates the definitions, however, surely is the power of their authors’ specific presuppositions about law and nature and the active or inactive role of a God who is personal—Hume’s presuppositions exclude the supernatural, as opposed to those of the person who believe that God is and that he personally acts upon the nature he has created; in other words, miracles can be expected.
III. The Nature and Characteristics of a Miracle
To qualify as a miracle, an event must possess certain characteristics. The characteristics that follow are not exhaustive, but they seem to provide a good lens for recognizing and distinguishing a miracle from a nonmiraculous event. Richard L. Purtill notes five characteristics of a miracle. “A miracle is an event (1) brought about by the power of God that is (2) a temporary (3) exception (4) to the ordinary course of nature (5) for the purpose of showing that God has acted in history.” (Purtill, DM, 72) We consider these characteristics and highlight additional traits next to define a miracle from the perspective of one who agrees with Purtill.
A. Miracles Are Supernatural Events
By definition miracles are supernatural events, and not events produced by finite power. There is some agent external to the world who brings about the event we call a miracle. In Beckwith’s definition above, he names angels as nonnatural agents. But the word “agent” can mean either independent agency or the dependent agency of one acting on another’s authorization. While angels do operate within a supernatural realm that transcends human powers, still, within their different order, in a Judeo-Christian understanding they are creatures, finite agents, whose power comes from God. In the traditional Medieval and Renaissance “great chain of being” that seems an echo of Psalm 8:5, they are not deity but created beings and in some sense “natural.” Their powers of movement, appearance, speech, or other action come from their obedience to God. They don’t work the miracles; God does. As the theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas says:
When any finite power produces the proper effect to which it is determined, this is not a miracle, though it may be a matter of wonder for some person who does not understand that power. For example, it may seem astonishing to ignorant people that a magnet attracts iron or that some little fish might hold back a ship. But the potency of every creature is limited to some definite effect or to certain effects. So, whatever is done by the power of any creature cannot be called a miracle properly, even though it may be astonishing to one who does not comprehend the power of this creature. But what is done by divine power, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible in itself, is truly miraculous. (Aquinas, SCG, 3.102.3)
If a miracle attempt is not successful, then it is not a miracle. No one would call a failed attempt to raise someone from the dead a miracle because no actual supernatural event took place. Norman Geisler states, from a worldview anchored in a Creator who remains passionately watchful over his creation:
Indeed, the Bible records that God is always successful in His efforts. Diseases always vanish at His command, demons always flee at His order, nature is always open to His intervention. This is an important characteristic of the fingerprint of God which bears repeating. The supernatural acts of God in the Bible were and are always successful. That is, God always accomplished what He intended to accomplish. If He desired to heal someone, they were completely healed. There are no exceptions. (Geisler, SW, 28–29)
Another characteristic of miracles is that they are always immediate. Geisler notes:
With specific regard to the healing ministry of Jesus, the results were always immediate. There were no instances of gradual improvement over a few days. Jesus commanded the invalid to “Arise, take up your pallet and walk,” and “immediately the man became well” (John 5:8 NASB). In Peter’s ministry in Acts 3 we see God healing a lame man instantly at Peter’s hand. “Peter said, ‘I do not possess silver and gold, but what I do have I give to you: In the name of Jesus Christ the Nazarene—walk!’ And seizing him by the right hand, he raised him up; and immediately his feet and ankles were strengthened” (Acts 3:6–7 NASB). There was no lapse of time over which the man gradually improved. The restoration of this man’s health was instantaneous and complete. (Geisler, SW, 29)
Miracles are rare events. C. S. Lewis writes in Miracles: A Preliminary Study, “A miracle is by definition an exception. How can the discovery of a rule tell you whether, granted a sufficient cause, the rule could be suspended?” (Miracles, 47) In the epilogue to that book, he adds,
You are probably quite right in thinking that you will never see a miracle done. . . . God does not shake miracles into Nature at random as if from a pepper-caster. They come on great occasions; they are found at the great ganglions of history—not of political or social history, but of that spiritual history which cannot be fully known by men. If your own life does not happen to be near one of those great ganglions, how should you expect to see one? . . . Miracles and martyrdoms tend to bunch about the same areas of history—areas we naturally have no wish to frequent. (Lewis, Miracles, 173–74)
Because miracles are indeed rare and connected to God’s high oversight of history, then we would be presumptuous to expect predictability or demand a miracle. If miracles were frequent, they would seem predictable. If they were predictable, then what is to distinguish a miracle from the normative course of nature? New Testament scholar Craig Keener notes the sobering fact that not everyone who seeks healing receives it. “Affirming the reality of miracles also does not give us the right to ignore the fact that miracles very often do not happen. Tragically and disappointingly, large numbers of people who seek supernatural (or natural) healing are not healed.” (Keener, MCNTA, 603)
Even in the Bible there are time periods in which miraculous events are rare. Until God prepared Moses to lead the exodus, there is no record of a miraculous event during Israel’s four hundred years of slavery in Egypt. In 1 Samuel 3:1 it is specifically noted that even visions and messages from the Lord were rare at the time.
Keener notes that miracles are unpredictable because a person cannot always predict the activity of an intelligent agent. God is under no compulsion to perform a miracle, so if God brings about a miracle, it is due to his initiative and will. Since God is a free agent, there is no conclusive formula that allows us to determine when, or where, a miracle will occur. Keener explains that if someone makes the hypothesis that a particular event may be a miracle, the hearers will normally be more inclined to trust that judgment in a case in which the speaker had accurately predicted it beforehand. Yet even so, some hearers would claim it was coincidence. Keener points out that some academic disciplines (such as history and the social sciences) generally cannot make precise predictions either, since they involve the study of persons who are not always predictable. Rather than believing miraculous accounts are “coincidence,” Keener says:
I prefer a different hypothesis: a personal God ready and able to heal, but one who often allows created nature to take its own course and who is not manipulated by formulas, as perhaps impersonal or merely psychological force could be. Although miracles are consistent with the character of the biblical God, we cannot always predict a personal deity’s future actions, especially when our knowledge about the factors involved in those actions are [sic] limited. If miracles happened with absolute regularity, we would view them as part of the course of nature; their occurrence beyond providence in nature allows them to function more specifically as signs revealing God’s activity and character. (Keener, MCNTA, 740–741)
Among the important distinctions of Keener’s hypothesis is the emphasis upon a personal God: the god of Enlightenment deism was imagined as impersonal, one who establishes a working machine but does not relate to it in any personal way.
E. Miracles Cannot Be Tested by Scientific Means
Miracles cannot be tested by the means used in scientific inquiry. J. Harold Ellens reasons, “It is obvious that miracles cannot be investigated by the usual scientific methods since we cannot control the variables and perform experiments.” (Ellens, BMPP, 266) However, just because miracles cannot be tested via scientific inquiry, one should not conclude that miracles cannot be investigated in any manner. Keener explains we must utilize the proper methodology: “Miracles must be investigated by means of the appropriate methodology, one suited for individual events. Miracles are distinct acts in history (on theistic premises, actions of an intelligent agent) and thus no more subject to experimentation than other historical events like Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo.” (Keener, MCNTA, 608)
F. Miracles Always Promote Good and Glorify God Alone
Norman Geisler and Ronald Brooks explain that a miracle will always promote good, and never promote evil: “Morally, because God is good, miracles only produce and/or promote good.” (Geisler and Brooks, WSA, 88) In addition, since God is good, they glorify him, as he is deserving all of the credit and glory for the miracle. “A miracle is never merely for show: Miracles are never performed for entertainment, but have the distinct purpose of glorifying God and directing men to Him.” (Geisler and Brooks, WSA, 89)
G. Miracles Are More Than Astonishing
Miracles are not merely astonishing acts; such a definition is too broad. A magician can perform astonishing acts, through sleight of hand or through manipulating perception. Pharaoh’s magicians and others encountered by the apostles in Acts also astonished people—but within limits that they admitted (see Acts 8; 16; and 19). However, a magician’s tactics can be reduced to merely natural means. These acts, though capable of producing wonder in the minds of the audience, are purely natural events. A miracle is a supernatural event, is rare, and demonstrates divine power. Therefore, a miracle is much more than an astonishing event. C. S. Lewis remarks on that blinding power: “If the ultimate Fact is not an abstraction but the living God, opaque by the very fullness of His blinding actuality, then He might do things. He might work miracles.” (Miracles, 98)
H. Miracles Are Not Contradictions
Finally, miracles are not contradictions. God could not cause a square circle to appear in the sky because square circles are a logical contradiction. Note there is nothing logically contradictory about some events that are considered physically impossible. For example, it is physically impossible for a man to walk on water; however, there is nothing self-contradictory about this idea and thus God can bring it about. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli explain, “A man walking through a wall is a miracle. A man both walking and not walking through a wall at the same time and in the same respect is a contradiction. God can perform miracles but not contradictions—not because his power is limited, but because contradictions are meaningless.” (Kreeft and Tacelli, HCA, 109)
A. Miracles Can Confirm a Message from God
E. J. Carnell argues miracles are the only confirmation of a reference point that stands outside the system of natural law and establishes that law in being, subject to its Creator’s will:
Miracles are a sign and a seal of the veracity [truthfulness] of special revelation, revelation which assures us exactly how God has elected to dispose of His universe. In this revelation we read that He Who made us, and Who can also destroy us, has graciously chosen to keep the universe regular according to the covenant which He made with Noah and his seed forever. If the scientist rejects miracles to keep his mechanical order, he loses his right to that mechanical order, for, without miracles to guarantee revelation, he can claim no external reference point; and without an external reference point to serve as a fulcrum, the scientist is closed up to the shifting sand of history. (Carnell, ICA, 258)
Carnell concludes,
In such a case, then, how can the scientist appeal to the changeless conviction “that the universe is mechanical,” when from flux and change only flux and change can come? The scientist simply exchanges what he thinks is a “whim of deity” for what is actually a “whim of time and space.” Why the latter guarantees perseverance of a mechanical world, when the former seemingly is impotent so to do, is not easy to see. (Carnell, ICA, 258)
B. Miracles Can Confirm a Messenger of God
Another purpose of miraculous “signs,” as Norman Geisler notes, is
to provide divine confirmation of a prophet of God. The religious ruler Nicodemus said of Jesus: “We know that you are a teacher who has come from God. For no one could perform the miraculous signs you are doing if God were not with him” (John 3:2). Many people followed him because they saw the signs he performed on those who were sick (John 6:2). When some rejected Jesus, even though he had cured a blind man, others said, “How can a sinner do such miraculous signs?” (John 9:16). The apostles were confident in proclaiming, “Jesus the Nazarene was a man accredited by God to you by miracles, wonders, and signs, which God did among you through him, as you yourselves know” (Acts 2:22). For his credentials to the Corinthians, the apostle Paul claimed that the signs of a true apostle were performed among them (2 Cor. 12:12). He and Barnabas recounted to the apostles “the miraculous signs and wonders God had done among the Gentiles through them” (Acts 15:12). (Geisler, MMM, 98)
R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley argue that a miracle is the only unquestionable confirmation God could have used:
Now if God would certify His messengers to us—as we have shown He would do if He intends to send them at all—He would give them credentials that only He could give. Thus, we would know indubitably that they are to be received as the messengers of God. What would God give His messengers that all could see could come only from God? Since the power of miracle belongs to God alone, miracles are a suitable and fitting vehicle of attestation. (Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, CA, 144)
V. Objections Raised Against Miracles
We now consider a variety of objections that have been raised against miracles. Some argue that miracles are not possible. Others conclude miracles cannot truly happen because they are not scientific, in that they lack predictive value and are not replicatable—that is, they cannot be tested by the methods of scientific experimentation. Some plead ignorance, taking an agnostic position like that defined and popularized by T. H. Huxley in the nineteenth century, determining to remain uncommitted to any conclusion and anticipate that natural explanations will eventually arise for all miracle claims. Others concede that miracles are possible but suggest they cannot be accepted as credible evidence in historical accounts or empirical study. We consider each of these objections along with possible responses to their arguments.
While Hume’s arguments are certainly the most significant challenge to the possibility of miracles, and they have been the signal influence upon a climate of thought that cuts off any supernatural intervention into the normal course of events, they are not insurmountable. In fact, Hume’s arguments against miracles are not only rejected by Christian scholars, they are also rejected by non-Christian scholars like John Earman, professor of the history and philosophy of science at the University of Pittsburgh, and author of Hume’s Abject Failure. Though it does not seem that the best definition of a miracle should incorporate reference to a violation of the laws of nature, this does not answer the question as to whether or not particular events called miracles are, in fact, a violation of these laws. However, as many have noted, miracles are not violations of nature, especially in the form that Hume proposes. It is important to note that Hume does not deny that miracles are metaphysically impossible—meaning there is nothing strictly impossible about the occurrence of a miracle. Rather, Hume objects that one cannot have epistemic warrant for knowing a miracle occurred. He makes this objection so stringently because he trusts in the uniformity of the laws of nature: the operations that they carry out are what they have always done and will continue doing. They have, in his view, been “wound up” when they were made and have been left to run on their own, uniformly, whether we like the results or not. Accordingly, Hume challenges the identification of a miracle, not its occurrence:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. . . . Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happened in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior. (Hume, ECHU, 144–146, 148)
1. Miracles as Violations of Nature
Hume’s argument is rather clever, as Hume builds upon the confidence in natural order that had underwritten many of the early scientists’ boldness to undertake experimentation (and Hume himself had shocked his readers by arguing that even cause and effect are ultimately only a connection that we imagine—because our sense experience comes to us in a series of separate sensations that only become “cause and effect” due to our describing them that way). Having undermined a science that relies on natural order, as philosopher Ronald Nash explains, Hume springs the trap:
First, Hume cleverly manipulates the theist into admitting that he (the theist) must believe in a natural order since without such an order, there cannot be any way of recognizing exceptions to the order. Then, Hume hammers the theist with the obvious fact that the probability for the theist’s alleged violations of natural laws must always be much less than the probability that the exception has not occurred. (Nash, FR, 230)
a. Are Miracles Interruptions in Nature?
According to C. Stephen Evans, the description of miracles as a “break” or “interruption” with respect to natural law incorrectly presumes God’s absence from creation prior to his miraculous activity. But God is constantly present in his creation as the sustaining, necessary Being. Hence, whereas miracles entail special acts of God, nature is still held in being by the normal activity of God. Evans explains:
It is, however, somewhat incorrect to call such special actions “breaks” or “interruptions” in the natural order. Such terminology implies that God is not normally present in the natural order; but if God exists at all, then he must be regarded as responsible for the whole of that natural order. The contrast, then, is not between “nature” and very unusual divine “interventions” into nature, but between God’s normal activity in upholding the natural order and some special activity on God’s part. Thus, when God does a miracle, he does not suddenly enter a created order from which he is normally absent. Rather, he acts in a special way in a natural order which he continually upholds and in which he is constantly present. (Evans, WB, 88)
b. Are Laws of Nature Inviolable?
Another question worth asking is whether or not it is appropriate to categorize the laws of nature as inviolable. Keener observes this is often included as an assumption in the way natural laws are defined. “Most natural laws by definition assume a closed system; they make normal predictions but do not claim to account for influences outside the system in question.” (Keener, MCNTA, 129)
We cannot reason from the nature of science that God is unable to act uniquely in the world. As Templeton laureate John Polkinghorne notes, “Science simply tells us that these events are against normal expectation. We knew this at the start. Science cannot exclude the possibility that, on particular occasions, God does particular, unprecedented things. After all, God is the ordainer of the laws of nature, not someone who is subject to them.” (Polkinghorne, QCC, 100)
Hume defined a system that failed to recognize the significance of God acting as a volitional agent, because he did not think of God as personal. But Keener explains the larger perspective of what a personal agent can do without destruction of the predominant operations, “The action of agency (whether divine or human) need not violate the laws of nature; in most cases it merely changes the initial and boundary conditions on which the laws of nature operate.” (Keener, MCNTA, 182) Furthermore, it is important to note the difference between a human and a divine perspective. “Miracles might appear contrary to nature, Augustine concedes, but they do not appear so for God; ‘For him “nature” is what he does.’ ” (Keener, MCNTA, 130, emphasis in original)
Keener explains by noting that even within scientific inquiry we observe unusual behavior under unusual conditions.
At different levels or on different conditions, the laws may be subject to higher or more complex principles. Thus these laws “behave in extreme ways in unusual contexts (for example, superconductivity or black holes).” Principles applicable to some kinds of matter under some conditions may need to be adjusted under significantly higher temperatures, density, and so forth, so that even voluminous observations limited to one setting need not predict phenomena for all conditions; by the same token, we should not expect norms of nature to predict conditions if an active intelligence beyond the universe would choose to act in distinctive ways in it. One therefore need not speak of apparent anomalies in terms of violations of a rigid, deterministic system. In fact, the violation concept of a miracle is not feasible on any of the three major theories of natural law prevailing today, rendering Hume’s primary philosophic argument untenable. In a different cosmological framework plausible today, Hume’s very argument works against him. (Keener, MCNTA, 136)
c. Do Regularities Determine What We Can Expect to Observe?
Many have argued the laws of nature can be utilized to place boundaries on what kind of observations we should expect to make as we examine the world around us. Others have argued against this assumption of uniformity by reexamining the concept of a law of nature. Stewart E. Kelly explains:
Such laws were indispensable for the Newtonian world order, but such a view was eclipsed a long time ago. Now there are regularities and order found in nature, [sic] they simply don’t give us adequate reason for seeing these regularities as prescriptive. (Kelly, MMM, 55–56)
Should we be surprised to discover that nature is never surprised when something out of the ordinary occurs? Here is how C. S. Lewis answers in his landmark book on miracles:
If events ever come from beyond Nature altogether, she will be no more incommoded by them. Be sure she will rush to the point where she is invaded, as the defensive forces rush to a cut in our finger, and there hasten to accommodate the newcomer. . . . The divine art of miracle is not an art of suspending the pattern to which events conform but of feeding new events into that pattern. It does not violate the law’s proviso, “If A, then B”: it says, “But this time instead of A, A2,” and Nature, speaking through all her laws, replies, “Then B2” and naturalizes the immigrant, as she well knows how. She is an accomplished hostess. (Lewis, Miracles, 60)
Terrence L. Nichols also criticizes the idea that the laws of nature can prescriptively describe what we can or cannot expect to occur:
Yet, if the hallmark of empirical science is impartial openness to evidence, such a way of proceeding [that is, pre-emptively excluding supernatural interventions] can hardly be called scientific. If scientific laws are held to be not only descriptive but also prescriptive, telling us what can and cannot occur in nature, then we have to dismiss all evidence that cannot be explained by present scientific theory. For example, recent experimental evidence, which has established that widely separated “entangled particles” interact nonlocally (or else communicate at faster-than light speeds), would have to be rejected because it is inexplicable according to current scientific theory. (Nichols, MST, 704–705)
It is important to clarify that we are not denying that nature is an ordered system full of regularities. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli note that theism assumes a system of natural law: “The concept of miracles presupposes, rather than sets aside, the idea that nature is a self-contained system of natural causes. Unless there are regularities, there can be no exceptions to them.” (Kreeft and Tacelli, HCA, 109)
d. Do Hume’s Argumentative Methods Lead to His Conclusion?
Hume was mistaken in his use of inductive principles. Stanley Jaki observes, “[Hume] failed to come to grips with the fact that on the basis of the bare inductionism he advocated one could never establish the existence of [immutable laws of nature]. An inductionism severed from metaphysics could not yield that completeness which was meant by universally and permanently valid laws.” (Beckwith, DHAAM, 38).
Hume’s argument depends heavily on his definition of a miracle. As Keener writes: “Thus, on the usual reading of Hume, he manages to define away any possibility of a miracle occurring, by defining ‘miracle’ as a violation of natural law, yet defining ‘natural law’ as principles that cannot be violated.” (Keener, MCNTA, 134) Yet there are good reasons for rejecting Hume’s definition.
It is important to note, the theist does not deny the uniformity of nature; nor does she deny that there is natural order. In fact, the identification of a miracle presupposes uniformity in nature. Rather, the presupposition scientists take today is called methodological naturalism. Essentially, methodological naturalism entails that supernatural causes should be excluded a priori in scientific inquiry. However, this view is essentially flawed. Take for example a theistic worldview, which also presupposes order in nature and that most causes have natural explanations. However, if one takes this approach, but allows for the world to be an open system—a system where the intervention of a divine being is possible—then it does not take away from the proficiency of scientific inquiry. Rather, adding the possibility of miracles does not take away from the efficiency of the scientific method, miracles just add to the scope of possible explanations that explain certain events and features in nature. (personal correspondence with Blake Giunta, founder of BeliefMap.org)
2. Hume’s Rejection of Testimony
Having discussed Hume’s definition of miracles as violations of natural law, we now consider Hume’s rejection of eyewitness accounts of miracles. Those who haven’t experienced or witnessed a miracle firsthand must rely on the testimony of others in their consideration of the evidence for miracles. Hume set very high standards for an individual to meet before that person’s testimony of a miracle could be considered credible. Some argue these standards are impossible to meet. “Hume’s position demands ‘overwhelming evidence’ before accepting the validity of a miracle. Yet Hume deliberately sets the standard of ‘overwhelming’ as virtually impossible, rejecting virtually any historical or present testimony.” (Keener, MCNTA, 647) Keener continues:
Hume also argued, apparently based on his first argument against miracles, that eyewitness testimony can never be sufficiently persuasive to overcome the uniform experience against miracles. If this argument against testimony is understood as it usually is, it likewise constitutes a circular argument, since whether human experience is uniformly against miracles is precisely the question under debate. Given abundant and sometimes well-attested claims of miracles today, Hume’s argument on this point should appear even less persuasive in a twenty-first-century multicultural context than it appeared in his own day. (Keener, MCNTA, 169)
The question remains: Is human experience uniformly against the occurrence of miracles? This part of Hume’s objection introduces another aspect of the subject—not our assessment of miracles’ possibility when we consider our direct empirical observation of an event, but instead, our assessment of the reports or accounts (written or spoken) made by other people. Keener, a leading authority on this topic, has authored a two-volume study defending the credibility of miracle reports in both historical and modern-day human experience. His research clearly demonstrates it is inappropriate to presume that miracle claims are incredibly rare. On the contrary, hundreds of millions of people, ranging across a multitude of cultural perspectives, adamantly testify they have experienced a miracle firsthand. The precision of Keener’s work is respected among leading authorities in a variety of academic disciplines. A case can be made that Western intellectuals who dismiss his research out of hand have fallen prey to an ethnocentric prejudice.1
Many healing claims involve blindness, inability to walk, and even raisings from death; other claims involve sudden changes in nature after prayers. Despite some debatable instances, some other cases are fairly clearly extraordinary. It seems to me that to dispute that such phenomena have sometimes occurred is not really possible for open-minded people. (Keener, MCNTA, 599)
Following this conclusion, Keener explores a variety of possible explanations for such phenomena. He makes a strong case suggesting the best explanation for some miracle claims is divine activity. This study serves as further support for our argument that Hume’s universal rejection of testimony regarding miracles is inappropriate and strongly contradicted by the present evidence.
Mark Larson argues that a testimony’s credibility is primarily grounded in the character of the person giving the testimony along with the nature of that testimony. “The proper way to assess testimonial evidence is to ascertain the sincerity of the witnesses and the causes of their convictions. The testimony of a witness should be received and believed if the witness is sincere and if the facts to which he testifies are indeed the only possible explanation for his testimony.” (Larson, TCO, 89)
In fact, a significant portion of our general knowledge relies on the testimony of others’ experiences. J. S. Lawton summarizes George Campbell’s Dissertation on Miracles when he explains, “Hume was contrasting experience and testimony as distinct sources of knowledge, the former being greatly superior to the latter. But, says Campbell, children give unlimited assent to testimony long before they have experience to act for themselves: how then can the acceptance of testimony be grounded in experience?” (Lawton, MR, 56).
Furthermore, Hume sets impossibly high standards for what it means to give a credible testimony (see chapter 32, V.A.1.a). Gary G. Colwell asks a few pertinent questions:
Has any event, let alone a miracle, ever had such attestation as Hume requires? Can we think of any ancient historical event whose chronicler can pass the test which Hume wants to use on persons who recount miracle stories? Can we not doubt any chronicler’s motives, as well as his education, his sincerity and his reputation—not to mention his possible habit of writing at 3 a.m. with a bottle of spirits at his side? Phrases like “of such unquestioned good sense” and “of such undoubted integrity” contrive impossible situations; for as soon as one begins to question a man he ceases from being a man of unquestioned good sense, no matter how far above reproach he has previously been known to be. (Colwell, MH, 10)
Today we have far more miracle claims to consider than Hume did in his day. However, Keener notes that “already in Hume’s day, it was clear to some that he failed to take into adequate account that the confluence of multiple, independent, and reliable witnesses increases the probability of a testimony’s accuracy.” (Keener, MCNTA, 152–153)
a. Does Religious Diversity Discredit Miracle Claims?
Hume observed some miracle claims must be false because they independently support incompatible religions. The decision to dismiss all miracle claims based on this observation about competing religious contexts is faulty. Robert Larmer observes, “If in fact the evidence for miracles in a certain religion is very strong and the evidence for miracles in other religions is very weak, there exists no reason for seriously questioning the strongly evidenced claims.” (Larmer, WIW, 108) Moreover, Craig Keener notes,
Most important, Hume’s counting the testimonies of different religions against one another is poor logic in any case; no court would throw out two testimonies on the allegation that one is false. Some could be true and others false; but the recognition that some miracle claims may be (and in fact are) false does nothing to damage the possibility that some other miracle claims may prove true. (Keener, MCNTA, 197)
This kind of reasoning would lead us to dismiss almost everything we know to be true: “It is a logical fallacy to reject stronger claims simply because weaker ones exist; on such grounds one could dispute most kinds of truth claims, since they usually have false or weaker competitors.” (Keener, MCNTA, 197) Keener continues:
While frauds exist and are probably common, one cannot extrapolate from a number of fraudulent claims to the conclusion that all miracle claims are fraudulent. Extrapolating from some claims being false to all claims being false involves a common logical fallacy: generalizing based on specific cases, hence illegitimate transference, that is, guilt by association. This approach lumps all supernatural claims together as a single group, then evaluates the entire group based on some claims.” (Keener, MCNTA, 615)
Hasty generalizations often overlook alternate possible explanations. If a religious context is accepted as presenting an opening for acknowledging a supernatural event (as, perhaps, with Beckwith’s definition), then particular interpretations given by one religion with fraudulent claims would not limit a supernatural God by falsifying the interpretations and claims of another context.
b. Why Are We Automatically Suspicious of Supernatural Claims?
Keener points out that automatic suspicion of supernatural claims may be rooted in a specific cultural context and intellectual era:
We typically ground our critique of supernatural phenomena in a modern Western worldview that we do not question, and then use those untested assumptions to posit an authoritative Metanarrative or construal of reality. As children of the Western Enlightenment, many Western biblical scholars reject all reports of supernatural activity out of hand without critically examining the philosophic prejudices that we ourselves bring to the table. . . . It was the radical Enlightenment, however, that introduced thoroughgoing suspicion of all supernatural claims. While many scholars continue to operate with this radical Enlightenment paradigm, its dogmatism, perhaps inherited from an earlier era of religious disputes, fares poorly when evaluated from the perspectives and claims of many other cultures or a post-Enlightenment critique. The radical Enlightenment perspective on miracles has its own cultural and historical context that is not even the context of current Western scientific discovery. (Keener, MCNTA, 102, 106)
Keener also suggests a flaw in the outlook that dismisses miracle claims without a solid argument for the presuppositions that led to this dismissal. “It seems to me that such disdain for vast numbers of claims (apparently hundreds of millions of them) from other cultures, purely on the basis of unproved presuppositions inherited from the radical wing of the Enlightenment, risks the charge of ethnocentric elitism.” (Keener, MCNTA, 762)
c. Is Indirect Evidence Valuable?
Moreover, Hume overlooks the importance of indirect evidence in support of miracles. As Nash argues:
Hume was wrong when he suggested that miracles are supported only by direct evidence cited in the testimony of people who claim to have witnessed them. There can also be important indirect evidence for miracles. Even if some person (Jones, let us say) did not observe some alleged miracle (thus making him dependent on the testimony of others who did), Jones may still be able to see abiding effects of the miracle. Suppose the miracle in question concerns the healing of a person who has been blind for years. Jones may be dependent on the testimony of others that they saw the healing occur, but perhaps Jones is now able to discern for himself that the formerly blind person can now see. The situation is analogous to that of someone who hears the testimony that a tornado has ravaged his city. Since he was not an eyewitness to the storm, he is dependent on the testimony of eyewitnesses who were there. But when this person arrives on the scene and sees the incredible devastation—cars on top of houses, other houses blown apart, trees uprooted—all this functions as indirect evidence to confirm the eyewitness testimony of others. In this way, certain effects of a miracle that exist after the event can serve as indirect evidence that the event happened. (Nash, FR, 233)
British Philosopher C. D. Broad appealed to indirect evidence to support the cornerstone miracle of the Christian faith—the resurrection of Christ:
We have testimony to the effect that the disciples were exceedingly depressed at the time of the Crucifixion; that they had extremely little faith in the future; and that, after a certain time, this depression disappeared, and they believed that they had evidence that their Master had risen from the dead. Now none of these alleged facts is in the least odd or improbable, and we have therefore little ground for not accepting them on the testimony offered us. But having done this, we are faced with the problem of accounting for the facts which we have accepted. What caused the disciples to believe, contrary to their previous conviction, and in spite of their feeling of depression, that Christ had risen from the dead? Clearly, one explanation is that he actually had arisen. And this explanation accounts for the facts so well that we may at least say that the indirect evidence for the miracle is far and away stronger than the direct evidence. (Broad, HTCM, 91–92)
3. Additional Reasons to Reject Hume’s Argument
a. Hume’s Arguments Are Circular
Beyond the responses listed above, Hume’s argument against miracles contains serious logical flaws. Hume’s notion of uniform experience either begs the question or is guilty of special pleading—that is, either Hume assumes the truth of his conclusion in order to arrive at his conclusion, or Hume applies rules and standards that he does not apply to his own view, without any explanation of why his own view does not fall victim to the same standards.
Further, Lewis exposes the circular character of Hume’s use of “uniform experience” in the following passage:
Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely “uniform experience” against miracles, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately, we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all the reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle. (Lewis, Miracles, 102)
Hume’s argument merely restates the conclusion as part of his argument. In this way, Hume is presenting his own worldview concerning whether or not supernatural activity is to be expected. He is not presenting a solid argument for this conclusion. Charles Talbert observes, “Worldviews are highly resistant to disconfirmation. The materialistic worldview, represented by Lüdemann [the German New Testament scholar], dictates that the world was and is ruled by iron physical laws that not even God could or can bend.” (Talbert, RLAMM, 215–216)
b. Hume Assumes the Probability of a Miracle Is Zero
Michael P. Levine explains the flaw in assuming that because a miracle is unprecedented, its probability must be zero. If this were true, based on probability, we should believe any other explanation with a non-zero probability before we believe a miracle has occurred, even if miracles are logically possible. The question becomes, is it appropriate to assign a probability of zero to a miracle’s occurrence?
By treating a miracle as an event in the normal course of events as Hume must do if probability is to be applicable to determining whether to believe a miracle occurred, Hume assures that its probability rating will be zero. A miracle is infinitely improbable because it is totally unprecedented. The only way one can obtain an infinite improbability is to make the kind of implicit a priori assumption about the uniformity of nature that Hume makes. Assuming we do not presuppose the principle that entails the concept of miracle as a violation of the laws of nature is incoherent (i.e. that a miracle cannot occur), the probability of a unique event is not zero as Hume would have it. Rather, it cannot be determined. (Levine, HPM, 34)
Again, the problem originates in the presuppositions made by definition before considering any particular account of a miracle. Keener observes we do not have all the information we need to rule out miracles based on the uniformity of nature. “We could reason from nature’s uniformity only if we knew all the causal conditions present and could exclude intelligent (and in this case extranatural) causes. Probability estimates for rolls of dice will be skewed if the dice are loaded and if one allows for the possibility of distinctive divine action in some circumstances, one cannot rule out miracles in those circumstances.” (Keener, MCNTA, 183)
c. Hume Confuses Evidence with Probability
Beckwith notes Hume’s failure to make an appropriate distinction between evidence and probability:
Hume has failed to realize that the wise and intelligent person bases his or her convictions on evidence, not on Humean “probability.” That is, an event’s occurrence may be very improbable in terms of past experience and observation, but current observation and testimony may lead one to believe that the evidence for the event is good. In this way, Hume confuses evidence with probability. (Beckwith, DHAAM, 38).
d. Hume Is Inconsistent
Another challenge Hume faces in defending his argument against miracles is the fact that it seems inconsistent with his arguments elsewhere in support of ethics and ordinary life. For Hume, miracles cannot be claimed as causes: in fact, he argued that no causation at all is provable. He said we observe events and infer what they mean, but what we experience is actually only a succession of disconnected sensations. We have no proof they will repeat that succession. In this sense, he was radically skeptical. Keener explains:
Hume’s usual empiricism was so radical that it allowed only disconnected experiences, not determinations of causation, which are interpretive. The past sequence of events arouses expectation of their continuation, but cannot justify our expectations. For example, far from endorsing nature’s uniformity, Hume argued that one might presume that the sun would rise the next day out of habit, but one could not be certain about it. He critiqued conventional notions of causality, treating laws as “merely observed uniformities” and, against earlier rationalists, denying them any metaphysical role. Thus some argue that Hume himself could not support the notion of inviolable laws (as opposed to mere habits of interpretation); if taken to its logical conclusion, the epistemological rigor in his miracles essay would have undercut even Newton’s physics. (Keener, MCNTA, 136–137)
Despite his bleak conclusions about what a mind could know, Hume met death with tranquility, and he discussed with James Boswell, Samuel Johnson’s biographer, matters of economics and philosophy and his own writing on history: Hume did not live according to the extreme skeptical conclusions of his essays. (Smith, DH, 78)
e. Hume Has a Defective View of Probability
Moreover, Hume confuses the probability of historical events with the way in which scientists employ probability to formulate scientific law. Nash explains:
Finally, critics of Hume have complained that his argument is based on a defective view of probability. For one thing, Hume treats the probability of events in history like miracles in the same way he treats the probability of the recurring events that give rise to the formulation of scientific laws. In the case of scientific laws, probability is tied to the frequency of occurrence; the more times scientists observe similar occurrences under similar conditions, the greater the probability that their formulation of a law is correct. But historical events including miracles are different; the events of history are unique and nonrepeatable. Therefore, treating historical events including miracles with the same notion of probability the scientist uses in formulating his laws ignore a fundamental difference between the two subject matters. (Nash, FR, 234)
The task of assigning probabilities to the nature of an explanation is complicated and deeply influenced by the assigner’s presuppositions. According to Keener:
For most Western observers, the interpreter’s assumptions determine how improbable natural explanations must be before supernatural explanations will be considered. Some rule out all evidence that they could explain by some other means, no matter how improbable the other explanations are, because they presuppose that supernatural explanations are always more improbable than even the weakest natural ones. In this case, they do not merely assign the burden of proof wholly to supernaturalists, despite antisupernaturalism being the minority position historically and globally. They also demand a standard of evidence impossible for any person to meet, because evidence that contradicts one’s position can virtually always be explained away. (Keener, MCNTA, 601)
Benedict de Spinoza argues that miracles are metaphysically self-contradictory. As one of the characteristics of a miracle is that it is not contradictory (see section III.H. above), this could be a serious objection to the possibility of miracles. Spinoza actually goes beyond the critique of miracles by Hume, but Spinoza’s criticism against the possibility of miracles suffers from the same shortcoming of fallacious reasoning. We will identify those flaws, as seen from the perspective of one who accepts the concept of a personal God who not only created the cosmos but has the power and will to intervene in it.
1. Spinoza’s Pantheistic View Of God
Van der Loos explains, “For Spinoza God, substance, and nature are identical concepts. God as the natura naturans, the first cause of all things, acts in accordance with strict laws. The universal laws of nature are eternal dispensations of God, embracing eternal truth and necessity. This system leaves no room for miracles.” (van der Loos, MJ, 11) Moreover, Ernst and Marie-Luise Keller state that “For [Spinoza] non-natural or supernatural miracles are ‘a mere absurdity.’ If they really existed they would do away with all certainty in human affairs.” (Keller, MID, 33–34).
Further, Spinoza claims that miracles would be a contradiction, not in the occurrence of miracles with the natural world, but with the very nature of God. Spinoza writes, “Nature cannot be contravened, but . . . she preserves a fixed and immutable order. . . . If anyone asserted that God acts in contravention to the laws of nature, he, ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature—an evident absurdity.” (Spinoza, TPT, 48)
2. Refuting Spinoza’s Objection
Spinoza’s objection is rather strange. It appears to apply only to his rational pantheistic view of God, not to the personal concept Christians hold. The biblical concept of God does not declare that God is identical to nature; thus, the laws of nature are not part of God’s nature. If God interacts with, supervenes, violates, or disrupts the laws of nature, it does not follow by this view that God is violating his own nature; he is merely interacting with his creation in an unexpected or unusual manner. Keener writes:
As Polkinghorne and others have responded, why should God choose to be limited to one way of working? Granted that God would be free to work through the apparent randomness of nature (and human lives) to achieve long-range purposes, is there any reason why God could not sometimes work differently, to communicate something special by making it distinct from the broader general revelation? Such a supposition requires no inconsistency in God’s character, only multiple means of achieving divine ends, just as humans can perform physical work either directly or through verbal communication that elicits a physical response. (Keener, MCNTA, 181–182)
It is worth noting that even humans interact with nature in a complex way. Keener argues:
Intelligent actors may not “disrupt” the “regularity” of nature but their existence operates on a level of complexity quite different from most of the vaster cosmos of which they are a part. How much more should this be true of a putative divine actor not subject to a cosmos that this actor originated? Those who, with Scripture and/or creed (“maker of heaven and earth”), affirm a Creator would hardly be impressed with any demand that this God be subject to patterns of nature that this God initiated. (Keener, MCNTA, 184)
Why should God choose to be limited to one way of working? Granted that God would be free to work through the apparent randomness of nature (and human lives) to achieve long-range purposes, is there any reason why God could not sometimes work differently, to communicate something special by making it distinct from the broader general revelation? Such a supposition requires no inconsistency in God’s character, only multiple means of achieving divine ends.
Craig S. Keener
3. Spinoza “Begs the Question”
In addition, Norman Geisler argues that Spinoza’s argument begs the question:
Spinoza’s Euclidean (deductive) rationalism suffers from an acute case of petitio principii (begging the question). For, as David Hume notes, anything validly deducible from premises must have already been present in those premises from the beginning. But if the antisupernatural is already presupposed in Spinoza’s rationalistic premises, then it is no surprise to discover him attacking the miracles of the Bible.
Geisler adds, “What Spinoza needed to do, but did not, was to provide some sound argument for his rationalistic presuppositions.” Spinoza “spins them out in the thin air of rational speculation, but they are never firmly attached to the firm ground of empirical observation.” (Geisler, MMM, 18, 21)
4. Proper View of God’s Interaction with the World
Contrary to Spinoza, influential philosopher Richard Swinburne argues for a normative understanding of the biblical conception of God’s nature—a concept that entails the expectation of God to act in nature. In contrast to the deist or pantheist, if the theist believes that God will act in nature, then there is great credence given to the belief in favor of the possibility of miracles.
If there is no God, then the laws of nature are the ultimate determinants of what happens. But if there is a God, then whether and for how long and under what circumstances laws of nature operate depend on God. Any evidence that there is a God, and, in particular, evidence that there is a God of a kind who might be expected to intervene occasionally in the natural order will be evidence leading us to expect occasional violations of laws of nature. And any evidence that God might be expected to intervene in a certain way will be evidence supporting historical evidence that he has done so. (Swinburne, ER, 198)
C. The Objection That Miracles Are Impossible
Even with reasonable responses to Hume’s and Spinoza’s objections available, the question of whether or not miracles are possible continues to arise, and, as explained at the opening to this chapter, it has become almost the default view of a great many people in the Western world as the twenty-first century opens. For the theist, miracles are possible if God exists. However, a number of thinkers still argue against the possibility of miracles based on a variety of antisupernatural presuppositions.2 Craig Keener summarizes Keith Ward’s argument (Ward, MT, 137–138): “An atheist has reason to presuppose miracles impossible on the premise of atheism, but they are not logically impossible; the degree of probability assigned to miracles depends on one’s prior assumptions.” (Keener, MCNTA, 139)
1. Supposing the Impossible
The question then becomes, is it reasonable to rule out divine activity as a starting point? Keener gives reasons for concluding that the answer to this question is no.
Is it really intellectually necessary to dismiss as possible the explanation that large numbers of actual observers believe far more consistent with the most relevant evidence—namely, the explanation of divine activity? The majority of those who assume as necessary Hume’s argument or antitheism are not themselves professional philosophers. They seem to simply take for granted that philosophy has excluded the possibility of miracles, when in fact, contrary to the belief of some outside academic philosophy, theism remains an acceptable subject of discussion in that discipline. (Keener, MCNTA, 740)
2. Miracles Are Possible
Even Hume did not accept that miracles are logically impossible. The person whose presuppositions propose that miracles are logically impossible goes even further than did Hume, the best-known critic of miracles. The modern critic of miracles who asserts the illogicality of affirming what he does not know is true would seem to be following in the wake of Thomas Henry Huxley, who declared that belief in the supernatural aspects of the Gospels would be “that which the candid simplicity of a Sunday scholar once defined it to be. ‘Faith,’ said this unconscious plagiarist of Tertullian, ‘is the power of saying you believe things which are incredible.’ ” (Huxley, AAC, 1452) Those who believe miracles are not logically possible have no justification for the belief except their refusal to commit to anything for which they do not yet see the proof. Huxley in fact declared that agnosticism was not
a creed of any kind, except insofar as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a principle . . . that it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty . . . yet that the application of that principle results in the denial of, or the suspension of judgment concerning, a number of propositions respecting which our contemporary ecclesiastical “gnostics” profess entire certainty. (Huxley, AAC, 1450)
Huxley and those who withhold judgment to remain neutral are actually basing their own beliefs on unsupported assumptions—that is, their “absolute faith” in the validity of the principle that judgment should be deferred for topics about which they have no certain knowledge and that they see as being out of reach and perhaps out of reach for everyone. (Huxley, AAC, 1450–51) To the theist, these agnostic assumptions that seem to call for neutrality are not enough to rule out the possibility of miracles.
Those in Huxley’s camp have chosen to defer judgment, taking an epistemologically neutral position that goes beyond the methodological neutrality that historian Ronald J. Sider says modern historiography requires of historians. He separates the personal beliefs of a historian from his or her professional role’s requirement to maintain a neutral position toward God’s existence or nonexistence.
Now the historian, qua historian, cannot assume that traditional theism has been either finally proven or finally disproven. To do either would be to include a significant metaphysical presupposition in one’s historical methodology. The historian must remain methodologically neutral. Personally, the historian may be a theist or a non-theist, but qua historian he ought—according to the morality of historical knowledge—to be an agnostic. As a methodological agnostic, he knows that the God of traditional theism just may happen to exist and that miracles would therefore be a real possibility. Hence he must decide the historicity of alleged miracles on the basis of the evidence that can be adduced for each individual case. (Sider, HMAM, 28)
D. The Objection That Miracles Are Unscientific
Nowell-Smith claims that miracles are unscientific because they lack predictive value. Nowell-Smith draws again upon the trust in uniformity that Hume had said prevents the occurrence of miracles. Of anyone trusting in the possibility of miracles, Nowell-Smith says, “Let him consider the meaning of the word ‘explanation’ and let him ask himself whether this notion does not involve that of a law or hypothesis capable of predictive expansion. And then let him ask himself whether such an explanation would not be natural, in whatever terms it was couched, and how the notion of ‘the supernatural’ could play any part in it.” (Nowell-Smith, “Miracles,” 253)
1. Predictability and Explanation
However, contrary to Nowell-Smith’s assertion, there are several natural events that lack predictive value, yet are still suitable as good explanations. As Geisler explains:
Nowell-Smith demands that all explanations have predictive value to qualify as true explanations. And yet there are many events he would call natural that no one can predict. We cannot predict if or when a bachelor will marry. But when he does say, “I do,” do we not claim that he was simply “doing what comes naturally”? If naturalists reply, as indeed they must, that they cannot always predict in practice (but only in principle) when natural events occur, then supernaturalists can do likewise. In principle we know that a miracle will occur whenever God deems one necessary. If we knew all the facts (which include the mind of God), then we could predict in practice precisely when this would be. Furthermore, biblical miracles are past singularities that like the origin of the universe or of life are not presently being repeated. But predictions cannot be made from singularities. They can only be projected from patterns. The past is not known by empirical science, but by forensic science. Therefore, it is misdirected to ask for predictions (forward); rather, one is attempting to make a retroduction (backward). (Geisler, MMM, 46–47)
2. Replication of a Miracle Is Not Necessary
Some have further argued that miracles are unscientific because they are not replicable in controlled settings. However, this provides no reason to presume miracles do not happen. As Keener says,
Events in history are not repeatable in controlled studies; yet should we draw from that observation the inference that they are therefore not true? One is compelled to ask what kind of narrow epistemology would require us to rule out virtually any reliable information in history. When one employs a method of verifying miracles that insists that they be replicable in controlled settings, yet regards as natural and nonmiraculous any event that is so replicable, one has framed the method so as to secure the expected antisupernatural outcome. (Keener, MCNTA, 667)
Keener goes on to explain the inadequacy of empirical science to lead us to conclusions about the metaphysical: “Pure science is inductive and thus does not rule on metaphysical possibilities. It may extrapolate from known cases or work deductively from mathematical principles, but neither excludes the possibility of specific divine action.” Neither, in fact, can pose metaphysical questions: the metaphysical is not within their domain. Furthermore, “Since science works inductively from details to larger patterns, it looks for larger patterns and cannot address single anomalies like miracles.” (Keener, MCNTA, 126)
3. Science Is Not the Only Mode of Knowledge
We must venture outside the realm of science to describe some aspects of human history, including the narrations of events that are described as miracles. Science alone cannot describe everything that exists in reality. Keener asserts:
Human experience necessitates metaphysical as well as scientific language; the languages describe different aspects of existence and are not intrinsically contradictory. Human history, therefore, is not subject to pure scientific description. “The so-called conflict between science and miracles,” Ian Ramsey observes, “is a pseudo-conflict which only arises when complete adequacy is claimed for the language of science.” (Keener, MCNTA, 184–185)
The objection, then, that miracles are not scientific should not lead us to conclude miracles are not possible or credible as explanations of our evidence. Science is not equipped to lead us to this conclusion. Keener notes: “Many scientifically inclined persons who rule out supernatural explanations a priori may do so not because the data in their specialties demand this approach but because their initial plausibility structures reflect philosophic assumptions borrowed from outside their discipline.” (Keener, MCNTA, 692)
E. The Objection That Supposed Miracles Are Natural, Not Supernatural
Recall that we characterized miracles as supernatural. Some deny this classification and claim they are unnatural (as previously discussed). Others deny the supernatural character of miracles claiming they are in fact natural, thus, miracles will eventually be explained by natural means.
1. The Faith of Naturalism
Patrick Nowell-Smith claims “miracles” are simply “strange” natural events that either have or will have a strict scientific explanation. An explanation like this reflects the outlook of naturalism, which became widespread during the last third of the nineteenth century. Naturalism sees man as only matter, temporarily alive in a cosmos without God. But this view does look to empirical science and reason to continue discovering the complex natural processes that explain the causes of events. According to Nowell-Smith, “No matter how strange an event someone reports, the statement that it must have been due to a supernatural agent cannot be a part of that report.” (Nowell-Smith, Miracles, 246) He continues, “No scientist can at present explain certain phenomena. It does not follow that the phenomena are inexplicable by scientific methods, still less that they must be attributed to supernatural agents.” (Nowell-Smith, Miracles, 247) To further his argument he states, “There is still the possibility that science may be able, in the future, to offer an explanation which, though couched in quite new terms, remains strictly scientific.” (Nowell-Smith, Miracles, 248)
2. Naturalism Limits Knowledge
Nowell-Smith’s objection to miracles is rooted in a kind of naturalistic faith, not scientific evidence. Norman Geisler exposes the flaws in Nowell-Smith’s assertion as follows:
While Nowell-Smith claims that the scientist should keep an open mind and not reject evidence that ruins his preconceived theories, it is clear that he has closed his mind to the possibility of any supernatural explanations. He arbitrarily insists that all explanations must be natural ones or they do not really count. He makes the grand assumption that all events will ultimately have a natural explanation, but doesn’t offer any proof for that assumption. The only way he can know this is to know beforehand that miracles cannot occur. It is a leap of naturalistic faith! (Geisler and Brooks, WSA, 81)
According to Lewis, no amount of time will be sufficient to naturalize a legitimate miracle: “When a thing professes from the very outset to be a unique invasion of Nature by something from outside, increasing knowledge of nature can never make it either more or less credible than it was at the beginning. In this sense it is mere confusion of thought to suppose that advancing science has made it harder for us to accept miracles.” (Lewis, Miracles, 48)
Furthermore, scientific naturalism does not seem to distinguish between observable operations of nature and the unobservable sources of those operations’ very existence. As Geisler notes,
One of the problems behind this kind of scientific naturalism is the confusion of naturalistic origin and natural function. Motors function in accordance with physical laws but physical laws do not produce motors; minds do. In like manner, the origin of a miracle is not the physical and chemical laws of the universe, even though the resulting event will operate in accordance with these natural laws. In other words, a miraculous conception will produce a nine-month pregnancy (in accordance with natural law). So, while natural laws regulate the operation of things, they do not account for the origin of all things. (Geisler, MMM, 47)
3. Naturalism’s Reductionist Assumptions about Medical Miracles
Many miracle claims involve an individual who has experienced physical healing. Some physicians reject that these claims are truly miraculous. It is important to discern what kind of authority should be heeded in these instances. As Keener writes:
When a doctor reports that a condition is not genuinely cured or that it often resolves on its own, she speaks within her expertise and we should give heed. When a doctor denies that a cure is miraculous based on a philosophic paradigm that excludes miracles, however, he speaks not as a doctor but as an amateur philosopher. In the latter case, the opinion merits no greater weight than that assigned to that of any other amateur philosopher. (Keener, MCNTA, 656)
A patient’s psychological disposition can play a significant role in his or her recovery. Keener summarizes Rex Gardner’s argument (Gardner, HM, 29–31): “Clearly natural factors are at work in much healing, but some observers contend that attributing all medically unexplained recovery claims to exclusively psychological causes, when other proposed factors may be at work, is reductionist.” (Keener, MCNTA, 646) Psychological factors are not always sufficient for explaining remarkable instances of healing. As David Robertson notes,
No one will ever know how much of the cure depends on the patient’s desire and expectation that he be healed. But most physicians do recognize that motivation is a powerful force aiding recovery. In spite of this, there are surely few in the field who have not, on some rare occasion at least, witnessed a recovery so contrary to the usual prognosis, and so apparently complete, that the word “miracle” seemed the only appropriate description of it. (Robertson, EL, 188–189)
Keener explains further what is meant by the argument that the exclusion of supernatural explanations for remarkable healings is reductionist: “Although one cannot prove special divine action where natural factors can account for a healing, to assume by contrast that the presence of natural factors must exclude supernatural ones is reductionist. Some critics carry the reductionism so far that they attribute even healings without any currently explainable natural causes to natural causation that may someday be explained.” (Keener, MCNTA, 711)
Some who concede that divine activity is possible still argue that it should serve as a credible explanation only when all other explanations have been ruled out. This reasoning embraces future scientific discoveries as more credible explanations than divine action. However, problems exist with accepting unknown laws of nature as a better explanation than divine healing: one ends up profoundly skeptical. The person arguing in this way has reduced the potential answer to the single one that has no existence yet and ambiguous evidence for its potential. According to Keener,
The burden of proof seems stacked impossibly against divine healing: any recovery that could be explained otherwise excludes divine healing, yet nearly any restoration noted in Scripture or today could potentially be explained on such terms. This criterion does not require the antisupernaturalist to offer a plausible explanation—just any explanation. Among viable explanations in the skeptic’s arsenal is now that apparent miracles could reflect unknown laws of nature—a criterion that effectively excludes any appeal to evidence. (Keener, MCNTA, 653, emphasis in original)
We argue reasonably that divine activity is not necessarily the least likely explanation in every circumstance. It serves as a stronger explanation than the appeal to coincidence or undiscovered scientific laws. Keener concludes: “Granted that a supernatural interpretation presupposes the existence of something supernatural, the ruling out of such an interpretation presupposes the nonexistence of anything supernatural, and in some cases a supernatural explanation (such as theism) provides a more plausible explanation than coincidence would.” (Keener, MCNTA, 703)
James Burke began his 1985 PBS series The Day the Universe Changed with the anecdote of someone remarking to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein about the foolishness of those who lived before Copernicus and thought that the sun went around the earth. According to the story, Wittgenstein’s response was, “Yes. But what would it have looked like if the sun did so?” Our interpretations, clearly, come from presuppositions that govern what we expect to perceive. We began with my (Sean’s) conversation with the physicist who presumed that normality governed all possible natural events. We have seen Hume’s classic argument that also trusted in uniformity but at the same time questioned causality and reports that were not directly perceived, and we have noticed how he was situated between a refusal of his Scots Calvinist upbringing and the heady new deist proclamations of the Enlightenment. Our own postmodern world remembers and still holds traces of these earlier suppositions, along with modern confidence in reason and postmodern suspicion—especially when traditional faith is involved. C. S. Lewis begins his book Miracles by saying,
In all my life I have met only one person who has seen a ghost. And the interesting thing about the story is that the person disbelieved in the immortal soul before she saw the ghost and still disbelieves after seeing it. She says that what she saw must have been an illusion or a trick of the nerves. . . . For this reason, the question whether miracles occur can never be answered simply by experience. . . . If anything extraordinary seems to have happened, we can always say that we have been the victim of an illusion. If we hold a philosophy which excludes the supernatural, this is what we shall always say. What we learn from experience depends on the kind of philosophy we bring to experience. It is therefore useless to appeal to experience before we have settled, as well as we can, the philosophical question. (Lewis, Miracles, 7)
Serious thinkers are always invited to reflect on the expectations they bring to an experience or concept or conversation or project—or to the reading of a text. We usually begin to discover these presuppositions when something seems not to fit in the way that we expect. If the topic involves questions of whether an eternal, personal God cares about the world and the individual—and in fact intervenes within the world or an individual life—all the more so.
1. These millions of reports do not undermine our claim that miracles are relatively rare occurrences. For all the millions of reports, these events remain exceptions to everyday experience, far outweighed by the uncounted trillions upon trillions of instances when everything proceeds according to the normal laws of nature.
2. For further discussion on how presuppositions affect the position a person takes about knowledge, see these other chapters in this book: “The Nature of Truth,” “The Knowability of Truth,” “Answering Postmodernism,” “Answering Skepticism,” and “Is History Knowable?”