NOTES

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INTRODUCTION: “THE BEGINNING”

    1. Sam Tannenhaus, Whittaker Chambers: A Biography (New York: Modern Library, 1998), 96; Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, 1952), 337.

    2. The details of Chambers’s day in Washington come from Chambers, Witness, 335–40.

    3. “Dr. Wirt’s Statement on ‘Brain Trust’s Plans,” New York Times, March 24, 1934.

    4. “Quick End Planned for Wirt Inquiry,” New York Times, March 31, 1934.

    5. “Crowd at Hearing Fills Caucus Room,” New York Times, April 11, 1934. The charges that Wirt was jailed as a German sympathizer would stand five days before Bulwinkle retracted them, noting cryptically that the false report “came to me by what any one would consider reliable sources.” “Retracts Charge Against Dr. Wirt,” New York Times, April 17, 1934.

    6. “Dr. Wirt’s Targets Swift in Denial,” New York Times, April 11, 1934.

    7. “Laughing Through,” Miami Daily News, April 15, 1934.

    8. “Big Crowd Meets Train,” New York Times, April 14, 1934.

    9. “Wirt Story Denied by Fellow-Diners,” New York Times, April 18, 1934.

  10. “Wirt Story Denied by Fellow-Diners,” New York Times, April 18, 1934.

  11. Barrows is noted in KGB archives, for instance, for helping to bring Laurence Duggan, a State Department official close to Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, into espionage service to Stalin. The KGB record also chides her for serial affairs with Soviet representatives in Washington, first Boris Skvirksy, the USSR’s unofficial representative, and then Ambassador Aleksandr Troyanovsky, the first Soviet ambassador. Almost unbelievably, Troyanovsky would host the first Soviet gala in Washington on the night of Wirt’s testimony. Among the Soviet ambassador’s guest list of five hundred were also two men Wirt had named: Rexford Tugwell and dinner party guest Laurence Todd. John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 220, 528.

  12. John Earl Haynes, comp., Vassiliev Notebooks Concordance: Cover Names, Real Names, Abbreviations, Acronyms, Organizational Titles, Tradecraft Terminology (2008), 88, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/vassilie-notebook-concordance-file.

  13. “Wirt Story Denied by Fellow-Diner,” New York Times, April 18, 1934.

  14. Investigation of Statements Made by Dr. William A. Wirt, 69.

  15. “Wirt Story Denied by Fellow-Diners,” New York Times, April 18, 1934.

  16. “Wirt Story Denied by Fellow-Diners,” New York Times, April 18, 1934.

  17. Investigation of Statements Made by Dr. William A. Wirt, Minority Views, p.7.

  18. “Wirt Sees Nation Going to Socialism,” New York Times, May 1, 1934.

  19. “O’Connor Admits Helping To Discredit Dr. Wirt,” The Observer Dispatch (Utica), April 10, 1940.

  20. Martin Dies, Martin Dies’ Story (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), p. 33.

CHAPTER 1

    1. A. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1976), p. 101.

    2. Hans Christian Andersen, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” Hans Andersen’s Fairy Tales: A New Translation by Reginald Spink (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1958), 79–81.

    3. Stephen C. Coughlin and I are coauthors of Shariah: The Threat to America, Report of Team B II (Center for Security Policy, 2010), with Lt. Gen. William “Jerry” Boykin, Lt. Gen. Harry Edward Soyster, Christine Brim, Amb. Henry F. Cooper, Michael Del Rosso, Frank J. Gaffney Jr., John Guandolo, Brian Kennedy, Clare M. Lopez, Adm. James A. “Ace” Lyons, Andrew C. McCarthy, Patrick Poole, Joseph E. Schmitz, Tom Trento, J. Michael Waller, R. James Woolsey, and David Yerushalmi.

    4. Stephen Collins Coughlin, Major, Military Intelligence, USAR, “‘To Our Great Detriment’: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad,” unclassified thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, July 2007.

    5. See “Words That Work and Words That Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” National Counterterrorism Center, March 14, 2008.

    6. Spencer Ackerman, “FBI Purges Hundreds of Terrorism Documents in Islamophobia Probe,” Wired, February 15, 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/hundreds-fbi-documents-muslims/.

    7. Memorandum from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, April 24, 2012, http://tinyurl.com/8cjcpfq.

    8. Pentagon spokesman Capt. John Kirby stated on Al Jazeera on or around May 10, 2012, “The concern here is not so much that we may be spinning down a cadre of individuals and creating these warped views but that again, it’s not in keeping with—this material is not in keeping with our core values and is not in keeping with the strategy that we know we’re out there executing.” “US, Military Course ‘Islam Is a Threat to America’ Outlawed,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embeded&v=Cy6yR3UJ2Dc.

    9. Noah Shachtman and Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Military Taught Officers: Use ‘Hiroshima’ Tactics for ‘Total War’ on Islam,” Wired, May 10, 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/05/total-war-islam/all/?pid=1200.

  10. The slide cites the authoritative Koran sura (verse) 5:51, where Allah commands Muslims not to take Jews and Christians for friends; the authoritative hadith recorded by both Bukhari and Muslim (two authoritative Koranic commentators) that states Muslims will not enter paradise until the Muslims kill all the Jews; and another authoritative hadith that states Jesus will return at end of days to implement sharia, send all Christians to hell for failing to become Muslim, and kill all the Jews. In a memorandum of record shared with the author, Stephen C. Coughlin chronicled this chain of events surrounding the Dempsey-initiated purge of military training materials.

  11. In 2008, following the largest terrorism-financing trial in U.S. history, the Holy Land Foundation and five of its leaders were convicted of providing material support to Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group and Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Trial evidence revealed that the majority of Islamic organizations in the United States are affiliates of or associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of these groups, including unindicted co-conspirators Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), have been part of government “Muslim outreach” programs.

  12. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007, http://tinyurl.com/9xvuzlo.

  13. COMISAF Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009, http://tinyurl.com/ko29sc.

  14. Ibn Warraq, ed., Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), 414. See the following Koranic principles, selected from Appendix A.

The believers who stay at home … are not equal to those who fight for the cause of God with their good and their persons. (IV.95–96)

Believers, do not choose the infidels rather than the faithful for your friends. (IV.144)

O you who believe! Take not the Jews and Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who takes them for friends is one of them. (V.51)

Make war on them until idolotary shall cease and God’s religion shall reign supreme. (VIII.39)

I will instill terror into the hearts of the Infidels, strike off their heads then, and strike off from them every fingertip. (VIII.12)

Believers, when you meet the unbelievers preparing for battle do not turn your backs to them. [Anyone who does] shall incur the wrath of God and hell shall be his home: an evil dwelling indeed. (VII.15, 16)

Believers, do not befriend your fathers or your brothers if they choose unbelief in preference to faith. Wrongdoers are those that befriend them. (IX.23)

If you do not fight, He will punish you sternly, and replace you by other men. (IX.39)

Prophet, make war on the unbelievers and the hypocrites and deal rigorously with them. Hell shall be their home: an evil fate. (IX.73)

Do not yield to the unbelievers, but fight them strenuously with this Koran. (XXV.52)

The unbelievers among the People of the Book and the pagans shall burn forever in the fire of Hell. They are the vilest of creatures. (XCVIII.6)

  15. “Probe Targets clerk in London,” Washington Post, October 28, 2001.

  16. Ibn Warraq, What the Koran Really Says (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 69.

  17. Memorandum from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, April 24, 2012, http://tinyurl.com/8cjcpfq.

  18. Patrick S. Poole, “FBI Escorts Known Hamas Operative Through Top-Secret National Counterterrorism Center as ‘Outreach’ to Muslim Community,” Breitbart News, September 27, 1010, http://tinyurl.com/8dfuvnt.

  19. Patrick S. Poole, “Once Again, FBI’s ‘Muslim Outreach’ Welcomes Terror-Tied Man,” PJ Media, June 4, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/8lwpmct.

  20. “Director of National Intelligence James Clapper: Muslim Brotherhood ‘Largely Secular,’” ABC News, February 10, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/8ekyhj6.

  21. Tina Magaard quoted and linked in Andrew G. Bostom, “Eurabia Versus Wilders Agonistes,” American Thinker, April 29, 2012, http://tinyurl.com/943ak34.

  22. See John David Lewis, “‘No Substitute for Victory’: The Defeat of Islamic Totalitarianism,” The Objective Standard 1, no. 4 (Winter 2006–7), http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2006-winter/no-substitute-for-victory.asp.

  23. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 144.

  24. Andrew C. McCarthy, “Huma Abedin’s Brotherhood Ties Are Not Just a Family Affair,” PJ Media, July 27, 2012, http://pjmedia.com/andrewmccarthy/2012/07/27/huma-abedins-brotherhood-ties-are-not-just-a-family-affair.

  25. Andrew C. McCarthy, “Fear the Muslim Brotherhood,” National Review Online, January 31, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/258419/fear-muslim-brotherhood-andrew-c-mccarthy?pg=2*.

  26. McCarthy, “Fear the Muslim Brotherhood.”

  27. “You Love Life and We Love Death,” Boston Globe, March 14, 2004.

  28. Andrew Bostom, “Why Hamas Loves Death (and Cease-Fires),” American Thinker, November 23, 2012, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/11/why_hamas_loves_death_and_cease_fires.html*.

  29. Diana West, “C-PAC and the ‘Trojan’ Brotherhood,” syndicated column, February 11, 2011, http://www.dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/1686/C-PAC-and-the-Trojan-Brotherhood.aspx.

  30. Diana West, “Pieces, Shards, Dust … Revolt?” blog entry, November 25, 2008, http://www.dianawest.net/Home/tabid/36/EntryId/603/Pieces-Shards-Dust-Revolt.aspx.

  31. Edward Winslow, “Mourt’s Relation,” quoted in Mary Caroline Crawford, Social Life in Old New England (Boston: Little, Brown, 1915), 474.

  32. West, “Pieces, Shards.”

  33. Robert Conquest, The Dragons of Expectation: Reality and Delusion in the Course of History (New York: Norton, 2005), 169.

  34. Vladimir Bukovsky, “The Power of Memory and Acknowledgment,” Cato’s Letter 8, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 2.

  35. Paul Belien, “Former Soviet Dissident Warns for EU Dictatorship,” The Brussels Journal, February 27, 2006, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/865; see also Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov, EUUSSR: The Soviet Roots of European Integration (Worcester Park, Surrey, UK: Sovereignty Publications, 2004).

  36. Hans Vogel, “Twenty Years After…,” November 4, 2009, Pravda, http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/04-11-2009/110289-berlin_wall-0.

  37. Conquest, Dragons, 167. Besides Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), there was the steady toll of individuals killed trying to cross from the east side of the Berlin Wall. There were also significant though unreported food riots (1962) and the mutiny of the warship Storozhevoy (1975) inside the USSR.

  38. Ian Gallagher and Daniel Boffey, “EU’s New ‘Foreign Minister’ Cathy Ashton Was Treasurer of CND.” Mail Online, November 21, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1229940/Cathy-Ashton-EUs-new-Foreign-Minister-Treasurer-CND.html. See also Pavel Stroilov, Cold War & Peace Movement: The ‘Peace Movement’ in Britain in the Final Stages of the Cold War (mid-1970s–mid-1980s), research paper commissioned by Gerard Batten, MEP, UK Independence Party, 2010. See: gerardbattenmep.co.uk/pam phlets/Peace02FEB10.pdf*

  39. Stroilov, Cold War & Peace Movement, 3.

  40. Belien, “Former Soviet Dissident Warns.”

  41. “Batten Call to Block Commission,” January 12, 2010, UK Independence Party, http://www.ukip.org/content/european-issues/1401-batten-call-to-block-commission. The six other commissioners are: Estonia’s Siim Kallas, Slovakia’s Maroš Šefcovič, the Czech Republic’s Štefan Füle, Latvia’s Andris Piebalgs, Slovenia’s Janez Potočnik, and Hungary’s László Andor. Their terms run through 2014.

  42. The European Parliament mainly exists to vote on European Commission bills. It is not empowered to introduce legislation.

  43. Jonah Goldberg, “What Kind of Socialist Is Barack Obama?” Commentary, May 2010.

  44. The interview is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkpdNtTgQNM.

  45. Roger Kimball, “The Real Obama,” PJ Media, October 27, 2008, http://pajamasmedia.com/rogerkimball/2008/10/27/the-real-obama-forget-the-constitution-economic-justice-demands-redistribution-of-wealth.

  46. Special Report with Brit Hume, October 23, 2008, transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,443908,00.html.

  47. Veronique de Rugy, “Bush’s Regulatory Kiss-Off,” Reason, January 2009, http://reason.com/archives/2008/12/10/bushs-regulatory-kiss-off.

  48. Paul Kengor, “Why Obama’s Communist Connections Are Not Headlines,” American Thinker, September 4, 2012, http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/10/why_obamas_communist_connectio.html.

  49. Jeff Zeleny, “The President Is on the Line to Follow Up on Socialism,” New York Times, March 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/us/politics/08callback.html.

  50. Kurtz quoting Hank De Zutter, “What Makes Obama Run?” Chicago Reader, December 7, 1995, http://www1.chicagoreader.com/obama/951208.

  51. Kurtz changed his mind in his book Radical-in-Chief: Barack Obama and the Untold Story of American Socialism (New York: Threshold Editions, 2010), 6. “So when I began my post-campaign research for this book, my inclination was to downplay or dismiss evidence of explicit socialism in Obama’s background. I thought the issue was an unprovable and unnecessary distraction. I was wrong. Evidence that suggests Obama is a socialist, I am now convinced, is real, important, and profoundly relevant to the present.”

  52. Adam Shaw, “Obama’s Socialism,” American Thinker, February 25, 2010, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/02/obamas_socialism.html.

  53. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Grand Jihad (New York: Encounter Books, 2010), 189.

  54. Zeleny, “The President Is on the Line.”

  55. “Obama to Republicans: Stop Pretending Health Care Reform Is a ‘Bolshevik Plot,’” January 29, 2010, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcRWS45gPzo.

  56. M. K. Dziewanowski, A History of Soviet Russia (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979), 107.

  57. Elizabeth Fee and Theodore M. Brown, eds., Making Medical History: The Life and Times of Henry E. Sigerist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 252.

CHAPTER 2

    1. R. W. Apple Jr., “Washington-Moscow Name-Calling: What Does It Mean?” New York Times, February 5, 1981.

    2. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 546.

    3. Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: Norton, 2000), 155.

    4. Nicholas S. Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York: Dutton, 1946), 192–203.

    5. http://www.cpusa.org/a-way-out-of-the-deepening-crisis. Michael del Rosso pointed out this statement by CPUSA leader Sam Webb at the 29th National Convention of the Communist Party, USA, May 21–23, New York City: “What a difference between now and five years ago when we convened in Chicago!… Broadly speaking, our view of the general conditions of struggle and the strategic path forward is on the money. We make mistakes and acknowledge them. But we didn’t make the big mistake—underestimating the danger of rightwing extremism in government and elsewhere. To the extent that we applied our strategy, we extended and deepened our mass connections, we contributed to the historic victory in 2008, we enhanced our presence and visibility, and we increased our membership. We didn’t grow as much as we would have liked, but we have a firm foundation on which to increase our size, visibility and readership of our publications in the period ahead” (emphasis in original). Webb further described President Obama’s reelection in 2012 as “the dawn of a new era.” Sam Webb, “Democracy comes out on top on Nov. 6,” People’s World, November 6, 2012. See: http://peoplesworld.org/democracy-comes-out-on-top-on-nov/.

    6. McCarthy, Grand Jihad, 14.

    7. Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II (New York: Penguin Books, 1971), 95.

    8. Judge Kaufman’s sentencing statement is available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/ROS_SENT.HTM.

    9. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 143, 545. See also Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets (Washington: Regnery, 2000), xv, 253.

  10. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—the Stalin Era (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 344.

  11. Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2011), 35. South Korea sustained roughly 1.3 million casualties, including 400,000 dead. North Korea suffered 2 million casualties, while 900,000 Chinese soldiers were killed.

  12. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/29/opinion/essay-the-decline-of-the-east.html?scp=8&sq=gloat+Gorbachev&st=nyt.

  13. The National Security Archive, online database, points out that the transcript it offers “is a translation of the Soviet record from the Gorbachev Foundation, since the U.S. memcons remain, astonishingly, still classified at the George H. W. Bush Library in Texas”; http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/index.htm.

  14. National Security Archive, “Bush and Gorbachev at Malta,” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/index.htm, Document 10, Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2–3, 1989, 10, 3.

  15. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04EFDE1431F935A35751C1A9629C8B63.

  16. Robert Buchar, ed., And Reality Be Damned … Undoing America: What the Media Didn’t Tell You About the End of the Cold War and the Fall of Communism in Europe (New York: Eloquent Books, 2010), 6.

  17. National Security Archive, “Bush and Gorbachev at Malta,” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/index.htm, Document 8, Transcript of Gorbachev–John Paul II Meeting, Vatican City, December 1, 1989 [Transcribed notes by Aleksandr Yakovlev].

  18. Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, 18.

  19. Gregor Dallas, 1945: The War That Never Ended (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 576. “Stalin’s policy through the last two years of the war and into the peace was an extension of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, with the Nazis conveniently excluded.”

  20. “Is the European Union the New Soviet Union?” Speech by Vladimir Bukovsky, February 28, 2002, http://www.scribd.com/doc/20956318/Bukovsky-Is-the-European-Union-the-New-Soviet-Union-Transcript-R.

  21. Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, 18.

  22. Philip Taubman, “Gorbachev’s Gloomy America,” New York Times, November 15, 1985. See also Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Why the Soviets Cheat on Arms Control Treaties (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 13.

  23. In FDR’s first real public pitch for what would become Lend-Lease—his “arsenal of democracy” speech of December 29, 1940—he said, “There is no demand for sending an American expeditionary force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your government to send such a force. You can therefore, nail, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth. Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and away from our people”; http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrarsenalofdemocracy.html.

  24. George Racey Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries (Belmont, MA: Western Islands, 1965), 67 (Jordan’s book was originally published by Harcourt, Brace, 1952); John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 94–95.

  25. Martin J. Bollinger, Stalin’s Slave Ships: Kolyma, the Gulag Fleet, and the Role of the West (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

  26. “Khrushchev Remembers,” Life, December 4, 1970, 68. See also John Keegan, The Second World War (Penguin, 2005), 218.

  27. Jordan, Diaries, 73.

  28. George C. Herring, Aid to Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), xvii.

  29. Jordan, Diaries, 99.

  30. Jordan, Diaries, 20.

  31. Hearings Regarding Shipments of Atomic Material to the Soviet Union During World War II (Washington: GPO, 1950), 909–10; Jordan, Diaries, 21.

  32. Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), 386.

  33. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington: Center of Military History, 1953), 27, 49. Out of the 151,000 forces stationed in the Philippines in November 1941, 120,000 were Filippino and 31,000 were American.

  34. Lord Moran, Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 41, 108, 499–500.

  35. Johnson, Modern Times, 386.

  36. Herring, Aid to Russia, 42, 56.

  37. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 338.

  38. George T. Eggleston, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the World War II Opposition: A Revisionist Autobiography (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1980), 155.

  39. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 121. See also Eggleston, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the World War II Opposition, 153–54.

  40. William Manchester, American Caesar (New York: Dell, 1978), 273.

  41. Robert Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate History, vol. 2, January 1942–July 1945 (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949), 634–35.

  42. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 551.

  43. Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, 16.

  44. Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, 20.

  45. The following discussion between Bush and Gorbachev about “Western values” appears in Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, 30–33.

  46. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=1297&year=&month=.

  47. Freedom of the Press 2012, Freedom House, 17, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom=press/freedom=press=2012*.

  48. See the Committee to Protect Journalists Web site, http://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/.

  49. http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012(2).pdf.

  50. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/03/russia.eu.

  51. Vladimir Bukovsky, “The Power of Memory and Acknowledgement,” Cato’s Letter, 8, no. 1, (Winter 2010); 2.

  52. http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120209/171229834.html.

  53. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6501UF20100601.

  54. Bukovsky, “The Power of Memory and Acknowledgement,” 4.

  55. Bukovsky, “The Power of Memory and Acknowledgement,” 4–5.

  56. John Laughland, A History of Political Trials: From Charles I to Saddam Hussein (Long Hanborough, Eng.: Peter Lang, 2008), 116.

  57. Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor: The Life of Andrei Vyshinsky (New York: Grove Press, 1991), 259.

  58. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

  59. Laughland, Political Trials, 116.

  60. Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor, 261; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992), 639.

  61. Taylor, Anatomy, 192–93.

  62. Taylor, Anatomy, 307.

  63. John J. Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the KGB (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 203.

  64. Taylor, Anatomy, 307.

  65. Malcolm Muggeridge, Things Past: An Anthology (William Morrow, 1979), 135.

  66. Laughland, Political Trials, 111.

  67. Vaksberg, Stalin’s Prosecutor, 101.

  68. Conquest, Dragons, 169.

  69. Laughland, Political Trials, 103.

CHAPTER 3

    1. Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Justice (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1950), 76. Vassili Lujna was one of many witnesses attesting to Soviet crimes on Kravchenko’s behalf in his 1949 case accusing a French Communist publication of libeling him as a fabricator. Kravchenko won.

    2. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Mortal Danger: How Misconceptions About Russia Imperil America (New York: Harper Colophon, 1980), 111.

    3. As recently as September 2012, a CNN survey of historians and commentators placed FDR first for foreign policy; http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/20/the-best-foreign-policy-presidents/.

    4. Moran, Churchill, 837: “The President’s feelings toward Winston were rather more complicated. To try to unravel them, I shall turn to a disturbing entry in my diary of those months [final year of war]. Hopkins, in a temper, blurted out that it did not seem just to the President that Winston should take all the credit as Leader of the Free World. Roosevelt had become jealous. Lord Halifax confirmed this when I put a direct question to him. Marshall told me about that time that the President did not look forward to Winston’s visits to the White House. Winston would embark on endless discussions about his strategy, and he was always talking about the British Empire. The sad story ended at Yalta, where Winston became impatient with the President’s apathy and indifference. He did not seem to realize that Roosevelt was a very sick man.”

    5. Chambers, Witness, 707.

    6. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 171.

    7. Chambers, Witness, 574. He was referring specifically to Truman’s calling the Hiss case a “red herring” whose “political purpose was to distract attention from the sins of the 80th [Republican] Congress. For thousands of people that automatically outlawed the Case. To me, it meant that I was not only deprived of official good will in testifying against Communism; I must expect active hostility among most powerful sections of the Administration.”

    8. In Martin Dies’ Story, 77–83, Dies discusses FDR’s active role in thwarting his run for a U.S. Senate vacancy in 1941, and later the pressure the administration brought to bear to remove him from Congress in 1943–44. When some personal health matters came up, Dies, “disgusted and exhausted,” announced his retirement. “I felt that the country had been given all the facts it needed to defeat Communism, and I asked myself: ‘What more can I accomplish under a hostile Administration?’”

    9. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 145: “The President said, ‘I do not regard the Communists as any present or future threat to our country, in fact, I look upon Russia as our strongest ally in the years to come. As I told you when you began your investigations [in 1938], you should confine yourself to Nazis and Fascists.’” House Un-American Activities Committee investigator Robert Stripling corroborates Dies’s account of that 1938 conversation. Dies, Stripling writes, returned from a White House visit in 1938 to tell the committee, “The President became very upset. He told me that no one was interested in Communism; that he had heard about it all his life but had seen nothing of it; that it was not a menace. He urged me to concentrate on Nazism and Fascism and forget Communism.” Robert Stripling, The Red Plot Against America (Drexel Hill, PA: Bell, 1949), 28–29, emphasis added. As noted by Dies (179) and elsewhere, at the Army-McCarthy hearings a witness let slip the fact that President Eisenhower participated in a White House meeting to consider how to halt McCarthy. Besides Eisenhower, presidential assistant Sherwood Adams, Attorney General William Rogers, Press Secretary James Haggerty, and presidential assistant General Wilton B. Persons were present. Vice President Richard Nixon was either present or available by telephone.

  10. In the summer of 2012, Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-MN) and four House Republican colleagues asked inspectors general at five government agencies to investigate evidence of Muslim Brotherhood penetration. For this, Bachmann in particular was denounced—quite ignorantly, given McCarthy’s vindication by the historical record—for “McCarthyism.” Regarding contemporary ignorance about McCarthy, see M. Stanton Evans, “When Conservatives Parrot Liberal Lies About Joe McCarthy,” Human Events, August 19, 2012, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/08/19/when-conservatives-parrot-liberal-lies-about-joe-mccarthy/.

  11. Here, for starters, are ten McCarthy suspects M. Stanton Evans cites in the opening pages of Blacklisted by History (New York: Crown Forum, 2007) who have been identified as Soviet agents in the Venona archives: Solomon Adler, Cedric Belfrage, T. A. Bisson, V. Frank Coe, Lauchlin Currie, Harold Glasser, David Kerr, Mary Jane Keeney, Leonard Mins, Franz Neumann.

  12. The “no decency” tag is probably the biggest bum rap of all time. To quote Stanton Evans (568): “Army Counsel Joseph Welch denounced McCarthy for outing Welch’s assistant Frederick Fisher as a former member of a cited front group called the National Lawyers Guild. But Welch himself had publicly confirmed Fisher’s former Guild membership weeks earlier in [a] New York Times story of April 16, 1945” (emphasis in original). Yet the rap lives on: http://billmoyers.com/wp-content/themes/billmoyers/transcript-print.php?post=7029.

  13. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 454.

  14. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 49.

  15. Stripling, Red Plot, 23, 13.

  16. Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941), 11.

  17. Stripling, Red Plot, 27.

  18. Lyons, Red Decade, 11.

  19. Stripling, Red Plot, 27.

  20. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 177.

  21. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 541.

  22. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 7.

  23. Eduard Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (April 1998): 1–31, 2.

  24. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 7.

  25. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 7.

  26. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 21. Evans notes a veritable cordon sanitaire against a reevaluation of McCarthy. “However, there has to date been no reevaluation of McCarthy’s cases, or efforts to reassess his reputation based on the new disclosures. Despite occasional suggestions that he might have been onto something, the standard treatment of McCarthy and his charges rolls on today as negatively as ever. Indeed, the usual negative view not only prevails but is reinforced in some excellent studies of Venona, the Soviet archival sources, and other now-available records, without much indication the authors have made any particular study of McCarthy. To all appearances, these authors have simply rephrased the usual version of the story before proceeding on to the main business of their own researches.”

  27. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 21.

  28. Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946), 304.

  29. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 304.

  30. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 305.

  31. Haynes and Klehr would write a book about this denial called, appropriately enough, In Denial: Historians, Communism, and Espionage (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2005).

  32. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 4, 7.

  33. Haynes and Klehr tell us that partly due to the impact their initial archival revelations had on Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and partly due to an institutional drive toward declassification, the Venona cables—some 2,900 randomly decrypted and partly translated Soviet intelligence messages (out of hundreds of thousands)—began to be declassified by the U.S. government. Intelligence historians Jerrold and Leona Schecter see controversy over their revelations of Soviet infiltration of the Manhattan Project in their 1994 book with Soviet spymaster Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, as having helped midwife the release.

  34. Chambers, Witness, 710. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), 149, 156.

  35. http://w.hnn.us/articles/1706.html#klehr.

  36. Chambers, Witness, 707.

  37. Haynes, Klehr, Vassiliev, Spies, 548.

CHAPTER 4

    1. Lyons, Red Decade, 12.

    2. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 195.

    3. Conquest, Dragons, 141.

    4. Weinstein and Vassiliev, Haunted Wood, 340.

    5. Roger Kimball summoned the phrase “the long march through the institutions,” for the title of his book The Long March. While usually associated with Mao’s path to power and cultural transformation, the phrase, Kimball writes, is attributed to Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, was later popularized by the German New Left’s Rudi Dutschke, and was echoed by American student radicals to further revolutionary goals once violent overthrow became a nonstarter. Herbert Marcuse described the principle as “working against the institutions by working in them”—boring from within, a tactic embraced by revolutionaries from Alinsky to the Muslim Brotherhood.

    6. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 124. Evans writes, “For the FBI, it [Bentley’s testimony] was probably the single greatest data haul of the Cold War, rivaled only by Venona.”

    7. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 543.

    8. Haynes and Klehr, In Denial, 210–12. Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. Harry Bridges was an Australian labor leader whom the U.S. government unsuccessfully tried to deport as a secret Communist operative, which he denied under oath. Comintern files reveal that not only was Bridges a party member, he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPUSA. Millionaire Corliss Lamont was a socially prominent fellow traveler and Stalin sycophant. Meanwhile, at the University of Colorado, the Dalton Trumbo Free Speech Fountain spews forth the idea that this dedicated Stalinist believed in free speech for all, not just Communist Party Liners. See “Fountain of Lies” by University of Maryland history professor Art Eckstein for a partial history of Trumbo’s enforcement of Party orthodoxy, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=9274.

    9. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 543–44.

  10. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 546.

  11. FRUS 1943, 3: 504.

  12. http://tinyurl.com/8f9mjj9.

  13. Robert C. Williams, Russian Art and American Money, 1900–1940 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 249.

  14. Williams, Russian Art, 246.

  15. Williams, Russian Art, 246. Davies’s edited letter of March 22, 1937, titled “Moscow’s Shops and Theaters,” appears on 130–31 in his book Mission to Moscow.

  16. Williams, Russian Art, 254–56.

  17. Tim Tzouliadis, The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Penguin, 2008), 328. The museum lists it as Holiday on a Collective Farm by Sychkov.

  18. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 120.

  19. Williams, Russian Art, 240.

  20. “Davies Predicts Victory in 1944,” New York Times, January 30, 1943.

  21. Todd Bennett, “Culture, Power, and Mission to Mascow,” Journal of American History 88, no. 2 (September 2001): 489. In I Chose Freedom, 470–471, Kravchenko describes “perhaps my most harrowing evening in America” watching the movie Mission to Moscow. “I was grateful for the dark, which covered up the distress that, I am sure, was written on my face … No Soviet propaganda picture would have dared twist facts so recklessly out of their sockets …

“I had been through the purge. Though one of the least among the victims, I had suffered its indignities in my own flesh and spirit. Now in a Washington theatre I saw my own ordeal and that of my country being mocked in terms of caricature and falsification … When I emerged from the hours of my purgatory that evening I saw that I had drawn blood in my palms with my fingernails.”

  22. Timasheff, Great Retreat, 263.

  23. Billingsley, Hollywood Party, 282.

  24. Drawing from the testimony of a former high-ranking Czech Communist official, Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, Joseph D. Douglass Jr. explores this horror in Betrayed (1st Books Library, 2002).

  25. See Tzouliadis, The Forsaken.

  26. Alexsandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Two (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 632.

  27. Billingsley, Hollywood Party, 64. M. B. B. Biskupski, Hollywood’s War with Poland, 1939–1945 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2009), 203.

  28. Dalton Trumbo, “Getting into Focus,” The Worker, May 5, 1946, quoted in Billingsley, Hollywood Party, 92–93.

  29. John V. Fleming, The Anti-Communist Manifestos: Four Books That Shaped the Cold War (New York: Norton, 2009), 159.

  30. Kravchenko, I Choose Freedom, 459, 461–62.

  31. Edward Dmytryk, Odd Man Out: A Memoir of the Hollywood Ten (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996), 14.

  32. Fleming, Anti-Communist Manifestos. The other three are Koestler’s Darkness at Noon (1940), Kravechenko’s I Chose Freedom (1946), and Chambers’s Witness (1952).

  33. Billingsley, Hollywood Party, 88, footnotes William L. O’Neill, A Better World: The Great Schism: Stalinism and the American Intellectuals (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 78, which footnotes William Henry Chamberlin, “Where the News Ends,” New Leader, August 22, 1942, 5.

  34. Partisan Review, March–April 1942, 173.

  35. The feature was short-lived; presumably publishing quickly stowed its “dangerous thoughts” for the duration. Having searched PR’s wartime editions, I found only one more entry for “Dangerous Thoughts” in the May–June 1942 issue, 271: the announcement by Reader’s Digest that it would stop distributing free reprints of a December 1941 article by Max Eastman called “Stalin’s American Power.” Digest editors wrote, “Our decision is prompted by protests … against any unnecessary post-publication circulation of the article now that our own war effort is so closely connected with that of the Russian people.” Despite the author’s “express statement that ‘common sense demands that we support’ the Russian resistance to Hitler, we nevertheless feel that all doubts should be resolved against anything that might operate to disturb our essential war effort.” In PR’s Summer 1944 issue, Orwell writes (281), “Russophile feeling [in London] is on the surface stronger than ever. It is now next door to impossible to get anything overtly anti-Russian printed. Anti-Russian books do appear, but mostly from Catholic publishing firms and always from a religious or frankly reactionary angle … The servility of the so-called intellectuals is astonishing. The Mission to Moscow film … was accepted here with hardly a murmur.”

  36. Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3.

  37. Fleming, Anti-Communist Manifestos, 159–60

  38. See note 13, chapter 3.

  39. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 544. The authors further cite the bibliography of a praised academic study of Soviet foreign relations (1917–91) that, but for a Beria biography, lists no work on Soviet intelligence in more than 120 titles.

  40. Dziak, Chekisty, xvii. Dziak also cites the “paucity of scholarly work on Soviet state security” (xv). He further notes his personal “distress” as a professor of Soviet intelligence and security on repeatedly finding students “had heretofore been taught about the Soviet system with no, or very little, reference to the gurantor of that system”—meaning the KGB (xvii).

  41. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 545.

  42. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 545.

  43. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 545.

  44. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 551.

  45. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 667.

  46. Joseph Alsop, “Kill-out by Stalin,” New York Times, November 28, 1970.

  47. Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 309.

  48. Witness, The God That Failed, I Chose Freedom, In Stalin’s Secret Service, etc.

  49. Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937), 398.

  50. Lyons, Utopia, 414–15. The New Masses was a leading Marxist publication.

  51. Lyons, Utopia, 398.

  52. S. J. Taylor, Stalin’s Apologist: The New York Times’s Man in Moscow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 193–96. Cairns never returned to Russia; nor did his report see the light of day. Later, he would admit he’d been threatened “by powerful figures on the Left in Great Britain whom he believed at the time could do him great harm,” Taylor writes. She names Beatrice Webb specifically; she and her husband, Sydney, were two of Stalin’s most effective apologists for arguing that any misfortune Russian peasants suffered was all their own fault. Cairns’s colleague on the trip, a German, published his scathing findings and was denounced as a fascist by Pravda and expelled from the USSR.

  53. Lyons, Utopia, 398.

  54. Lyons, Utopia, 392.

  55. Lyons, Utopia, 392.

  56. Lyons, Utopia, 400–401.

  57. Lyons, Utopia, 414–15.

  58. William Henry Chamberlin, The Confessions of an Individualist (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 88.

  59. Muggeridge, Things Past, 44.

  60. Lyons, Utopia, 418.

  61. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 308.

  62. Written response to author’s questions, July 21, 2011.

  63. Orwell, Essays (New York: Everyman’s Library, 2002), 439–41.

  64. “‘Righteous’ Aims Spur Bolsheviki,” New York Times, March 1, 1933.

  65. Muggeridge himself would memory-hole Jones, omitting him from subsequent accounts of the period for reasons or motivations unknown.

  66. Lyons, Utopia, 575.

  67. Lyons, Utopia, 575–76.

  68. “Russians Hungry, but Not Starving,” New York Times, March 31, 1933.

  69. “Mr. Jones Replies,” New York Times, May 13, 1933.

  70. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 344.

  71. http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/feb/15/featuresreviews.guardianreview23. It’s worth noting this peculiar mechanism in action. In a 1969 review of The Great Terror in The New York Review of Books, Alexander Gerschenkron, a Harvard economics professor (who, his grandson later wrote, seriously believed Republicans were “morally flawed”), emphasized Conquest’s failure to understand dictatorships “which must therefore create and continually recreate the stability conditions of its power.” Still, he commends the research and accepts Conquest’s assessment that Stalin caused twenty million deaths, calling it “a very reasonable estimate.” None of it, however, colors his judgment. It can’t. He writes, “The book must be read in its entirety, even though some tender souls will shrink from this close look into a chamber of horrors. But they should not and they need not. Brazen forgeries, improbable lies, cruel tortures, inhuman executions, barbarous treatment of prisoners—all this should be sickening. But it is much less so than one might expect. For the enormity of the crimes exceeds the capacity of the human mind to absorb the horror.”

  72. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 322.

  73. Conquest, Dragons, 141–42.

  74. Conquest, Dragons, 142.

  75. Vladimir Bukovsky, for one, has written extensively on the USSR’s cynical manipulation and direction of the “peace movement,” the unilateral (Western) nuclear freeze movement, and the campaign against the neutron bomb.

  76. “John Le Carré Has a Surprising New Story to Tell,” Times of London, September 14, 2008.

  77. http://www.reaganfoundation.org/bw_detail.aspx?p=LMB4YGHF2&h1=0&h2=0&sw=&lm=berlinwall&args_a=cms&args_b=74&argsb=N&tx=1770.

  78. Conquest, Dragons, 135.

  79. “Gromyko News Conference: A ‘Virtuoso Performance,’” New York Times, April 4, 1983.

  80. John F. Burns, “Gromyko Rejects Reagan Arms Plan,” April 3, 1983.

CHAPTER 5

    1. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings (1947–2005) (Intercollegiate Studies Edition, 2006), 558.

    2. Thoughts from Maeterlinck arranged and chosen by E.S.S. (Dodd, Mead, 1912), 29–30.

    3. Conquest, Great Terror, 446.

    4. Albert L. Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the USSR in World War II (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 25.

    5. See chapter 2.

    6. Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries, 12.

    7. W. L. White, Report on the Russians (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945), 124. In his 1950 book America’s Second Crusade (Chicago: Regnery), 242–44, journalist William Henry Chamberlin described the “pro-Soviet hysteria” that drove widespread denunciations of White’s by no means anti-Soviet (indeed, rather pro-Stalin) book in the spring of 1945. Chamberlin explains, “But what aroused the fury of many reviewers of the book was the author’s frank, unsparing description of such negative sides of Soviet life as police terror, widespread employment of slave labor, gross discrepancy in the living standards of the higher bureaucrats and the masses of the people, and general poverty and backwardness. All these allegations were supported by a mass of corroborating evidence. But the feeling that Russia could do no wrong, that any criticism of Stalin’s dictatorship was akin to treason, had taken a strong grip on the American wartime mind.” After Pravda denounced it—“the standard stew from the fascist kitchen, with all its aroma of calumnies, unpardonable ignorance and undisguised malice”—Chamberlin noted “many American reviewers echoed [Pravda’s] sentiments, in slightly more sophisticated language. Sixteen American writers and journalists … signed on the dotted line an abusive denunciation of the book which was forwarded to Moscow by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship,” then led by pro-Soviet millionaire Corliss Lamont and identified as a Communist front group. Chamberlin continues, “I have dwelt at some length on this incident because it furnishes such clear proof of the mental subservience of many American intellectuals during the war to a foreign power, and to a totalitarian dictatorship at that. A muddled philosophy that might be called totalitarian liberalism came into fashion, with the Nation, the New Republic, and the newspaper PM as its main exponents. There was a tremendous revival of the prewar double standard of morals in judging those twin phenomena, communism and fascism.”

    8. White, Report on the Russians, 124.

    9. Dallas, 1945, 576.

  10. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 195–96.

  11. Hanson Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 9.

  12. In The New York Times, February 14, 1943, Arthur Krock pointed out that OWI’s Victory magazine called Hoover the candidate of “reactionaries” and featured a speech by Henry Wallace urging citizens to win “the people’s revolution” that began with the War of Independence and included the Bolshevik Revolution of 1918.

  13. Chesly Manly, The Twenty-Year Revolution from Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Chicago: Regnery, 1954), 113.

  14. Arthur Krock reported in The New York Times on August 1, 1943 (“OWI’s Critics Stirred by Broadcast on Italy”), that FDR himself “sternly rebuked” OWI’s overseas division for Soviet-line broadcasts into Italy.

  15. Evans, Blacklisted by History. 87.

  16. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90.

  17. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 403, 433.

  18. “Investigations: The Case Against IPR,” Time, September 3, 1951, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,821608-2,00.html.

  19. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 393–95.

  20. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 390–92.

  21. Institute of Pacific Relations, Report Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Congress, Hearings Held July 25, 1951–June 20, 1952, by the Internal Security Subcommittee, 38.

  22. Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator (New York: Free Press, 1999), 125.

  23. Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism (Chapter Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 101.

  24. Herman, McCarthy, 232.

  25. “Report Cited to Back Charge by McCarthy,” New York Times, December 20, 1950.

  26. Karr shows up in both American and Soviet archives as a Soviet asset. Romerstein and Breindel (Venona Secrets, 158–59) report on a 1992 discovery of a KGB document by Yevgenia Albats that “showed that Karr had been regularly providing the KGB with information that was in turn relayed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”

  27. By contrast, Pearson didn’t know whereof he spoke. “Of course, Dave [Karr], like a lot of youngsters, might have had Communist leanings or even been a party member,” Pearson wrote in his diary. “But if I am any judge of human nature, he was cured of this long ago.” Drew Pearson Diaries, 1949–1959, 75. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 44.

  28. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 41; Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 190.

  29. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90.

  30. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 184–85; Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 78.

  31. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 89; Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 407.

  32. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 169. Currie is further discussed in chapter 6.

  33. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 169–72.

  34. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90. The Mihailovich story is further discussed in chapter 10.

  35. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90.

  36. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 198–201.

  37. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 325.

  38. WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 241.

  39. Billingsley, Hollywood Party, 89.

  40. Dennis J. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin: America’s Ambassadors to Moscow (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 141.

  41. Timasheff, Great Retreat, 263.

  42. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 255–56. As we learn in Andrew and Mitrokhin’s Sword and Shield, Solzhenitsyn, too, on leaving the USSR, drew a circle around him in Switzerland that was completely penetrated, including translators of his works (318).

  43. Max Eastman conjured the term to describe Soviet defector Alexander Barmine. Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1945), xii.

  44. Jordan, Diaries, 47.

  45. These lists came from the Soviets at Jordan’s request.

  46. Indeed, “the most famous brands of American industry [were used] in the service of the death camps,” Tim Tzouliadis writes in The Forsaken (208), noting the crucial contributions of Lend-Lease, including Studebaker trucks and ice-breaking ships, that keep the flow of slave labor moving.

  47. Hearings Regarding Shipments of Atomic Material to Russia During World War Two, House Committee on Un-American Activities, 81st Congress, December 7, 1949, testimony of Gen. Leslie R. Groves: “We didn’t want this material shipped, yet they [officials from Lend-Lease] kept coming back and coming back” (947).

  48. According to Jordan, “Lend-Lease,” patents continued shipping to the USSR until 1949.

  49. Jordan, Diaries, 11, 33. Regarding his claim about undocumented espionage workers, Jordan reproduces a letter by Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley that appeared in The New York Times on August 31, 1951. Bradley wrote, “Of my own personal knowledge I know that beginning early in 1942 Russian civilian and military agents were in our country in huge numbers. They were free to move about without restraint or check and, in order to visit our arsenals, depots, factories and proving grounds, they had only to make known their desires. Their authorized visits to military establishments numbered in the thousands. I also personally know that scores of Russians were permitted to enter American territory in 1942 without visas. I believe that over the war years this number was augmented at least by hundreds.”

  50. Victor Suvorov, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 114–20. Suvorov argues that this military defeat stymied further Japanese aggression toward the USSR.

  51. William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago: Regnery, 1955), 221–35.

  52. Jordan, Diaries, 149–150. The senior office was Lt. Col. J. D. McFarland, formerly an inspector for the Alaskan Wing of the Air Transport Command. Jordan quotes McFarland from an interview with the Cincinnati Inquirer, December 9, 1949: “I was in Great Falls every couple of weeks. Major Jordan repeatedly raised hell about uncontrolled deliveries going to Moscow.

“The Russians wanted no restrictions from the U.S. Army. Every time the issue got hot, they would telephone Washington, and they always had their way.”

  53. Jordan, Diaries. Jordan recounts the details of his one-man raid on Soviet secret cargo on 33–46.

  54. Jordan, Diaries, 63. Jordan cites White’s account of this wartime exchange in Kansas City Star, March 17, 1950.

  55. Herring, Aid to Russia, xvi.

  56. Hearings Regarding Shipment of Atomic Material to the Soviet Union During World War II, 1149.

  57. Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver, 122. Weeks writes, “Some American experts also argue that a quantity of uranium was shipped through Great Falls to the Soviet Union … Some deny any such Russian conspiracy.”

  58. Jordan, Diaries, 1.

  59. Jordan, Diaries, 63–64.

  60. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 96–100.

  61. Jordan, Diaries, 48.

  62. Rhodes, Dark Sun, 100.

  63. Rhodes, Dark Sun, 592, 217–18.

  64. Rhodes, Dark Sun, 121.

  65. David J. Dallin, “The Kravchenko Case, A Personal Account,” Modern Age, Summer 1962.

  66. Dallin, “Kravchenko Case.”

  67. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 253.

  68. Walter Krivitsky was a senior Soviet intelligence official who defected in 1937; the cause of his death in a Washington hotel room in February 1941—suicide—is widely disbelieved. Similarly, the 1959 “suicide” of Paul Bang-Jensen in New York City remains suspicious. Bang-Jensen, a United Nations official from Denmark, refused to disclose the names of anonymous Hungarian witnesses to the Soviet invasion in Hungary in 1956. Both men had told their families that in the case of untimely demise, not to believe it could have been by suicide.

  69. Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors: The Unique World of a Foreign Service Expert (New York, Doubleday, 1964), 256.

  70. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:562.

  71. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:399.

  72. “Harry L. Hopkins: Lender and Spender,” Life, September 22, 1941, 93.

  73. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:448.

  74. George McJimsey, Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 360.

  75. FRUS, The Tehran Conference, Roosevelt-Stalin Secret Meeting, December 1, 1943, 594. Martin Weil notes FDR’s general political concerns about Senate ratification of the United Nations in A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service (New York: Norton, 1978), 180.

  76. Dallin, “Kravchenko Case.”

  77. McJimsey, Hopkins, 360. Sherwood makes no mention of the Kravchenko affair.

  78. “Hopkins Backs a Third Term,” The Oelwein Daily Register, June 16, 1939.

  79. Chesley Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 95. Manly cites an article Hopkins wrote in American Magazine, July 1941.

  80. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:582–83.

  81. “Addresses of Litvinov, Hopkins, and Green,” New York Times, June 23, 1942.

  82. Christina Krotkova, previously mentioned in the context of Soviet penetration of OWI.

  83. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 86.

  84. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 26.

  85. The cable comes to us via the KGB. Explanation in a nutshell: The British ambassador to Washington cabled the Foreign Office about Stettinius on November 27, 1944. His secret cable was “obtained” by a Soviet agent in London and conveyed to Stalin, Beria, and Molotov on December 12, 1944. Roughly half a century later, Alexander Vassiliev came across it in a KGB archive and copied it down in his famous notebooks. See Vassiliev, “Yellow Notebook No. #4, File 40935, Vol. 1, The US Government,” viewable online at http://www.scribd.com/doc/84608440/Alexander-Vassiliev-Papers-Yellow-Notebook-No-4-Translation.

  86. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:378.

  87. Life, October 6, 1947, 68: Forrestal’s “summons to Washington in 1940, which greatly surprised him, probably dated in part to the help he gave SEC in drawing up some of its new rules for Wall Street. It also resulted in part from his acquaintance with Harry Hopkins, whom he had met socially.”

  88. Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver, 22.

  89. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:268. Sherwood wrote: “It was obvious that Lend Lease should become the most vital element in the relations between the United States and all the Allied combatant nations and many neutrals as well, with the result that more and more foreign missions in Washington were conducting, or attempting to conduct, their most important business directly with Hopkins, thus bypassing the State Department (emphasis added).

  90. Jean Edward Smith, FDR (New York: Random House, 2007), 583. Smith also notes that correspondence between FDR and Churchill and Stalin was “rarely seen in Foggy Bottom.”

  91. McJimsey, Hopkins, 241. Both Stimson and Hopkins recommended Leahy.

  92. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 2.

  93. Deane, Strange Alliance, 9. Quoted in My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin, ed. Susan Butler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 7.

  94. Stettinius, “as far as anyone could tell,” Martin Weil writes in A Pretty Good Club (142), “had no interest in policy. His sole objective was to please as many people as possible as often as possible”—chiefly his patrons President Roosevelt and “Deputy President” Hopkins.

  95. Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York: Macmillan, 1944) 73.

  96. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=71&page=transcript.

  97. On February 16, 1943, FDR declared, “The defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States.” On December 31, 2005, George W. Bush declared the United States “has a vital interest in the success of a free Iraq.” On December 1, 2009, Barack Obama declared it was in the United States’ “vital interest” to send additional forces to Afghanistan.

  98. Doris Kearns Goodwin, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in War Time (Touchstone, 1995), 193.

  99. Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 193. See also Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:223.

100. Goodwin, No Ordinary Time, 193.

101. Edward Jay Epstein, Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer (New York: Random House, 1996), 135–56.

102. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:224.

103. Evidence of Hopkins’s work on behalf of the Kremlin will be fully discussed below.

104. Weeks, Russia’s Life-Saver, 23.

105. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 142.

106. Williams, Russian Art and American Money, 258.

107. Transcript of Tape 10, of conversations between Forrest Pogue and George C. Marshall, recorded January 22, 1957, 319.

108. McJimsey, Hopkins, 157.

109. Jordan, Diaries, 48–49.

110. Jordan, Diaries, 50.

111. Jordan, Diaries, 51.

112. Standley, 363. Faymonville, a.k.a “the Red General,” was exposed as a Soviet asset and is discussed here.

113. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 287.

114. Haynes and Klehr, Spies, 258.

115. For details on Operation Snow, see Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington: 2002), 22–45.

116. Testimony by Elizabeth Bentley quoted in report, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83rd Congress, July 30, 1953, 30.

117. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 287.

118. McJimsey, Hopkins, 52.

119. McJimsey, Hopkins, 74.

120. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story 121.

121. David Ciepley, Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 76.

122. “Tugwell Sees End of Laissez-Faire,” New York Times, February 16, 1934. See also http://www.bartleby.com/73/147.html.

123. McJimsey, Hopkins, 74–75.

124. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, 1933–1935 (Boston: Mariner Books, 2003), 40.

125. Schlesinger, New Deal, 49.

126. “Tugwell Sees End of Laissez-Faire.”

127. Schlesinger, New Deal, 50.

128. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 212–13.

129. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 106.

130. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 214.

131. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 287.

132. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 287.

133. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 350.

134. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 290, 289.

135. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 111.

136. Eduard Mark, “Venona’s Source 19 and the ‘Trident’ Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or Espionage?” Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (April 1998): 1–31, 15 quoted.

137. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 594.

138. Mark, “Venona’s Source 19,” 24.

139. Mark, “Venona’s Source 19,” 24.

CHAPTER 6

    1. Soviet secret memorandum of 1931 as recounted by Igor Bogolepov in Institute of Pacific Relations, Report of the Committee of the Judiciary of the 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings Held July 25, 1951 to June 20, 1952 by the Internal Security Subcommittee, 31. Hereafter cited as IPR Report.

    2. Buchar, editor, And Reality Be Damned, 85–86.

    3. See Bryton Barron, Inside the State Department (New York: Comet Press, 1956), one of the first books, if not the first, to present evidence of Hiss’s (and, in passing, Hopkins’s) active role at Yalta. For a complete rendering of Alger Hiss’s activities at Yalta, see also M. Stanton Evans and Herbert Romerstein’s Stalin’s Secret Agents: The Subversion of Roosevelt’s Government (New York: Threshold Editions, 2012).

    4. Fraser J. Harbutt, Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 232.

    5. Elliot Rosen, Roosevelt, the Great Depression and the Economics of Recovery (University of Virginia, 2005), 172.

    6. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 180–81.

    7. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:109.

    8. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 181.

    9. See Currie’s intervention on behalf of Paul Hagen, for example, in chapter 5.

  10. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 168.

  11. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 374, 119.

  12. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 119–21.

  13. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 374.

  14. IPR Report, 100.

  15. IPR Report, 225.

  16. Greenberg was also editor of IPR’s magazine Pacific Affairs. IPR Report, p. 135.

  17. See Peter B. Niblo, Influence: The Soviet “Task” Leading to Pearl Harbor, the Iron Curtain, and the Cold War (Elderberry Press, Oregon), 2002.

  18. IPR Report, 228.

  19. IPR Report via Evans, Blacklisted by History, 390–91.

  20. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 395.

  21. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 374.

  22. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 145.

  23. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 375.

  24. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 374.

  25. “Currie and White Deny Under Oath They Aided Spies,” New York Times, August 14, 1948.

  26. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 136.

  27. Silvermaster file, vol. 7, http://education-research.org/csr/holdings/silvermaster/summaries.htm.

  28. M. Stanton Evans called this FBI report, which also contains the real estate ad, to the author’s attention.

  29. Chambers, Witness, 600.

  30. “Currie and White Deny Under Oath They Aided Spies.”

  31. Chambers, Witness, 601.

  32. “Ruth Gerson, Justin Ginsburgh,” New York Times, May 24, 2009.

  33. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 140; Earl Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 258. White’s notes in Pumpkin Papers comes from IPR Report, 230.

  34. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 373.

  35. Pearson’s lawyer estimated that some 275 lawsuits were filed against Pearson seeking more than $200 million in damages. Only one plaintiff ever collected. Review of Drew Pearson: An Unauthorized Biography by Oliver Pilat,” New York Times, April 29, 1973.

  36. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 111.

  37. Laura Tyson Li, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek: China’s Eternal First Lady (New York: Grove Press, 2006), 217.

  38. Klehr and Radosh, The Amerasia Spy Case, 62.

  39. Tyler Abell, ed., Drew Pearson Diaries, 1949–1959 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974), 166–67.

  40. Pearson Diaries, 181.

  41. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedermeyer Reports! (New York: Holt, 1958), 316–17. “It was all too typical of the general attitude in America, as influenced either by unwitting misrepresentations or by treasonable manipulators, that Drew Pearson should have referred to the Chinese Communists as ‘the Northern Chinese.’” Typical, yes—but natural, given Communist influence.

  42. Herman, McCarthy, 123.

  43. See chapter 5.

  44. The previous year, David Karr named a baby after Drew Pearson. Drew Pearson Diaries, 88.

  45. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 139.

  46. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90.

  47. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 159–60. Allen, Tom Ricks reported, became an intelligence officer under Patton, one of few with clearance to read ULTRA. Ricks even wonders whether it might have been Allen who fed Pearson the notorious scoop on Patton slapping his shell-shocked soldiers, which helped end the career of the resolutely anti-Communist commander. See http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/01/pattons_third_army_deputy_intel_officer_briefly_was_on_the_kgbs_payroll.

  48. Herman, McCarthy, 232.

  49. Krafsur worked under TASS Washington bureau chief Laurence Todd, of Wirt dinner party fame.

  50. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 242–44.

  51. Alan Farnham, “Armand Hammer: Tinker, Traitor, Satyr, Spy,” Fortune, November 11, 1996.

  52. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 111.

  53. Chambers, Witness, 574–75.

  54. Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 143. Alger Hiss persistently raised the possibility that Chambers had long been in a mental institution. See Witness, 682–92.

  55. Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 143.

  56. Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 149.

  57. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 15.

  58. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 15.

  59. The second source is Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957 (Washington: National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996), xxiv, xxx. On xxiv, Benson and Warner write, “Truman’s repeated denunciations of the charges against Hiss, White, and others—all of whom appear under cover names in decrypted messages translated before he left office in 1953—suggest that Truman either was never briefed on the Venona program or did not grasp its significance.” Another possibility is that, he decided early on (see Schecter and Schecter) to ignore the facts/implications of the decrypted messages, and he stuck to it. Back to Benson and Warner: “Although it seems odd that Truman might not have been told, no definitive evidence has emerged to show that he was. In any event, Truman always insisted that Republicans had trumped up the loyalty issue and that wartime espionage had been insignificant and well contained by American authorities.”

  60. Robert Novak and Haynes and Klehr duked it out, academically speaking, in the pages of The Weekly Standard in June and July, 2003. I agree with Novak and the Schecters. The exchange is also available online at: http://hnn.us/articles/1706.html.

  61. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 146.

  62. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy: The American Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 70–71.

  63. I’m not aware of new records to bolster Moynihan’s and Haynes and Klehr’s contention. Curiously, when Moynihan wrote a new preface to Secrecy for the 1999 paperback edition, he highlighted the Truman-as-Venona-innocent tale, noting General Bradley’s role as gatekeeper and therefore roadblock on Venona information (which I think is wishful thinking, not a logical deduction), quoting Haynes and Klehr for additional support: “The evidence is not entirely clear, but it appears that Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley … decided to deny President Truman direct knowledge of the Venona Project.” Talk about circular arguments: The Haynes and Klehr quotation that Moynihan uses here footnotes Moynihan himself—Secrecy, 70–71!

  64. http://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic_heritage/hall_of_honor/2008/kirby.shtml.

  65. Benson and Warner, Venona, xxvi–xxvii.

  66. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 149. The authors footnote this statement to a March 5, 1999, interview with Kirby plus “Kirby’s handwritten notes.”

  67. This isn’t dissimilar from current strategy to consider everyone a suspect rather than identifying the doctrinal Islamic nature of the threat.

  68. Novak wrote that Kirby’s assertions that Truman knew are based on notes he made at the time he worked on Venona, contradicting the Klehr and Haynes dismissal of Kirby’s recollections “fifty years after the event.”

  69. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 11–12.

  70. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 144

  71. “Earle Reports Ban on Katyn Evidence,” New York Times, November 14, 1952.

  72. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 149.

  73. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 77.

  74. “Bricker Attacks Foreign Influence,” New York Times, October 31, 1944.

  75. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 9.

  76. Robert H. Jackson, “Communism in America,” New York Times, May 21, 1950.

  77. For example, CPUSA policy shifted with ups and downs of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

  78. Haynes and Klehr, In Denial, 8.

  79. George Orwell, 1984, (New York: Signet Classic, 1977), 80.

  80. Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 950. This book, too, is devoid of Venona revelation, although Haynes and Klehr’s Venona is listed in the bibliography.

  81. August 4, 1948, http://tinyurl.com/9jdjtrh.

  82. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 427.

  83. Haynes and Klehr, In Denial, 4.

  84. Susan C. W. Abbotson, ed., Masterpieces of 20th-Century American Drama (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005), 77.

  85. Chambers, Witness, 741–42.

  86. See chapter 1, “Case Closed,” Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies.

  87. Chambers, Witness, 556–57.

  88. Lyons, Red Decade, 309–10.

  89. Lyons, Red Decade, 47.

  90. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 40.

  91. Lyons, Red Decade, 298–99.

  92. Niblo, Influence, 55.

  93. Chambers, Witness, 549–50.

  94. Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past (San Francisco: Encounter, 2000), ix.

CHAPTER 7

    1. Conquest, Great Terror, 463.

    2. Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 577.

    3. “Washington Success Story,” New York Times, July 26, 1942.

    4. In the Harry L. Hopkins Papers at Georgetown University, the author discovered a letter dated August 7, 1941, apparently typed by Hopkins himself (there are no secretarial initials), noting his recent meeting with Stalin. It is to General Hastings Lionel “Pug” Ismay, Churchill’s top military advisor. It begins “Dear Pug,” and it is signed, “Ever so gratefully yours, H.H.” Box 60, Folder 9.

    5. Hearings Regarding Shipment of Atomic Materials to the Soviet Union During World War II, House Committee on Un-American Activities, 81st Congress, 1049, 1149.

    6. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:388.

    7. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 217–18.

    8. To be discussed at length.

    9. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 287.

  10. John Keegan, “Necessary or Not, Dresden Remains a Topic of Anguish,” Telegraph, October 31, 2005; Niblo, Influence, 124.

  11. Victor Klemperer records their escape in the second of his three volumes of diaries.

  12. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:920–21.

  13. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 93.

  14. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 132, quoting Hopkins’s biographer McJimsey.

  15. Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, 314.

  16. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 128.

  17. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:399.

  18. Sherwood writes in his biography preface of the forty filing cabinets in the Hopkins house and “a great many more in a warehouse, the latter being records of the New Deal, which I have never seen.” Sidney Hyman organized the papers, sorting them into folders—“Casablance Conference,” “Aid to Russia,” etc.—before Sherwood arrived, making Hyman the editor of Hopkins’s papers, not Sherwood.

  19. Newsweek, December 19, 1949, quoted in Jordan’s 1950 congressional testimony, 1169.

  20. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:155–57, 2:701, 1:181.

  21. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:16.

  22. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 111.

  23. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 594.

  24. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 216.

  25. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 545–46.

  26. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 255–57.

  27. Hearings 1950, Shipment of Atomic Material, 1163

  28. Benson and Warner (eds.), VENONA, 49–50.

  29. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:402.

  30. When Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, U.S. ambassador in Moscow, learned that the Soviets were stockpiling surplus diesel engines and ordering more at a time when these same engines were in scarce supply for landing craft designated for OVERLORD, Deane, already aboil over similarly urgent but unexplained Soviet demands for increases in aluminum, nickel, copper wire, and alcohol, cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff back in Washington his recommendation that before approving allocations to Moscow the United States obtain one, good, Soviet reason for sending the stuff. How reasonable. Deane wasn’t urging a cutoff in a fit of pique; simply justification. General Marshall cabled his approval of Deane’s recommendation. Hopkins’s man in Moscow, Averell Harriman, however, told Hopkins about the Deane logjam and received “what amounted to instructions to attach no strings to our aid to Russia,” Deane wrote. All of the extra supplies (including diesel engines) went through. Deane, Strange Alliance, 96–98.

  31. “Forrestal,” Life, October 6, 1947, 68.

  32. See Russell Kirk and James McClellan, The Political Principles of Robert A Taft (New York: Fleet Press Corporation, 1967). The authors underscore the “feebleness of party principles” that marked both the Republican and Democratic parties before the New Deal, which endowed the Democratic Party with “a strong ideological cast.” Arthur Krock quotation from Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 85–86.

  33. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 18.

  34. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 144–48; Robert I. Gannon, S.J., The Cardinal Spellman Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 222–25.

  35. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 281, note 17. In Dunn’s interview with Harriman, Dunn writes, Harriman “emphasized the importance of the theory of convergence in explaining Roosevelt’s policies.” Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 37–38: FDR “told me that he did believe that if one took the figure 100 as representing the difference between Anerican democracy and Soviet Communism in 1917, with the United States at 100 and the Soviet Union at 0, American democracy might eventually reach the figure of 60 and the Soviet system might reach the figure of 40 … He regarded this trend as making it more likely that no fundamental conflict between the two countries need ever become inevitable, provided Soviet Communism had permanently abandoned its doctrine of world revolution” (emphasis added). This last provision, Bullitt tells us, is what Harry Hopkins told him.

  36. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 93. Some files were saved and later went to the CIA.

  37. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 134–35.

  38. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 106. Weil notes George Kennan “echoed these feelings in a letter he wrote to Henderson” two days after the German invasion of Russia.

  39. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 81–82.

  40. Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 57.

  41. Excerpts from testimony of Dr. D. H. Dubrowsky, former head of Russian Red Cross. See Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 223.

  42. Litvinov letter of agreement on terms of recognition reproduced in full in Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 221.

  43. Herbert Hoover, Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath, edited and with an introduction by George H. Nash (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011), 24–29. Hoover notes (25) that on becoming president, FDR “had knowledge of two current glaring examples of Communist conspiracy specifically directed against the United States. These were the so-called ‘Bonus March’ of 1932 and the flooding of the world with counterfeit American money printed in Moscow and used for Communist purposes.”

  44. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 19–20. Totaling executions and victims of civil repression including pogroms between 1860 and 1914 in Czarist Russia, Robert Conquest writes, “We can hardly reach a figure of twenty thousand odd. The current estimate for executions alone in the two-year period 1937–1938 is just under two million. In terms of dialectic, this is surely an overwhelming case of the quantitative becoming the qualitative.” Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: Norton, 2000), 86.

  45. Conquest, Great Terror, 470.

  46. Conquest, Great Terror, 470.

  47. Bullitt, Correspondence, 58.

  48. There were two final straws for Bullitt: the blood purges after the December 1934 murder of Kirov, which, he wrote FDR on May 1, 1935 (116), intensified “the terror, always present,… to such a pitch that the least of the Muscovites, as well as the greatest, is in fear”; and, finally, the 1935 Moscow meeting of the world’s Communist Parties in which the CPUSA leaders took leading roles. As Dunn notes (Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 49), “This not only proved that [the Soviets] still pursued the goal of world revolution, but it also proved that they were breaking their promise made in the letters exchanged between Roosevelt and Litvinov in November 1933 which stipulated that Moscow would have nothing to do with the American Communist Party.”

  49. Bullitt, Correspondence, 130–31.

  50. Standley, Admiral Ambassador, 308.

  51. Douglass, Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, vii, 85.

  52. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 52.

  53. Bullitt, Correspondence. See xix for Kennan’s assessment; see 575–90 for the January 29, 1943 letter.

  54. See chapter 5.

  55. Bullitt, Correspondence, 577.

  56. William C. Bullitt, “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” Life, August 30, 1948, 94.

  57. Bullitt, Correspondence, 578.

  58. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 478–90.

  59. Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929–1969 (New York: Norton, 1973), 126.

  60. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 467–68.

  61. http://tinyurl.com/8fz842e.

  62. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 572.

  63. Thaddeus Wittlin, Time Stopped at 6:30: The Untold Story of the Katyn Massacre (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). Stalin endlessly stonewalled Polish and Allied officials seeking information on missing Poles; see 223–32.

  64. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 64.

  65. The Katyn Forest Massacre, Final Report, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 10.

  66. Rees, WWII, 184.

  67. Rees, WWII, 184.

  68. David Carlton, Churchill and the Soviet Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 106.

  69. Katyn Final Report, 19.

  70. McJimsey, Hopkins, 293.

  71. Excerpts of O’Malley’s report come from Rees, WWII, 186–89.

  72. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 21.

  73. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 105.

  74. Rees, WWII, 190.

  75. David Irving, Nuremberg (N.P.: Focal Point Publications, 1999), 62.

  76. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 19–20.

  77. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 466–67.

  78. Rees, WWII, 191–92.

  79. Standley, Admiral Ambassador, 363.

  80. FRUS: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, 624–27. See also Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 115–16.

  81. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 98–100.

  82. Haynes and Klehr, Venona, 44–45.

  83. McJimsey, Hopkins, 293.

  84. Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, http://tinyurl.com/8ozefca.

  85. George H. Earle, “F.D.R.’s Tragic Mistake!” Confidential, August 1958, 16.

  86. Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings, 2197.

  87. Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings, 2204.

  88. Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings, 2205.

  89. Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings, 2211–212.

  90. Letter from Earle to FDR, June 11, 1944, Katyn Forest Massacre Hearings, 2199.

  91. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 217–18, In this example, General F. L. Anderson notes in a memo that Hopkins stated he would withhold from FDR cables from Churchill and the U.S. ambassador to London favoring air support for a Polish uprising.

  92. Joseph Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2002), 385.

  93. A facsimile of the president’s letter is reproduced in “F.D.R.’s Tragic Mistake” by George H. Earle, Confidential, August 1958.

  94. Rees, WWII, 249–50.

  95. Julius Epstein, “The Mysteries of the Van Vliet Report: A Case History,” http://tinyurl.com/8vad5yy.

  96. Ibid. On September 18, 1950, the Department of Defense finally released a dossier of previously classified documents relating to the Katyn Forest Massacre. Julius Epstein explains its importance: “With the release of this report, our government indicates for the first time that it does not any longer believe in Stalin’s lies about the German guilt. This is of tremendous importance in view of the fact that the government, through its Office of War Information, disseminated for years Stalin’s lies about Katyn, and our present Voice of America has always rejected [efforts] to tell the world the truth about Katyn. This persistence in not telling the truth about Katyn went so far that the Voice even forced Count Joseph Czapski, one of the few survivors of the Russian massacre of Polish officers, to omit any mention of the word and the facts of Katyn when he was invited to broadcast in Polish to his Polish brethren.”

  97. Herbert Romerstein, “Coverup for Those Who Carried Out Mass Murder,” Polska, March 8, 2008, accessed online at http://victimsofcommunism.org/media/article.php?article=3738. Romerstein notes that while the State Department claimed to have no record of receipt of the 1945 Van Vliet Report (and the army claimed to have no carbon copies), “it is interesting to note that the report went to that part of the State Department headed by Alger Hiss. We now know that Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. So we can understand the disappearance of the document.”

  98. Final Report of the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstance on the Massacre at Katyn Forest, 8.

  99. “New Security Charter Seems to Be Assured,” New York Times, May 20, 1945.

100. “San Francisco Outlook: Hope of Banning War Stirs World Despite History’s Somber Teaching,” New York Times, May 21, 1945.

101. Final Report, Katyn Massacre, 8.

102. “How Has the United States Met Its Major Challenges Since 1945?” Commentary, November 1985.

103. Romerstein, “Coverup.”

104. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 83.

105. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 83.

106. See Wittlin, Time Stopped, 276–84, for details on Krivosertsov’s life and death.

CHAPTER 8

    1. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 314.

    2. Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador, 276. Willkie, the GOP’s presidential candidate in 1940, was addressing Stalin’s primo fixer, Andrei Vyshinsky, in 1942.

    3. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 133.

    4. Solzhenitsyn objected to the word “anti-Communism.” He wrote, “It makes it appear as though Communism were something original, fundamental. Therefore, it is taken as the point of departure, and anti-Communism is defined in relation to Communism … The primary, the eternal concept is humanity, and Communism is anti-humanity. Whoever says ‘anti-Communism’ is saying, in effect, ‘anti-anti-humanity.’ A poor construction. So we should say: That which is against Communism is for humanity. Not to accept, but to reject this inhuman Communist ideology is simply to be a human being. Such a rejection is more than a political act. It is a protest of our souls against those who would have us forget the concept of good and evil.” Warning to the West, 58–59.

    5. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 19–20.

    6. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf: Sketches of Literary Life in the Soviet Union (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 10.

    7. Michael Scammell, ed., The Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents Reveal One Man’s Fight Against the Monolith (Chicago: Edition q, 1995).

    8. Elia Kazan, A Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1988), 459.

    9. Kazan, A Life, 464, 459.

  10. Paul Kengor, Dupes: How America’s Adversaries Have Manipulated Progressives for a Century (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2010), 521.

  11. See “Justice Jackson on Communism in America,” New York Times, May 21, 1950. Jackson distinguishes between the Communist Party and all other U.S. political parties in his concurrence with the Supreme Court ruling upholding Taft-Hartley. For example, noting that no other parties are secret, disciplined organizations, he writes, “Membership in the Communist Party is totally different. The party is a secret conclave. Members are admitted only upon acceptance as reliable and after indoctrination in its policies … Moreover, each pledges unconditional obedience to party authority.…”

  12. Dmytryk, Odd Man Out, 158.

  13. Lyons, Red Decade, 184.

  14. Village Voice, March 16, 1999; Maureen Dowd, “Streetcar Named Betrayal,” New York Times, February 24, 1999; Gordon quotation in “Elia Kazan; Feted but Not Forgiven,” Christian Science Monitor, March 10, 1999; Polonsky quotation in Entertainment Weekly, February 5, 1999.

  15. “Gold Field Prisoner,” New York Times, October 30, 1949.

  16. “Workers in Chains,” New York Times, June 17, 1951. Dallin assisted Kravchenko on his defection.

  17. “Mr. Dallin Among the Scholars,” Modern Age, Winter 1960–61, http://tinyurl.com/8dxv9tr.

  18. Lyons, Red Decade, 184.

  19. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Three (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 28, via Dallas, 1945, 457. Time magazine perceived the double standard as early as December 1934 in a report about Stalin’s blood purge following the assassination of Kirov, writing, “Since President Roosevelt cast the cloak of his popularity over Dictator Stalin by recognizing the Soviet Union, the U.S. Press last week breathed no such denunciation as at Adolf Hitler’s ‘blood purge.’” Time, December 17, 1934.

  20. Of note is a 1951 tribunal in Brussels where survivors of Nazi concentration camps put the concentration camp system of the Soviet Union “on trial” by hearing testimony of Gulag survivors of inhuman cruelties. The verdict? Guilty. See http://tinyurl.com/8d3r88z.

  21. Indeed, his Swiss ménage was penetrated by Communist agents.

  22. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 311, 317–20.

  23. Douglass, Why the Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties, 9–10. Among others, Douglass cites John W. Finney, “Brezhnev Said to Assure East Europe that Accords with West Are a Tactic,” New York Times, September 17, 1973, and William Beecher, “Brezhnev Termed Détente a Ruse, 1973 Report Said,” Boston Globe, February 11, 1977. Both articles refer to a British intelligence report on a secret spring 1973 meeting in Prague where Brezhnev described détente as a strategy to serve world Communist interests: “We are achieving with detente what our predecessors have been unable to achieve using the mailed fist.”

  24. Beecher, “Brezhnev Termed Détente a Ruse.”

  25. Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), 293. Simultaneously, the Soviets were expanding the international drug trade with similar deniability, as Joseph D. Douglass Jr. would write in his groundbreaking book Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America (Atlanta: Clarion House, 1990), an exposé of pharmacological Soviet aggression post–Cold Warriors refused to confront.

  26. Conquest, Dragons, 99.

  27. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Memoirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 650.

  28. Sterling, Terror Network, 2.

  29. A. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 22.

  30. 2 + 2 = 5 was the equation Orwell made famous in 1984, which was undoubtedly borrowed from Eugene Lyons’s chapter of the same name in Assignment in Utopia.

  31. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1970/solzhenitsyn-autobio.html.

  32. There is a sickening point of comparison between this repatriation policy, born of Yalta, and a secret agreement between the Nazis and the Soviets to return to each other either German Marxists who had sought refuge in Soviet Russia, or anti-Communist Russians who had sought refuge in Germany. Two main differences: The numbers of those returned were insignificant in the Nazi-to-Soviet example; and in the British and American case, we didn’t get thousands of our hostages back in return. See chapter 11.

  33. Nikolai Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977); Julius Epstein, Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1973).

  34. Nikolai Tolstoy, Letter to the Editor, TLS, October 27, 2010.

  35. Barron, Inside the State Department (New York: Comet Press, 1956), 18.

  36. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness, a Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 227.

  37. Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 136–37.

  38. See chapter 7.

  39. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 27, 53.

  40. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, I–II (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 85. Solzhenitsyn notes that not until 1973—in the Sunday Oklahoman of January 21—was an article by Julius Epstein published. Julius Epstein, as noted and saluted above, was one of our great truth tellers. It was his investigative journalism that prompted the 1951 congressional hearings on the official suppression of the Katyn Massacre that were crucial to the reestablishment and preservation of the historical record.

  41. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 213–14.

  42. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, “Introduction” by Bertram D. Wolfe, viii.

  43. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 92–93.

  44. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 97.

  45. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 63.

  46. Epstein, Operation Keelhaul, 62.

  47. Patton, at Eisennhower’s order, was cooling his heels outside Prague, waiting for the Red Army to enter Prague, but Vlasov was there first; Epstein, 64–65, sourcing a report in The Saturday Evening Post by a reporter in Prague.

  48. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 22.

  49. Time, December 17, 1934, quoted in Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 76.

  50. James Allan, No Citation (London: Tandem Books, 1965).

  51. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 45–57. About Berlin, Baldwin writes, “General Eisenhower’s own inclinations about Berlin apparently had full support in Washington; Edgar Ansel Mowrer reports in The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy that he had been personally told by the White House that ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin.’”

  52. This included thousands of refugees of the Russian Revolution who had never been Soviet citizens and were not covered by the Yalta Agreement. See Tolstoy, Secret Betrayal, 19–20. Tolstoy describes the millions of Russians who came West during the war as forced workers, POWs, or refugees, at 26–41. Among them were nearly one million Russian and other anti-Soviet men who joined the German enemy of their Soviet enemy. As Tolstoy puts it on 101, this made for an extreme peculiarity in the annals of war: “The USSR alone of all the Allies had provided the enemy with thousands of recruits.” This was more than an embarrassmen; it was a massive cut at Soviet prestige. It was Soviet policy to deny such a “problem” existed, although this became difficult as Russians in German uniforms started massing by the thousands in British and American POW camps after D-day. The Soviet regime fully expected these men and their families to pay for their anti-Soviet actions; additionally, it feared as a matter of its own survival the existence of an armed, anti-Soviet army in the West. Repatriation was their answer to which the British and Americans acquiesced.

  53. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 90.

  54. A photograph is captioned “Greenhouse vitamins for Miners.” The subhead reads, “We visited goldmines operated by Dalstroi in the valley of the Kolyma River … It was interesting to find, instead of the sin, gin, and brawling of an old-time gold rush, extensive greenhouses growing tomatoes, cucmbers and even melons, to make sure the hardy miners got enough vitamins!” (657) As Tim Tzouliadis points out in The Forsaken (222), these miners in the photograph were not what they seemed. He writes, “Judging from their physical condition, these strong ‘healthy miners’ could only have been NKVD guards playing the part for the American visitors … While the persecutors took on the role of the persecuted for a few hours, the real miners waited hidden in the shadows, worked close to death … Their faces would never grace the pages of the National Geographic.”

  55. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 220–21. According to the IPR Report, Lauchlin Currie got Lattimore the gig traveling as a senior adviser to Wallace.

  56. Life, August 30, 1948, 94; Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 471.

  57. Nigel Cawthorne, The Iron Cage: Are British POWs Still Alive in Siberia? (London: Fourth Estate, 1994), 114–15.

  58. Tolstoy, Secret Betrayal, 305.

  59. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, 468.

  60. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 44–45.

  61. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and Shield, 320–21.

  62. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 56–57.

  63. Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 309.

  64. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 37.

  65. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 70.

  66. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 106.

  67. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 137

  68. Bullitt, Correspondence, 522.

  69. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 91–92.

  70. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 83–84.

  71. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 92–93, 283.

  72. See chapter 1.

  73. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 64.

  74. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 62–63. Dies notes that the highest membership serial number his committee ever came across was 195,762. “Given that Communists strive for quality, rather than quantity, it was amazing that they had been able to grow from 10,000 aliens in 1919 to nearly 200,000 members in 1938, mostly native born or naturalized citizens.”

  75. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 139.

  76. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 139.

  77. See chapter 3.

  78. Weinstein and Vassiliev, Haunted Wood, 343–44.

CHAPTER 9

    1. On opening, the National D-day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia—a town that lost more Americans per capita on D-day than any other—unveiled busts of FDR, Truman, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Stalin. Stalin’s inclusion sparked anger, editorials, a petition, and, finally, board action to remove all of the leaders from public display. http://www2.newsadvance.com/news/2010/sep/28/d-day-memorial-remove-busts-stalin-other-allied-fi-ar-530016/*.

    2. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xi.

    3. Bohlen, Witness to History, 126.

    4. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xi.

    5. Suvorov, Chief Culprit, xiii.

    6. Dies, Martin Dies’ Story, 11.

    7. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Enigma Books, 2007), 389.

    8. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 405–32.

    9. William C. Bullitt, “How We Won the War and Lost the Peace,” Life, August 30, 1948.

  10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), 396.

  11. See, for example, Rafael Medoff, “The Roosevelt Administration, David Ben-Gurion and the Failure to Bomb Auschwitz,” http://www.wymaninstitute.org/special-reports/.

  12. Dallas, 1945, 413–14.

  13. Suvorov makes a compelling argument that the Soviets were caught off guard in an offensive position while preparing to strike at Germany themselves.

  14. “Chinese Ask Russia for Second Front,” New York Times, June 14, 1943.

  15. Notwithstanding the Soviets’ “secret” blitzkrieg in Mongolia in August 1939 that destroyed Japan’s 6th Army. See Suvorov, Chief Culprit, 114–20.

  16. Manchester, American Caesar, 241. Initially, army brass (including Marshall) and FDR found MacArthur’s proposal to bring Russia into the Pacific War persuasive; with Japan knocked out, all Allied forces could turn to captive Europe. FDR wired Moscow to convene a conference. “Stalin’s reply was cool. He preferred, he said, to defer judgment on the matter until spring. Studying his reply, Marshall and Stark decided it would be unwise to press the issue.”

  17. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 605.

  18. Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets, chapter 2, “Operation Snow,” 22–45.

  19. Niblo, Influence, 101. Niblo agrees with Adm. Edwin Layton that the Soviets probably knew of the attack given that the Japanese strike force, steaming toward Hawaii with instructions to sink anything in its path, permitted a Soviet-flagged freighter, Uritsky, loaded with Lend-Lease goods, to sail unharmed. Admiral Layton writes in “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway, “This raises the probability that Uritsky’s course must have been given to the Japanese by the Russians themselves. This deduction then leads to the logical assumption that that Soviet intelligence knew precise details of the course to be take across the Northern Pacific by Nagamo’s striking force.” Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, U.S.N. (ret.), with Captain John Pineau, U.S.N.R. (ret.), and John Costello, “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky and Konecky, 1985), 221.

  20. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 37.

  21. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 44.

  22. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 114.

  23. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 30.

  24. Manchester, American Caesar, 240, 270.

  25. Manchester, American Caesar, 279.

  26. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:548. Sherwood writes, “In one convoy [to Murmansk] twenty-one out of thirty-three ships were sunk.”

  27. Transcript of Lend-Lease Act of 1941, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=71&page=transcript.

  28. Lyons, Red Decade, 240.

  29. McJimsey, Hopkins, 190.

  30. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:400.

  31. Herring, Aid to Russia, 46.

  32. Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:449. Chesly Manly discusses this paradox in Twenty-Year Revolution, 114–15.

  33. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:542.

  34. Writing in 1958, General Wedemeyer, a member of the first joint strategic planning group in early 1942, defended Marshall and rejected the notion that the “second front” was conceived with anything but Western interests at heart. “From my own knowledge I can state categorically that the BOLERO-ROUNDUP conception was aimed at winning the war on preferential terms for the West. See Wedemeyer Reports! 153–54.

  35. “Drive in North Africa Not Enough,” New York Times, October 28, 1942.

  36. “Shock Troops Lead, Simultaneous Landings Made Before Dawn at Numerous Points,” New York Times, November 8, 1942; see FDR’s statement announcing “second front” at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421107b.html.

  37. “Stalin Still Insisting on That Second Front,” New York Times, November 8, 1942.

  38. “Stalin Says Drives in Africa Turn War in Favor of Allies,” New York Times, November 14, 1942.

  39. Figures come from Mark Clark’s memoir, Calculated Risk, 290.

  40. Moran, Churchill, 155. According to Moran, it was at Tehran where Churchill first realized that “if he wanted to help the countries of Eastern Europe he must get there before the Red Army.”

  41. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:790.

  42. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:769. “During these days at Cairo, Hopkins formed a friendship with Charles E. Bohlen.… Hopkins asked him all manner of questions about the Soviet Union, and was surprised and impressed by the objectivity and lack of bias as well as by the considerable scholarship revealed in his answers … Hopkins subsequently persuaded the president to appoint Bohlen to a post in the White House where he would act as a liaison officer with the State Department…”

  43. Bohlen, Witness to History, 148.

  44. “Was Stalin (the Terrible) Really a Great Man? A Conversation with Averell Harriman,” Encounter, November, 1981, 24.

  45. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942–1945 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946), 447–48.

  46. These Eisenhower quotations come from FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (published 1961), 359–61.

  47. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 38–39. Eaker explained that from an air point of view it would be “easier to support a trans-Adriatic operation than the invasion of southern France. The bases, he pointed out, had already been established in Italy … But the southern France operation would have to be supported from new bases in Corsica. After the meeting was over, General Marshall commented … to General Eaker: “You’ve been too damned long with the British.”

  48. See Moran, Churchill, for an eyewitness account of Hopkins’s Churchill-rage.

  49. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 198–200.

  50. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 56–57. “General Eisenhower’s own inclinations about Berlin apparently had the full support of Washington; Edgar Ansel Mowrer reports in The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy that he had been personally told by the White House that ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Truman to let the Russians take Berlin.’ President Truman, new to the White House and without much background about the past nuances of our politico-military policies, apparently acceded.” Joint Chiefs = Mar shall. Marshall = Hopkins?

  51. “Allied Front in Italy Not So Far from Reich,” New York Times, September 12, 1943.

  52. Gannon, Cardinal Spellman Story, 224.

  53. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 195–96.

  54. Clark, Calculated Risk, 203.

  55. “St. Exupery Lost on Flying Mission,” New York Times, August 10, 1944.

  56. Clark, Calculated Risk, 294.

  57. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 196.

  58. Somehow Hopkins’s coaching of Molotov to circumvent American military advice didn’t make it into Sherwood. See Mark, “Venona’s Source,” 20.

  59. “Mr. Molotoff Came to Plead for a Second Front,” New York Times, June 13, 1942.

  60. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:610.

  61. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:615.

  62. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 90.

  63. Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador, 271.

  64. “Our Indispensable Fronts,” New York Times, February 25, 1943.

  65. “Second Front Lag Is Denied By Knox,” New York Times, June 23, 1943.

  66. Moran, Churchill, 102.

  67. “Zero Hour,” New York Times, July 11, 1943.

  68. “Russians Cheer Landing as Aid to the Red Army,” New York Times, July 11, 1943.

  69. McJimsey, Hopkins, 299.

  70. Moran, Churchill, 142.

  71. Moran, Churchill, 140–42.

  72. FRUS: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (published 1961), 493.

  73. FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 494. “Marshal Stalin said that he favored the operation in Southern France particularly as he thought Turkey would not enter the war. He repeated that he thought Turkey would not enter the war.” You better believe Turkey wouldn’t enter the war. Lord Moran tells us (157) that Churchill tried desperately to bring Turkey in. “Inonu had made it clear that it is Russia, not Germany that the Turks fear. They fear that if Russians come to their assistance they will remain; once the Kremlin has her troops in command of the Straits, only force will displace them.”

  74. Clark, Calculated Risk, 293–95.

  75. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:775.

  76. From Sherwood, Hopkins, 1:202–3: “Columnist Marquis Childs wrote: Should the President on a dull day suggest casually to his friend and confidant Harry L. Hopkins that the national welfare would be served if Mr. Hopkins were to jump off the Washington Monument, the appointed hour would find Mr. Hopkins poised for the plunge. Whether with or without parachute would depend on what the President seemed to have had in mind.

Mr. Hopkins would know about that, because he has made a career of understanding, sensing, divining, often guessing—and usually guessing right—what is in Franklin Roosevelt’s mind. It is a career that has taken him from the dull routine of social-service work to the upper reaches of diplomacy, where he has had a thrilling preview of the shape of things to come. And, what is more, history may show that he was one of the shapers.”

  77. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:775.

  78. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 121.

  79. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:783.

  80. Bohlen, Witness to History, 148.

  81. FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 563–64.

  82. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:788. On December 1, 1943, the last day of the conference, the Prime Minister put in a final plug for an assault on Rhodes and Hopkins went into smack-down mode. In fact, as Sherwood writes, “Hopkins was so anxious to have the record straight that he wrote his own version of his comments for inclusion in the minutes,” disowning Churchill’s remarks every way possible: “It should be clearly understood that the American side believe that there are no landing-craft available for an attack on Rhodes—and, more important, still, that even if the landing-craft were available—no decision has been reached as to whether or not the landing craft could not be used to better advantage in some other operation.”

  83. Moran, Churchill, 155.

  84. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 96.

CHAPTER 10

    1. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 92.

    2. After meeting with Stalin in Moscow on May 28, 1945, Hopkins told Truman that Stalin “prefers to go through with unconditional surrender” regarding Japan. “However, he feels that if we stick to unconditional surrender the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroy them as we did Germany.” Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:892–93.

    3. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 123. Allen Dulles, Germany’s Underground (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 22.

    4. Dulles, Underground, 140.

    5. Dulles, Underground, 165.

    6. Dulles, Underground, 136. This cable was written in April 1944.

    7. “Full Story of Anti-Hitler Plot Shows That Allies Refused to Assist,” New York Times, March 18, 1946.

    8. “Gen. Menzies, Ex-British Intelligence Chief, Dies,” New York Times, May 31, 1968.

    9. Dulles, Underground, 24–25.

  10. “Eisenhower Praises Anti-Nazi Resistance,” New York Times, May 11, 1945.

  11. Peter Hoffman, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, 3rd English ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), xiii.

  12. “Canaris Hanging Related,” New York Times, October 11, 1952.

  13. “Lubavitch Jews Want Admiral Canaris Honoured by Yad Vashem,” Agence France Presse, August 6, 2009, http://www.ejpress.org/article/38250. “Following historical research we have established that Admiral Canaris saved Rabbi Yosef Schneerson—sixth in that lineage—and 500 other Jews from the Warsaw ghetto,” said [Rabbi Benjamin] Lipshitz.”

  14. Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 126.

  15. Ian Colvin, Hitler’s Secret Enemy (London: Pan Books, 1957). It was Sir Christopher Warren, undersecretary of the British Foreign Office, who first told Colvin of Canaris’s aid to the British. Colvin’s book was later endorsed by Gen. L. Rivet of the Deuxième Bureau, France’s military intelligence organization.

  16. Colvin, Canaris, 7.

  17. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 418.

  18. Box 61, Folder 4, Harry Hopkins Papers, Georgetown University Library.

  19. See chapter 7 for more about Sidney “Harry-Doesn’t-Know-Uranium-from-Geranium” Hyman. There is only one passing mention of Earle in the Sherwood Hopkins biography.

  20. Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2005), 368, quoting Secret and Personal, by F. W. Winterbotham (New York: HarperCollins, 1969), 162.

  21. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, 93–97.

  22. Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 119.

  23. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 134–35.

  24. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 181.

  25. George H. Earle, “F.D.R.’s Tragic Mistake,” Confidential, August 1958, 19.

  26. Two weeks after Canaris made the Paris trip, the answer from Churchill came back: unconditional surrender. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? How Paris Miraculously Escaped Hitler’s Sentence of Death in August 1944 (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1991), 5.

  27. Vassiliev’s White Notebook No. 3 notes (133) that Neumann’s KGB recruitment was approved on January 2, 1943. In 1942, Vassiliev’s notes also reveal, three still unidentified KGB agents considered Neumann “pro-Soviet.”

  28. Jürgen Heideking and Christof Mauch, eds., American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A Documentary History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 267.

  29. Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies, 308, 305.

  30. Alexander Vassiliev Papers, White Notebook No. 1 Translation, 51, http://www.scribd.com/doc/84608249/Alexander-Vassiliev-Papers-White-Notebook-No-1-Translation.

  31. Their names, unasterisked, stud the index of the tome Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Department of State, Publication 3580, 1950).

  32. Stripling, Red Plot Against America, 35–36.

  33. Niblo, Influence, 75.

  34. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:693.

  35. FRUS: Casablanca wasn’t published until 1968—twenty-five years after the conference!

  36. Without delving into CFR’s reputation among so-called conspiracy theorists (were they at least half right all along?), I will note that the online history of CFR to this day describes Soviet military intelligence agent Alger Hiss on joining the group after World War II as “a newly elected member sympathetic to the left wing of the Democratic Party”; http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html.

  37. FRUS: The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, 506.

  38. McJimsey, Hopkins, 277. FRUS: Washington and Casablanca, 703.

  39. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 96.

  40. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! 95.

  41. This list includes British prime minister Winston Churchill, British foreign minister Anthony Eden, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and soon-to-be U.S. Ambassador to Moscow W. Averell Harriman. See The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 11 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1570, 1575. See also W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 189. In 1948, Eisenhower calls the unconditional surrender announcement of 1943 “extraordinarily pleasing to me,” but he himself sought modifications in 1944 to counter “German propaganda … interpreting the words “unconditional surrender” to strengthen the morale of the German Army and people.” See Hull, Memoirs, 1578. See also Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, 518. Butcher further wrote, “Any military person knows there are conditions to every surrender … Our psychological experts believe we would be wiser if we created a mood of acceptance of surrender in the German army which would make possible a collapse of resistance.”

  42. B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow, 1948), 292–93; see also Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 122–23.

  43. Biskupski, Hollywood’s War with Poland, 74, 155–56.

  44. Biskupski, Hollywood’s War with Poland, 77, 263.

  45. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 25.

  46. Evans, Blacklisted by History, 95–97.

  47. Julian Wadleigh admitted in court that he passed four hundred to five hundred secret State Department documents to the Soviets. See Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 130.

  48. On this State Department committee list appear three of the four lucky recipients of fine Bokhara rugs Whittaker Chambers delivered on behalf of the Kremlin for services rendered for the Communist cause: Hiss, Wadleigh, and White. George Silverman was the fourth. See Romerstein and Breindel, Venona Secrets, 117.

  49. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945, 76.

  50. Hull, Memoirs, 1570–71.

  51. McJimsey, Hopkins, 278–79.

  52. Klaus P. Fischer, Hitler and America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 237.

  53. Hoffman, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, 214–15, 596.

  54. Earle, “FDR’s Tragic Mistake!” Confidential, 18.

  55. Earle, “FDR’s Tragic Mistake!” 56.

  56. Earle, “FDR’s Tragic Mistake!” 56–57.

  57. I say “Roosevelt White House” rather than “Roosevelt administration” because Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson vehemently opposed the Morgenthau Plan, and were angered also at the “high-handed procedure” by which Morgenthau “conducted negotiations” at the 1944 Quebec Conference “on a matter of primary concern to the State and War Departments, without consultation with us.” See Hull, Memoirs, 1615.

  58. These quotations on the impact of the Morgenthau Plan on German morale come from John Dietrich, The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002), 69–70.

  59. Dietrich, Morgenthau Plan, 70–71.

  60. Ernie Pyle, Here Is Your War (New York: World Publishing, 1945), 240–42.

  61. Geoffrey T. Hellman, “Profiles—House Guest II,” New Yorker, August 14, 1943, 35.

  62. The Schecters found a copy of the Morgenthau Plan in Soviet archives with “Soviet comments” noting Western opponents including Churchill, the Catholic Church, Republicans, businesses, and banks. See Sacred Secrets, 124.

  63. Bentley testimony of May 29, 1952, Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, July 30, 1953, http://www.archive.org/stream/interlockingsubv1953unit/interlockingsubv1953unit_djvu.txt.

  64. Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New York: Free Press, 2011), 191–92.

  65. As a Royal Marine, Ian Colvin was himself in discussions with British intelligence about a possible mission to contact Canaris, “but,” Colvin wrote, “other councils in the end prevailed.

“I am sorry I cannot send you to meet Admiral Canaris,” said the senior intelligence officer with whom I had been discussing the project in October 1942, “but the Foreign Office says we have to be awfully careful not to offend the Russians.” Canaris, 148.

  66. Smith, OSS, 368.

  67. “Gen. Menzies, Ex-British Intelligence Chief, Dies,” New York Times, May 31, 1968.

  68. Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 115–16.

  69. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 130–42.

  70. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 139.

  71. The Berle incident is related in Christof Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 64–65.

  72. Mauch, Shadow War, 64–65.

  73. Mauch, Shadow War, 248.

  74. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 136.

  75. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 144.

  76. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 143–44.

  77. Heideking and Mauch, American Intelligence, 145.

  78. Francis Biddle Papers: Series 2, Correspondence: Chronological, Box 6, Folder 45, Georgetown Special Collections.

CHAPTER 11

    1. http://frontpagemag.com/2011/07/22/symposium-why-we-left-our-pows-behind/. Joseph D. Douglass Jr. is the author of Betrayed, a comprehensive history of U.S. POWs left behind in Communist captivity. He is also the author of Red Cocaine, a shocking account of the Communist strategy to undermine the West with illegal narcotics.

    2. White House press conference, June 16, 1992.

    3. An Examination of Policy Toward POW/MIA, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff, May 23, 1991, 16. This report is available at: www.scribd.com/doc/82455046/An-Examination-of-US-Policy-Towards-POW-MIAs-1991.

    4. The term “concentration camp” had been used during World War I, Solzhenitsyn tells us, “but here in 1918 it was for the first time applied to the citizens of one’s own country.” Gulag Archipelago, 2:17.

    5. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 16–17.

    6. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 17.

    7. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 255.

    8. “Group Is Called Communist Front,” New York Times, February 9, 1956.

    9. “Threat of Atomic War Held Basis of Misunderstanding with Soviets,” New York Times, November 15, 1945.

  10. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 253.

  11. M. Stanton Evans and Herbert Romerstein posit in Stalin’s Secret Agents that the feeble FDR may not have even comprehended the secret agreements at Yalta he signed.

  12. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:864.

  13. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 430.

  14. Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 298–99.

  15. Cawthorne, Iron Cage, 5.

  16. Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 299.

  17. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 430; Polish report in Deane, Strange Alliance, 191.

  18. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 424–25.

  19. Cable classified URGENT, TOP SECRET, “A Personal Message for the President, From U.S. Ambassador to Russia, W. Averell Harriman,” March 8, 1945. It is quoted in the Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 31.

  20. See note 19. This March 8, 1945, cable is also excerpted in Harriman’s memoir, Special Envoy, 420–21.

  21. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 426.

  22. It’s worth recalling the aide-mémoire Cardinal Spellman wrote up after meeting with FDR on September 3, 1943. With Russian armies still well inside Russia, FDR tells Spellman, “there is no point to oppose the desires of Stalin because he has the power to get them anyhow. So better give them gracefully.” FDR went on to tick off all of the nations of Europe he was ceding to the USSR—before Tehran, before Yalta: Finland, the Baltics, the “Eastern half” of Poland, Bessarabia. “There will be no opposition to a Russian-dominated Communist Austrian regime,” FDR said. “No plebiscite is to be expected in Czecho-Slovakia.”

What comes through is the sound of regurgitated agitprop. To wit: FDR said it’s “improbable” to get Stalin to pledge not to extend Soviet territory past a certain line; the population of Eastern Poland “wants to become Russian”; the USSR is “expected” to engineer Communist regimes in Europe; “Communist Regimes would expand but what can we do about it.” FDR continues, “We should not overlook the magnificent achievements of Russia. Their finances are sound.” FDR as five-year-plan flack, too? Then, “Be it as it may … the U.S. and Britain cannot fight the Russians. The Russian production is so big that the American help, except for trucks, is negligible.” Maybe the president hadn’t heard of Lend-Lease.

  23. Cable, “To: Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., U.S. Secretary of State, From: Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, No. PH-1449,” March 14, 1945. Quoted in the 1991 Senate Minority Report on POWs, Sections 3–9 and 3–10.

  24. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 429.

  25. Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 300.

  26. After Yalta, Hopkins never saw FDR again.

  27. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 422.

  28. Deane, Strange Alliance, 190. “The reason for this was that the Soviet leaders did not want American or British officers within Poland where they could observe the methods being used to bring Poland under the domination of the Soviet Union. The world was led to believe that the Poles were so enthusiastically happy at their deliverance from the Germans that they wanted nothing more than to embrace their Russian liberators, including their ideology.”

  29. As a Russian speaker, Captain Hills remained involved in the British end of repatriation, witnessing many Soviet atrocities.

  30. Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 301–02.

  31. Deane, Strange Alliance, 186.

  32. Michael Beschloss, The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler’s Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 83.

  33. Weil, A Pretty Good Club, 189.

  34. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 419.

  35. Beschloss, Conquerors, 196.

  36. Barron, Inside the State Department, 44.

  37. Barron, Inside the State Department, 53. See also chapter 2, “The Role of Alger Hiss and Others Like Him,” 15–36.

  38. Sherwood, Hopkins, 2:867.

  39. Harriman, Special Envoy, 421–22.

  40. Harriman, Special Envoy, 422.

  41. Rees, WWII, 249–50.

  42. http://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/hiss/hiss1111.0100.004/2?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image.

  43. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 255–56.

  44. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 256–57.

  45. The Soviets would make good propaganda use of having liberated these cities in Communist coups in Czechoslovakia and in Austria. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 45–57.

  46. Kent Cooper, The Right to Know: An Exposition of the Evils of News Suppression and Propaganda (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1956), 205.

  47. Cooper, Right to Know, 207–8.

  48. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, 49, 51.

  49. Edward Kennedy, “I’d Do It Again,” The Atlantic, August 1948, 41.

  50. Cooper, Right to Know, 206.

  51. Cooper, Right to Know, 208.

  52. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 39. “SHAEF Asks Russians About Freed PW’s,” Associated Press dispatch, ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, Reims, France, May 12, 1945.

  53. Report, “From: Major General R. W. Barker, Subject: Report on conference with Russian Officials Relative to the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, To: The Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, AEF (Allied European Forces),” May 23, 1945. Quoted in Senate POW/MIA Minority Report, 41.

  54. FRUS: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, 70–71.

  55. FRUS: Potsdam, 38.

  56. FRUS: Potsdam, 57–59.

  57. Stalin wouldn’t even release the sixteen Poles. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, 498: “Nothing more was heard of the [Polish] victims of the trap until the case opened against them on June 18. It was conducted in the usual Communist manner. The prisoners were accused of subversion, terrorism, and espionage and all but one admitted wholly or in part the charges against them. Thirteen were found guilty, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from four months to ten years, and three were acquitted. This was in fact the judicial liquidation of the Polish Underground which had fought so heroically against Hitler. The rank and file had already died in the streets of Warsaw.”

  58. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 42.

  59. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 41.

  60. Cable, “To: AGWAR, From: SHAEF FORWARD, SIGNED EISENHOWER, REF. No. FWD-23059,” June 1, 1945. Quoted in Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 42.

  61. Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012).

  62. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 42–43.

  63. Bukovsky, “The Power of Memory and Acknowledgment.”

  64. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 339.

  65. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 43. See “10,000 Ex-Captives Coming by Week-End; Army Sees All in Europe Accounted For,” New York Times, June 1, 1945.

  66. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 43.

  67. Cawthorne, Iron Cage, 3.

  68. “Ex-U.S. Envoy Says Yeltsin Misspoke on M.I.A.’s,” New York Times, June 27, 1992.

  69. Tzouliadis, The Forsaken, 291.

  70. Wringer report, 51-B-13005A, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/wringer/.

  71. Senate Minority POW/MIA Report, 49.

  72. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Betrayed (1st Book Library, 2002). Douglass credits researchers John M. G. Brown and Tom Ashworth with first recounting this history of abandonment.

  73. http://www.villagevoice.com/content/printVersion/181282/.

  74. Sydney Schanberg, “Silent Treatment,” The American Conservative, July 1, 2010, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/silent-treatment/.

  75. The first half of Betrayed reports on the experiences of Gen. Jan Sejna, a very high-ranking Cezch Communist official who defected in 1968. Sejna revealed the extent to which thousands of prisoners, including American POWs, were used as human guinea pigs for Communist “medical experiments.”

  76. “Official Says Hundreds of U.S. Citizens Likely Died in Soviet Gulags,” CNN, February 11, 2005. See at: http://articles.cnn.com/2005-02-11/us/gulag.report_1_gulag-system-pentagon-report-camps?_s=PM:US.

  77. Washington Post, September 15, 1990, A21.

  78. Known as “Memoirs,” this interview was obtained by the U.S. Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA and Defense Personnel POW/Missing Personnel Office; http://www.nationalalliance.org/korea/memoirs.htm.

  79. Jordan, Diaries, 29.

  80. Bollinger, Stalin’s Slave Ships, 108–9. On assessing the Soviet merchant fleet as inadequate for transporting Lend-Lease equipment across the Pacific, the United States transferred to Soviet control “about a hundred older merchant ships [and] thirty-eight new Liberty ships and five more advanced Victory ships, all built in the 1940s … It seems clear that the cargo included forced laborers and that the destinations included Magadan.” Bollinger continues, “There are a number of reports that the Soviets used some of these ships after the war to transfer prisoners to the Kolyma camps, including perhaps U.S. military personnel.”

CHAPTER 12

    1. Igor Shafarevich, The Socialist Phenomenon (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 269.

    2. Tomas Schuman, World Thought Police (Los Angeles: NATA Almanac, 1986), 5.

    3. Muggeridge, Things Past, 226.

    4. This idea grew into The Death of the Grown-Up (New York: St. Martin’s, 2007).

    5. Geert Wilders, speech at Cornerstone Church, Nashville, Tennessee, May 12, 2011.

    6. For a textbook example of how Islamic violence effectively advances Islamic law, see my discussion of the 2006 Airplane Plot at http://tinyurl.com/8mtupw3.

    7. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2128788/London-university-considers-stopping-sale-immoral-alcohol-campus-offends-Muslim-students.html. Muslims comprise an estimated 20 percent of London Metropolitan University.

    8. Diana West, “Shariah Goes to Harvard,” Washington Times, April 24, 2009.

    9. http://sig.ville.gouv.fr/Atlas/ZUS/.

  10. J. B Matthews, Odyssey of a Fellow Traveler (Belmont, MA: American Opinion Reprints, 1961), 110.

  11. Ibn Warraq, Why I Am Not a Muslim (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1995), 30; Betrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (Project Gutenberg E-book, 2005), 165.

  12. Russell, Autobiography, 5.

  13. http://www.wnd.com/2011/02/267817/. Despite commentators’ derision, the caliphate polls well in the Islamic world. In 2007, University of Maryland/WorldPublicOpinion.org polled four Muslim countries: Egypt, Pakistan, Indonesia and Morocco. By large majorities, Muslims favored the application of sharia and uniting Islam in a caliphate. http://tinyurl.com/99zs9eu.

  14. Alain Besançon quoted in Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century, 112–13.

  15. Ibn Warraq, Virgins? What Virgins? And Other Essays (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2010), 289–95; Andrew Bostom, “Geert Wilders, Western Sages, and Totalitarian Islam,” http://pjmedia.com/blog/geert-wilders-western-sages-and-totalitarian-islam/.

  16. http://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/3586-speech-geert-wilders-berlijn.html.

  17. See note 16.

  18. Alain Besançon, A Century of Horrors: Communism, Nazism, and the Uniqueness of the Shoah (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007), p. 36.

  19. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 57–58.

  20. Lenin wrote, “Our morality is entirely subjugated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat”— i.e., Lenin himself. He also wrote, “We do not believe in eternal morality, and we expose all the fables about morality.” See Matthews, “Odyssey of a Fellow Traveler,” 104. Matthews also quotes a letter from a Marxist friend who wrote (105), “‘Right’ is a relative term, with many connotations. Being on the right side is more important by far than doing the precisely right thing in a given instance.”

  21. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 58.

  22. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt and Stalin, 50.

  23. Conquest, Dragons, 169.

  24. Solzhenitsyn, Warning to the West, 125–26.

  25. Schuman (Besmenov), World Thought Police, 2.

  26. “An Explanatory Memorandum on the Strategic Goal for the Group in North America,” http://tinyurl.com/8ggj23l.

  27. Conquest, Ravaged Century, 155.

  28. Richard Crossman, ed., The God That Failed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 34.

  29. Crossman, God That Failed, 45.

  30. Crossman, God That Failed, 50.

  31. “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” National Counterterrorism Center, March 14, 2008.

  32. Manly, Twenty-Year Revolution, 79.

  33. R. H. S. Crossman, “Agreeing to Disagree,” The Nation, December 16, 1950.

  34. Eggleston, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the World War II Opposition.

  35. John T. Flynn, The Decline of the American Republic: And How to Rebuild It (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955), 4, 45.

  36. Raymond F. Gregory, Norman Thomas: The Great Dissenter (New York: Algora Publishing, 2008), 241.

  37. Murray N. Rothbard, “The Myth of Reaganomics,” http://mises.org/daily/1544.

  38. “Socialism Threat Seen by Ely in NRA,” New York Times, July 28, 1934.

  39. Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 691–92.

  40. Raymond Moley, “Thomas Sings Hosanna for Ike’s Course,” Kittanny Simpson Leader Times, May 6, 1957. In his syndicated column, ex-New Dealer Moley was quoting a recent interview with Thomas conducted by the college newspaper, The Harvard Times Republican. Moley further quoted Grayson Kirk, Eisenhower’s successor as president of Columbia, as describing the “danger” that “we shall begin to develop government as an instrument of welfare [and] lose, in the process, some of our own stamina, self-reliance and individual initiative.”

  41. Attributed to Norman Thomas by W. Cleon Skousen, Letter to the Editor, Schenectady Gazette, January 3, 1979.

  42. Leon A. Harris, Upton Sinclair: American Rebel (New York: Crowell, 1975), 351.