1. Never are any existing things found to originate from themselves, from something else, from both, or from no cause.
2. There are four conditioning causes: A cause (hetu), objects of sensations, “immediately preceding condition,” and of course the predominant influence—there is no fifth.
3. Certainly there is no self-existence (svabhava) of existing things in conditioning causes, etc.; and if no self-existence exists, neither does “other-existence” (parabhāva).
4. The efficient cause (kriyā) does not exist possessing a conditioning cause, nor does the efficient cause exist without possessing a conditioning cause. Conditioning causes are not without efficient causes, nor are there [conditioning causes] which possess efficient causes.
5. Certainly those things are called “conditioning causes” whereby something originates after having come upon them; as long as something has not originated, why are they not so long “non-conditioning causes”?
6. There can be a conditioning cause neither of a non-real thing nor of a real thing. Of what non-real thing is there a conditioning cause? And if it is [already] real, what use is a cause?
7. If an element (dharma) occurs which is neither real nor non-real nor both real-and-non-real, how can there be a cause which is effective in this situation?
8. Just that which is without an object of sensation is accepted as a real element. Then if there is an element having no object of sensation, how is it possible to have an object of sensation?
9. When no elements have originated, [their] disappearance is not possible. Therefore it is not proper to speak of an “immediately preceding condition”; for if something has already ceased, what cause is there for it?
10. Since existing things which have no self-existence are not real, it is not possible at all that: “This thing ‘becomes’ upon the existence of that other one.”
11. The product does not reside in the conditioning causes, individually or collectively, so how can that which does not reside in the conditioning cause result from conditioning causes?
12. Then the “non-real” would result from those conditioning-causes. Why then would a product not proceed also from non-causes?
13. On the one hand, the product [consists in its] conditioning causes; on the other hand, the causes do not consist of themselves. How can a product [resulting] from [conditioning causes] not consisting of themselves be consisting of those causes?
14. Therefore, that product does not consist in those causes; [yet] it is agreed that a product does not consist of non-causes. How [can there be] a conditioning cause or non-cause when a product is not produced?
1. [An opponent says:] If all existence is empty, there is no origination nor destruction. Then whose nirvāṇa through elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of illusion] would be postulated?
2. [Nāgārjuna replies:] If all existence is non-empty, there is no origination nor destruction. Then whose nirvāṇa through elimination [of suffering] and destruction [of illusion] would be postulated?
3. Nirvāṇa has been said to be neither eliminated nor attained, neither annihilated nor eternal, neither disappeared nor originated.
4. Nirvāṇa is certainly not an existing thing, for then it would be characterized by old age and death. In consequence it would involve the error that an existing thing would not become old and be without death.
5. And if nirvāṇa is an existing thing, nirvāṇa would be a constructed product (saṃskṛta), since never ever has an existing thing been found to be a non-constructed-product (asaṃskṛta).
6. But if nirvāṇa is an existing thing, how could (nirvāṇa) exist without dependence [on something else]? Certainly nirvāṇa does not exist as something without dependence.
7. If nirvāṇa is not an existing thing, will nirvāṇa become a non-existing thing? Wherever there is no existing thing, neither is there a non-existing thing.
8. But if nirvāṇa is a non-existing thing, how could (nirvāṇa) exist without dependence [on something else]? Certainly nirvāṇa is not a non-existing thing which exists without dependence.
9. That state which is the rushing in and out [of existence] when dependent or conditioned—this [state], when not dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be nirvāṇa.
10. The teacher [Gautama] has taught that a “becoming” and a “non-becoming” (vibhava) are destroyed; therefore it obtains that: nirvāṇa is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing.
11. If nirvāṇa were both an existent and a non-existent thing, final release (mokṣa) would be [both] an existent and a non-existent thing; but that is not possible.
12. If nirvāṇa were both an existent and a non-existent thing, there would be no nirvāṇa without conditions, for these both [operate with] conditions.
13. How can nirvāṇa exist as both an existent thing and a non-existent thing, for nirvāṇa is a non-composite-product (asaṃskṛta), while both an existent thing and a non-existent thing are composite products (saṃskṛta).
14. How can nirvāṇa exist as both an existent and a non-existent thing? There is no existence of both at one and the same place, as in the case of both darkness and light.
15. The assertion: “nirvāṇa, is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing” is proved if [the assertion]: “It is an existent thing and a nonexistent thing” were proved.
16. If nirvāṇa is neither an existent thing nor a non-existent thing, who can really arrive at [the assertion]: “neither an existent thing nor a nonexistent thing”?
17. It is not expressed if the Glorious One [the Buddha] exists after his death, or does not exist, or both or neither.
18. Also, it is not expressed if the Glorious One exists while remaining [in the world], or does not exist, or both or neither.
19. There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (saṃsāra) from nirvāṇa; and there is nothing whatever which differentiates nirvāṇa from existence-in-flux.
20. The extreme limit (koti) of nirvāṇa is also the extreme limit of existence-in-flux; there is not the slightest bit of difference between these two.
21. The views [regarding] whether that which is beyond death is limited by a beginning or an end or some other alternative depend on a nirvāṇa limited by a beginning (pūrvānta) and an end (aparānta).
22. Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite? What is infinite? What is both finite and infinite? What is neither finite nor infinite?
23. Is there anything which is this or something else, which is permanent or impermanent, which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neither?
24. The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a salutary (śiva) cessation of phenomenal development (prapañca); no dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anything.
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From Mūlamadhyamakakārika (Fundamentals of the Middle Way), translated by Fred Streng (Nashville, TN: Abingdon press, 1967). Copyright © Abingdon Press, 1967. Text edited.