Even though Temujin was now the ruler of the Mongolian plateau north of the Gobi Desert, his rule was not undisputed. Several threats existed in 1206. Senggum, Toghril’s son, fled to Xi Xia and remained a potent threat. Even though Temujin had amiable relations with many Kereit before their war and his family married relatives of Toghril, the return of Senggum could potentially cleave the Kereit from his new state. Guchulug, a Naiman prince, escaped the debacle at Chakirmaut and was rumoured to be in league with the Merkit leaders who eluded Chinggis Khan’s troops. Finally, the Jin Empire still meddled in steppe affairs. Chinggis Khan knew from personal experience and from history that the Jin would not readily accept his dominion over northern Mongolia. A comparable state had not existed in Mongolia since the ninth century with the Uighur Empire, which intervened in the Tang Empire frequently.1
While the Jin Empire was certainly a threat, the Jin’s strategy of using one group of nomads to weaken another could only be successful if they caused fissures among the Mongols. The easiest way to do this would be to recruit the disaffected or rival leaders such as Guchulug or Senggum, much as they did with Temujin and Toghril against the Tatars. Guchulug and Senggum, however, were a threat even without the Jin. Chinggis Khan’s control over Mongolia remained tenuous. Although he had virtually eliminated all other aristocratic lines, the acceptance of the altan urugh was not guaranteed and would take time to provide with legitimacy. As evinced by Jamuqa’s ill-fated Gur-Khanid confederation, massive tribal confederations were difficult to manage and permanence elusive. Even though Chinggis Khan now held sway from the Altai to the Khalkha River, how long he could do so remained a pertinent question.
Additionally, there were neighbouring groups to the north, known collectively as the Hoi-yin Irgen or Forest People, that posed problems. Although the Mongols generally referred to them as a single group, the Hoi-yin Irgen were not a confederation but rather a number of independent tribes who lived in Siberia. In most of the steppe wars, they tended to be neutral, but some groups, like the Oirat, had joined Jamuqa’s confederation.2
The Oirat’s fleeting alliance with Jamuqa was not sufficient cause to wage war against them, but, from Chinggis Khan’s perspective, the fact that some, like the Oirat, also then aligned with the Naiman could not be overlooked. Nonetheless, there were other reasons to bring the Hoi-yin Irgen to heel. The first reason was the Merkit, who had been at a stage between complete pastoral nomadism and the economy of the Hoi-yin Irgen. Although the Merkit had been defeated with the Naiman, many escaped westward. Their traditional homeland was in northern Mongolia and south of Lake Baikal, just south of many of the Hoi-yin Irgen. If Chinggis Khan exerted dominance over the region, he then deprived the Merkit of their pastures and eliminated a threat. In addition, the region was economically important. Grain grew in several areas around Lake Baikal and in Siberia; thus he could secure food supplies. Furthermore, by controlling the Hoi-yin Irgen, Chinggis Khan then had access to the lucrative fur trade as well as gold deposits along the Yenisei River. Finally, a campaign to subdue the Hoi-yin Irgen also served the purpose of creating a patrimony for his son Jochi. The campaign began in 1207 and quickly overcame most of the Hoyin-Irgen. Some, such as the Oirat, submitted without fighting and gained favour. Others, such as the Kirghiz and Kem-Kemjiuts in the Yenisei River basin, submitted only after some resistance.3
Meanwhile, Mongol forces also expanded westward. In 1207, a Mongol army, perhaps reinforced by Jochi’s army and aided by the Oirat, crossed the Altai Mountains in search of the allied Naiman and the Merkit.4 The Mongols encountered them at the Irtysh River where they soundly defeated the refugees again in late 1208 or early 1209. Despite their victory, the Mongols were unable to destroy their enemies, although they shattered their army. Guchulug and the Naiman fled south, attempting to take refuge in Uighurstan. The Uighurs, however, drove them away.5 Guchulug then sought protection among the Qarluqs, a Turkic confederation near Almaliq. The Naiman’s propensity for pillaging, however, quickly soured that relationship. Guchulug eventually found shelter with the Gur-Khan of Qara Khitai later in that year.6
Figure 3.1 Sandy steppe land. While they are often viewed as an unending expanse of grasslands, the steppes are actually quite varied in terrain and pasture.
Qara Khitai had long-standing ties with the Naiman, and during the twelfth century had even been their suzerain for a period of time.7 Since then, however, Qara Khitai had weakened. The Gur-Khan accepted Guchulug as a vassal and even presented his daughter to the Naiman prince as a wife. In Guchulug, the Gur-Khan found a stalwart warrior with a sizeable retinue who could possibly reverse the declining fortunes of Qara Khitai.
Meanwhile, the Merkit continued to seek refuge. As their primary leader, Toqtoa Khan, had died at the Irtysh River, they continued to flee westward under the leadership of Toqtoa’s sons, Qutu and Chila’un, skirting Qara Khitai territory. Eventually they halted north of the Aral Sea in the pastures of the Qangli nomads, another Turkic group.8 The Qangli permitted the Merkit into their territory, suggesting that the wars with Chinggis Khan seriously weakened the Merkit.
In 1208, the victory at the Irtysh was sufficient for Chinggis Khan. He neither forgot nor ignored these refugees, but for the time being Chinggis Khan was directing a number of expeditions, including one that came about while he was pursuing another refugee from Mongolia.
Xi Xia
After the defeat of the Kereit in 1203, Senggum fled to Xi Xia.9 As a result, Chinggis Khan’s gaze focused squarely on this kingdom. Its population was in the tens of millions, much larger than the Mongols’, and consisted of nomads and sedentary populations dwelling in fortified cities.
Mongol forces began probing raids into Xi Xia as early as 1205 – after their victory over the Naiman. As they were not certain of Senggum’s location, the raids served multiple purposes. First, they gathered intelligence, and secondly, they kept the newly formed army with its multi-tribal formation busy and outside of Mongolia where idleness could reawaken feuds. Theoretically, the raids also weakened a potential enemy. Although the Jin Empire frequently meddled in steppe affairs, Xi Xia’s proximity also permitted it to do so. With Senggum’s presence, along with a history of close ties with the Kereit, Chinggis Khan could not discount the Tangut’s potential involvement in disrupting his empire. Finally, the raids mirrored Chinggis Khan’s actions against the Naiman and the Merkit: hunting enemy leaders and eliminating them so that they could not pose a threat. As long as the old aristocracy existed outside of his control, Chinggis Khan’s new social order was vulnerable.
The Mongols’ efforts at capturing or eliminating Senggum were fruitless. Senggum’s own plundering forced the Tangut to evict him from Xi Xia. He fled southward with a few followers, where he was killed in the Tarim basin by Khalaj Turks raiding from modern Afghanistan.10 Mongol forays continued in 1206 and afterwards, and it is unclear whether Chinggis Khan knew of Senggum’s departure. The Tangut attempted to stop the Mongols, but were routinely defeated.11 Afterwards, the Tangut remained in their fortresses and cities and fought a defensive struggle. This passive policy led to the ruler being deposed and a more aggressive king, Li Anquan, coming to the throne. The shift did little in preventing the Mongol raids and may have actually led to the main invasion in 1209.
Although the Tangut armies also consisted largely of horse archers, the military reforms of Chinggis Khan baffled them as much as they did the Naiman and Merkit at Chakirmaut in 1204. Armies that opposed the Mongols on the battlefield were swept away. Some cities resisted, but eventually the Mongols stormed or blockaded them. The pivotal point came with the siege of Zhongxing. The Mongols made no headway against the city’s stout defences as they lacked more than basic battering rams for siege weapons. As the siege extended into 1210, it appeared that the Mongols might have to abandon it, but then they came up with a novel idea – flooding the city.12
With the winter rains, the Huanghe River, which fed the city’s irrigation canals, swelled and began to rise. Chinggis Khan ordered his men to redirect the river against the city by building a dyke. The waters soon entered the city and flooded many homes. The damage was great enough to kill many and damage the city’s earthen walls. The Tangut attempted negotiations, but the siege continued until the poorly constructed dyke broke and flooded not only the Zhongxing, but also the Mongol camp. Even though the Mongols suffered from their own tactics, their determination to continue the siege convinced the Tangut to make peace.13
As a result, in 1210, Li Anquan and Chinggis Khan agreed a treaty. First and foremost, the Tangut submitted to the Mongols and Li Anquan’s daughter, Chaqa, became one of Chinggis Khan’s wives. Furthermore, the Tangut would provide troops and send tribute to the Mongols as a client state. The tribute consisted of camels, woollen cloth and falcons. Upon receiving the first tribute payment (as many camels as Li Anquan could find) and Chaqa, Chinggis Khan withdrew from Xi Xia.14
While the treaty was humiliating and the tribute a burden, the Mongol raids ended and the tribute was certainly less expensive than the damage they had caused. Chinggis Khan gained a steady supply of tribute and demonstrated his military ability. The Mongols did not occupy Xi Xia by leaving a garrison force, nor did they attempt to govern there. Instead, they relied on the peace agreement and for several years it held; Xi Xia became the first sedentary state to survive the Mongol conquests largely intact.
The Jin Empire
Although the Jin had manipulated events in the steppes of Mongolia previously, other events curtailed their ability to intervene. Since 1198, not long after Temujin returned to Mongolia, a rebellion by the juyin in southern Mongolia (south of the Gobi) near the Jin Empire’s border occupied much of the Jin’s attention.15
Figure 3.2 Camels with saddles. The demand of camels as tribute from Xi Xia is a further indication of their value to the nomads of Mongolia. While primarily draught animals, they could also be ridden.
The rebellion dragged on for several years, preventing the Jin from interfering with events north of the Gobi. Furthermore, it also affected trade with the northern nomads as well, leading to a deterioration of economic relations between the Jin and most of the steppe tribes. An added complication was that, although Chinggis Khan controlled the northern Mongolian plateau, his influence filtered southward. Many nomads, including those among the juyin, looked to him rather than the Jin for aid and allegiance.16
War appeared on the horizon in 1211. By this time, Chinggis Khan was no longer involved in Xi Xia and saw the war as an opportunity to prevent the Jin from meddling in Mongolia once the juyin rebellion ended. Furthermore, it also served as an opportunity to avenge Ambaghai Khan. Yet, the invasion could not be started without some risk, as Guchulug remained a threat. To this end, Chinggis Khan dispatched the general Toquchar to the west to guard the Mongols’ western frontier against Qara Khitai and the Naiman.17 Chinggis Khan had no interest in a two-front war. As he marshalled his army for the advance against the Jin, Chinggis Khan assigned his youngest brother, Temuge Otchigin as his regent to mind affairs in Mongolia.18
The invasion began in 1211 with a three-pronged attack as armies struck western Jin domains and central north China, as well as the Manchurian homeland of the Jurchen. Overall, these were small forays, with the focus being on bringing the juyin tribes under Mongol control. This was achieved quickly and without too much effort as several already had established ties with Chinggis Khan. Now, however, they could not easily extricate themselves from him. Mongol raids into the Jin Empire kept the Jin from aiding those juyin who might resist Chinggis Khan. Furthermore, the Mongols defeated the Jin in the field and took a significant amount of territory, including Yunnei in the west, where the imperial stud’s grazing lands were located.19 By capturing these territories, the Mongols not only gained more horses, but deprived the Jin cavalry. When the Mongols withdrew in February 1212, they abandoned the territory within the Jin Empire, but Chinggis Khan did achieve several objectives.
The first was control of the juyin. Chief among the juyin were the Onggud, a Nestorian Turkic tribe. Chinggis Khan married his daughter, Alaqa Beki, to their prince, Buyan-Shiban, and gave Alaqush Digid-Quri, the Onggud ruler, the status of quda or in-law.20 Alaqa’s presence was to assure their loyalty and she essentially acted as an ambassador or even viceroy. Many of the Onggud rejected the marriage alliance, however; Alaqush and Buyan-Shiban were killed, and Alaqa escaped with her stepsons Boyaoha and Zhenguo to her father’s military camp at Datong. Chinggis Khan swiftly ended the Onggud’s rebellion. Alaqa persuaded Chinggis Khan not to massacre the Onggud. She then married her stepson, Zhenguo, and resumed her position as ambassador and viceroy. Alaqa ruled the Onggud peacefully until she died in the 1230s.21 With control of the juyin, Chinggis Khan now controlled the border and access into Mongolia.
Alaqush Digid-Quri warned Chinggis Khan of the Naiman’s plans to attack him in 1204. In gratitude, Chinggis Khan made a marriage alliance with the Onggud. Alaqa Beki was the Chinggis Khan’s third daughter with Borte. In total, Borte produced nine children, in the following order: Qojin (daughter); Jochi, Chaghadai, Ogodei (sons); Chechiyegen, Alaqa, Tumelun (daughters); Tolui (son); and Altun (daughter). Alaqa’s first husband, Bai Shibu, was also known in the Mongolian sources as Buyan-Shiban. After Bai Shibu’s murder, she married her stepson Zhenguo and then Boyaoha after Zhenguo’s death. While marrying her stepsons might seem odd to the modern reader, as they were not her sons it was permissible and quite normal in medieval Mongolia. Although Alaqa Beki was the true ruler of the Onggud after Chinggis Khan ended their rebellion, they maintained the pretence that the Onggud royal line still ruled. Chinggis Khan also used his other daughters as viceroys to ensure the loyalty of his vassals through marriage relations. Chechiyegen did so with the Oirat, Altun married the Uighur Idiqut, Tumelun married an Onggirad prince (one of Borte’s nephews), and Qojin married Butu of the Ikires, one of Chinggis Khan’s early nokod.22
Even though they did not occupy Jin territory, the Mongols controlled the mountain passes and prevented the Jin from entering Mongolia and, more importantly, from exerting influence in the region. The Mongols may also have withdrawn after they had exhorted tribute from the Jin; even if they did not, the plundering during the campaign ensured that the Mongol troops were happy.23 Finally, the attack kept the Jin on the defensive and unable to mount an invasion into Mongolia.
The 1211 invasion was only a prelude of things to come. In the autumn of 1212, another invasion came with what appeared to have been longterm objectives. The first was to annex some territory in order to secure Mongolia from potential Jin attacks. This required that the Mongols then administer the territory; however, the cost of doing so was offset by the ability to exert pressure on the Jin from the newly acquired lands.24 With this in mind, the Mongols invaded with two armies, both equipped with a train of camels carrying siege weapons that could be assembled on site. The first army was led by Chinggis Khan and the second by his youngest son, Tolui.25
The initial invasion went well, and as the war extended into 1213 the advantage shifted even more to the Mongols as famine swept much of the Jin Empire, accelerated by the war. In addition, an army from Xi Xia invaded the western provinces of the Jin Empire as the Tangut fulfilled their obligations to Chinggis Khan.26 Another issue was insurrection by Jin subjects. The largest occurred in the eastern regions by Khitans. As early as 1211, the Jin began to settle Jurchen colonists among the Khitans to ensure that they did not join the Mongols. As the Khitans had ruled northern China prior to the Jurchen takeover in 1125, the Jurchen still doubted their loyalty.27 Perhaps the Jin’s caution was merited, but their actions actually provoked rebellion.
Faced with two crises, the recently elevated Jin Emperor Xuanzong (1213–34) offered an olive branch, certain that he could bribe the Mongols into abandoning their campaign. To the court’s surprise, the Mongols rejected the peace overtures. It was not clear why they did so, but it may have been that the Mongols had not acquired enough booty to make the invasion profitable. Much of the campaign up to this time had been in regions previously ravaged by the Mongols.
With the rejection of the peace treaty, the Mongols advanced on Zhongdu, the Jin capital.28 The immensity of the city awed even Chinggis Khan. Rather than attempting to take the city, Chinggis Khan left contingents to blockade it and destroy any relief armies. Attempts to break the blockade by the garrison met with similar results.
Chinggis Khan then divided his own army into three divisions and systematically began to destroy the surrounding regions. Despite bringing siege equipment, the Mongols did not concern themselves with lengthy sieges. Instead, if an attack on a city became protracted, the Mongols simply moved to another location, but they might return. This kept the garrisons wary.
While the Mongol armies wreaked havoc in the provinces near Zhongdu, they also attacked the capital, which then led to more efforts by the Jin to relieve the city. The only results were that the Jin field armies, no longer sheltered by their fortifications, were crushed in battle. The defeats finally triggered another effort by the Jin to seek peace in April 1214. They offered regular tribute payments to Chinggis Khan, including horses (which the Jin sorely needed), gold and silk. In addition, the Jin gave Chinggis Khan one of the daughters of the previous emperor as a wife along with a retinue of five hundred followers. 29
Payments of gold, silk and other luxury goods were not uncommon in relations between the empires of China and the steppes. Several empires found it less expensive to send goods north than deal with raids.30 The inclusion of horses is an oddity as the nomads usually traded horses for goods. There are two possibilities for the inclusion of horses. The first is that the Mongols perhaps needed more horses due to the loss of mounts during the process of unification. Considering that it was now six years later, this loss of livestock seems less likely, but still a possibility. Considering that the climate was cooler during the thirteenth century, it is also possible that Mongolia experienced a number of zhuds, devastating snow and ice storms, which may have also contributed to famine in the Jin Empire. Even in twenty-first century Mongolia, a zhud can decimate livestock.31 Finally, the insistence on horses by Chinggis Khan may also reflect a concerted effort on his part to eliminate the Jin’s military capabilities. Without sufficient cavalry, the Jin’s military options were limited. Of course, one cannot dismiss the possibility of loss of mounts during the Jin campaign.
The inclusion of a bride in the tribute was not unusual. The Jin exhibited some craftiness by providing the daughter of the previous emperor, as she was viewed as expendable. In addition, this practice of sending a princess to the nomadic leaders was also part of standard operating procedure. Accompanied by a large retinue, she was not isolated. The idea was that the princess and her entourage would be a civilising influence on the Mongols and perhaps create a permanent alliance or treaty. Previous dynasties also attempted this, although history shows that results were uneven at best.32
Zhuds were and still are the bane of Mongolian nomads. ‘Zhud ‘ literally means a disaster caused by famine for livestock. While the most common zhuds are due to snow and ice covering the ground so that animals cannot eat the grass, other zhuds also exist due to drought, overgrazing and destruction to the pasture. Zhuds happen periodically, and climatic shifts only make them more prolific.
Chinggis Khan agreed to the treaty and withdrew his armies, while still maintaining the mountain passes. Peace remained elusive, however. The Jin Emperor, concerned with the ease with which the Mongols had penetrated Jin defences, moved his court to his southern capital, Kaifeng. Furthermore, the provinces of Hebei and Shansi, and the regions north of Zhongdu, were desolate, leaving the capital vulnerable. When the news reached Chinggis Khan, he was livid. In his eyes, the court’s relocation was a blatant breach of the treaty and indicated that the Jin were up to something. As a result, the Mongols invaded again in 1214.33
The Mongols marched directly onto Zhongdu and laid siege immediately. With the departure of the emperor, the city’s morale was low. Unlike in their previous attempts, the Mongols made a concerted effort to capture Zhongdu. Equipped with siege weapons and engineers, many of whom were Jin deserters, the Mongols systematically attacked the city as blockading forces stymied relief efforts.34 With starvation and panic setting in, the city submitted to the Mongols in 1215. The peace did not allay the fears of the populace, however. According to one chronicler, 60,000 virgins leapt from the walls rather than fall into the hands of the Mongols, although this was probably propaganda, perhaps encouraged by the Mongols.35
The fall of Zhongdu carried immense ramifications, not only as a military defeat for the Jin Empire. In addition to the Jin losing their capital, the loss of Zhongdu also undermined the defence of the surrounding areas, placing the Mongols squarely in the middle of the empire. Communications between the eastern and western portions were now cut off. Furthermore, this undermined the government’s legitimacy, which rested not only on stable rule but the concept that the dynasty had received the Mandate of Heaven, or that Heaven (tian) viewed the Jin as the legitimate rulers. While much of the Mandate was simply pretence – legitimacy based on the reality of Jin authority and power – a series of events could convince the population that the dynasty had lost Heaven’s favour. This included not only rebellion and natural disasters, but also foreign invasion.36 Rebellions broke out in many parts of the empire against the Jin, and some of the rebels declared allegiance to Chinggis Khan. The situation worsened for the Jin as well, as the Tangut seized Jin territory in Gansu. The Mongols further prospered, not only from looting Zhongdu, but also by capturing the treasury of the Jin Empire, which had not been removed when Xuanzong had relocated to Kaifeng. Furthermore, they acquired Yelu Chucai (1189–1243), a Khitan and high-ranking minister in the Jin government. His loyalty to the Jin impressed Chinggis Khan, who took the tall Khitan into his service. Yelu Chucai eventually became one of the highest-ranking non-Mongols in the empire, serving as a bichigchi or scribe, adviser, court astrologer, and eventually chancellor or chief minister of the Mongol Empire.37
Despite the calamity at Zhongdu, Xuanzong, the Jin Emperor, refused to submit. The Mongol armies then divided and struck on multiple fronts, making it near-impossible for the Jin to respond to the Mongol attacks. Chinggis Khan’s brother, Qasar, and General Muqali invaded Manchuria. Muqali then split off and invaded the Liaodong peninsula. Here, we have clear signs the Mongols planned on conquering the region and ruling it. A number of Han, Khitan and Jurchen commanders abandoned the Jin Empire and submitted to Muqali. In return, a rudimentary administrative structure was put in place in Liaodong.
As other armies ravaged the western portion of the empire, Chinggis Khan suddenly returned to Mongolia early 1216. Despite his departure, he remained confident in the abilities of his commanders to finish the operation with Muqali in overall command. Although Muqali died in 1223, he executed the war superbly until his death.38
Map 3.1 The Mongol Empire in 1216 © Mapping Specialists
Chinggis Khan’s departure was not planned. A rebellion arose in January or February 1216 among the Hoi-yin Irgen and was tied directly to the decisions of the quriltai of 1206. At that quriltai Qorchi, the individual who had prophesied Chinggis Khan’s ascendancy over Jamuqa, was rewarded by being appointed the governor of the Hoi-yin Irgen. Chinggis Khan had promised him a reward if the prophecy came true, and he remained true to his word. In addition to appointing him governor, he permitted Qorchi to collect beautiful women among his subjects. Qorchi paid little heed to social convention and took whoever he wanted any time he wanted, including women who were already betrothed or even married. This led to a rebellion among the Qori-Tumed, who seized Qorchi.39
Quduqa-beki, the leader of the Oirat, attempted to defuse the situation by negotiating with the Qori-Tumed. The rebels, led by Botoqui Tarqun, the wife of the deceased Qori-Tumed chieftain Darduqul-Soqor, also took him captive. Chinggis Khan erupted when he learned the news and wanted to lead the campaign to exterminate them. His advisors calmed him and convinced him to let others handle the situation. Boroqul, a trusted general, led an expedition into the northern forests. While leading his army through the woods, Boroqul was killed by the Qori-Tumed in 1217.40
Another general, Dorbei Doqshin, resumed the campaign while Jochi marched with an army against the Kirgiz and other Hoi-yin Irgen. This was in part to ensure that they did not join the Qori-Tumed, but also to punish them for not sending troops when Dorbei Doqshin had requested them. Meanwhile, Dorbei Doqshin did not take the primary route into rebel territory. Instead, he and his men cut a new road into the territory. Although it took considerable time and effort, their appearance surprised the Qori-Tumed and crushed the rebellion.41
Dorbei’s success prevented grave consequences. Although somewhat understandable, the Qori-Tumed’s actions were an open act of rebellion during a time when the majority of the Mongol army was in Jin territory. The failure to quell the rebellion risked the cohesion of Mongolia and, at a bare minimum, Mongol control of the Hoi-yin Irgen. If the Qori-Tumed had been successful, other tribes could easily have joined. Yet Dorbei’s success also demonstrated that the Mongols could fight pitched warfare in thick forests and demonstrated their flexibility in adapting to new terrain and circumstances.
The campaign also revealed many of Chinggis Khan’s concerns as a leader. Although the Qori-Tumed’s reaction to Qorchi’s actions is understandable, they did not seek Chinggis Khan’s intervention. Instead, they rebelled and then took an envoy hostage. For the Mongols, envoys were sacrosanct – they had true diplomatic immunity and could not be harmed in any manner. The Qori-Tumed violated this by taking Quduqa-Beki captive. As a result, they had to be punished severely. Killing Boroqul, one of Chinggis Khan’s closest associates, only worsened the situation.
As a result, Qorchi was reinstated and permitted to resume his wife-collecting as a punishment to the Qori-Tumed. Chinggis Khan gave the queen and ruler of the Qori-Tumed, Botoqui Tarqun, to Quduqa-Beki as a wife. This removed her from power and placed her under the control of a proven and loyal ally as well as assigning the Qori-Tumed to Quduqa-Beki’s supervision.42 Quduqa-Beki’s attempts to resolve the issue greatly enhanced the status of the Oirat leader in the eyes of Chinggis Khan, effectively negating his appearance at the side of the Naiman in 1204.
Western Expansion
Meanwhile, events to the west also came to a head. After the defeat of the Naiman and the Merkit at the Battle of the Irtysh River, they suffered heavy losses, but regrouped at the Chu River. The Mongols never ceased in their pursuit, defeating them again at the Chu River also in 1208. Here, the tenuous Naiman–Merkit alliance fell apart with Guchulug fleeing southward while the Merkit fled west. While Guchulug found refuge in Qara Khitai, the Merkit entered the territory of the Qangli, the eastern branch of the Kipchak confederation that nomadised the steppes between the Caspian and Pontic Steppes, often referred to in Islamic sources as the Dasht-i Kipchak or Kipchak Steppes.43 A Mongol army dealt with the Merkit eventually – at some point between 1209 and 1219, although the dates are uncertain,44
Now, far from home, the Mongol general Subedei approached this situation cautiously.45 They did not attack immediately, but requested that the Qangli hand over the Merkit refugees, as they were rebels. The Qangli refused, leading to a Mongol attack. Although the Qangli resisted, the Mongol forces overwhelmed them and destroyed both the Qangli and the Merkit.46 With their task complete and Guchulug out of reach in Qara Khitai, Subedei began to return to Mongolia. His journey did not go unimpeded, however.
The Mongols were not the only army in the region interested in the Qangli. Muhammad Khwarazmshah, the sultan of the Khwarazmian Empire, which at its peak covered most of modern Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, was also in the vicinity seeking to punish the Qangli for raids.47 He came across the battlefield and pursued the Mongols. Subedei had strict orders not to engage in battle with any of the local powers in their pursuit of the Merkit and attempted to extricate his army from a potential battle. Muhammad, however, attacked. Despite having superior numbers, Muhammad quickly found that the Mongols were unlike any other opponent. By nightfall, the battle ended and the armies returned to their camps. Muhammad’s troops kept an uneasy watch through the night, but in the morning they found that the Mongols had departed in the night.48 Muhammad did not pursue. According to Nasawi, who worked for Muhammad Khwarazmshah, the encounter terrified him.49
The Mongol presence in the western regions had a larger impact than simply eliminating the Merkit. The far-ranging manoeuvres of Jebe and Subedei along with Jochi’s Siberian campaign demonstrated the Mongols’ operational abilities. Toquchar’s small army stationed west of the Altai Mountains placed a permanent Mongol force in the region.50 Now the Mongols bordered Qara Khitai, which gave many within that empire something to consider. Although Qara Khitai provided a haven for Guchulug, not all of the subjects within the empire approved, as Guchulug had plundered their territory in the past. Both the Uighurs and the Qarluqs of Almaliq submitted. Their leaders journeyed to Mongolia and offered their submission to Chinggis Khan in 1209 and 1211 respectively.51
The transfer of allegiance demonstrated more than just the extension of Mongol power. It also represented the declining power and prestige of Qara Khitai. Guchulug and the Naiman were welcomed with open arms by the Gur-Khan of Qara Khitai in an effort to revitalise his military strength.52 Not only were vassals submitting to Chinggis Khan, but to the south, Muhammad Khwarazmshah had renounced his vassalage and had revolted in 1207. Despite the fact that Guchulug became the son-in-law of the Gur-Khan and had converted from Christianity to Buddhism at his wife’s request, he joined Muhammad’s rebellion. They agreed to divide the empire, although neither could agree on the specifics of their pact.53 Once in power, Guchulug proved to be a rapacious ruler, increasing and arbitrarily collecting taxes. His Muslim subjects viewed his actions through a lens of religious persecutions, although there is some question as to whether this was an accurate interpretation of events.54
With the ascension of Guchulug in Qara Khitai, the door opened for Chinggis Khan to remove the Naiman threat once and for all. Chinggis Khan dispatched Jebe to resolve the matter in 1218. Jebe’s armies only skirmished with the Naiman, as Guchulug refused to chance battle. Upon the Mongol general’s arrival, the Naiman prince fled. Locals in Badakhshan killed him and presented his body to Jebe. The Mongols then incorporated Qara Khitai into their empire and Jebe issued an order for religious toleration throughout the poly-religious region.55
The Khwarazmian Empire
Now the Mongol Empire’s border reached the Syr Darya River, the northern frontier of the Khwarazmian Empire. Seeking to expand trade within his empire, Chinggis Khan sent a caravan to Otrar, a border town along the Syr Darya.56 Otrar’s governor, Inalchuq, saw the enormous wealth of the caravan and could not contain his avarice. Furthermore, he also noticed that the merchants asked many questions, which raised his suspicions. He informed Sultan Muhammad, who then authorised his subordinate to act. Inalchuq massacred the caravan in 1218, but one camel tender escaped unnoticed. The governor and the sultan divided the plunder between themselves.57
Chinggis Khan became enraged when he learned of the massacre. Bogged down in a war against the Jin and still dealing with the repercussions of the Hoi-yin Irgen rebellion, he had no desire to become involved in another war; thus he turned to diplomacy. He sought restitution of the goods – many Chinggisids, including their wives, had invested in the caravan. He also requested that the governor be sent to him. Muhammad refused. Although the earlier encounter with Subedei had unnerved him, Muhammad had expanded his empire by conquering Afghanistan and parts of modern Pakistan. His borders stretched almost to the Tigris River in the west and his cronies called him a Second Alexander. Knowing that Chinggis Khan was at war with the Jin and had meagre forces in Qara Khitai, Muhammad was not concerned. Furthermore, he found Chinggis Khan’s letter insulting. Therefore, he killed the Mongol diplomat and burned the beards of the envoy’s guards before sending them back to Chinggis Khan.58
This insult was more than Chinggis Khan could bear. He left Muqali with a small army in northern China and marched 2,000 miles to invade the Khwarazmian Empire. Along the way, Uighurs and Qarluqs reinforced him.59 According to Yelu Chucai, who accompanied Chinggis Khan, the massacre at Otrar ‘was the only reason for the western campaign’.60 A far cry from attempting to conquer the world.
Although the governor of Otrar expressed concerns about Mongol espionage, it is clear that Khwarazmian spies were also active. Muhammad quickly learned that the Mongols were approaching and met with his advisors to plan for the coming invasion. He settled for dividing his army and defending his cities. While not a popular plan for some of his commanders, including his son Jalal al-Din, it made sense.61 The Khwarazmian Empire was vast and newly formed. If he did not secure the cities, they might surrender without a fight. Also, the memory of his previous encounter with the Mongols surely haunted him. Muhammad raised new troops, built new fortifications, and then waited for the hammer to fall.62
It came swiftly and without mercy. Although Otrar resisted, it fell to the Mongols and the governor suffered an ironic death for his avarice as the Mongols allegedly poured molten silver into his mouth and ears. The Mongols then divided their forces. Jochi marched along the Syr Darya towards Urgench and Khwarazm. Ogodei and Chaghadai took another route in the same direction. Jebe and Subedei took their armies into central and southern Mawarannahr. Chinggis Khan took his army and simply disappeared.63
As the Mongols attacked various points south of the Syr Darya along with a few border towns north of the river, Muhammad Khwarazmshah tried to keep track of the multiple Mongol armies. He reeled with shock when he suddenly learned that Chinggis Khan’s army had appeared before Bukhara – 300 miles behind enemy lines.64 The wily Mongol leader led his army through the Kizil Kum desert, thought to be impassable by such a large force. Despite a desperate defence, Bukhara fell.65
The attack on Bukhara carried not only shock value. For Chinggis Khan the city held immense importance as it was rumoured that the loot from the caravan massacred at Otrar was stored there. Many of the city’s leading citizens underwent interrogation as to its location. 66 The message was clear – one does not steal from Chinggis Khan. Afterwards the population was divided. Talented artisans were sent back to Mongolia while the less skilled marched before the Mongols towards Samarqand. These survivors then filled Samarqand’s trenches and moats with debris, manned siege weapons, and served as arrow fodder.67 Jebe and Subedei also joined the Mongol Khan there.
Despite a large garrison and a contingent of war elephants, Samarqand could not hold against the Mongols.68 With the fall of two leading cities of the region, Muhammad retreated across the Amu Darya to Khurasan. Chinggis Khan dispatched Jebe and Subedei after him. With the two generals in pursuit, Muhammad never had an opportunity to rest or rally his forces. He eventually escaped from them, by fleeing to an island in the Caspian Sea, where he died ignobly of dysentery shortly thereafter.69
Meanwhile, the destruction of his empire continued. While Chinggis Khan led an army into Afghanistan, Tolui entered Khurasan and destroyed any city that resisted, often returning later to kill survivors who came out of hiding. Those who did submit were to destroy their walls.70 After the region was devastated, Tolui withdrew north of the Amu Darya. His objective was not to conquer the region, but simply to destroy all strongpoints, leaving it defenceless against future attacks. Writing a generation later, the Persian historian Juwayni, whose father witnessed the Mongol invasion, commented on the destruction: ‘With one stroke a world which billowed with fertility was laid desolate, and the regions thereof became a desert, and the greater part of the living dead, and their skin and bones crumbling dust; and the mighty were humbled and immersed in the calamities of perdition.’71 While Juwayni was prone to hyperbole, his commentary reveals an amount of destruction never seen before in the region.
As for Chinggis Khan, he pursued Jalal al-Din, the most talented son of Muhammad Khwarazmshah. With the death of his father, Jalal al-Din became the de facto leader of the empire. At Parwan, near Kabul, he defeated a Mongol army led by Shigi Qutuqu, but retreated across the Hindu Kush mountains upon the advance of Chinggis Khan. Chinggis Khan treated the defeat as a learning opportunity and conducted what in modern military parlance is known as an After-Action Review (AAR) to determine what went wrong at the battle and also what the commanders did correctly.72 He then followed Jalal al-Din, finally catching him at the Indus River in 1221. With his flanks crumbling, Jalal al-Din spurred his horse off a cliff and into the river. Other elements of the Khwarazmian army joined him, escaping into India; those that did not were eradicated. Dorbei Doqshin, who suppressed the Hoi-yin Irgen rebellion, led the hunt for Jalal al-Din across the Indus.73 Although Mongols pursued and laid waste to a few towns, they eventually rejoined the main Mongol forces in reducing other fortresses in Afghanistan. The heat and humidity of India proved to be too much of an obstacle for the Mongols and their horses. Additionally, it weakened their bows, making them less effective.74
Then, abruptly, the campaign was over. Chinggis Khan’s army regrouped and returned to Mongolia. A force remained in Mawarannahr and Khwarazm, depriving Jalal al-Din of the core of his father’s empire. These regions were also the economic centres, which the Mongols turned to their advantage. They abandoned the rest of their conquests, despite the fact that the conquest of the region proved to be a masterpiece of Mongol warfare at all levels.
Return to Xi Xia
It is impossible to determine whether the Mongols would have lingered in the remnants of the Khwarazmian Empire, but they withdrew north of Amu Darya in 1223 after receiving news of a revolt in Xi Xia.75 The standard story found in the sources is that when Chinggis Khan prepared to march on the Khwarazmian Empire, he ordered the Tangut to provide troops. Already contributing a significant force again the Jin Empire, Asha Gambu, a Tangut general, retorted, ‘Since [Chinggis Khan’s] forces are incapable of subjugating others, why did he go as far as becoming [khan]?’76 Thus, the king of Xi Xia heeded his advice and did not send the troops as his client status dictated.
Despite this act of rebellion, Chinggis Khan did not retaliate because the Tangut had previously provided approximately 50,000 men towards the Jin campaign, and Chinggis Khan needed to deal with in the Khwarazmian Empire immediately.77 Thus, when the Mongols invaded Xi Xia again in 1225, he was dealing with an insult that was seven years old.
It is clear that the Mongols did not forget past grievances. If the Tangut had ignored the request for troops in 1219, ignoring this slight and open act of defiance to his authority contradicts Chinggis Khan’s behaviour. With the Hoi-yin Irgen revolt, he dealt with it immediately and even returned to Mongolia rather than remaining in the Jin Empire, which persisted as a powerful opponent. The reality is that Xi Xia’s response may not have happened in quite the way the sources depicted it.
While the Tangut may have been exasperated with the constant demand for soldiers, the ruler certainly did not rebel. Indeed, armies from Xi Xia fought against the Jin until 1223, when Muqali died. With the bulk of the Mongol army in Central Asia and far from Xi Xia, they made peace with the Jin. Chinggis Khan quickly learned of it. Again, he attempted to resolve the matter diplomatically, but without success. Although the Tangut engaged in peace talks, these broke down after the Tangut court could not come to terms over which hostages to send to Chinggis Khan. The issue was not so much sending hostages, but who among the Tangut elite should go. Eventually, Chinggis Khan lost patience and declared war. Meanwhile, Chinggis Khan had returned to the Tula River in central Mongolia, after an absence of eight years, before invading Xi Xia in March 1226.78 The fact that he could return to Mongolia after such a lengthy departure is testament to the foundations of his rule and the governing institutions that he had established in his rise to power.
The Mongols swiftly advanced and captured cities one by one before dividing their forces. While Subedei performed mop-up operations through the region, Chinggis Khan advanced on Zhongxing in 1227. The Tangut made last-ditch efforts for peace, but it was too late.79 The Tangut almost had a lucky break, however. During the campaign, Chinggis Khan went hunting, during which the sudden appearance of wild asses startled his horse, causing it to rear up and throw the Mongol leader. Unlike those he sustained from a similar fall while hunting wild boar in Central Asia, these injuries were severe.80 Afterwards, he sickened and grew weaker. The Tangut again sued for peace and his commanders and sons urged Chinggis Khan to grant peace and return to Mongolia, arguing that the Tangut lived in cities and were not going anywhere.81 Chinggis Khan refused, and ordered that even if he died nothing should be revealed and that the attack should be continued until the Tangut were ‘maimed and tamed’.82
Figure 3.3 Chinggis Khan advising his sons on his deathbed. Fifteenth-century miniature from Marco Polo’s Livre des Merveilles. (Rue des Archives/The Granger Collection, New York)
Chinggis died on 18 August 1227. His commanders faithfully carried out his orders, destroying much of the city and the population of Zhongxing. While the population of Xi Xia was not killed in a genocidal spree, the Mongols wiped the kingdom off the map along with the Tangut royalty. It was a necessary step, for as long as the royal family of Xi Xia existed it would continue to view the kingdom as an independent state and not part of the Mongol Empire. It also demonstrated that the Mongols’ system of ruling sedentary populations was not an effective form of ruling an empire. Sedentary cultures viewed the land as the kingdom, while the Mongols viewed the people as the empire. The two views did not mesh. As with their first conquest of Xi Xia, the Mongols did not leave an occupying garrison. There was no reason; they destroyed the military might of Xi Xia. Although Xi Xia had been economically important through its tribute, it was now fully incorporated into the Mongol Empire with officials assigned to govern the territory as part of the ulus or patrimony of Ogodei.
The Post Chinggis Khan World
Although Chinggis Khan was now dead, he had left a considerable legacy. The most important elements of this included his unification of the Mongolian plateau and the establishment of an effective state. This transformation included a social revolution that altered the fundamental tribal structure of the plateau, in which everything was inexorably linked to the altan urugh.83 The key to this state was the political and bureaucratic structure, which promulgated a writing script that the Naiman were already using. Chinggis Khan and his successors developed a keen eye for recognising what was useful among the conquered, such as a writing system, and adapting it to their own use. Even though Chinggis Khan remained illiterate, he decreed that his sons and grandsons would learn to read and write using the new vertical script that remains in use today in Inner Mongolia.
Figure 3.4 Modern statue of Chinggis Khan, depicting him as the father of Mongolia. Located in the Chinggis Khan pavilion in Sukhbaatar Square, Ulaanbaatar.
He also built an effective army, incorporating new tactics, strategies and organisation that revolutionised steppe warfare. With this, the Hoi-yin Irgen were subdued, along with much of Manchuria and North China. Xi Xia, Qara Khitai, Uighurstan and Mawarannahr were annexed and incorporated into a new steppe empire. Yet now, the Yeke Monggol Ulus was without its leader: a man who had not only conquered more territory than anyone else in history, but had also constructed an empire out of a previously declining steppe tribe.
As a result of Chinggis Khan’s death, the Mongol Empire faced an immediate crisis. Who would be the next ruler? As the Mongols, like most steppe nomads, did not use primogeniture or ultimogeniture as a succession method, the possibilities for Chinggis Khan’s successor were increased. Although the youngest son typically inherited the hearth (the ger and personal possessions of his father), inheriting an empire was more complicated than inheriting a few tents and livestock.84 Furthermore, Chinggis Khan had died far from home; thus, steps had to be taken to ensure that the empire remained cohesive while the Mongol army returned to Mongolia in order that the princes and generals could determine Chinggis Khan’s successor.
To this end, Chinggis Khan’s youngest son, Tolui, was appointed regent. Why Tolui? For one, he was an able military commander and could lead the army from Xi Xia to Mongolia while maintaining good order. Furthermore, he being the youngest son his father’s possessions became his and he became the executor of the estate, although, as Isenbike Togan points out, the title Otchigin was never applied to Tolui.85 Tolui then created, possibly using some previous traditions, practices that regents employed upon the death of the khan.
First, almost all military activity by the Mongols ceased. This did not mean that all fighting ceased, but all offensive actions involving the Mongols ended. Khitans, Han troops and other non-Mongol armies continued to operate in the Jin Empire. Most senior Mongol commanders, however, returned to Mongolia to participate in the quriltai. There would also be a period of mourning for all Mongols. The regent oversaw the rites of mourning – propitiating the spirits and escorting the body to burial. The regent also convened the quriltai in which the successor would be selected and was also expected to nominate the heir. It is important to remember that while a khan could name a successor, the quriltai was not obliged to follow the previous khan’s wishes.
There were good reasons why the khan’s chosen heir might be bypassed. The most obvious is that the quriltai might deem him unworthy or incompetent. New conditions, such as illness or even death, might have changed the situation. In short, all possible contenders were to be considered. Two groups decided the matter. The first was the altan urugh. The second group was the noyad or military commanders. As many of the leading figures were the companions of Chinggis Khan and served in the keshig or bodyguard, they were loyal to the wishes and desires of Chinggis Khan.
Prior to Chinggis Khan’s death, there were five possible candidates for the throne: his four sons (Jochi, Chaghadai, Ogodei and Tolui) and his youngest brother, Temuge Otchigin.86 While en route to the Khwarazmian Empire or proceeding against the Tangut, Chinggis Khan chose a successor.87 The long ride gave him plenty of time to discuss the matter with his sons as well as with his advisors. Jochi, the eldest son, was excluded as an option due to his questionable parentage. It does not appear that Chinggis Khan was concerned about it, but during the discussion Chaghadai exploded at the idea of Jochi being the potential successor, saying ‘How can we let ourselves be ruled by this bastard offspring of the Merkit?’88 Indeed, the two engaged in fisticuffs while in the presence of their father. Ultimately, the issue was moot as Jochi died before Chinggis Khan.
Still, tensions existed between Chinggis Khan and Jochi prior to the latter’s death. During the Khwarazmian campaign, Jochi became increasingly distant from his father and appeared more content to stay in his new lands in modern Kazakhstan than to join Chinggis Khan against the Tangut. Chaghadai was also excluded, largely because of his derision towards Jochi. This indicated to Chinggis Khan that Chaghadai could not compromise and was too unforgiving. His stern character was useful, but not for a ruler. Tolui, the youngest son, was perhaps the most logical as he was a brilliant military commander, although there were concerns over his comparative youth. Temuge Otchigin, the youngest brother, was also a contender, but Chinggis Khan preferred his sons over his brother. Finally, there was Ogodei, who, like Tolui, was a drunkard. The fact that his father and other Mongols viewed him as a drunkard was worrisome, as all were known to be a hard-drinking lot. In the end, however, Chinggis Khan named Ogodei as his heir and his brothers swore to obey him.89
So why Ogodei? Not only was he a drunkard, he also was a mediocre military commander. Yet, perhaps it was his failings that made him suitable for the position. Unlike his stern and serious brothers, he knew clemency. Furthermore, he was likeable and he worked well with others, presumably because he understood the limitations of his own talents. While not gifted in war like Tolui, he learned to trust the advice and judgements of his subordinates. He also knew, unlike Chaghadai, that the ruler could not view all things as black and white, but rather had to see them in many shades of grey. Unlike Jochi, he did not allow perceived slights to define his being. Ogodei recognised his weaknesses and found ways to compensate. It was his ability to find the compromise in difficult situations that gained the trust of Chinggis Khan and was the reason he was named the successor to his father.
Yet in 1227, these decisions were no longer guaranteed. Much had happened, then, as Tolui escorted Chinggis Khan’s body back to Mongolia. Tolui may have considered the potential candidates – including himself. He remained a viable candidate. His campaign in Khurasan was brilliant and broke the Khwarazmian Empire. That alone, however, was insufficient for him to gain the throne. In order to do so, he needed support from another branch of the altan urugh. Fortunately for Tolui, his wife Sorqoqtani was related to Begtutmish Fujin, the widow of Jochi.90 As sisters, the two women had close ties that pre-dated their 1203 marriages to the sons of Chinggis Khan. It was clear that the Jochid line of the altan urugh would never gain support for the candidacy of the throne, but through the maternal lines they could have strong support if Tolui became khan. Yet, a funny thing happened on the way to the quriltai. Chinggis Khan may have died a man, but he entered the spirit world as a powerful demi-god.
In the shamanistic world of the Mongols, the afterlife was very much like the mundane. One’s power as a spirit was equivalent to one’s position in the here and now. Thus a simple herdsman was still a simple herdsman in the afterlife. Shamanism did not offer a transcendental afterlife. A khan would still be a khan, and thus a powerful spirit. Typically, the Mongols and other nomads propitiate the spirits of their ancestors – asked for protection, to ward off evil, etc. Yet, now Chinggis Khan had entered the spirit world, his ascendancy in the mundane world was unexpected. He not only unified Mongolia, but also rendered all potential enemies impotent. He avenged the massacre at Otrar, the death of Yesugei, the insult to Ambaghai – he was an avatar of vengeance, a god of war, and a creator hero who brought writing and stability to the Mongols. His sulde, a part of his soul or genius, took residence in the tuq or standard of the Mongols and offered protection to the ruler and to the Mongols in general.
As a result, his words were sacred and became bileg, or ‘wisdom’, and proper behaviour for Mongols (yosun); the words, deeds and wisdom of Chinggis Khan became analogous to the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad in Islam. Since Chinggis Khan had decreed his son Ogodei his heir, this could not be disputed. In 1229, Ogodei became the second Qa’an (Khaghan) of the Yeke Monggol Ulus.
Islam and the Mongol Empire
By 1227, the Yeke Monggol Ulus went from being a state with negligible knowledge of the Islamic world to one that not only interacted with Dar al-Islam, or the Islamic world, but also caused it to contract. This was true not only in terms of death and destruction, but also through the mere fact that, in the eyes of the Muslims, Dar al-Islam consisted of territories ruled by Muslims. Furthermore, the largest and most powerful Islamic state, the Khwarazmian Empire, was irrevocably shattered, and parts of it ruled by infidels. Afterwards, the Mongols gained more knowledge concerning Islam and the Islamic world, but it was still an imperfect knowledge. At the time of the promulgation of the Yeke Monggol Ulus, there were only a handful of Muslims (primarily merchants) within the Mongol realm. These men, however, proved to be quite useful.
A Muslim may have negotiated the 1214 peace treaty with the Jin Empire. According to one source, Ja
far Khwaja went to the Jin Emperor Xuanzong (1213–24) as Chinggis Khan’s envoy, and asked for his submission. Although the Emperor Xuanzong rejected it, what is significant is that Jafar Khwaja was a Muslim, originally from Yanikant along the Syr Darya River, and in the employ of Chinggis Khan.91 Jafar’s role is not discussed in Juwayni or Rashid al-Din and may be apocryphal, albeit not implausible. Juzjani, however, offers another explanation for Jafar’s services. In Juzjani’s account, Jafar did not enter the Jin Empire as a diplomat, but as a spy prior to the Mongol invasion. The Jin captured him, although he eventually escaped and provided Chinggis Khan with intelligence regarding the best routes for invading the Jin Empire.92
The truth of the matter is likely somewhere between the two accounts. It is unclear from whom either author received his information, Khwandamir writing much later, and Juzjani as a refugee in Delhi. Curiously, the sources from within the Mongol Empire are largely silent about the activities of Jafar Khwaja. Still, his role as an emissary or as a spy should not be completely dismissed. Indeed, it is feasible that both events took place. Why Jafar was in Mongolia remains a mystery.
Jafar also commanded troops during the Mongol war against the Jin Empire, but he is best known for his administrative service. Chinggis Khan appointed Jafar Khwaja, already quite old, as a daruqachi or governor of Yanjing (the former Zhongdu) and the surrounding environs in 1214 or 1215. He continued to serve as the chief civil authority in North China during Muqali’s vice-royalty there.93 Ostensibly, he died at the age of 117 or 118.94 It was during his tenure as daruqachi that Jafar Khwaja, a descendant of the prophet Muhammad, may have converted to Daoism. This remains unclear, but it is certain that he held great reverence for the Daoist sage Changchun Zi, whom he met when the latter was summoned to meet with Chinggis Khan. Afterwards, Jafar personally delivered messages to him and eventually implored the sage to build a new temple and presented him with five acres of land for that purpose.95 It could be argued, however, that Jafar’s sponsorship of the temple may simply have been in line with the Mongol practice of religious tolerance and not the result of conversion.
Jafar was not the only Muslim emissary. While the latter may have been a surprising choice to send to the Jin Empire, Muslim emissaries to the Khwarazmian Empire seems an obvious choice. To the modern reader it may seem surprising that Chinggis Khan’s envoys for initiating a trade agreement with the Khwarazmian Empire – Mahmud al-Khwarazmi (a.k.a. Mahmud Yalavach), Ali Khwaja al-Bukhari and Yusuf Kanka al-Otrari96 – originated from that empire: nationalism as we know it did not exist yet, although it is also clear that Sultan Muhammad attempted to sway Mahmud by pointing out their ties in location and religion, as well as bribing him with a pearl to spy on Chinggis Khan. Mahmud agreed, although either Chinggis Khan never learned of this or he also continued to serve as a spy for Chinggis Khan.97 The latter case seems likely, as when the Khwarazmshah pressed him for information about the Mongol ruler’s campaign in China, Mahmud allegedly told him the story of the 60,000 virgins leaping to their death at Zhongdu and roads lined with hills of bones.98 Mahmud did not lie about Chinggis Khan’s capture of Zhongdu, but he may have embellished it. After the massacre, the Chinggis Khan again sent a Muslim as his diplomat. Ibn Kafraj Bughra, a Turk, was the unfortunate individual whom Muhammad executed.
The role of Muslims in opening trade relations with the Khwarazmian Empire is not surprising. After all, it is very likely that the idea originated among Muslim merchants operating in the Yeke Monggol Ulus. Religion had very little to do with it; business and the safety of a secure trade route, however, meant profits for everyone. Yet, due to the avarice and hubris of the Khwarazmshah, the Mongols wiped the most powerful Muslim state off the map. Their fury was unrestrained and the destruction unparalleled in a region that had seen frequent wars. Due to this, the damage inflicted by the infidel armies left a jagged scar on the Muslim psyche in the thirteenth century, and various authors attempted to rationalise the event and explain why God had seemingly abandoned the Believers.
The Islamic world possessed an imperfect view of the Mongol Empire as well, viewing the Mongols both as liberators and as an apocalyptic force of nature. Prior to the Khwarazmian war, the Muslims in Qara Khitai welcomed Jebe as their liberator from the tyrannical oppression and persecution of the infidel Guchulug.99 While Jebe’s edict of religious toleration benefited the Muslims, it did not favour them. Nonetheless, the Mongols appeared more favourable to Islam than Guchulug did.
For the Muslims of the former Khwarazmian Empire, the Mongols were not liberators, but a force of nature and the stuff of nightmares. And the nightmare began swiftly. With the capture of Bukhara, Chinggis Khan allegedly announced: ‘O People, know that you have committed great sins, and that the great ones among you have committed these sins. If you ask me what proof I have for these words, I say it is because I am the punishment of God. If you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a punishment like me upon you.’100
The great Arab chronicler Ibn al-Athir also was mortified by the event. Living in Mosul, a region spared by the Mongol onslaught, but a destination for refugees from the east, Ibn al-Athir wrote: ‘For several years I continued to avoid mention of this disaster as it horrified me and I was unwilling to recount it. I was taking one step towards it and then another back. Who is there who would find it easy to write the obituary of Islam and the Muslims?’101 In his attempts to rationalise the Mongol invasion and destruction, Ibn al-Athir drew upon apocalyptic descriptions, painting al-Djallal (the Anti-Christ) in a favourable light vis-à-vis the Mongols. Ibn al-Athir wrote, ‘As for the Anti-Christ, he will spare those who follow him and destroy those who oppose him, but these did not spare anyone. On the contrary, they slew women, men and children. They split open the bellies of pregnant women and killed the fetuses.’102
Juwayni and Ibn al-Athir’s examples are but a small sample of the uncomprehending horror that the Muslim world experienced before the Mongol onslaught. Yet shock gave way to attempts to rationalise the Mongol arrival, as will be discussed in Chapter 12.
With the Mongol entry into Dar al-Islam there was no indication that the Yeke Monggol Ulus would expand it and drift towards becoming an Islamic empire. Indeed, it is clear that they did not understand the religion or the culture. By ruling Muslims and bringing many into their service, whether as soldiers or bureaucrats, they could not avoid Islam or the fact that some might find it attractive. Yet, the expansion of Islam throughout the Mongol Empire and the eventual conversion of much of the empire was not inevitable by any means.
Map 3.2 The Mongol Empire at the time of Chinggis Khan’s death © Mapping Specialists
1 See Colin Mackerras, ‘The Uighurs’, CHEIA, 320–42.
2 SHM, §141.
3 SWQZL, 39–40; RD/Karimi, 308–9; RD/Thackston1, 204; RD/Thackston2, 144–6.
4 SWQZL, 39–40; RD/Karimi, 308–9; RD/Thackston1, 204; RD/Thackston2, 144–6.
5 RD/Karimi, 308–9; RD/Thackston1, 204; RD/Thackston2, 145.
6 Juwayni/Qazvini, 46–9; Juvaini/Boyle, 62–4.
7 Michal Biran, The Empire of Qara Khitai in Eurasian History (New York, 2005), 46.
8 SWQZL, 40, 49–50; RD/Thackston2, 160.
9 Ruth Dunnell, ‘The Hsi Hsia’, 154–214, in CHCAR, 164.
10 Dunnell, ‘His-Hsia, 206–7.
11 SWQZL, 198; RD/Thackston2, 144; RD/Thackston1, 203–4; RD/Karimi, 306–8.
12 Ruth Dunnell, Chinggis Khan (New York, 2010), 64; Dunnell, ‘Hsi-Hsia’, 208.
13 RD/Thackston2, 146; RD/Thackston1, 206; RD/Karimi, 311.
14 SHM §249; H. D. Martin, Chinggis Khan and His Conquest of North China (Baltimore, 1950), 119; RD/Karimi, 427; RD/Thackston1, 289–90; Thackston 2012, 146.
15 Thomas Allsen, ‘The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongolian Rule in North China’, CHCAR, 349; Paul D. Buell, ‘The Role of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Zone in the Rise of Cinggis-Qan’, in SOM, 66–8.
16 Buell, ‘Role of the Sino-Mongolian Frontier Zone’, 66–8.
17 SWQZL, 49–50; RD/Karimi, 320, 427; RD/Thackston1, 213, 290; RD/Thackston2, 151, 197.
18 RD/Karimi, 412; RD/Thackston2, 212; RD/Thackston1, 281.
19 SWQZL, 42; RD/Karimi, 322; RD/Thackston2, 152; RD/Thackston1, 215; Martin, Rise of Chingis Khan, 146.
20 RD/Karimi, 100; RD/Thackston2, 50; RD/Thackston1, 71.
21 George Qingzhi Zhao, Marriage as Political Strategy and Cultural Expression: Mongolian Royal Marriages from World Empire to Yuan Dynasty (New York, 2008), 150–4.
22 Anne Broadbridge, ‘Marriage, Family and Politics: The Ilkhanid-Oirat Connection’, JRAS 26, no. 2 (2016), f2, 123.
23 SWQZL, 45; SHM, §248.
24 Martin, Rise of Chinggis Khan, 155, Sechen Jagchid, ‘Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the Nomadic Peoples of Mongolia’, Essays in Mongolian Studies (Provo, UT, 1987), 17.
25 SWQZL, 43.
26 SWQZL, 44.
27 Martin, Rise of Chingis Khan, 150–1.
28 SWQZL, 45.
29 SWQZL, 45; RD/Karimi, 428; RD/Thackston1, 290; RD/Thackston2, 156; Khwandamir, 12–13.
30 For a discussion on the Heqin treaties during the Han-Xiongnu period see Nicola Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History (New York, 2002), 210–17. For a discussion of Sui-Tang and Uighur relations see Jonathan Karam Skaff, Sui-Tang China and Its Turko-Mongol Neighbors: Culture, Power, and Connections, 580–800 (New York, 2012).
31 ‘Foreign Minister Says Extreme Weather “Draining” Mongolia’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 January 2010, LexisNexis Academic, Web (last accessed 9 January 2015); ‘Red Cross Launches Appeal to Help Mongolian Herders’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 January 2010, LexisNexis Academic, Web (last accessed 9 January 2015); ‘UNICEF Delivers Freeze Aid for Mongolian Children’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 March 2010, LexisNexis Academic, Web (last accessed 9 January 2015); Miro Cernetig, ‘Famine Stalks Mongolian Steppes: A Half Million Nomads on Brink of Starvation’, The Globe and Mail (Canada), 10 April 2000, LexisNexis Academic, Web (last accessed 9 January 2015).
32 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II, trans. Burton Watson (New York, 1993), 143; Skaff, Sui-Tang China and lts Turko-Mongol Neighbors, 203–20, 238–40.
33 SWZQL, 46; SHM, §251; RD/Thackston2, 156–7.
34 SWQZL, 47.
35 Juzjani/Habibi, 102; Juzjani/Raverty, 964–5.
36 F. W. Mote, Imperial China, 900–1800 (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 8–10, 278–9.
37 For more on Yelu Chucai, see Igor de Rachewiltz, ‘Yeh-Lü Ch’u-Ts’ai (1189–1243), Yeh-Lü Chu (1221–1285)’, in ITSOTK, 136–75.
38 YUS, 44; Igor de Rachewiltz, ‘Muqali (1170–1223), Bōl (1197–1220), Tas (1212–1239), An-T’ung (1245–1293)’, ITSOTK, 3–12.
39 SHM, §241.
40 SHM, §240–1; SWQZL, 50.
41 SHM, §50; SWQZL, 50; RD/Karimi, 429–30; RD/Thackston1, 290–1; RD/Thackston2, 198.
42 SHM, 241.
43 SWQZL, 38–40; SHM, §236; Juwayni/Qazwini, v1, 51–2; Juvaini/Boyle, 69; Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Prelude to the Western Campaigns: Mongol Military Operations in the Volga-Ural Region, 1217–1237’, AEMA III (1983), 8.
44 For a discussion of the dates see Paul D. Buell, ‘Early Mongol Expansion in Western Siberia and Turkestan (1207–1219): A Reconstruction’, CAJ 36 (1992), 1–32.
45 SHM, §236; SWQZL, 40, 49–50; Depending on the date of the event he was either accompanied by Chinggis Khan’s son Jochi or by Jebe.
46 SHM, §236; SWQZL, 40, 49–50; Juwayni/Qazwini, v1, 51–2; Juvaini/Boyle, 69.
47 Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 149; Juzjani/Raverty, 1,096–7. This may have been the reason why the Qangli welcomed the Merkit.
48 Juwayni/Qazvini, v2, 101–4; Juvaini/Boyle, 370–2; Nasawi, 44–5; Nasawi/Houdas, 18–19.
49 Nasawi, 44–5; Nasawi/Houdas, 19–20.
50 SWQZL, 41; 49–50; RD/Karimi, 428; RD/Thackston1, 290; RD/Thackston2, 198.
51 SHM, §235, 238; Juvaini/Boyle, 45–6; 74–5; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 33, 56–8; RD/Karimi, 318; RD/Thackston1, 205–6, 213, 289; RD/Thackston2, 145–6, 197; SWQZL, 40–1.
52 Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 77.
53 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 46–8, v2, 83–4; Juvaini/Boyle, 62–4, 351; RD/Karimi, 338; RD/Thackston2, 163. Ostensibly, whoever defeated the Gur-Khan would have preference in the division of spoils. If the Khwarazmshah won, then his territory would extend to Khotan and Kashgar. If Guchulug won (and he did), his territory would extend to Fanakat. Neither had intention of honouring their agreement to the letter.
54 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 49, 53; Juvaini/Boyle, 65–6, 70; RD/Karimi, 338; RD/Thackston2, 163. For the argument against religious persecution see Biran, Qara Khitai, 194–6.
55 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 50–1; Juvaini/Boyle, 66–8; SWQZL, 50; RD/Thackston2; 163–4.
56 Juzjani/Habibi, 650–1, Juzjani/Raverty 963–6; Yelu Chucai, 21; Henry Schwarz, ‘Otrār’, CAS (1998), 8.
57 Juvaini/Boyle, 79–81; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 61; Juzjani Raverty, 272; Juzjani/Habibi, 311; RD/Thackston2, 165–6; RD/Karimi, 341; Nesawi/Houdas, 57–9; Nasawi, 83–6; Ibn al-Athir, 361–2; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 205.
58 Juvaini/Boyle, 79–81; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 61; Hadid, v3, 71; Nasawi, 87–8; Nesawi/Houdas, 60; Ibn al-Athir, 363–4; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 206.
59 Juwayni/Qazvini, 63; Juvaini/Boyle, 82.
60 Yelu Chucai, 21.
61 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 106–8; Juvaini/Boyle, 376–7; Nasawi, 89–90; Nesawi/Houdas, 62; Hadid, v3, 70.
62 Nasawi, 89–91; Nesawi/Houdas, 61–3; Ibn al-Athir, 363–5; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 206–7.
63 RD/Karimi, 353, 430–1; RD/Thackston1, 241, 291; RD/Thackston2, 170–3; SWQZL 51; Juzjani/Habibi, 367–8, 652–3; Juzjani/Raverty, 273–4, 969–71; Juwayni/Qazvini, 62–75; Juvaini/Boyle, 81–97.
64 Nasawi, 101–3; Nesawi/Houdas, 75–6.
65 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 82–3; Juvaini/Boyle, 106–7; Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 653; Juzjani/Raverty, 976–8. RD/Karimi, 360–2; RD/Thackston1, 246–7; RD/Thackston2, 173–4; Ibn al-Athir, 365–7; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 207–9.
66 Ibn al-Athir, 366–7; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 208–9.
67 RD/Karimi, 364; RD/Thackston1, 248–9; RD/Thackston2, 175; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 94–7; Juvaini/Boyle, 120–2. Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 665; Juzjani/Raverty, 1,048; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 209; Al-Athir, 367.
68 RD/Karimi, 363–4; RD/Thackston1, 248–9; RD/Thackston2, 174–6; BH2, 381; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 94; Juvaini/Boyle, 120; Juzjani/Raverty, 274, 979–80; Juzjani/Habibi, v1, 311–12, v2, 107.
69 Juzjani/Raverty, 278–9, 992; Juzjani/Habibi, v1, 313; v2, 108–9; Dhahabi, 208–9, Nasawi, 104–7; Nesawi/Houdas, 79–80; Ibn al-Athir, 370; Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 211.
70 Juwayni/Qazvini, 126–8, 140; Juvaini/Boyle, 161–4, 178.
71 Juvaini/Boyle, 152.
72 Juzjani/Habibi, 372–3, 660; Juzjani/Raverty, 287–9, 1,019–21; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 105, v2, 137–8; Juvaini/Boyle, 132, 406–7; Nuwayri, 255. My thanks to Staff Sergeant (ret.) Robert Klemm for the correct terminology.
73 Juwayni/Qazvini, v2, 140–2; Juvaini/Boyle, 409–11; RD/Karimi, 377; RD Thackston 1998, 257; RD/Thackston2, 183; Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 492–3; Juzjani/Raverty, 534–6.
74 For the effects of humidity on the composite bow see Charles R. Bowlus, ‘Tactical and Strategic Weaknesses of Horse-archers on the Eve of the First Crusade’, 149–66, Autour de la Premiere Croisade, ed. Michel Balard (Paris, 1996), 161.
75 Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 665–6; Juzjani/Raverty, 1,046–7; Juvaini/Boyle, 139; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 110.
76 SHM, §256.
77 Luc Kwanten, ‘The Career of Muqali: A Reassessment’, The Bulletin of Sung and Yüan Studies 14 (1978), 33–4.
78 SWQZL, 53; RD/Karimi, 385–6; RD/Thackston1, v2, 262; RD/Thackston2, 187.
79 SHM, §265; Yelu Chucai, 24.
80 For the incident with the boar, see Xi Youji, 118. For the wild asses incident see SHM, §265.
81 SHM, §265.
82 SHM, §268.
83 See Isenbike Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations (Leiden, 1998), 124–50; David Sneath, The Headless State (New York, 2007), 172.
84 Isenbike Togan, ‘Otchigin’s Place in the Transformation from Family to Dynasty’, in CEMA, 408–9, 417; Michal Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (London, 1997), 8 and 134; Joseph F. Fletcher, ‘Turko-Mongolian Tradition in the Ottoman Empire’, HUS 3–4 (1979–80), 239.
85 Togan, ‘Otchigin’s Place’, 409. Togan suggests (pp. 417–19) that Tolui may have been his actual title.
86 Temuge Otchigin will be the last to use the title Otichigin. Togan, ‘Otchigin’s Place’, 410–12.
87 SHM §254; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 142–3; Juvaini/Boyle, 180–2; RD/Karimi, 384–5; RD/Thackston1, 262; RD/Thackston2, 186. This date is not certain. SHM §254 gives the impression that this council took place prior to the Mongol march on Khwarazm (1219). Juwayni places the event when Chinggis Khan is on his deathbed during the final Tangut campaign (1227). It is possible that the scenario took place on the march against the Tangut in 1225 as indicated by Rashid al-Din.
88 SHM, §254.
89 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 144; Juvaini/Boyle, 182–3; SHM, §255.
90 RD/Karimi, 505; RD/Thackston1, 348; RD/Thackston2, 246.
91 Xi Youji, 135, fn. 2; Khwandamir, 12. The Mengda beilu (p. 64) indicates he was a Uighur, but this seems to be the term the Song Empire used for Central Asians. At this time, most Uighurs were either Nestorian Christians or Buddhists.
92 Juzjani/Raverty, 954; Juzjani/Habibi, v2, 100.
93 Elizabeth Endicott-West, Mongolian Rule in China: Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty (Cambridge, MA, 1989), 26. Igor de Rachewiltz, ‘Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period’, JESHO 9 (1966), 122, fn. 2; MDBL, 64.
94 Considering that Chinggis Khan summoned Changchun Zi in order to learn any secrets to immortality, there is some irony here. One must wonder if Ja’far followed the recommendations that Changchun Zi gave to Chinggis Khan to extend his life. Xi Youji, 101.
95 Xi Youji, 137.
96 Nasawi, 84; Nesawi/Houdas, 57.
97 Nasawi, 84–5; Nesawi/Houdas, 58–9.
98 Juzjani/Habibi, 102; Juzjani/Raverty, 964–5.
99 Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 49, 53; Juvaini/Boyle, 65–6, 70; RD/Karimi, 338; RD/Thackston2, 163.
100 Juvaini/Boyle, 105; Juwayni/Qazvini, v1, 81. RD/Thackston2, 174; RD/Karimi, 499; Khwandamir, 16.
101 Ibn al-Athir/Richards, 202; Ibn al-Athir, 358.
102 Ibn Al-Athir/Richards, 202; Ibn al-Athir, 359.
