Behind Closed Doors

In mid-1984, Punjab was sitting on a volcano, which could erupt any time. The Government of India was in a quandary about how to deal with such a serious situation, which could have much wider repercussions for the country’s unity and integrity. But when the GOI concluded that all efforts to restore normalcy in Punjab had failed and the terrorist violence had assumed alarming dimensions, it decided to entrust the task of tackling the situation to the Indian Army. What perhaps also clinched the decision to send in the army were the disturbing reports given to the Centre (by the Indian intelligence agencies) about the Pakistan-sponsored plan for fostering mass insurgency (in Punjab) in June-July 1984 to coincide with an attack from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

That Pakistan was desperately waiting for – rather trying to engineer – an opportunity to attack India was also revealed by Operation Bluestar – The Untold Story, a nine-part series telecast in June 2013 by Day and Night, a Chandigarh-based news channel on the occasion of the 29^th anniversary of the June 1984 army operations. The series was based on the conversations that Kanwar Sandhu (chief of the news channel and a former resident editor of Hindustan Times, Chandigarh) had held with eyewitnesses. Senior Akali leaders ensconced in the SGPC complex of the shrine gave details of how the separatist militants operating from the Golden Temple Complex were in touch with President Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan, who wanted the Akali leaders to declare the formation of Khalistan. Balwant Singh Ramoowalia (a former Union minister and a senior Akali leader) disclosed that ‘around 6 p.m. on 5 June [1984], four to five Sikh youth came to where I along with Akali Dal president Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and SGPC chief Jathedar Gurcharan Singh Tohra were sitting. They were carrying a “box”. They were also carrying SLRs [self-loading rifles] and they placed them on stands with their barrels pointing towards all of us. They told us that the “box” is connected [to] General Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan. They told Jathedar Tohra and Sant Longowal to declare the formation of Khalistan so that the Pakistani Army can launch an attack … Tohra told them that this battle is between Sant Bhindranwale and Mrs Indira Gandhi. He told them that he or Sant Longowal was not leading the battle. “This battle is being led by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. So be fair to us and please ask Sant Bhindranwale to issue a statement on the creation of Khalistan first. You have a tape recorder. Please record and play his statement to us and then we will make the necessary comments on whatever he says. He did not say that he will make the announcement for Khalistan.”’ The Akali leaders felt relieved when the youth returned without harming them.1

The Indian intelligence agencies also had received reports from their moles in the militants’ camp that Pakistan had sent messages to Major-General Shabeg Singh (who had trained the Mukti Bahini² in the December 1971 Indo—Pak war, but later began training militants in Punjab) and Amrik Singh, president of the All India Sikh Students’ Federation (AISSF), both of whom who were confidants of Bhindranwale and were also operating from the Akal Takht (located within the Golden Temple premises). The messages revealed that the Pakistani Army’s handlers wanted to hold an urgent meeting with the two militant leaders for giving final touches to the mass insurgency plan.

As the conditions that prevailed in Punjab were extremely volatile and unstable, curfew was imposed in the state, the international border was sealed and the army was summoned on 2 June 1984.

The following extracts from the White Paper on the Punjab Situation (issued by the Government of India on 10 July 1984) highlight the army’s hour-by-hour activities during Operation Bluestar, which was undertaken to flush out, from the Golden Temple Complex, the militants/terrorists who had converted it into a veritable fortress for mounting attacks on any paramilitary or military forces that might challenge their position:

On 2 June 1984, Government [of India] decided to call in the Army in aid of civil authority in Punjab. The tasks assigned to the Army were:

To check and control extremist, terrorist and communal violence in the State of Punjab and the Union Territory of Chandigarh, provide security to the people and restore normalcy [and] to augment the Border Security Force [BSF] presence on the India—Pakistan border lying within the territorial jurisdiction of Punjab in order to stop smuggling and unauthorized cross-border traffic.
The paramilitary forces deployed in Punjab and Chandigarh as well as the Punjab Armed Police units were placed under the command and control of the Army. Since the Union Territory of Chandigarh was also affected by terrorist action, the Governor of Punjab was appointed for a period of two months as Administrator of the Territory in order to facilitate coordinated action.

On 3 June 1984, the entry of foreigners into Punjab was prohibited under the Foreigners Act. Subsequently, on 15 June 1984 the requirement of visa for persons holding passports of the UK and Canada and on 18 June 1984 for nationals of other Commonwealth countries and Ireland was introduced. Such rules exist for nationals of other countries. Temporarily the movement across the Attari checkpost [at the Indo—Pak border; 28 km from Amritsar], the gateway to Pakistan, was stopped.

The Government of Punjab took action under the Punjab Press (Special Powers) Act to prohibit the publication and transmission of material which may have the effect of inflaming communal passions and affect public order.

Plan of Army Operation

The Army’s plan to re-establish law and order in Punjab and Chandigarh envisaged apprehension of terrorist elements, the flushing out of known terrorist hideouts, recovery of illegal arms and ammunition and restoration of public safety and confidence.

By the early hours of 3 June 1984, Army formations had moved into Punjab and Chandigarh and had been suitably deployed in all districts.

By that time BSF battalions deployed on the Punjab—Pakistan border had already been placed under the operational command of the Army for effective coordination and control of the international border against illegal trans-border traffic and smuggling.

The States contiguous to Punjab had also taken action to prevent terrorists from crossing over into their territories.

While information was available that the terrorists possessed large quantities of arms of different kinds and had built up strong fortifications, tactical intelligence in regard to the strength and disposition of terrorist gangs was inadequate. However, to save the situation from irretrievable deterioration, there was utmost necessity for speed in the completion of Army operations.

Specific orders were given to troops to use the minimum force, to show utmost reverence to all holy places and to ensure that no desecration or damage was done to the Harmandir Sahib, the sanctum sanctorum of the Golden Temple, and the Darbar Sahibs of other Gurdwaras. [Italics added.] The use of high trajectory weapons and incendiary ammunition was totally barred. Troops were particularly instructed not to wear any leather items in holy places and to treat all apprehended persons with dignity and consideration. All Commanders were instructed to continuously use the public address systems for a number of hours at every suspected hideout or terrorist base, to advise terrorists to give themselves up in order to prevent bloodshed and damage to holy places before the use of force for their apprehension.

A 36-hour curfew was declared by the Punjab Government and the Chandigarh Administration from 2100 hours on 3 June, which was later extended selectively. Police cordons around the Golden Temple and other known terrorist hideouts were made more effective by Army units [which] also assisted in ensuring that curfew was not violated.

Army Action in the Golden Temple Area

A map showing the layout of the Golden Temple and adjacent buildings together with a brief description was prepared.

The dispositions of the terrorists in the area were organized on military lines, which exploited the defensive potential of the buildings to the fullest extent. The terrorists selected the Akal Takht as a building of prime importance since it housed Shri Bhindranwale and his headquarters and was tactically significant to their operations. The approaches to the Akal Takht were heavily defended.

Lookout and Early Warning Posts

Seventeen houses in the civilian residential areas had been selected by the terrorists at distances of 500 to 800 metres from the outer periphery of the temple complex and held by approximately 10 men each. These lookout and early warning posts were [provided] a veritable arsenal of light machine guns and other automatic and semi-automatic weapons with huge caches of ammunition. The posts had been given common communication equipment to be in instant touch with their command posts. In addition, posts had been created on the structures which dominated the entire surroundings, i.e., the overhead water tank east of Guru Ram Das Sarai, the two towers adjacent to, and west of, the langar (free kitchen for devotees or pilgrims), each of which has a staircase whose ventilation recesses were used as gun positions. Canopies, sunshades and other projections had been sand-bagged on three sides and developed as machine gun nests. Verandah arches had been closed with masonry and used as vantage firing posts with slits just enough for observation and fire.

First Line of Positions

Weapon positions had also been sited on the roof tops of all buildings on the eastern side, which constituted the most vulnerable approach. In addition, the buildings themselves permitted fire through sand-bagged windows at each floor level.

Second Line of Positions

Similar weapon positions including a large number of [alternative] positions had been created on the roofs and intermediate floors of the buildings enclosing the entire temple complex.

The Main Positions at the Akal Takht

As the Akal Takht is set back from the Parikrama (path around the sanctum sanctorum) on the western side, the open space to its east had been developed as a ‘killing ground’ with effective fire being brought down on it from the Akal Takht itself, the buildings on its right and left and also from the Toshakhana (place where gifts/offerings are kept). The Akal Takht had been fortified as well as any dug out position of any modern army. Starting from the basement upwards, gun placements had been planned out and sited at every level including the floor level, the window level, the roof ventilators, on to the first floor and the upper storeys. The terrorists had cut holes in the walls and the marble façade like a pillbox for the positioning of weapons.

The Pattern of Terrorists’ Resistance

The design of resistance of the terrorists as it turned out during the Army action was as follows:

Early warning and aggressive attrition by the peripheral ring of lookout posts and clever fire control and use of [alternative] positions on the first and second defensive lines.

It was evident that weapons were craftily deployed and tried. For example, while rifles and automatic weapons were used from the lookout positions, Sten machine carbines were the major weapon on the first and second defensive lines since ranges of more than 25 to 30 yards [approximately 23 to 27 metres] were rarely available around the main complex. There was very effective coordination of fire. The selected killing ground was fully covered by fire from all sides. The limited anti-tank resources were well marshalled and used only when a mechanized vehicle came within range.

The terrorists had converted the Golden Temple complex into a veritable fortress for mounting attacks on any paramilitary or military forces that might challenge their positions. They had received extensive training in military operations and use of explosives and sophisticated weapons, installed their own communication systems and stored adequate quantities of foodgrains to last several months. Training had been provided by experienced ex-army personnel and battle plans had been drawn up with ingenuity, maximizing the advantages provided by the basements, underground passages, niches, winding staircases, lookouts and towers in the temple complex. Wearing assorted uniforms, the terrorists were as well trained and well equipped as any regular force could be. The pattern of killings, bank robberies and arson committed by the terrorists all over Punjab also showed how well they were trained in the use of weapons. They had an elaborate protective cover of getaway plans and eventual sanctuary in places of worship.

During the afternoon and evening of 5 June 1984, repeated appeals were made to the terrorists on the public address system to lay down their arms and surrender to the authorities to prevent avoidable bloodshed and damage to the structures in the temple complex. 129 surrendered. At 1900 hours on 5 June, the Army commenced preliminary operations to secure dominating buildings on the periphery of the area occupied by terrorists around the Golden Temple.

From 2230 hours, Army units commenced moving to the Golden Temple precincts. This drew a very heavy volume of fire from the terrorists into the narrow streets at close range. A large number of tear-gas shells were fired by the troops into the terrorist positions including the Akal Takht but these were not effective since all windows and doors had been heavily barricaded with bricks and mortar as well as sandbags. Despite casualties, the troops gradually closed in and commenced movement into the area around the temple, after overcoming very heavy and organized resistance.

Troops effected entry into the area around the Sarovar (holy tank) through the northern deori (entrance) and the southern library building. In the latter area, the terrorists were firing from a number of machine-gun positions in the library building and were hurling country-made grenades, lighting them with matchsticks. A fire was noticed at this stage in the library. Troop fire-fighting parties were repeatedly rushed to put out the fire, but these attempts were foiled by the heavy machine-gun fire from the terrorists. By the time the terrorist positions could be overcome, the library had been gutted.

Intensive fire had to be faced from the Akal Takht, which stood like a fortress, covering all avenues of approach with a deadly and concentrated volume of machine-gun fire, causing heavy casualties.

The terrorists from their outer line positions also reinforced the fire from the Akal Takht and made it a bastion of automatic weapons. Machine guns from Harmandir Sahib simultaneously raked the Parikrama … and surrounding buildings from where the troops had forced back the terrorists. In spite of this, the troops exercised great restraint and refrained from directing any fire at Harmandir Sahib.

At 0010 hours on 6 June, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and Shri G. S. Tohra surrendered near Guru Nanak Niwas with about 350 people. The terrorists opened fire at them and also lobbed hand grenades to prevent their surrender. As a result, 70 people were killed including 30 women and 5 children. Among those killed [was] Shri Gurcharan Singh, who had been accused by extremists of having plotted the murder of Shri [Surinder Singh] Sodhi and Shri Bagga Singh, a vocal critic of the cult of religious terrorism preached by Shri Bhindranwale.

At about 0410 hours on 6 June, some troops attempting to close in on the Akal Takht in an armoured personnel carrier (APC) were fired at by anti-tank rockets from the Akal Takht, which damaged and immobilized the APC. Thereafter, one tank with its searchlights was taken into the area to blind the terrorist positions in the Akal Takht and to engage these with fire. By the morning of 6 June, the troops had effectively engaged all gun positions at the Akal Takht. After engagement with, and silencing of, some machine-gun positions of the Akal Takht, the troops effected entry into the Akal Takht. Room-to-room engagement commenced. Some extremists were then observed rushing down towards the first and ground floors, where shortly thereafter an explosion took place and a fire started. The troops also heard an exchange of fire among the extremists themselves on the ground floor and in the basement.

Some terrorists at this stage attempted to rush out of the Akal Takht to clear some areas held by the troops, but were beaten off. A group of 10 terrorists thereafter surrendered with a white flag. Room-to-room fighting, however, continued in the Akal Takht till it was cleared by 1230 hours on 6 June, except for resistance continuing from the ground floor and basements.

That afternoon, the troops made further appeals over loudspeakers to the terrorists to surrender. As a result some 200 terrorists surrendered including 22 from Harmandir Sahib. The head Granthi [the keeper and reader of the Sikh scriptures] and two other Granthis were at this stage found to be safe inside Harmandir Sahib.

The continued resistance from the ground floor and the basement of the Akal Takht was tackled during the night of 6/7 June. When this resistance was finally overcome the troops commenced a thorough search of the ground floor and the basement. The bodies of Shri Bhindranwale and Amrik Singh were found among 34 other bodies on the ground floor of the Akal Takht.

Some terrorists remained active in the morning hours of 7 June using the surrounding buildings and number of tunnels in the area of the Golden Temple. It required a few days of careful search to winkle out the last of the terrorists who inflicted brutal casualties on troops. No women or children were killed in the action by the troops.

Damage to Buildings in the Area of the Golden Temple

From the commencement of the planning stage of this operation, damage to the temple buildings was not contemplated and strict instructions had been issued to preserve the buildings. The heavy toll of Army casualties is an indication of the deliberate restraint exercised by troops in order to ensure that Harmandir Sahib and Akal Takht were not damaged despite the murderous small arms and automatic fire which poured forth on the troops from these buildings from the terrorists. Fire on the Akal Takht had to be opened only when very high casualties began to accrue to the troops and when the terrorists escalated action by using anti-tank weapons from this building.

A large quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives were recovered, including automatic and anti-tank weapons. A small factory for the manufacture of hand grenades and Sten guns was also found within the precincts of the Golden Temple. The Army is still engaged in the process of recovery of arms. It will take some time to complete this task.

Brutalities by the Terrorists

The atrocities committed by the terrorists on innocent Sikhs and Hindus prior to the induction of the Army are well known. During the Army operations, instances of further heinous acts and barbarous vandalism by the terrorists in control of the Golden Temple have come to light. On the night of 5/6 June 1984 when, on appeals by the Army, several civilians including women and small children from the Guru Nanak Niwas and the SGPC building came out to surrender, the terrorists opened fire and lobbed grenades at them and killed 70 people including 30 women and 5 children [as mentioned earlier; see § 26]. The terrorists also tortured in a most inhuman manner and brutally murdered two junior commissioned officers whom they had captured. They strapped explosives on to the body one of the junior commissioned officers after having skinned him alive, and blew him up as he was thrown from the upper floor of the Akal Takht. On 8 June 1984 they hacked to death an unarmed army doctor who had entered a basement to treat some casualties.

A total number of 42 religious places in Punjab were identified where terrorists were based. During the evening of 5 June repeated appeals were made at all these places over public address systems for the terrorists to hand themselves over to the authorities. When there was no response, the Army moved into these premises in stages to flush them out. In most of these places very little resistance was encountered. However, the terrorists offered a fair amount of resistance in the gurdwaras at Moga and Muktsar and fired at the security forces. Besides they also fired in Faridkot, Patiala, Ropar and Chowk Mehta (the headquarters of Bhindranwale before he moved to Golden Temple complex). Major recovery of arms and ammunition was made from religious places at Chowk Mehta, Patiala and Ropar. The last of these operations was completed by 1700 hours on 6 June after the Army had flushed out terrorists from the Muktsar Gurdwara.

Use of Navy and Air Force in the Operation

The Army had the help of the Navy and Air Force for certain supporting services.

The Navy provided a contingent of divers to search for arms, ammunition and equipment which the terrorists threw into the Amrit Sarovar (sacred water reservoir around the sanctum sanctorum of the Golden Temple) and the wells around the Golden Temple as also in various ponds and wells in other areas. These operations have been successful, resulting in a large haul of arms, ammunition, equipment and valuables.

The Air Force provided transport air support for speedy movement of certain Army elements from other States. Effective helicopter communications and reconnaissance flights were also organized by this service.

² Mukti Bahini (meaning liberation army) was a resistance force (made up of Bengalis) in the erstwhile East Pakistan that took on the Pakistan Army in the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war with help from the Indian Army.