Behind Closed Doors

In the wake of Operation Bluestar, the main question was: Who would provide leadership to the Sikh community after the Akali Dal stalwarts had lost face and with the Congress being an even more unpalatable choice? The Centre wanted to create an alternative to the Akali leadership. It was also anxious to ensure that gurdwaras did not become dumping grounds for arms and ammunition.

My 21 October 1984 lead article (published in the magazine section of the Indian Express) threw light on the post-Operation Bluestar scenario in Punjab. In the process, the article also highlighted the Akali Dal’s post-independence history (see also Chapter 1):

What next? This is the question that has been haunting the Akali Dal ever since the traumatic happenings of the past few months were set in motion. To use a cliché, the party is facing a deep crisis. Its morcha¹ [agitation or movement] has failed. The events that have taken place in the state since June [1984] have pushed to the background the territorial, river waters and religious issues on which the party launched its dharam yudh over two years ago. The Akali Dal is left with no live issue which can be used as a plank to start another agitation in the near future. With its leadership discredited, the party faces a vacuum at the top. The worst that could happen to a regional party has happened to the Akali Dal. It stands isolated from the national mainstream.

The most significant development that has taken place in Punjab’s volatile Sikh politics is that for the first time in the post-independence history of the state, the Akali morcha has been defeated after over two years of no-holds-barred confrontation with the government. On occasions, the Akalis appeared to be emerging victorious. But the final outcome saw them vanquished. The Akali leadership proved to be a poor match for Mrs Indira Gandhi’s apparently well-thought-out strategy and superior tactics.

To understand the significance of this development, one needs to recall briefly the history of the Akali morchas. The first morcha [post-independence] was launched by the Akali Dal to get the Sikh Harijans [now called Dalits] included in the list of scheduled castes so that they could avail of the benefits available to the latter. Launched under the stewardship of Master Tara Singh – then the unchallenged leader of the Akali Dal – the morcha was a success. The Akali demand was accepted.

In the early 1950s, Master Tara Singh started an agitation for the creation of the Punjabi Suba. It ended in an agreement between the Akali Dal and the Government, thus giving birth to the regional formula. Under the formula two regional committees were formed for the Punjabi-speaking and the Hindi-speaking areas of the composite Punjab. The Akali legislators joined the Congress and the Akali Dal decided to confine its activities to the religious field.

Soon after, the decline of Master Tara Singh began. With the covert support of Partap Singh Kairon (then Punjab Chief Minister), a new leadership led by Fateh Singh emerged on the Akali scene. In sharp contrast to Master Tara Singh’s sectarian approach to the demand for a Punjabi Suba, Sant Fateh Singh tried to give the morcha a secular colour to elicit the support of the Hindus who had, right from the start, seen in this demand (for a Punjabi Suba) an attempt designed ultimately to create a Sikh state. They adopted a communal approach even on issues like language: Instead of Punjabi, they declared Hindi as their mother tongue in the census.

Sant Fateh Singh [also] began a morcha for the formation of a Punjabi Suba. He followed it up with a fast unto death. His demand was accepted by the Centre and the composite Punjab was bifurcated into the present Punjab and Haryana in November 1966. Chandigarh, however, was made a union territory to house the capitals of the two states. Sant Fateh Singh again began a fast unto death for the inclusion of Chandigarh in Punjab. It resulted in Mrs Gandhi’s having the earlier award of the [J. C.] Shah Commission which had given Chandigarh to Haryana reversed. She accepted Punjab’s claim on Chandigarh but decided that Haryana would be compensated for it by the transfer of the Fazilka-Abohar areas of Punjab to that state.

The last morcha that the Akali Dal launched was against the Emergency and it continued right through the Emergency. It yielded dividends to the Akalis in the form of popular acclaim and support in the 1977 elections which ultimately helped the party share power both in Punjab and in Delhi.

After Mrs Gandhi’s return to power in [January] 1980 followed by the dismissal of the nine non-Congress state governments, including that of Punjab, the Akalis called a ‘World Sikh Conference’ in Amritsar in July 1981 to formulate their charter of demands.

It was the beginning of the Akalis’ battle whose ultimate object was to capture lost power. With the help of the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India (Marxist)] and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Akali Dal launched a morcha in Kapoori village near the Haryana border to stop the digging of the Sutlej—Yamuna link [canal] which is to bring Haryana’s share of the Ravi—Beas waters through Punjab. When this failed to make an impact, the Akali Dal shifted the venue of its agitation to the Golden Temple Complex converting its battle into a ‘dharam yudh’ (religious war), using the territorial, river waters and the religious demands as its rallying point. The CPI (M) and the BJP dissociated themselves from the ‘dharam yudh’.

The morcha, which at one stage virtually paralysed the Darbara Singh Government [in power from 6 June 1980 to 10 October 1983], appeared to be on the verge of achieving its objective, at least, on two occasions. But the Centre made a tactical retreat on both occasions. With a simultaneous escalation in terrorist violence, the agitation started losing its moorings. The political problem was converted into a law and order problem and the army’s intervention to curb terrorism became unavoidable. With the top Akali leadership in jail, the second-rung leaders tried to regroup themselves after absorbing the first shock of the army action. They began to send jathas [armed groups of Sikhs] to ‘liberate’ the Golden Temple complex from the security forces [in mid-June 1984]. The revived agitation did not make any impact. On occasions, it became difficult even to enlist volunteers for the jathas.

Ultimately, the Akali leaders decided to mobilize the Sikh high priests on two demands, solely religious: withdrawal of the security forces from the Golden Temple complex and handing it over to the Akali-dominated Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC), which manages the historical gurdwaras in this region. The priests decided to lead a massive march to ‘peacefully liberate’ the complex but gave the government a month’s time to accept their demands.

During this period, the Akal Takht, extensively damaged during the Army’s action [Operation Bluestar], was repaired and the government could claim to have accomplished its task of restoring to the highest temporal seat of the Sikhs its pristine glory before handing it over to its rightful custodians. For the first time in the history of the Akali Dal’s morchas, a morcha had not only failed but it had forced the party leadership to be on the defensive about getting back what it had lost.

The party, therefore, cannot now immediately identify any live issue with which to launch an agitation. The only issue on which it can organize protests is the alleged excesses on the Sikh youths by the security forces, which are combing the terrorist-infested areas in search of remnants. But such protests can, in the present situation, not go beyond fighting legal battles or starting a campaign, mainly through the media.

Turmoil brings changes in the character and composition of political parties. The Akali Dal cannot be an exception. The recent developments have affected the political fortunes of the trio that heads it – Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, Parkash Singh Badal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra. After their release – as and when it is ordered – they cannot hope to regain their old political position. It will be an uphill task for Longowal and Tohra to explain away to the Sikhs their ‘surrender’ to the security forces in the Golden Temple Complex when Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his terrorist followers were dying fighting.

In Sikh history, fighters generally acquire an aura of martyrdom even if they are fighting for the wrong cause. The case of Badal is somewhat different. He was not arrested from the complex. Besides, in sharp contrast to the other two Akali leaders, he has a mass base among the Sikh peasantry. However, in the current situation, he may also find it difficult to face his followers. One thing, however, seems to be certain. It will be impossible for Tohra, who had been able to retain the presidentship of the SGPC through intra-party manoeuvres during the past 12 years, to get elected again.

The leadership vacuum created in the Akali Dal has proved to be a godsend for the Congress. The latter has been able to groom an amenable leadership in the main opposition party. There were reports that Amarinder Singh, who resigned from the Lok Sabha and the Congress in protest against the army action, was to be a ‘plant’ in the Akali Dal. Although some moderate Akalis tried to prop him up for a key position in the party, the move evoked strong protests from other sections, particularly from the followers of Badal.

Delhi should be happy that it has been able to bring the priests into prominence, thereby keeping in the background the Akali Dal which wanted to use the priests to regain its initiative. But this will be a short-lived gain as the Centre will have ultimately to fight the Akali Dal on political grounds. The Congress high command should also feel reassured by the fact that even the leadership of the ad hoc Akali Dal committee, which was set up in June [1984] after the arrest of the top Akali leadership, is not hostile to Delhi.

This may be because of the political compulsions forced by the new situation in which the Akali Dal finds itself, or because of the proximity of some moderate Akali leaders (now commanding influence in the ad hoc committee) to Rajiv Gandhi. Whatever the alignments and links, their net gain is that these are proving helpful in the process of the restoration of normalcy.

The crucial question Punjab now faces is: Who will provide leadership to the Sikh community which has been passing through phases of despondency and anger? The present Akali leadership has lost face. In the absence of any other alternative, however, if it becomes a question of choosing between the Congress and the Akali Dal – the two main political rivals – the latter will be the unquestioned choice of the community. If more sober and forward-looking Akali leaders from the present or the new generation, or secular elements, are not able to provide leadership to the Sikh community in their present hour of despair, forces which may prove to be more dangerous may fill the void.