Chapter 20
THE RAJIV—LONGOWAL ACCORD AND AFTER
Sensing that important developments were in the offing regarding the future roadmap of Punjab politics, I met Governor Arjun Singh on 25 May 1985 at Chandigarh, as he was playing a key role in trying to bring about an understanding between the Congress and the Akali Dal for the formation of the next government in the state. (Punjab was then under president’s rule.)
When I asked him whether the Centre thought that with Longowal now having an upper hand in Akali politics, it could initiate the process of talks with the moderate Akalis, Arjun Singh replied: ‘The situation is still not clear. Longowal has not yet resumed his office [as Akali Dal president]. [Only] after he does and a picture about Baba [Joginder Singh; Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s father] becomes clear, can anything be said.’ Asked if there was a move for the formation of a popular government as the Assembly would be dissolved on 26 May 1985 and governor’s rule would end on 5 October 1985, Arjun Singh said that ‘there is no sanctity about the dates to decide the next programme of action’. When told that the Punjab Congressmen were working at cross-purposes on the issue of the Centre’s policy to reach a settlement in Punjab, he candidly admitted that ‘such Congressmen will have to regret what they are doing now’.
On the roles of President Giani Zail Singh and former Punjab chief minister, Darbara Singh, who had been (and were) at loggerheads with each other, Arjun Singh bemoaned the fact that ‘they are creating problems in the way of the formation of a government. It is these two leaders who created problems in Punjab. Unhon ne beda garq kiya hai [literal meaning: they have made the boat sink]’.
***
Despite the top three Akali leaders (Badal, Tohra and Longowal) having taken a solemn vow, on 16 May 1985, ‘to sink or swim together’, a rift had started developing among them due to the deep feelings of distrust against each other. Each was apprehensive that the other two would surge ahead in the political race. Such a rift became clear from their closed-door discussions held in Amritsar in early June 1985 to take a decision on holding talks with the Centre.
The fact that Badal ascended the chief minister’s ‘throne’ for a record fifth time in 2012 makes his views on Akali politics not only significant but also relevant and need elaboration. These views revealed the strategy that Badal had chalked out and followed after the normalization of Punjab’s situation in the 1990s.
After his return to Chandigarh from Amritsar, when I met him on 10 June 1985, Badal made some important disclosures. First of all, he asserted: ‘No talks can be held with the Centre unless the Sikhs’ pride and dignity are restored. The government is not interested in a settlement in Punjab as it believes that Sikhs nurse a desire for Khalistan and hence need to be dealt with as aliens forever. Sikhs will be suppressed within and outside Punjab.’
Badal’s main grouse was that despite their changed attitude towards him ‘both Tohra and Longowal cannot change basically.’ He noted: ‘Tohra is more mischievous. Longowal vacillates. I had told Longowal to suspend the morcha [agitation] after the first killings of Hindus on 4 October 1983 but some people surrounding Longowal did not allow this to happen. Had Longowal shown some courage then, the present situation would not have arisen.’
Badal also shed light on the Longowal—Bhindranwale links:
Another [vital] factor was that these leaders thought that the terrorists’ actions were helping the Akali morcha as these had unnerved the Government of India. They provided shelter to terrorists. At one time, Longowal and Bhindranwale were very thick. They used to hug each other. Longowal would go to him even for having tea. But later, for his own safety, Longowal moved away from the terrorists’ splinter groups and differences arose between him and Bhindranwale.
Badal next outlined his proposed move: ‘Akali Dal and SGPC [Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, the Sikhs’ apex religious body] leaderships do not want Akali Dal’s rule as their own importance will fade under an Akali Government. They will then have to seek favours from the Akali Chief Minister.’ Hence, Badal, citing the example of Indira Gandhi, favoured ‘combining of both the offices of Akali Dal President and leadership of the party’s legislative wing for the stability of an Akali Government as otherwise conflicts would crop up between the Akali Dal President and Chief Minister within a year of coming to power.’ (This was precisely what Badal did after assuming power in the 1990s when he started holding both the offices of chief minister and Akali Dal president besides acquiring a firm grip on the SGPC.)
Badal was of the view that ‘an agreement with the government can be reached only if bold steps are taken by the government.’ He then specified the steps that he had in mind:
He was unhappy that ‘the government has not done anything to show its desire to settle the Punjab issue. Akali leaders cannot talk to the government without achieving results; otherwise Sikhs will say that even after the Army’s attack on the Golden Temple and killings of Sikhs, nothing had been achieved. Territorial and water issues are no longer big issues now. Unity of all Akali groups is essential as without such unity Akalis cannot capture power. If elections are held today, Akalis cannot get as many seats as they have now. They have only three strongholds – Sangrur, Bhatinda and Faridkot – from where they can, at the most, retain their present seats.’
He concluded: ‘Power cannot be shared with the Congress at least for five to seven years. Even if it is shared, Congress will try to be a dominant partner. Akalis cannot come to power by joining hands with communists and BJP. Somebody had told me that if elections are held and Akali Dal contests, Akali Dal’s extremist splinter faction would get some candidates murdered.’
***
Two days before signing of the 24 July 1985 Rajiv—Longowal Accord, Akali politics witnessed certain developments, which later led to the formation of Punjab’s first elected government led by Surjit Singh Barnala post-Operation Bluestar. These developments also created a permanent wedge between Badal and Barnala. Over the years, their relations became so estranged that, after retiring as Tamil Nadu governor in August 2011, when Barnala was campaigning for the January 2012 Punjab Assembly elections, Badal publicly described him as a ‘cheat’. Barnala paid him back by branding Badal as a ‘wily politician’.
It was a sultry afternoon on 23 July 1985 when I received a telephone call from Badal who wanted me to meet him at his Chandigarh residence. When I reached the place, I found Badal visibly upset. He told me that Longowal had arrived in Chandigarh on 21 July evening to convene a meeting of the Akali high command to discuss the PM’s letter inviting Akalis for talks to Delhi. Arjun Singh, the Punjab governor (who had facilitated the Centre—Akali parleys), had met Longowal at the house of Balwant Singh, a prominent leader from the Barnala camp. Arjun Singh was insistent that Badal must accompany Longowal to Delhi when the latter went to meet the prime minister.
The meeting of the Akali high command could not take place on 21 July as Tohra’s car had met with an accident. The meeting was instead held the next day morning. After hectic discussions it was decided to send a letter to the PM stating that the conditions laid down by the Akali Dal would have to be met before holding the talks. The letter was given to Balwant Singh for typing. In the meantime, Badal left for Dosanjh village. So did Tohra. But on returning to Chandigarh at 11 p.m. Badal learnt that Longowal, Barnala and Balwant Singh had left for Delhi. ‘This was against the decision taken by the Akali high command,’ he lamented.
Badal wanted to hold a press conference to announce that he was praying for the success of the talks between Longowal and the prime minister. There, he also proposed to explain the factual position of the Akali high command’s decision taken at its Chandigarh meeting to send a letter to the PM laying down the party’s conditions for holding talks.
However, on second thoughts, he decided against holding a press conference. Badal also pointed out he could not be a ‘thaila bardar’ (servant) of Sant Longowal, whom he termed ‘a cheat’. Badal admitted that his position had weakened vis-à-vis Longowal: ‘The sant is supported by the government, the opposition, the Sikhs living outside Punjab and Hindus of Punjab. Sikhs in Punjab are demoralized and want settlement. The sant has taken over my platform of Hindu—Sikh unity.’
A dismayed Badal felt that although Longowal had promised him the leadership of the Akali Legislature Party, Surjit Singh Barnala might be the sant’s candidate for chief ministership if an agreement was reached between Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal and if the Akali Dal won the Assembly elections. (And that was exactly what happened. As mentioned earlier, Barnala took over as chief minister on 29 September 1985.)
Badal’s view that the sant had promised him the Akali Legislature Party’s leadership was also substantiated by his loyalist Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa, who later (in 2000) became a minister in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government at the Centre. Dhindsa told me that ‘on 20 August 1985 before he was assassinated at a gurdwara in Sherpur [a village in the Sangrur district of Punjab], Sant Harchand Singh Longowal had come to my MLA flat [at Chandigarh] and told me that, that very day, he had promised Badal that he [Badal] would be the CM after the Assembly elections to be held in September and that he [Badal] would distribute party tickets for the polls. That morning the sant also had a meeting with Badal and other Akali leaders and there was a patch-up between the two sides.’ The same day Longowal held a press conference at Badal’s residence before leaving for Sherpur. I was also present.
Although Badal and Tohra (who were also there) expressed their reservations about the Rajiv—Longowal Accord, they assured the sant that they would obey his orders. It was obvious at the press conference that Longowal considered Badal the tallest Akali leader, implying that he (Badal) would lead the party if the Akali Dal came to power.
It was not surprising when, in such a frame of mind, Badal told me (during my 23 July 1985 meeting with him) that ‘a lasting solution to the Punjab problem lies in an Akali—Congress coalition’. That there was actually a move for the formation of such a coalition government was later confirmed by Balwant Singh. On 27 March 1989, he told me that ‘there was an agreement between Akalis led by Barnala and Governor Arjun Singh that, in the 1985 elections, Akalis should form the government and then they should tackle the terrorists and the Centre should implement the Rajiv—Longowal Accord. This should be followed by the formation of an Akali—Congress coalition [government] in Punjab. Arjun Singh asked for a list of top Akali leaders who [he insisted] must win the elections. I supplied a list of 14 such leaders against whom weak Congress candidates should be put up …’
***
Senior Akali leaders are known for making use of religion as a weapon even for outsmarting each other in the race for power. Behind the Longowal—Barnala—Balwant Singh trio’s decision to go to Delhi for talks with Rajiv Gandhi by sidelining Badal lay the story of how the Barnala camp (favouring talks with Rajiv Gandhi and ignoring Badal’s resistance) made use of the Akali Dal’s doctrine that ‘politics and religion are inseparable’ with the rider that religion will guide politics. Chandigarh’s political and official circles were then abuzz with reports that the Barnala—Balwant Singh duo managed to ‘secure guidance’ from the Sikhs’ holy book, Guru Granth Sahib, for going ahead with their plan to go to Delhi (for meeting the prime minister on 24 July 1985).
After the 22 July morning meeting of the Akali high command, Longowal – who was reluctant to go to Delhi without Badal and Tohra accompanying him (even Rajiv Gandhi and Arjun Singh wanted Badal to be present during the talks) – was present at Balwant Singh’s residence. It was decided that guidance on whether or not they should hold talks with the prime minister should be sought from the Guru Granth Sahib.
It is customary among Sikhs that, during the ardaas (meaning supplication) held after the prayers, the holy book is opened at random and the first word/sentence of the page is treated as the vaak (or hukamnama): the order of the Guru. It was later announced that Longowal took a vaak from the holy book. The first lines after the holy book was opened read: ‘Hoye ikkattar, milo mere bhai/Duvida chhadh, karam liv layee (come and gather together, O my brothers/dispel your dilemma and give yourself to the task at hand).’ It was then that Longowal wrote to the prime minister accepting his invitation for talks. He, Barnala and Balwant Singh soon left for Delhi.
On 23 July 1985, rumours circulating in Chandigarh’s knowledgeable official circles claimed that it had been arranged to keep the holy book in such a position that, on opening it, the first page should have a vaak to prompt the devotee to act on the directive given therein.
A few months after Balwant Singh had taken over as finance minister in the Barnala Government (which assumed office on 29 September 1985), I asked him about the truth in the rumours of how it was arranged to ‘fix’ the vaak. He merely smiled but refused to comment.
***
As scheduled, a meeting between Rajiv Gandhi and Longowal was held at 10 a.m. on 23 July 1985 in New Delhi and the Rajiv—Longowal Accord, covering eleven points, was signed the next day.
Let me go back to my meeting with Badal on that landmark day: 23 July. Badal told me that he had come to know that at the meeting between Longowal and Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, the formula put forward by the Centre had been discussed. He thought that a settlement between the Akali Dal and the Government of India was round the corner. He then briefly outlined the formula:
The story giving the main points of the settlement formula (as Badal had told me) was prominently front-paged by the Indian Express in its next day’s issue when the Rajiv—Longowal Accord was yet to be signed. It was a day later that the other newspapers published the details of the accord after it was officially made public.
The main points of the accord signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali Dal President Sant Harchand Singh Longowal on 24 July 1985 are as follows:
The Government of India agrees to consider the formulation of an All India Gurdwara Bill. Legislation will be brought forward for this purpose in consultation with Shiromani Akali Dal [and] others concerned and after fulfilling all relevant constitutional requirements.
6.1 The notifications applying the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to Punjab will be withdrawn. Existing Special Courts will try only cases relating to the following type of offences: (a) Waging war. (b) Hijacking.
6.2 All other cases will be transferred to ordinary courts and enabling legislation, if needed, will be brought forward in this session of Parliament.
7.1 The Capital Project Area of Chandigarh will go to Punjab. Some adjoining areas which were previously part of Hindi[-speaking] or Punjabi[-speaking] regions were included in the Union Territory. With the capital region going to Punjab the areas which were added to the Union Territory from the Punjabi[-speaking] region of the erstwhile State of Punjab will be transferred to Punjab and those from Hindi[-speaking] region to Haryana. The entire Sukhna lake will be kept as part of Chandigarh and will thus go to Punjab.
7.2 It had always been maintained by Smt. Indira Gandhi that when Chandigarh is to go to Punjab some Hindi-speaking territories in Punjab will go to Haryana. A Commission will be constituted to determine the specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana, in lieu of Chandigarh. The principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit will be the basis of such determination. The Commission will be required to give its findings by 31 December 1985 and these will be binding on both sides. The work of the Commission will be limited to this aspect and will be distinct from the general boundary claims which the other Commission referred to in para 7.4 will handle.
7.3 The actual transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab and areas in lieu thereof to Haryana will take place simultaneously on 26 January 1986.
7.4 There are other claims and counterclaims for readjustment of the existing Punjab—Haryana boundaries. The Government will appoint another Commission to consider these matters and give its findings. Such findings will be binding on the concerned States. The terms of reference will be based on village as a unit, linguistic affinity and contiguity.
8.1 Shiromani Akali Dal states that the [1973] Anandpur Sahib Resolution is entirely within the framework of the Indian Constitution; that it attempts to define the concept of Centre—State relations in a manner which may bring out the true federal characteristics of our Unitary Constitution; and that the purpose of the Resolution is to provide greater autonomy to the State with a view to strengthening the unity and integrity of the country, since unity in diversity forms the cornerstone of our national entity.
8.2 In view of the above, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, in so far as it deals with Centre—State relations, stands referred to the Sarkaria Commission.1
9.1 The farmers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan will continue to get water not less than what they are using from the Ravi—Beas system as on 1. 7. 85 [1 July 1985]. Waters used for consumptive purposes will also remain unaffected. Quantum of usage claimed shall be verified by the Tribunal referred to in para 9.2 below.
9.2 The claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares in their remaining waters will be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal to be presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The decision of this Tribunal will be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties. All legal and constitutional steps required in this respect [shall] be taken expeditiously.
9.3 The construction of the SYL [Sutlej—Yamuna link] canal shall continue. The canal shall be completed by 15 August 1986.
10. Existing instructions regarding protection of interests of minorities will be recirculated to the State Chief Ministers (PM will write to all Chief Ministers).
11. The Central Government may take some steps for the promotion of the Punjabi language. The settlement brings to an end a period of confrontation and ushers in an era of amity, goodwill and cooperation, which will promote and strengthen the unity and integrity of India.
Signed
Rajiv Gandhi,
Prime Minister of India
Harchand Singh Longowal,
President, Shiromani Akali Dal
Besides Balwant Singh, the Panjab University professor, Dr Attar Singh (who had close links with Akali and Congress leaders as also with the Punjab Raj Bhawan2 and was in the loop about the developments) categorically informed me that one of the ‘secret clauses’ of the accord was formation of an Akali—Congress coalition after the September 1985 Assembly elections. Their expectation was that Congress would win 50-55 seats and the Akalis 40-45 seats in the 117-member Assembly. They would then form a coalition to ensure political stability in Punjab. (In fact, on the day the election results were to be announced, Arjun Singh’s aides in the Raj Bhawan were anxiously making inquiries from journalists whether, in their assessment, the Congress would get 50-55 seats.)
The plan for forming an Akali—Congress coalition ministry did not materialize as the Longowal-led Akali Dal secured an absolute majority in the elections. The results greatly demoralized the Congress leaders. Arjun Singh was also in low spirits.
***
Sant Longowal was highly impressed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s approach to the Punjab problem adopted during his meeting with the Akali leaders on 23 and 24 July 1985. On 31 July, I met Longowal at his Gurdwara Cambowal headquarters (at his ancestral village called Longowal), when he bemoaned the fact that ‘the two big men [Giani Zail Singh and Darbara Singh] are playing games [to sabotage the talks] from behind the scenes’.
Giani Zail Singh, who was then president of India, had a different view. A few days before the SGPC office bearers’ elections, he had asked Balwant Singh (over the telephone) to meet him at the Rashtrapati Bhawan. Balwant Singh took along a Punjab cadre IAS officer (who later occupied a senior post in a national sports body) when he went to meet the president. It was late in the evening. In the meeting, Zail Singh asked Balwant Singh to support Atma Singh (a prominent Akali leader) in the elections for the SGPC president’s office as he felt that three persons were responsible for the Punjab situation: Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, Gurcharan Singh Tohra and Darbara Singh. Balwant Singh then remarked that many people believed that a fourth person was also responsible. Zail Singh then asked: ‘Did they mean me?’ Balwant Singh replied: ‘Yes.’
In my meeting with Longowal at Gurdwara Cambowal, I asked him whether he was convinced about Rajiv Gandhi’s sincerity to solve the Punjab problem. His answer was unambiguous: ‘After I met him for 35 minutes on 23 July, I found Munda maan naalon takra hai, hausle wala [the boy is bolder and more courageous than his mother Indira Gandhi]. He wants to solve the Punjab problem. When I met Rajiv I wanted to call in my two other colleagues Balwant Singh and Surjit Singh Barnala [they were sitting in another room]. Rajiv said: “No, we will go to them.” Then I and Rajiv came out to meet them and explained the details of our talks.’ Longowal finally said: ‘Arjun Singh fought for Punjab’s case as a Punjabi [would]. Credit goes to him.’ (Arjun Singh hailed from Rewa, Madhya Pradesh.)
***
In the run-up to the signing of the Rajiv—Longowal Accord, as mentioned earlier, there was a stipulation for ‘coordination’ between the Congress and the Akali Dal to fight the Assembly elections, which were to be held in September 1985. The undeclared understanding was that the Congress would put up weak candidates against the Akali nominees and, after the elections, the two parties would form an Akali—Congress coalition government.
Balwant Singh told me on 6 October 1985 that the coordination plan was discussed in the three meetings Arjun Singh and Balwant Singh held with Rajiv Gandhi. Before the final meeting, the draft of the agreement was signed by Arjun Singh and Balwant Singh.
The problem they faced was how to keep the negotiations secret. They were apprehensive that if the three-member Central Cabinet Committee on Punjab was involved in the discussions, the agreement would leak out and then pressures would mount from Haryana and Rajasthan, which would harm Punjab’s case on the inter-state issues. It was, therefore, decided that only the governor would deal with the Punjab issue.
It was believed that Arjun Singh arranged the funds for the Barnala—Balwant Singh camp to fight the elections. Apparently, Rs 6-7 lakh were provided out of the government’s secret funds to buy over two leaders of the United Akali Dal. (The UAD was a different Akali Dal having a marginal support base among the Sikhs.) Both of them had filled up the requisite forms for contesting the elections, but withdrew from the contest at the last moment.
On the day of the results, Arjun Singh was keenly keeping track of the winning candidates of the two parties. It was originally his idea for forming Punjab’s first Congress—Akali coalition government. Later, when the Akali Dal won an absolute majority on its own and the party formed its own government on 29 September 1985, Arjun Singh was in a dejected mood. Six weeks later, on 14 November 1985, Arjun Singh got himself relieved from the governor’s post, to which he had been appointed on 14 March 1985.
During his tenure as governor of Punjab, a close rapport had been established between Arjun Singh and me. The day he left Raj Bhawan, I received a letter from him:
Dear Shri B. K. Chum,
This is to express my gratefulness for all your help and kindness during my stay in Chandigarh. From the very beginning interactions with you were always useful and your writings helped me in understanding the changing scenario in Punjab. Your consistent support to the national and peace-loving forces in Punjab helped create that atmosphere in which we were able to undertake our tasks in Punjab, with a measure of confidence. I am sure that your constructive role shall continue to strengthen the democratic forces in Punjab.
I will be grateful if you continue to consider me as a friend and I am sure we will have occasions to meet and work together again.
Yours sincerely
Arjun Singh
__________________
1 In June 1983, the Sarkaria Commission (named after Justice Rajinder Singh Sarkaria, a retired judge of the Supreme Court) was constituted by the Government of India to study the relationships between the states and the Central Government.
2 The governor’s residence.