Chapter 23
OPERATION BLACK THUNDER II AND BEYOND
Notwithstanding the flushing out of the militants from the Golden Temple Complex at Amritsar during Operation Bluestar (June 1984) and Operation Black Thunder I (April 1986), the build-up of separatist militants continued there. They also stepped up their campaign to indoctrinate the young Sikh minds to fight for Khalistan. Their support base was spreading and also taking into its fold some sections of intellectuals and other sympathetic groups. A large number of rural Sikh youth started wearing kesri (the saffron colour identified with the Sikh religion) turbans. Shopkeepers not only in villages but also in semi-urban areas were also forced to repaint their signboards in the kesri colour.
In early May 1988, Punjab’s director general of police (DGP), S. S. Virk, was injured when he was fired upon in the Golden Temple Complex.
All these developments formed the basis for launching Operation Black Thunder II on 9 May 1988. K. P. S. Gill1 who had just taken over as Punjab’s DGP adopted a no-holds-barred offensive to deal with the terrorists. The police resorted to ‘bullet-for-bullet’ tactics. They had earlier used those militants who had surrendered during Operation Black Thunder I as ‘spotters’ to identify the militants indulging in terrorist activities. Of the 300-odd terrorists the police had killed in the previous one year, at least 90 per cent had been identified by their colleagues who had been earlier arrested. Some of the families that had been wiped out by terrorists were those of the ‘spotters’ who had helped pinpoint a large number of armed militants. Hardly ten terrorists were killed on the basis of the information secured by the police.
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Under Gill, the police continued its strategy of using the ‘spotters’ to identify and eliminate the militants. A separate unit under the charge of the Amritsar senior superintendent of police (SSP) was formed to conduct these operations. This unit recovered Russian-made RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) and Russian surface-to-air missiles from all over Punjab. There was, however, a controversy over the sources of these weapons and their recovery as some people claimed that the police had planted these weapons, which had been bought by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW; India’s primary external intelligence agency) from Afghanistan.
Julio Ribeiro, then adviser to the Punjab governor (Siddharth Shanker Ray), had certain reservations about the strategy adopted to counter the terrorists. Nevertheless, the strategy continued to be used.
Intelligence sources revealed that planning for undertaking an operation to meet the alarming situation in Punjab had been initiated in early 1988 at Manesar (in Haryana, about 40 km from Delhi) by the National Security Guards (NSG). A large model of the Golden Temple Complex had been built and practice for the operation was carried out at a high school at Tauru and in a college at Nuh, both in Haryana. Both had structures that resembled the parikrama (perimeter) of the Golden Temple. Weekend visits to the Golden Temple Complex became a regular feature of the Special Action Group (SAG) of the NSG. They also started growing their hair for operational reasons. The media was also asked to avoid ‘irresponsible’ reporting vis-à-vis the activities of the NSG.
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After 25 April 1988, the security forces established themselves on several rooftop pickets including the one facing the Golden Temple’s Clock Tower (from where General K. Sundarji had directed Operation Bluestar). The security forces had in the last couple of months kept the militants operating from the complex under observation to prevent their escape.
The time for launching Operation Black Thunder II arrived after the debate in Parliament on Punjab was concluded in the first week of May 1988. This operation began on 9 May 1988 and ended with the surrender of the militants on 18 May.
It was alleged, according to one version, that it was the police who tried to incite the militants holed up in the complex to open fire on the security forces from their hiding places. But when there was no response, the police took along Santokh Singh Kala, a former militant who was leading a state-sponsored outfit, atop the buildings around the complex. Kala evidently knew how to provoke action between the militants and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).
Giving an account of the operations, official sources said that ‘after the green signal for commencing the operation to flush out the terrorists from the complex was given, the Indian Air Force airlifted a Special Action Group (made up of 1000 commandos of the National Security Guards) and their equipment to Amritsar on 11 and 12 May. Meanwhile, an exchange of gunfire between the militants from within the Golden Temple Complex and the security forces had gone on intermittently. About 800 pilgrims had been evacuated on 10 May from the complex … the recitation of Gurbani had stopped. Half a dozen militants tried to slip away under the cover of darkness when they came under fire but only two managed to get away. This was followed by intense exchange of gunfire between the militants and the security forces’.
***
On 15 May 1988, in response to an appeal by the inspector general (border) and the deputy commissioner, Amritsar, 151 persons, including 17 women and children, came out with their hands raised. Those who had weapons surrendered them to the police.
Compared to Operation Bluestar, little damage was caused to the Golden Temple during Operation Black Thunder II, which the government described as ‘successful’. During the operation, around 200 militants surrendered and 41 were killed. It was officially claimed that the operation caused a severe setback to the Khalistan movement. This, however, proved to be a temporary relief as, after a few months, the separatist militants, with stepped-up support from Pakistan’s ISI, restarted the killings with a vengeance.
One of the major differences between Operation Bluestar and Operation Black Thunder II was that the media had free access to cover the latter. The day after the militants surrendered, nine reporters were allowed to go into the Golden Temple Complex. And kirtan (singing of devotional songs) was resumed at the Golden Temple on 23 May 1988.
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Gill has been a prolific writer. Besides authoring a couple of books, his analytic pieces on terrorism and security-related issues have been appearing regularly in the media. In one of his pieces, Gill has given a brief account of the impact of Operation Black Thunder II and the then-prevailing Punjab scenario (see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpstext.htm):
In the overall context of terrorism in Punjab, Black Thunder [II] was only a minor operation. Nevertheless, its impact, in certain aspects, was critical. Though only a fraction of the terrorists operating in the state were apprehended in the Temple, it generated crucial structural transformations in the terrorist movement. After Black Thunder [II], and the macabre exposures relating to the activities of the extremists in the Temple, the movement for Khalistan could never recover the façade of religiosity that had attended it in its early years, and became increasingly and manifestly criminalized. Moreover, the Gurudwara as sanctuary and safe house for terrorists and their leaders ceased to exist. It had been shown to be uniquely vulnerable to a pattern of police action that would not agitate the devout, and would inevitably force the renegade into police custody. The damage done to the extremist cause was tremendous.
The most significant was the loss of the Golden Temple and the Gurudwaras as shield and sanctuary. Rape, extortion and murder had been the business of the terrorists from the very beginning of the movement; but in its initial phases, and right up to the Black Thunder [II] period, the top leadership was apparently distanced from these activities, concentrated as they were in the Golden Temple. Their depravity and vice in the hallowed place remained unknown to the larger mass of Sikhs; and while lesser terrorists were often seen to ‘stray from the path’, the highest motives could still be ascribed to the militant leadership.
Divested of the sanctuary of the Golden Temple and the Gurudwaras, the leadership was forced to live life as fugitives in the Punjab countryside; on the one hand, their own deeds exposed them, and on the other, the deeds of their followers compromised them even further, since they were now believed to be condoned, even encouraged, by these leaders.
I had assumed charge as Director General of Punjab Police less than three weeks before Operation Black Thunder [II]. After the successful execution of the operation, I found, under my command, a police force far from triumphant in this victory; deeply divided and demoralized; ill-equipped, organizationally, materially and mentally, to confront the larger challenge of eradicating terrorism from the entire state. I had been serving in the state, but for a brief interregnum (October 1985 to June 1986), since September 1984, in various capacities that gave me state-wide jurisdiction, and I was more than familiar with the difficulties encountered by the forces in Punjab. Specifically, the problems that required immediate redress, and the steps taken to tackle them – albeit gradually and in a process that was often frustrated by the lack of means and support from the political leadership …
The question as to whether the top Akali leaders – who were planning a march to Amritsar against the Golden Temple siege during Operation Black Thunder II – should be given curfew passes and allowed to enter the complex was seriously debated in Chandigarh and New Delhi by the concerned authorities. But the move was not accepted because it was termed as childish for the government to allow the Akali leaders to march to the Golden Temple Complex in the then-prevailing tense situation. A few days later, the government issued orders for Parkash Singh Badal’s detention.
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After Operation Black Thunder II provided some respite from the terrorist activities, the Centre summoned all Punjab high-ups to Delhi on 7 July 1988 to review the situation with the prime minister. During discussions, it was hinted that the time had come to give political content to the Punjab situation to solve the problem. It was decided to start the process before the next Parliament session and simultaneously to continue and intensify anti-terrorist measures.
Governor Ray asked all the leaders from Punjab, including those of the United Akali Dal (UAD), namely, Manjit Singh Calcutta and Shavinder Singh (who had met him on 30 June 1988), to publicly oppose Khalistan and condemn the terrorists. He told them that in case they did not heed his advice, he would not be able to report to the president that the UAD would follow the Constitution of India if it won a majority in case elections were held in Punjab. The outcome of his appeal would decide whether or not he should seek an extension of president’s rule after November 1988.
While giving his assessment of the Punjab situation as it then prevailed, Ray told me on 1 August 1988 that the time was not yet ripe for releasing the Jodhpur detainees (arrested after Operation Bluestar). Even if they were released, he felt that the killings would continue. Then he queried as to what would the government have in its hands to offer for a compromise after it was able to contain the deteriorating situation? He pointed out: ‘If the government eliminates the most dreaded terrorists Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, Avtar Singh, Wassan Singh Zaffarwal and three-fourths [of the] others, the hard-core militant body will collapse though sporadic killings will continue. If the government is able to sever the terrorists’ Pakistan connection, the situation could be controlled in a fortnight.’
In the stepped-up anti-terrorist operations, the police was committing excesses and many police officers were extorting money from the people. The Punjab Home Department compiled a report naming terrorists and police officers who had accumulated huge assets. But because of the extraordinary situation created by the terrorist violence, the government found itself helpless to take any action against the extortionists.
Police excesses also led to differences between Governor Ray and Ribeiro (who had been appointed his adviser). On 6 February 1989 Ribeiro handed over a note to the governor telling him that he did not agree with the policy of harassment of the common people by the police as he felt that, while dealing with the terrorists firmly, efforts should be made to win over those who could be. Ribeiro then observed: ‘I will wait till May 1989 to see if the policy yields positive results [but he felt it would not], otherwise I would like to quit. Although I am in charge of Home, I am not being taken into confidence on any matter. Even the Home Secretary has become irrelevant. He also has started expressing his disgruntlement to the Governor.’
Ribeiro’s grouse against police excesses on innocent people also found its echo in the Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports. Amnesty reported that, from 1983 to 1994, armed groups struggling to form an independent Sikh state (Khalistan) were responsible for widespread human rights violations, killing thousands of civilians and taking hostages. Amnesty also noted: ‘The police responded with a “crackdown”, illegally detaining, torturing and killing hundreds of young men.’
HRW declared that from the 1980s onwards, Sikh separatists were ‘guilty of serious human rights violations through massacre of civilians, attacks upon Hindu minorities in the state and indiscriminate bomb attacks in crowded places. The government’s response resulted in further serious human rights violations against tens of thousands’.
Amidst all these developments, the Akalis, encouraged by the reports about New Delhi’s proposal of giving political content to solve the Punjab problem, resumed discussing the issue of forging unity between the disparate Sikh groups. The move was initiated by Surjit Singh Barnala. He told me on 10 February 1989 that he had met Parkash Singh Badal in jail and had asserted that mistakes had been committed by both sides and that they should forget the past. Badal agreed with Barnala’s move for coming together and advocated ‘unity with all people’.
Along with giving political content to the Punjab situation, the Centre also decided to implement a time-bound Development and Economic Action Plan, which Ribeiro told me was depicted on a chart in New Delhi.
In early March 1989, Governor Ray met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and discussed the implementation of the Action Plan. During the discussion, Rajiv Gandhi pointed to a particular date and said this was the ‘silver lining’. He handed over a pen to Ray to draw the ‘silver lining’ on that date. Ray tried to do so, but the ink flow in the pen let him down. Rajiv Gandhi took the pen back and gave it a few jerks, after which the ink started flowing. He then drew a line, which slowly became silvery.
Ray then rang up his secretary, Y. S. Ratra, and asked him to bring a copy of the Action Plan so that he could put a silver lining on the date pointed out by Rajiv Gandhi. Ratra went a step further. He despatched his aides to buy two Japanese pens: one which could draw silver lines and the other golden lines!
The salient points of the Action Plan included the following:
Holding of panchayat elections was the last item on the Action Plan.
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Meanwhile, contacts were also being established with Badal, who was pursuing a moderate line, to try and make him reach some understanding with the Centre. Ray said that if the effort failed, the choice would be Simranjit Singh Mann (a former Indian Police Service officer) who was considered close to the militants.
The Centre’s strategy was focused how to win the maximum number of Lok Sabha seats for the Congress in Punjab in the general elections due towards the end of 1989. Learning a lesson from its defeat in Tamil Nadu,2 the opinion in the Congress’s Central leadership had veered round to the view to leave Punjab to the regional party in return for its support to the Congress in the Lok Sabha polls.
The Centre decided to shift Badal to a jail near Punjab and later release him. However, New Delhi decided not to set free Gurcharan Singh Tohra, labelling him as ‘mischievous’. It was feared that he could again disband the SGPC security force, which comprised policemen in plainclothes, and hand over the control of the Golden Temple to the militants.
Even as these developments signalled the beginning of the process of attaining normalization in troubled Punjab, the dark clouds over Afghanistan began casting their shadow on the state.
With military and financial support from the UK, the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and China, the Mujahideen had forced the Soviet occupation forces to withdraw from Afghanistan. The withdrawal, which started on 15 May 1988, was completed on 15 February 1989. This withdrawal was followed by the Taliban gaining control of Afghanistan.
In early 1989, while analysing the implications of the events in Afghanistan for India in my Indian Express column Currents and Undercurrents, I had expressed the apprehension that after becoming free from their engagement in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Army and the ISI would focus their attention on the full-scale revival of terrorism in Punjab. This would be at a time when the terrorists had suffered their latest setback due to Operation Black Thunder I and II and also due to the intensification of the anti-terrorist campaign by the Indian security forces.
My write-up also did not rule out the possibility of Pakistan sending the jihadis, now free from their Afghanistan ‘jihad’, to Jammu and Kashmir where the situation was acquiring explosive dimensions because of the escalating militant activities. Among those becoming active in Kashmir was the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). In 1987, it had set up its first training camp in Paktia province in north-eastern Afghanistan, which was followed by another centre in Kunar (also in north-eastern Afghanistan). But by the time the first large batch of militants ‘graduated’ from the Lashkar’s training camps, the Afghan jihad was already over. Hence the jihadis’ priority was (what they claimed) ‘to get Jammu and Kashmir free from Indian occupation’. This signalled the beginning of the infiltration of Pakistan-trained jihadis into Jammu and Kashmir.
A day after the publication of my column in the Chandigarh edition of the Indian Express, the newspaper’s Delhi edition, which had earlier never carried my column, published it as its front page bottom-spread write-up. My friend, the late Prem Kumar (then resident editor of the Chandigarh edition), later told me that Arun Shourie – who had been persuaded by Ramnath Goenka (RNG), the proprietor, to rejoin the Indian Express in 1987 as its executive editor – had taken exception to my write-up as it was ‘perhaps thought to be beyond the jurisdiction of the paper’s Chandigarh-based staffer to write on foreign events’. (Shourie later went on to become a Union minister in 1998.) Taking Shourie’s reported reprimand in my stride, I told Prem Kumar ‘only the future would tell whether [or not] my perception is correct’.
As I had foreseen in my write-up, the Pakistani Army and the ISI, which were now free from their engagements in Afghanistan, revived their full-scale backing to the Punjab terrorists, leading to more innocent people being killed. The ISI also started infiltrating armed militants into Punjab on a larger scale. On 20 July 1989, the Punjab police caught nine youths who had crossed over from Pakistan. Seven were later shot dead; the other two revealed that they had been trained in a Pakistan camp along with 52 more terrorists. Another alarming factor was that the weapons being brought in by the infiltrating terrorists included Russian-made AK-94 rifles, rocket launchers and LMGs (light machine guns).
The government was expecting further escalation in extremist activities in Punjab as the Lok Sabha elections neared; they were eventually held in end November 1989. The State Law and Order Advisory Committee also expected the ding-dong battle with the militants to continue. The committee pointed out that terrorists were being killed, but it feared that the police harassment of innocent people would have an adverse impact on the anti-terrorist operations.
Issues such as the harassment by the police of the common people and the indulgence in corruption by some police officers, who wanted lucrative postings, started widening the differences between Governor Ray and Ribeiro.
When I met him on 1 August 1989, Ribeiro told me that he was unhappy because he was being isolated from the decision-making processes although law and order were supposed to be his charge. As he put it: ‘I was not called to the three of the four meetings P. Chidambaram [then a Union minister of state who went on to hold several important portfolios over the years] held last week with senior police officers from all over state.’ Ribeiro added that he was summoned only to the fourth meeting, to which TV crews had also been called. Ribeiro expressed his resentment thus: ‘They wanted to show me with them to tell people that I am with them in all their decisions. I read most of the news about law and order [only] in the newspapers. Why should I stay here when I am not needed?’
Ribeiro then told Governor Ray that he wanted to quit his post and leave Punjab. Ray, however, categorically informed him that he could not be relieved till the Lok Sabha elections were over. Ribeiro’s impression was that he was not being allowed to quit as the powers that be feared that such a move would have an adverse reaction in the rest of the country and also because it would adversely affect the electoral prospects of the ruling party (the Congress).
Ribeiro was tipped to become a governor, but that did not happen. However, in late 1989, he was appointed India’s ambassador to Romania. Like the 1986 attempt on his life inside the Punjab police headquarters at Jalandhar (in which he and his wife Melba Ribeiro were injured), he was also wounded in an assassination attempt at Bucharest (the capital of Romania) in August 1991 by gunmen identified as Punjabi Sikhs.
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As expected, there was an escalation of terrorist violence in the run-up to the Lok Sabha polls. Pakistan upgraded its qualitative and quantitative support to Punjab’s militant leaders (to whom it had provided shelter) and with the ISI’s help, it was sending trained Sikh militants into Indian Punjab for carrying out terrorist attacks, which invariably resulted in large-scale casualties.
Simultaneously, efforts were made by Islamabad to prop up separatist sentiments using religion as a tool. The Punjab state government and the non-Akali parties were worried over the reports of gurdwaras being built in the areas bordering Pakistan. ‘Bhog’ ceremonies for the killed terrorists were also being held in these areas, where even some Akali leaders paid tributes to them. (A Bhog ceremony usually entails a non-continuous reading of the complete Guru Granth Sahib in memory of the deceased.)
The alarming situation that was again developing in Punjab after Operation Black Thunder II prompted the Centre to explore various options that could change the course of events in the troubled state. Among the proposals discussed were holding of Assembly elections, the formation of an Akali—Congress coalition government, extending president’s rule for another six months and the adoption of tougher measures against terrorists and fundamentalists who were using religion to fan separatist sentiments.
When I met him on 29 September 1989 at Chandigarh, Governor Ray told me that ‘the best solution for Punjab will be an Akali—Congress coalition. The Assembly elections are expected to be held before 11 May 1990, most probably in March-April before the harvesting of the Rabi crops starts. I have already told the [Union] Home Ministry that president’s rule has started paying diminishing returns. But it will have to be extended for the last term of six months as the Punjab Assembly elections, if held along with the November 1989 Lok Sabha elections, will not provide a stable government in Punjab. For stability in the state, president’s rule has to be extended. I will send a formal recommendation to the President [of India] a week before the expiry of the present term on 11 November 1989. If Rajiv Gandhi does not return to power after the Lok Sabha elections, it will not be good for India. I will then immediately quit. [Even] otherwise, I do not want to return to active politics.’
And when Rajiv Gandhi did not return to power after the Congress’ defeat in the November 1989 Lok Sabha elections, Ray, who had taken over as Punjab governor on 2 April 1986, quit on 8 December 1989. (Meanwhile, on 2 December 1989, Vishwanath Pratap Singh of the Janata Dal had been sworn in as prime minister.)
As New Delhi was exploring the options to deal with the Punjab situation amidst the worsening security scenario, the Akali leaders also began thinking about the course of action they should follow, given the fast-paced events in the state. They were divided on matters such as the extension of president’s rule, the composition of the government, if formed before the elections (the Punjab Assembly was in a state of suspended animation) and whether the Akali Dal should fight the elections, if held. There were also conflicting views in the government about the attitude it should adopt towards militants, particularly on the issue of elections.
On 13 October 1989, Balwant Singh, in a conversation with me, claimed that Parkash Singh Badal was recently released from jail after a formula had been worked out with the Centre that he would be the chief minister and the suspended animation of the Assembly would be revoked. Surjit Singh Barnala was to be appointed as a governor and Balwant Singh (who was finance minister in the Barnala Government) was also to be included in Badal’s cabinet.
Balwant Singh was sounded out on the formula only 10 days before the release of Badal, who was asked not to make any public statement on being set free. However, according to information received by the Centre, after Badal was threatened by Gurbachan Singh Manochahal (at Chhatbir near Chandigarh) and later by Wassan Singh Zaffarwal (both dreaded terrorists) that if he continued to follow his moderate political line both he and his family would be liquidated, he (Badal) began adopting a hard line.
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1 Gill remained in this post up to December 1990. He was reappointed to the same post in November 1991 and continued up to December 1995. Arjun Singh (a former governor of Punjab) in his autobiography has stated: ‘He [Gill] was totally uncompromising when it came to punctuality and discipline among the policemen. On one occasion, he was planning to organize a search-and-raid operation and had asked for 17 companies of the police to converge at a particular place at 4.30 a.m. One inspector happened to come a few minutes late, and he was subjected to a tongue-lashing from Gill, who did not hesitate to use the choicest expletives! Gill … did not want red tape to hamper his mission. He wanted to directly communicate with the Union home minister or the prime minister so that decisions could be taken as expeditiously as possible. He thus ensured that he could obtain all the weapons, equipment and personnel that he wanted.’ (See A Grain of Sand in the Hourglass of Time, Hay House Publishers India, New Delhi, 2012, p. 204.)
2In the January 1989 Tamil Nadu Assembly polls, it was the regional party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) led by M. Karunanidhi, that had emerged victorious; the Congress had lagged far behind.