In summer 1967, the two most important places in Daoxian were the No. 2 High School, where the Revolutionary Alliance had its headquarters, and Yingjiang, where the Red Alliance established its headquarters after retreating to the countryside. Almost all the key incidents in the massacre are somehow related to one of these two places.
The Red Alliance called a meeting of People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD) cadres at Yingjiang on August 15, 1967. As the cadres ate watermelon beside a pond in the cool of the moonlight, District 6 PAFD commander Zheng Youzhi described the August 8 gun-snatching incident and other “counter- revolutionary crimes” by the Revolutionary Alliance, drawing intense indignation from those in attendance. A plan was formulated to prevent the Revolutionary Alliance from establishing contacts in the countryside and organizing an insurrection by class enemies: (1) each commune should transfer 20 militiamen to Yingjiang for verbal attack and armed defense, (2) they must establish and consolidate rural base areas and follow the path of “the villages surrounding the cities and ultimately scoring a victory,” and (3) every district had to organize militia and set up sentry posts, with Qingxi District responsible for the waterways, Simaqiao District responsible for roads to the Xiangyuan tin mine, Chetou District responsible for the Lingdao Highway, and Shouyan District responsible for the roads toward Guangxi. The cadres also discussed a preliminary plan for removing the Revolutionary Alliance headquarters from the No. 2 High School, and while discussing stronger supervision of black elements, Zheng Youzhi said, “Several troublemakers among the black elements can be done away with.”
After presiding over the killing-mobilization meeting at Qingtang on August 17, Zheng Youzhi rushed back to Yingjiang to set up the Yingjiang Frontline Command Post. Following the evening meal on August 18, 1967, Zheng Youzhi, District 2 PAFD commander Zhong Changyou, District 4 PAFD commander Liao Mingzhong, Red Alliance political commissar He Xia, and Red Alliance commander Zhang Mingchi strolled over to a fallow field in the Baiditou production brigade to discuss the arrangements.
By then the sun was sinking behind the mountains with a scarlet glow, but it was the busy season of rush planting and harvesting, so farmers could still be seen laboring in the fields. Zheng Youzhi said, “Call everyone in for a short meeting to organize militias, strengthen leadership, unify command, and prepare for the establishment of a battle command organ. … We’re at the frontline, so we can call it the Frontline Command Post. Do you all agree?”
With the others expressing their support, Zheng Youzhi moved on to who should man the command post. Zhong Changyou proposed Zheng Youzhi as commander and He Xia as political commissar.
Zheng Youzhi said, “Comrade He Xia has other important tasks at this time—he’s preparing to go to Beijing to file a complaint, so it would be better for Zhong to serve as political commissar. Liao, are you prepared to take on the responsibility of deputy commander?”
Liao Mingzhong said, “I have to hurry back to district headquarters tomorrow. I’ve been neglecting my duties there, and I can’t take any more time away.”
Zhong Changyou said, “Fuck that! We have to focus on the big picture now. Who cares about petty matters in the districts when the situation of class struggle is so grim?”
Zheng Youzhi agreed: “What’s the use of going back? If the Revolutionary Alliance overthrows the government, everything’s finished.”
Zhang Mingchi joined in: “Commander Liao, take up this responsibility. We’ll all support you.”
At this, Liao Mingzhong grudgingly agreed, with He Xia put forward as deputy political commissar. Zhang Mingchi, a cadre in the county goods-and-materials office, was recommended as logistics head, and he immediately declared, “I pledge to supply you with whatever you need!”
Once the most important leadership positions were decided, other matters were quickly dealt with, and Zheng Youzhi said, “Call in the Red Alliance leaders and PAFD cadres tonight to unify everyone’s thinking, and tomorrow we’ll hold our inaugural meeting.”
Around eight o’clock that night, Yingjiang’s Red Alliance leaders and PAFD cadres gathered at the Yingjiang seed multiplication farm. Zheng Youzhi announced the establishment of the “frontline command post” as the supreme power organ as well as the decision to organize two armed militia companies and one independent platoon: “After this meeting, all actions will be under the direction of the command post.”
Early the next morning (August 19), Zheng Youzhi had just gotten out of bed when he received a telephone call from Zhou Renbiao in Qingtang District: “Commander Zheng, I have good news to report. The poor and lower-middle peasants of the Liaojia brigade have started taking action, and they killed six bad guys last night.”
Upon hearing this, Zheng Youzhi cried out, “That’s wonderful! Comrade Renbiao, I have good news for you, too. We established the Yingjiang Frontline Command Post today, so the poor and lower-middle peasants of the Liaojia brigade have honored the command post’s establishment with a valuable gift!”
After breakfast, Zhong Changyou presided over a militia rally during which the Frontline Command Post was declared formally established. Zheng Youzhi gave the “keynote speech,” and he and others greatly exaggerated the so-called enemy situation of class struggle, describing the killings at Yangjia Commune and the Liaojia brigade as “revolutionary actions by the poor and lower-middle peasants” and as “the gold standard for who is revolutionary and counterrevolutionary.”
A special Red Frontline Politics and Law Headquarters was also established to set up blockades and arrest “suspicious persons” as well as to investigate and interrogate “ringleaders of counterrevolutionary organizations” sent up from the districts and communes. The Politics and Law Headquarters was staffed full-time by county cadres Yao Yuesong, Li Xianzhong, and He Rongsheng, whom local people referred to as the first, second, and third “presiding judges.” Several storerooms in Yingjiang’s seed multiplication farm were converted into prison cells, and 62 people were taken into custody and interrogated by the Politics and Law Headquarters. (Twenty were still detained there when the Frontline Command Post later evacuated Yingjiang, and some were killed after the Red Alliance notified their brigades to bring them back.)
After this inaugural meeting, Zheng Youzhi and the others quickly created and hung a 3-meter-long banner for the “Red Alliance Frontline Command Post.”1
On the day that the Frontline Command Post was established, county seize-and-push group head and PAFD commander Cui Baoshu made a special trip from the county headquarters to inspect Yingjiang. As Zheng Youzhi and He Xia reported to Cui on their work, the discussion turned to the killings in the countryside. Quoting Mao, Commander Cui instructed them: “Political power comes from the barrel of a gun. Daoxian’s problems arose mainly from gun barrels, so killing a few black elements is a small matter. Once the Military District leaders and 47th Army representatives arrive and seize all the guns, everything will be easier.”
On that same day, the vice chairman of the county federation of trade unions made a special trip to report to county Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary Xiong Bing’en on killings in the countryside: “Secretary Xiong, down in the villages they’ve put up blockades everywhere, and in some places they’ve started killing people. Everyone’s terrified. Why doesn’t the county party committee step forward and put a stop to it?”
Xiong Bing’en said, “Cadres have all run off, the PAFD’s guns have been snatched, and the public-security, procuratorial, and judicial organs have all been disbanded. Who’s going to listen to me?”
Xiong had taken a different tack, however, when Red Alliance heads He Xia and Zhang Mingchi had asked for his comments, saying, “This time the masses have truly been mobilized, and the poor and lower-middle peasants have the clearest understanding of who is good and who is bad.”
Leaders of the Red Alliance’s Yingjiang Frontline Command Post
| Name | Command Post position | Official position |
| Zheng Youzhi | Commander | PAFD commander, Qingtang District (6) |
| Zhong Changyou | Political commissar | PAFD commander, Chetou District (2) |
| Liu Houshan | Deputy commander | PAFD commander, Shangguan District (1) |
| Liao Mingzhong | Deputy commander | PAFD commander, Qiaotou District (4) |
| He Xia | Deputy political commissar | County CCP committee agricultural department |
| Wang Xianzhi | Deputy political commissar | PAFD commander, Xianzijiao District (5) |
| Huang Tao | Chief of staff | County public-security bureau cadre |
| Zhang Mingchi | Logistics department head | County goods-and-materials office cadre |
The Yingjiang Commune seed multiplication farm where the Red Alliance’s Yingjiang Frontline Command Post was situated was rather impressive. The compound had a two-story building at its main entrance flanked by a row of red-brick, one-story houses on each side, with an open area about the size of a soccer field in the middle. In this compound and two hamlets that surrounded and protected it, nearly 1,000 militiamen had amassed from various districts and communes to form two militia companies and one platoon. They wore an assortment of garb with leather belts or sashes tied around their waists, and they carried various types of weapons: core militiamen carried rifles, while rank-and-file militia carried fowling pieces, sabers, or spears. The most impressive were those wearing yellow military uniforms, most of whom were army veterans and served as the backbone of the militia. All were united by the common goal of earning revolutionary work points from their work teams in addition to subsidized food supplies.
Zheng Youzhi and the others also arranged for specialized personnel to manufacture homemade cannons and hand grenades at Dapingpu Farm. They succeeded in producing a cannon that could fire about 1,000 meters, but it wasn’t very accurate or deadly. Production of hand grenades was halted after an explosion killed someone.
The command post was headquartered in a crude and simple upstairs committee room, where Commander Zheng Youzhi and the other leaders handled factional battles with the Revolutionary Alliance as well as directing class struggle in the county’s villages and establishing a strong base area. It was hard work, and Zheng Youzhi was so absorbed in it that his eyes were bloodshot from days and nights of endless toil.
Especially given their location only 2 kilometers from the No. 2 High School, the Frontline Command Post needed to be on guard against surprise attacks from the Revolutionary Alliance’s “flying tiger brigades.” After experiencing the rapacious cunning of those “desperados” on August 13, Zheng Youzhi and the others were sleeping with their guns under their pillows. Open and covert sentry posts were set up along the small bridge and highway in front of the headquarters. Once night fell, the silence was broken by shouted calls for passwords, raising barking from nearby dogs and making Red Alliance members so tense that their temples throbbed. Not until the barking receded and silence gradually returned did their hearts drop back down from their throats.
On August 21, the deputy commander of the Lingling Military Subdistrict, Zhao Erchang, accompanied by county PAFD commander Cui Baoshu and political commissar Liu Shibin, arrived travel-worn and weary at the Yingjiang Red Alliance Frontline Command Post. Due to conditions at the time, Zhao had taken the long route via Ningyuan rather than the direct route through Daojiang in an effort to avoid the Revolutionary Alliance. Readers may find it baffling that a powerful military subdistrict commander was afraid of a mass organization in a small county town. But please keep in mind that this occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Throughout the country, CCP and government organs were in a state of paralysis or even stripped of their power, but the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) apparatus was still solid as a rock and had taken on the heavy responsibility of simultaneously “supporting the Left” and stabilizing public order. The crux of the problem was the term “support the Left.”
Although the PLA enjoyed the highest possible prestige, the local armed forces of the Hunan Provincial Military District (including subsidiary organs such as the Lingling Military Subdistrict and the Daoxian PAFD) were by now in an awkward position. The central government’s reversals over which factions it supported (described in chapter 3) had resulted in the Central Military Commission sending a cable on July 27, 1967, to the field army in Hunan, the 47th Army, directing it to take over “Support the Left” work from the provincial military district, and provincial military district commander Long Shujin had carried out a “profound self-criticism” before the Central Committee on July 31. The Central Cultural Revolution Small Group’s “August 10 Decision” criticizing the Hunan Provincial Military District for line errors on the “Support the Left” issue had also implicated the Lingling Military Subdistrict and the Daoxian PAFD—that is to say, they’d supported the wrong “Left” and now had to turn tail. But how easy was that in reality? There were myriad connections, and things couldn’t be clarified in two or three words.
That was why Deputy Commander Zhao and his party skirted the political hot seat of Daojiang and arrived in Yingjiang bronzed from traversing dozens of kilometers of mountain roads under the broiling sun. A local peasant who saw them at the time remembers clucking his tongue and thinking, “Deputy Commander Zhao is really something! Such a senior official, and here he is on such a hot day, walking on his own two feet, covered in sweat, but in full uniform and with his insignia all in order.”
As soon as he sat down, Deputy Commander Zhao didn’t even bother to mop the sweat from his brow before calling in the district PAFD commanders and leaders of the Red Alliance’s Yingjiang Frontline Command Post to report on the situation. Some 30 people were crammed into the little conference room. There were no air conditioners back then, and even electric fans were considered bourgeois luxuries, so the conference room was stifling. Deputy Commander Zhao was wearing a polyester uniform and a military hat, his hook-and-eye clasps all fastened tight, and he sat bolt upright looking straight ahead. Zheng Youzhi and the other PAFD commanders were dressed in more-casual rural garb, and when they saw Zhao, they busied themselves with tidying their appearance.
Zheng Youzhi reported first, indignantly condemning the “heinous crimes” he’d learned about while making the rounds of the districts: “Class struggle in Daoxian’s villages is very complicated right now… . In Yangjia Commune’s Zhengjia production brigade, the counterrevolutionary Anti-Communist National Salvation Army led by the mistress of puppet county head Zheng Yuanzan has grown to more than 3,000 members. She’s commanding black elements in an assault against the production brigade’s public-security head. In Gongba Commune, some black elements have been holding secret meetings to form a counterrevolutionary New People’s National Salvation Corps. In District 6 [Yueyan District], the landlord Jiang Weizhu2 has a radio transceiver, and she herself is the dispatcher, drawing funding from a secret agent with the code name ‘609’ in Lengshuitan. They’re preparing to attack the arsenal in Dazishan, Hubei Province, and mount a military insurrection. Some 200 to 400 bandits are holed up in the mountains on the border of Yangjia Commune and Ningyuan County and are planning to kill our party members, cadres, and poor and lower-middle peasants. These bandits killed six children from Xinche Commune who were grazing cattle in the hills.” (According to the Task Force’s subsequent investigations, not a single one of these stories was true.)
Before Zheng Youzhi could finish his report, Zhong Changyou cut in: “In our Chetou District, black elements in Jiaping Commune have staged a revolt and seized the militia’s weapons, and at least 100 black-element bandits are hiding in the hills behind Xiganqiao. …”
Unfamiliar with local conditions, Deputy Commander Zhao and the other military men were shocked by the reports, their faces expressing bitter hatred of the common enemy.
Zheng Youzhi continued: “Now the poor peasants have mobilized and have organized militia to enhance surveillance over black elements. In some places, class enemies have also been killed.”
Deputy Commander Zhao asked, “How many have been killed?”
Zheng Youzhi replied, “Maybe a hundred or so.”
Deputy Commander Zhao said, “You need to give us an accurate count.”
Zhou Renbiao took his turn to report, and apart from relating how he had “uncovered” the reactionary operations of two counterrevolutionary organizations, he added some new content: “These two counterrevolutionary organizations are in contact with the No. 2 High School. They want to overthrow the government, carry out a counterrevolutionary coup d’état, and kill the poor and lower-middle peasants. Poor peasants in the villages have risen up and killed a bunch of class enemies.”
At this point, someone interrupted: “Not everyone agrees with the killings in the villages.”
Zheng Youzhi stood up and retorted: “The poor peasants were right to kill those class enemies! It’s an expression of the class consciousness of poor and lower-middle peasants, and this is a good thing, not bad! We should support the revolutionary actions of the poor peasants. Better a thousand wrongful killings than even one poor or lower-middle peasant being killed.”
Deputy Commander Zhao said, “With class enemies in the villages rising up in insurrection to kill poor peasants, if poor peasants rise up and kill class enemies, this is what comrade Jiang Qing calls ‘verbal attack and armed defense.’ The PAFD’s guns have been seized, the political and legal departments are in disarray, and black elements are trying to overthrow the government. I understand the hatred of the poor peasants toward black elements; I myself am from a poor family, and I resolutely side with the poor and lower-middle peasants.”
When the reporting ended, Deputy Commander Zhao said, “Your reports and suggestions are excellent and have helped us understand the actual situation in Daoxian. We’ll take this back and report it to the 47th Army so the problems in Daoxian can be resolved as quickly as possible. On the basis of the current situation, you’ll need to enhance surveillance over black elements and must quickly assemble the manpower to unearth counterrevolutionary organizations, collect solid data, and resolutely attack them.”
Zheng Youzhi took this opportunity to request weapons. Zhao replied, “We can supply arms only under orders from the upper level.”
After the Yingjiang reporting meeting adjourned around three o’clock that afternoon, Zheng Youzhi convened a joint conference of PAFD commanders at the Baiditou production brigade. This small-scale inner circle meeting was attended by just eight people: Red Alliance commander Zheng Youzhi; district PAFD commanders Zhong Changyou (Chetou), Liao Mingzhong (Qiaotou), Liu Houshan (Shangguan), Liu Fuxi (Simaqiao), Jiang Youyuan (Qingxi), and Yang Yansheng (Gongba); and the commander of the Yingjiang Commune PAFD, Peng Zhongqiu. The meeting passed an important resolution to prepare to exterminate the Revolutionary Alliance if the 47th Army didn’t take measures to eliminate it. Each district selected 60 of its best army veterans to assemble at District 1’s Zhengjia brigade on the evening of August 23 to await orders. Liu Houshan held overall responsibility, his assignment being to hold the highway to Ningyuan and the Xiangyuan tin mine, cutting off the Revolutionary Alliance’s land and water access in a unified action that would close in on the No. 2 High School from both sides and obliterate the “Revolutionary Bandits.” In addition, with the entire county’s militia and masses mobilized not to deliver their grain taxes or go to town to sell vegetables, they would see how long the “Revolutionary Alliance bandits” could maintain their stubborn resistance. After the people’s militias were organized, they could be fed with the grain meant for agricultural tax wherever they were stationed.
The joint conference adjourned around six o’clock, and on the road back, Zheng Youzhi inquired about the killing of black elements in each district. Liu Houshan, Jiang Youyuan, and Yang Yansheng all said they were unaware of any killings in their districts. Liu Fuxi reported “seven or eight” killed in Yangjia, while Zhong Changyou said one had been killed in Meihua, and Liao Mingzhong reported one “struggled to death” in Qiaotou. Zheng Youzhi said, “In our district’s Liaojia brigade, six were done away with in one night. In Wuhan and Changsha many have been killed in armed conflict, and what’s done is done. Commander Cui [Baoshu] said that what matters now is to solve the problem of the Revolutionary Alliance; once this problem is taken care of, all the other problems will be easy to handle.”
Meanwhile, after returning to Lingling, Deputy Commander Zhao carried out no further inquiries to confirm the reports he’d been given in Yingjiang but summarized them in a “Cable on the Social Situation” that he sent to the 47th Army. After adding some editorial comments, the 47th Army transmitted this cable down its ranks and then to every district and commune in Daoxian. I was fortunate enough to obtain a copy of this cable:
According to various partially verified reports, Daoxian’s black elements have recently engaged in aggressive activity, distributing reactionary leaflets, killing poor and lower-middle peasants, retaliating to settle old scores, organizing counterrevolutionary organizations, and plotting insurrection. With the county PAFD and public-security organs paralyzed, the poor and lower-middle peasants are in fear of a government overthrow by black elements, and some have proactively taken action. According to incomplete figures, since the end of July, and especially since August 22, they have killed a total of 207 black elements (including a minority of black-element offspring) with fowling pieces, hoes, and carrying poles, and the situation is similar in other localities. We maintain that apart from dealing with killers and the most evil, aggressive, and rebellious of the black elements in accordance with law, black elements should not be indiscriminately killed. Black-element offspring should not be regarded as black elements, and in accordance with policy should be unified3 and educated. The boundary between those who are and are not the targets of dictatorship cannot be blurred; this is the only way to win over the offspring of black elements. …
In its comment on the “Cable on the Social Situation,” the 47th Army stated:
The Central Cultural Revolution Small Group transmits the Lingling Military Subdistrict’s report on black-element activities in Daoxian. Pay strict attention to the activities of black elements, but peasants must be advised to proceed in accordance with policy (August 26, 1967).
It is claimed that this “Cable on the Social Situation” entailed genuine investigation, since the Lingling Military Subdistrict had already sent a joint investigation group to Daoxian and other counties on August 19 to investigate the killings. The 18-member group that went to Daoxian, led by company commander Liang of the 6952 Unit, carried out eight days of on-the-spot inquiries in Shouyan, Yangjia, Gongba, Shangguan, Qingtang, and other localities. What remains a mystery is why the results of the inquiry diverged so greatly from reality. Furthermore, why were only 43 people (0.96 percent of the total) killed before the investigation group arrived, while 1,488 people (one-third of the total) were killed while the investigation group was in Daoxian from August 19 to 26?
In fact, the “partially verified reports” in this cable were subsequently found to be completely unsubstantiated. Yet, through this cable, gossip and even intentionally manufactured rumors became part of an official document transmitted to Daoxian’s base-level political organs, turning fiction into “ironclad evidence of an overthrow by class enemies” and even a basis for inciting or implementing killings. When we were carrying out interviews in Daoxian, many of those responsible for the killings spoke of this “Cable on the Social Situation” as the source of the “killing wind.” They said, “The ‘Cable on the Social Situation’ fueled the flames of the killing wind at that time. When the poor and lower-middle peasants read this cable, they believed that black elements had actually mounted an insurrection and had become bandits in the mountains. They were in a panic and killed black elements without distinguishing black from white.”
After reporting in Yingjiang, Zhou Renbiao told a three-level cadre conference in Qingtang District the next day that “Yesterday I reported to Deputy Commander Zhao on our class struggle in District 6 and the rising up of the masses to kill black elements, and Deputy Commander Zhao praised me. This has bolstered my confidence.”
I compiled my record of this incident on the basis of the Task Force’s records and from interviews with many people who were discreet yet very sincere. Even so, I must say that I still feel some apprehension regarding to what extent it reflects the original situation. Regarding what those who reported or accepted the reports actually did or directed at that time may be a matter of selective memory on the part of some of those involved at the time. Some people, facing irrefutable evidence that comes to light, still gritted their teeth and refused to admit their errors, greatly impeding the Task Force’s efforts, and I had even less recourse. Some informed sources said these people had “engaged in a lot of activity behind the scenes” and wanted to use human blood to “call out the Left,” but lacking proof, I have no right to publish such allegations as fact.
Deputy Commander Zhao’s main purpose in visiting Yingjiang was to gain an understanding of the situation and to end the violence. Yet statistics reveal this reality: August 21, 1967, was in fact a great leap forward for the Daoxian massacre. The report that the Task Force ultimately submitted to the Lingling prefectural CCP committee and Hunan provincial CCP committee divided the massacre into four phases:
The first phase was August 13–20, 1967, and was mainly manifested in the form of scattered and spontaneous killings. This initial eight-day phase resulted in 81 deaths, or 1.8 percent of the total, and involved only Shouyan, Simaqiao, and Qingtang Districts.
The second phase was August 21–25, and during this phase a countywide upsurge of killings emerged. Killing-mobilization meetings were held in various forms in most districts and communes. During those five days, 807 people were killed, composing 17.9 percent of the total, and only a minority of the county’s communes had no killings.
The third phase was August 26–30, and mass killings occurred in many localities for the purpose of “catching up” or “evening out,” creating a new upsurge of violence. During this phase, killings were carried out according to the guideline of “no random killings” and “killing one or two of the most heinous criminals.” In those five days, 2,454 people were killed, composing 54.5 percent of the total, and killings occurred in every one of the county’s 37 communes.
The fourth phase was from August 31 to October 17. This was the period when the killing wind was curbed and began to subside. In these 48 days, 1,177 people were killed (many of them driven to suicide), composing 25.8 percent of the total.
Each of these phases has a symbolic incident:
(1)the August 8 gun-snatching incident;
(2)the August 21 Yingjiang reporting meeting;
(3)the August 26 Yingjiang political and legal work conference;
(4)the August 29 stationing of the 47th Army’s 6950 Unit in Daoxian.
The facts make it clear that August 21 was a key date in the massacre, and that from this day forward, Daoxian’s killing wind swept rapidly through the county in the form of organized and large-scale killings. Not only did the number of killings increase radically, but the previous situation, in which some kind of accusation had to be fabricated against those who were killed, changed into one in which people could be killed arbitrarily and for no reason whatsoever. What exactly happened that day? It’s a matter deserving further thought.
A report the Task Force wrote for the county CCP committee and prefectural CCP committee clearly outlines the key role that the Red Alliance and its Yingjiang Frontline Command Post played in igniting, agitating, and orchestrating Daoxian’s killing wind:
A minority of Red Alliance leaders (including some cadres who supported them) fought factional wars and engaged in violent clashes with the Revolutionary Alliance on the one hand, while on the other hand spurring on the “random killing wind” in the villages through a range of activities.
The first activity was creating public opinion in favor of killings.
The second activity was actually mobilizing and engineering the killings. All the killing-mobilization meetings held in the districts and communes were carried out by Red Alliance leaders and the cadres who sided with them, and the Red Alliance headquarters and frontline command post leaders all took part in these activities. …
From August 26 to 28, the Red Alliance called a meeting of the county’s uniformed political and legal cadres, ostensibly to stop the killings, but it actually served as a further step in mobilizing killings. …
The third activity was organizing the people’s militia to control the villages throughout the county. … All districts and communes in the county assembled militia and established “command posts,” “militia barracks,” and “self-defense corps,” withdrawing people from production to man sentry posts and checkpoints to block, intercept, search, and investigate people and vehicles as they came and went. …
The fourth activity was that the Red Alliance arranged a unified solution for funding and feeding the militia and providing the districts and communes with explosives, covering their costs with public funds and grain collected for state tax. When some districts and communes questioned this practice, the Red Alliance leaders said, “This is not the time to think about a little money or grain; the Revolutionary Alliance wants to stage a counterrevolutionary coup d’état. We’ll eat first and resolve this later.”
The fifth activity was to establish and strengthen peasant associations throughout the county. On August 11–17 and 30, the Red Alliance convened two meetings of the county congress of poor and lower-middle peasants and its standing committee to organize the poor and lower-middle peasants to take part in the “random killing wind.” Many districts, communes, and production brigades established poor and lower-middle peasant associations (PPAs), and in many places, the trials for killing people were run by the heads of PPAs. …
The sixth activity was organizing specialists to interrogate members of so-called counterrevolutionary organizations. In the latter half of August, the frontline command post arranged for members of so-called counterrevolutionary organizations in all districts and communes to be sent to Yingjiang. … Most of the people who underwent interrogation were killed after their release. …
The seventh activity was carrying out upward and downward liaison work. In mid-August, after the Red Alliance withdrew to the countryside, it left three people in the county seat to carry out liaison work: Tang Mingzhi acted in the name of the Daoxian Red Guard Headquarters, while Liu Changlin and Wang Enchang acted in the name of peasant associations, regularly telephoning districts and communes to gain an understanding of developments and to collect statistics on the number of people killed, to share information on major situations throughout the county, and to communicate the views of the Daoxian Red Alliance Headquarters. …
Given the key role of the Yingjiang Frontline Command Post, this is a good time to describe the event that marked the third stage of the massacre, the Yingjiang Political and Legal Work Conference. Because the massacres continued over a period of weeks in most districts, understanding this event is essential to comprehending the progress of the killings in each locality.
The escalating violence in Daoxian had intense repercussions not only on the county, but also on Hunan Province and even throughout China, and not only through the spread of violence to surrounding counties and cities, but also in the intense resistance it began to engender. The circumstances of the killings (truth mixed with fiction) were passed along through private, military, and government channels to the provincial capital of Changsha, and from there to Beijing, arousing considerable concern and cautious attempts to arrest the progress of the killings. Around this time, both the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Group and the 47th Army’s Support-the-Left Group made numerous telephone calls to the Lingling Military Subdistrict and the Daoxian PAFD Headquarters inquiring about the killings.
Yet, Daoxian’s killing wind continued to rip through the county’s charming scenery like a plague that killed wherever it landed. The targets of the killings expanded from black elements and their offspring to anyone with “historical issues” or even people who were merely the subject of personal grudges or differences of opinion. People lived in dread of the next meeting that would send a new batch of corpses drifting down the Xiaoshui River. As the threat spread like a prairie fire, banners emblazoned with the slogan “Exterminate the Seven Black Categories” began appearing at Hunan University and other institutions of higher learning.
On the afternoon of August 26, 1967, the county PAFD’s political commissar, Liu Shibin, rushed to Yingjiang with a copy of the 47th Army’s “Cable on the Social Situation” and told Zheng Youzhi to quickly pass it on. Zheng Youzhi immediately notified all districts and communes of a three-day conference for political and legal cadres to be held in Yingjiang starting on August 27 for the purpose of transmitting the “Cable on the Social Situation” and discussing how to end the indiscriminate killing. On that evening, a telephone conference for district and commune seize-and-push group heads was also held to communicate the content of the cable.
Yet this meeting, ostensibly called to end the indiscriminate killing, turned into a killing-mobilization meeting that led to a new upsurge of violence. A comrade from the Task Force described to us how this paradoxical phenomenon came about:
The guiding ideology of the meeting that the Yingjiang Frontline Command Post called at Yingjiang Commune for the PSB [public-security bureau] duty officers and PAFD commanders of each district [the Yingjiang Political and Legal Work Conference] was that “indiscriminate killing is forbidden” and “in the case of heinous crimes, one or two can be killed,” but the emphasis was still on the word “kill.” During the meeting, there was a lot of talk about the gravity of class struggle and the sabotage being carried out by class enemies, and confessions forced from people through the use of torture racks, chili water, and branding irons were used to greatly exaggerate the existence of so-called counterrevolutionary organizations. Frontline Command Post commander Zheng Youzhi, Red Alliance commander Zhang Mingchi, and political commissar He Xia all gave speeches on the so-called current situation, the problem of the Revolutionary Alliance, and their views on the killings in the countryside. Some comrades effusively praised the random killing of innocent people as the revolutionary actions of the poor and lower-middle peasants. Some raised the killings to a theoretical level, saying they were “supplemental lessons in democratic revolution” and calling for everyone to seriously study Chairman Mao’s Investigative Report on the Hunan Peasant Movement to enhance their ideological awareness.4
At the meeting, Zheng Youzhi said, “This has made Daoxian famous; even the Central Committee knows who we are. The Central Cultural Revolution [Small Group] has issued a memo.5 Although the center didn’t praise us, they also didn’t criticize us, which shows that they support the revolutionary actions of the poor and lower-middle peasants. … The enemy wants to launch an insurrection, and the poor and lower-middle peasants have taken up their hoes, shoulder poles, and lances to kill the rebelling black elements, just as Chairman Mao described in the Investigative Report on the Hunan Peasant Movement. Is this excellent or deplorable? I say it’s excellent; everyone has to accurately recognize the problem of poor and lower-middle peasants killing landlords and rich peasants.”
Of course they also talked about killings requiring files being compiled and submitted for approval, and about distinguishing between black elements and their offspring and so on, but this was mere formality. Summing up the conference on August 28, Zheng Youzhi said, “In the earlier phase, there was some random killing; some who shouldn’t have been killed were killed, and some who should have been killed weren’t killed. You have to persuade the masses not to kill just anyone; too much killing leads to chaos and factionalism and the wrongful killing of good people. But in the case of people who commit heinous crimes, one or two can be killed if the masses demand it.”
Zheng Youzhi also convened a telephone conference at noon on August 29, and although he spoke of the prohibition against killing, he still talked about the seriousness of class struggle throughout the county and said black elements wanted to launch an insurrection and kill CCP members, cadres, and poor and lower-middle peasants. The speeches by Zheng Youzhi and others can be considered to have added fuel to the fire of the killing wind. Of course it wasn’t just him saying these things; he was just a typical example. Another reason, and in a certain sense an even more essential reason, was that left-deviating thought had confused people’s thinking. Let me tell you a joke. At that time, if there was flash flooding from the mountains, what should you do? Denounce class enemies. If the reservoir began leaking, what should you do? Denounce class enemies. If there was a meningitis outbreak, what should you do?6 Denounce class enemies. If grain output declined, what should you do? Denounce class enemies. … Every problem could be solved through class struggle. It sounds ridiculous now, but at that time, it was such a sacred formulation that you could lose your head over it. People talked about class struggle every month, every day, and every hour, and it led people to draw a simple conclusion: since class struggle was a fight to the death, killing black elements was perfectly justified, and if we don’t kill them, they’ll kill us.
Another factor was factionalist mischief-making. At that time the Red Alliance and Revolutionary Alliance were in a life-and-death struggle, and the Red Alliance vented its hatred of the Revolutionary Alliance on the black elements. What connection might actually exist between black elements and the Revolutionary Alliance was immaterial.
Before the Yingjiang Political and Legal Work Conference ended, there was a second upsurge of killings in every district.
As will be seen in the narratives that follow relating to the various districts and communes, commune delegates who attended this conference quickly telephoned their production brigades or held meetings immediately upon their return to arrange “catch-up” killings before bureaucracy came into play. In Shouyan District, for example, only 40-odd people were killed before the conference, but more than 400 were killed in the days immediately following. All in all, in the five days from August 26 to 30, a total of 2,454 people were killed throughout the county, comprising just over half of the killing wind’s total death toll. All of the county’s 37 communes experienced killings, including communes that had delayed killing up until then.7