Notes

Introduction

1      Alan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of the Military Planning (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996); Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2014).

2      Trudy Rubin, Willful Blindness: The Bush Administration and Iraq (Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Inquirer, 2004).

3      On the Iron Curtain, see Phil McKenna, “Life in the Death Zone,” Nova, PBS, February 18, 2015, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/european-green-belt/; John Pike, “2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment,” Global security.org, January 13, 2012, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2acr.htm.

4      For more on the Battle of 73 Easting, see H. R. McMaster, “Eagle Troop at the Battle of 73 Easting,” The Strategy Bridge, February 26, 2016, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2016/2/26/eagle-troop-at-the-battle-of-73-easting.

5      Hans Morgenthau and Ethel Person, “The Roots of Narcissism,” Partisan Review 45, no. 3 (Summer 1978): 337–47, Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Center, http://archives.bu.edu/.

6      Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006).

7      Statement of Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, On U.S.-China Relations in the Era of Globalization, May 15, 2008, U.S. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations, March 15, 2008, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HaassTestimony080515p.pdf.

8      Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2007); Herbert R. McMaster, “Crack in the Foundation Defense Transformation and the Underlying Assumption of Dominant Knowledge in Future War,” July 2003, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada416172.

9      Linda D. Kozaryn, “U.S. Aircrew Detained in China Heads Home,” U.S. Department of Defense, April 12, 2001, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44964.

10    Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007).

11    On this point, see David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Douglas Jehl, “C.I.A. Nominee Wary of Budget Cuts,” New York Times, Feb. 3, 1993.

12    David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

13    The White House, “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age,” December 2000, https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/.

14    Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “How Much Did the September 11 Terrorist Attack Cost America?,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, http://www.iags.org/costof911.html.

15    The bailout was part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.

16    “Obama on Afghan War Drawdown: ‘The Tide of War Is Receding,’” PBS NewsHour, PBS, June 23, 2011, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/obama-on-afghan-troop-drawdown-the-tide-of-war-is-receding#transcript.

17    Obama quotes from Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, June 25, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.

18    Zachary Shore, A Sense of the Enemy: The High-Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 258.

19    Nadia Schadlow, “Competitive Engagement: Upgrading America’s Influence,” Orbis, September 13, 2013, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438713000446.

20    Niall Ferguson, Kissinger: 1923–1968: The Idealist (New York: Penguin Press, 2015).

21    Sun Tzu and Thomas F. Cleary, The Art of War (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2005).

22    Winston S. Churchill, “Painting as a Pastime,” in Amid These Storms (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932).

Chapter 1: Fear, Honor, and Ambition: Mr. Putin’s Campaign to Kill the West’s Cow

1      On Russia’s alleged interference, see “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” Intelligence Community Assessment, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf; Becky Branford, “Information Warfare: Is Russia Really Interfering in European States?” BBC, March 31, 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39401637.

2      Sarah Marsh, “US joins UK in blaming Russia for NotPetya cyber-attack,” The Guardian, February 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/15/uk-blames-russia-notpetya-cyber-attack-ukraine.

3      Andy Greenberg, “The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History,” Wired, December 7, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.

4      Andrew Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War,” New York Times, March 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/europe/russia-hybrid-war-gerasimov.html.

5      “Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strike in Syria,” Department of Defense, April 6, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1144598/statement-from-pentagon-spokesman-capt-jeff-davis-on-us-strike-in-syria/.

6      On Gerasimov and the Syrian Civil War, see Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War.” On Syrian use of nerve agents, see Daryll Kimball and Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012–2019,” Fact Sheets & Briefs, Arms Control Association, March 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity. On Putin’s intervention in Syria, see Maksymilian Czuperski et al., “Distract Deceive Destroy: Putin at War in Syria,” The Atlantic, April 2016, https://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/distract-deceive-destroy/assets/download/ddd-report.pdf; and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria,” New York Times, May 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/world/middleeast/american-commandos-russian-mercenaries-syria.html.

7      Neil MacFarquhar, “Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is Known as ‘Putin’s Cook,’” New York Times, February 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictment-mueller.html.

8      Mariam Tsvetkova, “Russian Toll in Syria Battle Was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” Reuters, February 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-casualties/russian-toll-in-syria-battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ.

9      Lavrov was the mouthpiece of the regime abroad, a legendary diplomat who spoke flawless English and used his diplomatic cunning in foreign capitals to cover up the Kremlin’s abuses. Yet it was not clear if Lavrov’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the bureaucratic weight in the Russian system, which was dominated by the security services, to put back together the pieces of a bilateral relationship that the security services had broken with Russia’s 2016 election interference. Patrick Jackson, “Europe | Profile: Putin’s Foreign Minister Lavrov,” BBC News, June 29, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6242774.stm. On Patrushev’s rise to power, see Andrew Monaghan, “Power in Modern Russia” (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2017), 21.

10    Quotations in the previous paragraph are from Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 185–89, 388. On Putin and Patrushev’s climb, see Hill and Gaddy, 41, 185–89.

11    This was in violation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, an agreement that demonstrates a commitment to respecting the sovereignty of each state and its right to choose the best means to ensure its security while promising a peaceful settlement of disputes. These three concerns are also consistent with the analysis of Russian policy assumptions in Monaghan, “Power in Modern Russia,” 26–27; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Summary: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation,” May 27, 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25470.htm?selectedLocale=en. & NATO; “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France,” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.

12    Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 49.

13    On Kerry, see John Kerry, “Face the Nation Transcripts March 2, 2014: Kerry, Hagel,” Face the Nation, March 2, 2014, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-march-2-2014-kerry-hagel/. On maskirovka, see “Maskirovka: From Russia, with Deception,” October 30, 2016, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/10/31/maskirovka_from_russia_with_deception_110282.html. For more on World War I, see Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

14    For more on sanctions, see “President Donald J. Trump Is Standing Up to Russia’s Malign Activities,” Fact Sheets, The White House, April 6, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-standing-russias-malign-activities/; Office of the Spokes-person, “Sanctions Announcement on Russia,” U.S. Department of State, December 19, 2018, https://www.state.gov/sanctions-announcement-on-russia/.

15    On the attempted coup, see Andrew E. Kramer and Joseph Orovic, “Two Suspected Russian Agents Among 14 Convicted in Montenegro Coup Plot,” New York Times, May 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/world/europe/montenegro-coup-plot-gru.html; Adam Casey and Lucan Ahmad, “Russian Electoral Interventions, 1991–2017,” Scholars Portal Dataverse, December 15, 2017, https://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5683/SP/BYRQQS. On sanctions, see Jeremy Herb, “Senate Sends Russia Sanctions to Trump’s Desk,” CNN, July 27, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/27/politics/russian-sanctions-passes-senate/index.html.

16    Tak Kumakura, “North Koreans May Have Died in Israel Attack on Syria, NHK Says,” Bloomberg, April 27, 2008, https://web.archive.org/web/20121103011551/http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aErPTWRFZpJI&refer=japan; IDF, “The Secret Operation Revealed a Decade Later,” IDF Press Center, March 21, 2018, https://www.idf.il/en/articles/operations/the-secret-operation-revealed-a-decade-later/.

17    Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium.” https://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm.

18    Donald Kagan, Thucydides: The Reinvention of History (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 1, 9, 14–16.

19    Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, April 25, 2005, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931.

20    On Russia in the late 1990s, see Michael McFaul, “Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). See also Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: The Inside Story of the Second Russian Revolution (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000).

21    On the use of assistance, see U.S. General Accounting Office, “Foreign Assistance: International Efforts to Aid Russia’s Transitions Have Had Mixed Reviews.” GAO, November 2000, 33, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-8. On Russia under the Obama administration, see Carter Ash, Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon (New York: Dutton, 2019), 272–77.

On Putin’s speech, see Washington Post Editorial Board, “After the Fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S Tried to Help Russians,” Washington Post, May 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/after-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union-the-us-tried-to-help-russians/2015/05/04/cc4f7c20-f043-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html.

22    On Putin quote, see Russian media source: PNA HOBOCTN, “Путин: ‘цветные ревоΛюции’ в ряде стран—это урок дΛя России,” PNA HOBOCTN, November 20, 2014, https://ria.ru/20141120/1034329699.html. For estimates on civilian deaths and torture, see Simon Shuster. “Putin’s Secret Agents,” Time, https://time.com/putin-secret-agents/; Eli Lake, “Georgia’s Democracy Recedes into Russia’s Shadow,” Bloomberg Opinion. September 14, 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-14/georgia-s-rose-revolution-recedes-into-russia-s-shadow. On the color revolutions, see Lake, “Georgia’s Democracy Recedes Into Russia’s Shadow”; also, William Schneider, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution,’” The Atlantic, December 2004, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines-orange-revolution/305157/; Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and ‘The Color Revolution’: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the U.S. and the West,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 28, 2014, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-%E2%80%9Ccolor-revolution%E2%80%9D. On Putin’s reaction to the color revolutions, see Leonid Bershidsky, “Why ‘Color Revolutions’ Can’t Be Exported,” Bloomberg Opinion, February 14, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-15/saakashvili-and-why-color-revolutions-can-t-be-exported. On Putin’s election, see “Putin Declared President-elect,” RT, March 5, 2012, https://www.rt.com/news/putin-win-presidential-election-813/.

23    On Putin’s view of the color revolutions and their motivations, see Dmitri Simes, “Senior Kremlin Official Accuses NATO of Plotting ‘Color Revolutions’ in Russia’s Neighborhood,” CNSNews.com, July 5, 2019, https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/dimitri-simes/senior-kremlin-official-accuses-nato-plotting-color-revolutions-russias; Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, “Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 20, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067.

24    Statistics from the World Bank, “GDP per Capita—United States” and “GDP per Capita—Russian Federation,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. U.S. GDP per capita in 2017 was $59,927.93. Statistics gathered from World Bank, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017,” Transparency International, February 21, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017. On Russia’s corruption, see Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2017.”

25    On projected population decline in Russia, see David Holloway, “Russia and the Solecism of Power,” Governance in an Emerging World, Fall Series, Issue 118, October 3, 2018. https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-and-solecism-power. For statistics on health, see Rachel Nuwer, “Why Russian Men Don’t Live as Long,” New York Times, February 17, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/science/why-russian-men-dont-live-as-long.html. Life expectancy data accessed from the World Bank, “Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years): Russian Federation,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=RU&name_desc=false.

26    I am indebted to Dr. Kathyrn Stoner of Stanford University for this and many other insights into Russian strategy. For more on Putin’s preference for destroying rather than rebuilding order, see Jakub Grygiel, “The Geopolitical Nihilist,” American Interest, December 10, 2014, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/10/the-geopolitical-nihilist/.

27    Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson, Military Review, January–February 2016 (originally published in Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf.

28    Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It,” RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html; Margaret L. Taylor, “Combating Disinformation and Foreign Interference in Democracies: Lessons from Europe,” Brookings Institution, July 31, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/07/31/combating-disinformation-and-foreign-interference-in-democracies-lessons-from-europe/.

29    Amy Zegart, “The Dark Arts of Deception: What’s Old? What’s New? What’s Next?” Global Populisms Conference, March 1–2, 2019, Stanford University, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/zegart_populisms_memo_2.21.2019_1.pdf.

30    See Stanford Internet Observatory Paper, “Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence Operations in Africa,” https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/prigozhin-africa.

31    On the Ukrainian presidential elections, see Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, “Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004: OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,” May 11, 2005, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674?download=true; and Steven Pifer, The Eagle and the Trident: U.S.-Ukraine Relations in Turbulent Times (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 274.

32    On Russian interference in Moldova, see Andrey Makarychev, “Russia’s Moldova Policy: Soft Power at the Service of Realpolitik,” ponarseurasia.org, March 2010, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_094.pdf.

33    Gabe Joselow, “Election Cyberattacks: Pro-Russia Hackers Have Been Accused in Past,” NBC, November 3, 2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/technology/election-cyberattacks-pro-russia-hackers-have-been-accused-past-n673246.

34    On Russian subversion in each of these countries, see Jamie Doward, “Malta Accuses Russia of Cyber-attacks in Run-up to Election,” The Guardian, May 27, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/27/russia-behind-cyber-attacks-says-malta-jseph-muscat; Oren Dorell, “Alleged Russian Political Meddling Documented in 27 Countries Since 2004,” USA Today, September 7, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/09/07/alleged-russian-political-meddling-documented-27-countries-since-2004/619056001/; Ann M. Simmons, “Russia’s Meddling in Other Nations’ Elections Is Nothing New. Just Ask the Europeans,” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-election-meddling-20170330-story.html; and Larry Diamond, “Russia and the Threat to Liberal Democracy,” The Atlantic, December 9, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/russia-liberal-democracy/510011/.

35    On the Montenegrin election, see David Shimer, “Smaller Democracies Grapple with the Threat of Russian Interference,” The New Yorker, December 8, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/smaller-democracies-grapple-with-the-threat-of-russian-interference.

36    Milivoje Pantovic, “Vucic: Serbia Arrests People Involved in ‘Illegal Acts’ in Montenegro,” Balkan Insight, October 25, 2016, https://balkaninsight.com/2016/10/25/serbian-pm-failed-to-explain-coup-in-montenegro-10-24-2016/.

37    Kramer and Orovic, “Two Suspected Russian Agents.”

38    On Americans’ economic outlook, see Eduardo Porter, “Where Were Trump’s Votes? Where the Jobs Weren’t.” New York Times, December 13, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/economy/jobs-economy-voters.html. Michelle Ver Ploeg, “Access to Affordable, Nutritious Food Is Limited in ‘Food Deserts,’” U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, March 1, 2010, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2010/march/access-to-affordable-nutritious-food-is-limited-in-food-deserts/.

39    Aaron Blake, “More Young People Voted for Bernie Sanders than Trump and Clinton Combined—By a Lot,” Washington Post, June 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/20/more-young-people-voted-for-bernie-sanders-than-trump-and-clinton-combined-by-a-lot/.

40    For quote on Trump and historical perspective on Trump’s election, see Victor Davis Hanson, The Case for Trump (New York: Basic Books, 2020); Colleen Kelley, A Rhetoric of Divisive Partisanship: The 2016 American Presidential Campaign Discourse of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 15.

41    These and the statistics on the IRA in the following paragraphs from Renee DiResta, et al., “The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency,” New Knowledge, 2018, https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformation-report/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf.

42    The New Knowledge report on “The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency” concluded that the purpose was “to undermine citizens’ trust in government, exploit societal fractures, create distrust in the information environment, blur the lines between reality and fiction, undermine trust among communities, and erode confidence in the democratic process.” Renee DiResta et al., “The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency.”

43    Niall Ferguson, “Silicon Valley and the Threat to Democracy,” The Daily Beast, January 21, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/social-media-shreds-the-social-fabric-one-click-at-a-time; Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, “U.S. Senate: Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interferences in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views,” U.S. Senate, n.d., https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.

44    Select Committee on Intelligence, “Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interferences in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media with Additional Views.”

45    Harvey Klehr and William Tompson, “Self-determination in the Black Belt: Origins of a Communist Party,” Labor History 30, no. 3 (1989): 355, https://doi.org/10.1080/00236568900890231.

46    On the IRA’s use of false identities, see Robert S. Mueller, United States of America v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho, Defendants: Case 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ, U.S. Justice Department, https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download. On Guccifer 2.0, see Robert S. Mueller, “Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election,” U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, March 2019, https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf (hereafter cited as “Mueller Report”); on memes and their repurposing, see New Knowledge report, “The Tactics and Tropes of the Internet Research Agency”; and U.S. Justice Department, “United States of America v. Internet Research Agency,” July, 2018, .pdf at https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download.

47    See David Folkenflik, “Behind Fox News’ Baseless Seth Rich Story: The Untold Tale,” NPR, August 1, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/08/01/540783715/lawsuit-alleges-fox-news-and-trump-supporter-created-fake-news-story; and U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “New Reports Shed Light on Internet Research Agency’s Social Media Tactics,” Washington, DC, December 2018, https://cryptome.org/2018/12/ssci-ru-sm-aid-trump.pdf; Janine Zacharia, “Facebook, Others Must Do More to Protect National Security,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 17, 2017, http://janinezacharia.net/reporting/facebook-and-others-must-protect-national-security/.

48    See Mueller, United States of America v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho.

49    Tom LoBianco, “Trump Falsely Claims ‘Millions of People Who Voted Illegally’ Cost Him Popular Vote,” CNN, November 28, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/27/politics/donald-trump-voter-fraud-popular-vote/index.html.

50    Adam Goldman, Jo Becker, and Matt Apuzzo, “Russian Dirt on Clinton? ‘I Love It,’ Donald Trump Jr. Said,” New York Times, July 11, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/us/politics/trump-russia-email-clinton.html. Also see Mueller Report.

51    On Cambridge Analytica, see Nicholas Confessore, Matthew Rosenberg, and Sheera Frenkel, “Facebook Data Collected by Quiz App Included Private Messages,” New York Times, April 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-private-messages.html.

52    Shimer, “Smaller Democracies”; Amy Zegart and Michael Morrell, “Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/spies-lies-and-algorithms.

53    Philip Rucker, Anton Troianovski, and Seung Min Kim, “Trump Hands Putin a Diplomatic Triumph by Casting Doubt on U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” Washington Post, July 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ahead-of-putin-summit-trump-faults-us-stupidity-for-poor-relations-with-russia/2018/07/16/297f671c-88c0-11e8-a345-a1bf7847b375_story.html.

54    On the DNC’s reaction to the hacks, see Donna Brazile, Hacks: The Inside Story of the Break-ins and Breakdowns that Put Donald Trump in the White House (New York: Hachette Books, 2017), 95–103. On Obama, see Philip Bump, “What Obama Did, Didn’t Do, and Couldn’t Do in Response to Russian Interference,” Washington Post, February 21, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/02/21/what-obama-did-didnt-do-and-couldnt-do-in-response-to-russian-interference/. On Trump’s quote, see Paul Waldman, “Trump Sucks Up to Putin, Embarrassing Us Yet Again,” Washington Post, June 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/28/trump-sucks-up-putin-embarrassing-us-yet-again/.

55    Anton Troianovski and Joby Warrick, “Agents of Doubt: How a Powerful Russian Propaganda Machine Chips Away at Western Notions of Truth,” Washington Post, December 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/national-security/russian-propaganda-skripal-salisbury/.

56    On the Skripal attack, see Andrew Roth and Vikram Dodd, “Salisbury Novichok Suspects Say They Were Only Visiting Cathedral,” The Guardian, September 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/sep/13/russian-television-channel-rt-says-it-is-to-air-interview-with-skripal-salisbury-attack-suspects; Troianovski and Warrick, “Agents of Doubt.”

57    “Statement from the Press Secretary on the Expulsion of Russian Intelligence Officers,” Statements and Releases, The White House, March 26, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-expulsion-russian-intelligence-officers/.

58    Carl Gershman, “Remembering a Journalist Who Was Killed for Standing Up to Putin,” Washington Post, October 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/remembering-a-journalist-who-was-killed-for-standing-up-to-putin/2016/10/06/d3a9e176-8bf7-11e6-bff0-d53f592f176e_story.html; David Filipov, “Here Are 10 Critics of Vladimir Putin Who Died Violently or in Suspicious Ways,” Washington Post, March 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/23/here-are-ten-critics-of-vladimir-putin-who-died-violently-or-in-suspicious-ways/.

59    BBC News, “Syria War: What We Know About Douma ‘Chemical Attack,’” BBC, July 10, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43697084; Sheena McKenzie, “Suspected Syria Chemical Attack Might Have Affected 500 People, WHO Says,” CNN, April 11, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/11/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-500-affected-who-intl/index.html.

60    On the Wagner Group, see Mike Giglio, “How a Group of Russian Guns for Hire Are Operating in the Shadows,” BuzzFeed News, April 19, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegiglio/inside-wagner-mercenaries-russia-ukraine-syria-prighozhin. On the Malaysia Airlines flight, “Russia’s Role in Shooting Down an Airliner Becomes Official,” The Economist, May 30, 2018, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/05/30/russias-role-in-shooting-down-an-airliner-becomes-official.

61    Peter Ford, “Russia’s Retreat Ends Chechnya War but Leaves a Long-Term Impact,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1997, https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0106/010697.intl.intl.2.html.

62    “Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” CISA, March 16, 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.

63    Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, “Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power Plants, U.S. Says,” New York Times, March 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks.html.

64    Alexander Cooley, “Whose Rules, Whose Sphere? Russian Governance and Influence in Post-Soviet States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/30/whose-rules-whose-sphere-russian-governance-and-influence-in-post-soviet-states-pub-71403.

65    “Nord Stream: The Gas Pipeline Directly Connecting Russia and Europe,” Gazprom, http://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream/; Editorial Board, “The Right (and Wrong) Way to Deal with Nord Stream 2,” Bloomberg Opinion, November 27, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-27/nord-stream-2-the-right-and-wrong-response-for-america.

66    George Frost Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 13.

67    Philipp Ther, Europe Since 1989: A History, trans. Charlotte Hughes-Kreutzmüller (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2016), 302–3.

68    On the role of the Kremlin in each of these crises, see Michael Stott, “Russia Blames U.S. for Global Financial Crisis,” Reuters, June 7, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-forum-medvedev/russia-blames-u-s-for-global-financial-crisis-idUSL0749277620080607; Timothy Heritage, “Russia Waits in Wings as Greek Debt Crisis Deepens,” Reuters, July 3, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-russia/russia-waits-in-wings-as-greek-debt-crisis-deepens-idUSKCN0PD0YH20150703; Peter Walker, “Russia ‘Spreading Fake News about Refugees to Sow Discord in Europe’ Says Ex-Spy,” The Independent, March 22, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-europe-threat-refugee-crisis-europe-aggravate-propaganda-kremlin-farenc-katrei-hungarian-spy-a7642711.html; David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” New York Times, November 15, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html; Andrew Roth and Angelique Chrisafis, “Gilets Jaunes: Grassroots Heroes or Tools of the Kremlin?” The Guardian, December 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/17/gilets-jaunes-grassroots-heroes-or-kremlin-tools; Matt Bradley, “Europe’s Far-Right Enjoys Backing from Russia’s Putin,” NBC News, February 12, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-s-far-right-enjoys-backing-russia-s-putin-n718926.

69    Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 737.

70    For European perspectives on the American pivot, see Bjonar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Marc Lanteigne, and Ulf Sverdrup, “‘For Every Action . . .’: The American Pivot to Asia and Fragmented European Responses,” Project on International Order and Strategy, Brookings and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 27, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-American-pivot-to-Asia-and-fragmented-European-responses-2.pdf. On the Macron quote, see Alexandra Ma, “French President Macron Dunked on Trump for Pulling out of Syria Without Telling His NATO Allies,” Business Insider, n.d., https://www.businessinsider.sg/macron-trump-withdraw-syria-without-telling-nato-economist-2019-11/; Maegan Vazquez and Allie Malloy, “Macron Refuses to Back Down After Trump Attack,” CNN, December 4, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/03/politics/donald-trump-nato/index.html.

71    Andrew Rawnsley, “Interview: Madeleine Albright: ‘The Things That Are Happening Are Genuinely, Seriously Bad,’” The Guardian, July 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/jul/08/madeleine-albright-fascism-is-not-an-ideology-its-a-method-interview-fascism-a-warning.

Chapter 2: Parrying Putin’s Playbook

1      House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Excerpts from Joint Deposition: Dr. Fiona Hill Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council,” Washington, DC, October 14, 2019, https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20191108_-_hill_transcript_excerpts_-_13 7591.pdf.

2      Bill Keller, “Major Soviet Paper Says 20 Million Died as Victims of Stalin,” New York Times, February 4, 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/04/world/major-soviet-paper-says-20-million-died-as-victims-of-stalin.html.

3      Keir Giles, Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), 38.

4      According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, Texas’s GDP was ~ $1.8 trillion at the end of 2018. Heading into 2019, Russia’s nominal GDP was ~ $1.65 trillion while Italy’s GDP was ~ $2 trillion. Figures gathered from the World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product by State, First Quarter 2019,” July 25, 2019.

5      Nan Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018,” April 2019, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/fs_1904_milex_2018.pdf.

6      Timothy Garton Ash, “Europe’s Crises Conceal Opportunities to Forge Another Path,” Financial Times, November 21, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/160d11b6-ec25-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0.

7      Jill Dougherty, “U.S. Seeks to ‘Reset’ Relations with Russia” CNN, March 7, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/07/us.russia/index.html; Sue Pleming, “U.S. and Russia Pledge Fresh Start to Relations,” Reuters, March 6, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa/u-s-and-russia-pledge-fresh-start-in-relations-idUSTRE52522420090307.

8      On Clinton’s quotes, see Glenn Kessler, “Clinton ‘Resets’ Russian Ties—and Language,” Washington Post, March 7, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/06/AR2009030600428.html. On Obama, see J. David Goodman, “Microphone Catches a Candid Obama,” New York Times, March 27, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility.html.

9      Jillian Rayfield, “Obama: The ’80s Called, They Want Their Foreign Policy Back,” Salon, October 23, 2012, https://www.salon.com/2012/10/23/obama_the_80s_called_they_want_their_foreign_policy_back/.

10    “Press Conference by President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin,” The White House, President George W. Bush, National Archives and Records Administration, June 16, 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010618.html.

11    Peter Baker, “The Seduction of George W. Bush,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/06/the-seduction-of-george-w-bush/.

12    Tyler Pager, “Putin Repeats Praise of Trump: He’s a ‘Bright’ Person,” Politico, June 17, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/putin-praises-trump-224485.

13    Sophie Tatum, “Trump Defends Putin: ‘You Think Our Country’s So Innocent?’” CNN, February 6, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-trump-vladimir-putin/index.html.

14    “Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle Aboard Air Force One en Route Hanoi, Vietnam,” The White House (U.S. Government), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-gaggle-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-hanoi-vietnam/; and Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Sides with Putin over U.S. Intelligence,” CNN, July 16, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/16/politics/donald-trump-putin-helsinki-summit/index.html.

15    On the relationship between the Bush administration and Putin, see Condoleezza Rice, Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom (New York: Twelve, 2018).

16    FP Staff, “Here’s What Trump and Putin Actually Said in Helsinki,” Foreign Policy, July 18, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/18/heres-what-trump-and-putin-actually-said-in-helsinki/.

17    Scott Shane, “Stephen Bannon in 2014: We Are at War with Radical Islam,” New York Times, February 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/01/us/stephen-bannon-war-with-radical-islam.html.

18    See, for example, Donald J. Trump, “Trump: I’m Not Pro-Russia, I Just Want Our Country Safe,” interview by Tucker Carlson, Tucker Carlson Tonight, Fox News, July 17, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MB8etvUSag0; see also Anne Applebaum, “The False Romance of Russia,” The Atlantic, December 12, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/false-romance-russia/603433/.

19    George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 349–69.

20    Jason Schwartz, “Senate Approves Supplemental Lend-Lease Act, Oct. 23, 1941,” Politico, October 23, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/23/senate-approves-supplemental-lend-lease-act-oct-23-1941-243990.

21    On neo-Nazis and Russia, see Vegas Tenold, “My Six Years Covering Neo-Nazis: ‘They’re All Vying for the Affections of Russia,’” interview by Lois Beckett, The Guardian U.S., February 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/feb/17/vegas-tenold-everything-you-love-will-burn-q-and-a-nazis; on Hungary, see Rick Lyman and Alison Smale, “Defying Soviets, Then Pulling Hungary to Putin,” New York Times, November 7, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/world/europe/viktor-orban-steers-hungary-toward-russia-25-years-after-fall-of-the-berlin-wall.html; on the Orthodox Church, see Ishaan Tharoor, “The Christian Zeal Behind Russia’s War in Syria,” Washington Post, October 1, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/01/the-christian-zeal-behind-russias-war-in-syria/; on Russian Orthodox Church ties to Russian intelligence, see Paul A. Goble, “FSB, SVR Divide Control of Moscow Patriarchate Church at Home and Abroad, Ukrainian Intelligence Official Says,” Euromaidan Press, January 29, 2019, http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/01/29/fsb-svr-divide-control-of-moscow-patriarchate-church-at-home-and-abroad-ukrainian-intelligence-official-says/.

22    Mueller Report.

23    “Specially Designated Nationals List Update,” news release, March 15, 2018, Resource Center, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180315.aspx.

24    Mueller Report.

25    Adam Goldman, Julian E. Barnes, Maggie Haberman, and Nicolas Fandos, “Lawmakers Are Warned That Russia Is Meddling to Re-elect Trump,” New York Times, February 20, 2020.

26    U.S. Cyber Command, “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority, Command Vision for U.S. Cyber Command,” April, 2018, https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010.

27    U.S. Cyber Command, “Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority.”

28    Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, February 27, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html.

29    On the false reports, see Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia,” BBC, April 27, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. On Estonia’s response to Russia’s sustained disinformation campaign, see Emily Tamkin, “10 Years After the Landmark Attack on Estonia Is the World Better Prepared for Cyber Threats?” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/27/10-years-after-the-landmark-attack-on-estonia-is-the-world-better-prepared-for-cyber-threats/.

30    Quotes from former president Toomas Henrik IIves, interview by author, May 31, 2019.

31    The Security Committee, “Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy,” October 4, 2018, https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/finlands-cyber-security-strategy/ and https://www.kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/en/.

32    “Empowering Users to Discover What Matters,” Soap Public Media, https://www.getsoap.org/the-impact/.html.

33    “How Soap Works to Deliver Clarity,” Soap Public Media, https://www.getsoap.org/how-does-soap-work/.

34    “Our Mission, Clean and Simple,” Soap Public Media, https://www.getsoap.org/mission/.

35    Lionel Barber, Henry Foy, and Alex Barker, “Vladimir Putin Says Liberalism Has ‘Become Obsolete,’” Financial Times, June 27, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/670039ec-98f3-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36.

36    Andrew Radin et al., “The Outlook for Russia’s Growing Military Power,” RAND Corporation, June 18, 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10038.html.

37    Senate Judiciary Committee, “Testimony of William Browder to the Senate Judiciary Committee on FARA Violations Connected to the anti-Magnitsky Campaign by Russian Government Interests,” July 26, 2017, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/07-26-17%20Browder%20Testimony.pdf.

38    Robert Coalson, “Analysis: After ‘Significant’ Regional Elections, Russia’s Opposition Looks to the Future,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 17, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-analysis-opposition-future-regional-election-putin-navalny-protests/30169846.html.

39    Matthew Luxmoore, “‘With Smart Voting Strategy,’ Russian Opposition Takes Aim at Putin’s ‘Party of Crooks and Thieves,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 8, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-smart-voting/30153235.html.

40    Ellen Barry, “Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over Vote,” New York Times, December 8, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clinton-of-instigating-russian-protests.html.

41    Rice, Democracy, 74.

42    On the United States’ role in a post-Putin Russia, see Herman Pirchner, Post Putin: Succession, Stability, and Russia’s Future, American Foreign Policy Council (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). Also see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 346, 351.

43    Rice, Democracy, 73–74.

44    Holly Ellyatt, “China’s Xi Calls Putin His ‘Best Friend’ Against a Backdrop of Souring U.S. Relations,” CNBC, June 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/putin-and-xi-meet-to-strengthen-ties-as-us-relations-sour.html.

45    Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier, 61–74.

46    On the hundreds of violating flights, see the Heritage Foundation, “Russia: Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests,” October 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/russia; Emma Chanlett Avery, Caitlin Campbell, and Joshua A. Williams, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf. On the July 2019 incident, see Mike Yeo, “Russian-Chinese Air Patrol Was an Attempt to Divide Allies, Says Top U.S. Air Force Official in Pacific,” DefenseNews, August 23, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/08/23/russian-chinese-air-patrol-was-an-attempt-to-divide-allies-says-top-us-air-force-official-in-pacific/.

47    James Dobbins, Howard Shatz, and Ali Wyne, “A Warming Trend in China-Russia Relations.” RAND Corporation, April 18, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html.

Chapter 3: An Obsession with Control: The Chinese Communist Party’s Threat to Freedom and Security

1      Gerald F. Seib, Jay Solomon, and Carol E. Lee, “Barack Obama Warns Donald Trump on North Korea Threat,” Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones and Company, November 22, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-faces-north-korean-challenge-1479855286.

2      The Obama administration’s China policy is summarized here: Cheng Li, “Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama Administration,” Brookings Institution, September 5, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/.

3      John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 9.

4      “Xi Jinping: ‘Time for China to Take Centre Stage,” BBC, October 18, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41647872.

5      On China’s rise, see Gideon Rachman, Easternisation: War and Peace in the Asian Century (London: The Bodley Head, 2016).

6      On MacCartney’s journey to visit Emperor Qianlong, see Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), 5–8. As Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, observed in 2015, “Ever since the founding of ‘New China’ in 1949 . . . Foreign relations as well as trade and economic policy had to match the narrative of national greatness so the ruler, whether an eighteenth-century Emperor or a modern-day autocrat, could confirm his claim to rule.” Quoted in French, Everything Under the Heavens, 7–8.

7      For China’s sense of insecurity under Xi Jinping, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 12–13; Sulmaan Khan, Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 7–8 and 209–35.

8      For example, the future premier, Zhou Enlai, who is best known as the urbane interlocutor of Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, oversaw the murder of his political rival’s family in the 1930s. Benjamin Elman, Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 30.

9      The “Century of Humiliation” is remembered in China especially for the following grievances: defeat in the First and Second Opium Wars (1839–42 and 1856–60) by Great Britain; unequal treaties in the mid- to late nineteenth century; the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64); defeat in the Sino-French War (1884–85); defeat in the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1894–95 and 1937–45); the Eight-Nation Alliance suppressing the Boxer uprising (1899–1901); the British invasion of Tibet (1903–4); the Twenty-one Demands by Japan (1915); and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (1931–32). In many cases, China was forced to pay large amounts of reparations, open up ports for trade, lease or cede territories, and make various other concessions of sovereignty to foreign “spheres of influence” following military defeats.

10    For a history of the Cultural Revolution, see Khan, Haunted by Chaos, 111–26. On Deng’s policies and reforms, see Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2013). The 1981 declaration is found in “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, June 27, 1981.

11    On Xi’s upbringing of forced labor, see Chris Buckley and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Cultural Revolution Shaped Xi Jinping, From Schoolboy to Survivor,” New York Times, September 24, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/world/asia/xi-jinping-china-cultural-revolution.html; and Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” The New Yorker, March 30, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red. On how this affects Xi’s policies, see Patricia Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-making in Modern China. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), 168–69.

12    Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House, 2013), 386.

13    “Xi, unlike Mao, never grew into the Party, but always belonged to it. He has no existence separate from the culture of the Party, and no autonomy from it.” Kerry Brown, CEO, China: The Rise of Xi Jinping (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2017), 230.

14    Timothy Beardson, Stumbling Giant: The Threats to China’s Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 435.

15    On China’s growth, see Wei Chen, Xilu Chen, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Zheng Song, “A Forensic Examination of China’s National Accounts,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March 7, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/bpea_2019_conference-1.pdf. On SOEs, see Greg Levesque, “China’s Evolving Economic Statecraft,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/world/asia/china-soe-state-owned-enterprises.html.

16    Lily Kuo and Kate Lyons, “China’s Most Popular App Brings Xi Jinping to Your Pocket,” The Guardian, February 15, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/15/chinas-most-popular-app-brings-xi-jinping-to-your-pocket.

17    Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

18    “Mass Rally Thanks U.S. for ‘Supporting Hong Kong,’” Radio Television Hong Kong, November 28, 2019, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1494997-20191128.htm.

19    Benjamin Lim and Ben Blanchard, “Xi Jinping Hopes Traditional Faiths Can Fill Moral Void in China: Sources,” Reuters, September 29, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-vacuum/xi-jinping-hopes-traditional-faiths-can-fill-moral-void-in-china-sources-idUSBRE98S0GS20130929.

20    Christian Shepherd, “Disappearing Textbook Highlights Debate in China over Academic Freedom,” Reuters, February 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-law/disappearing-textbook-highlights-debate-in-china-over-academic-freedom-idUSKCN1PQ45T.

21    On China’s tributary system, see Christopher Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 92–96; and French, Everything Under the Heavens, 10–12, 244. See also David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 107.

22    U.S. Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” July 25, 2017, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf.

23    Jun Ding and Hongjin Cheng, “China’s Proposition to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind and the Middle East Governance,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017): 3.

24    On One Belt One Road, see Audrye Wong, “China’s Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping,” Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-economic-statecraft-under-xi-jinping/#footref-1; and Dylan Gerstel, “It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China-IMF Cooperation Across the Belt and Road,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17, 2018, https://www.csis.org/npfp/its-debt-trap-managing-china-imf-cooperation-across-belt-and-road.

25    On China’s efforts to influence the Maldives election, see Brahma Chellaney, “Beijing Loses a Battle in the Maldives—but the Fight for Influence Goes On,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Beijing-loses-a-battle-in-the-Maldives-but-the-fight-for-influence-goes-on; Oki Nagai and Yuji Kuronuma, “Maldives Election Marks Setback for China’s Belt and Road,” Nikkei Asian Review, September 25, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Maldives-election-marks-setback-for-China-s-Belt-and-Road2.

26    Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2019.

27    David Ndii, “China’s Debt Imperialism: The Art of War by Other Means?” Elephant, August 18, 2018, https://www.theelephant.info/op-eds/2018/08/18/chinas-debt-imperialism-the-art-of-war-by-other-means/.

28    Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “It Doesn’t Matter if Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” New York Times, December 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.

29    On the Maldives, see Simon Mundy and Kathrin Hille, “The Maldives Counts the Cost of Its Debts to China,” Financial Times, February 10, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/c8da1c8a-2a19-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8. On Malaysia, see Tom Wright and Bradley Hope, “WSJ Investigation: China Offered to Bail Out Troubled Malaysian Fund in Return for Deals,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-flexes-its-political-muscle-to-expand-power-overseas-11546890449.

           On Ecuador, see Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “It Doesn’t Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” New York Times, December 24, 2018.

           On Venezuela, see “China to Lend Venezuela $5 Billion as Maduro Visits Beijing,” Bloomberg, September 13, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-13/china-to-give-venezuela-5-billion-loan-as-maduro-visits-beijing.

30    Erik Sherman, “One in Five U.S. Companies Say China Has Stolen Their Intellectual Property,” Fortune, March 1, 2019, https://fortune.com/2019/03/01/china-ip-theft/.

31    William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernisation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 165–71, 216–25, 230.

32    On nontraditional intelligence collection, see Hearing on China’s Non-Traditional Espionage Against the United States: The Threat and Potential Policy Responses, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Congress (2018) (statement of John Demers, Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/chinas-non-traditional-espionage-against-the-united-states-the-threat-and-potential-policy-responses. For more on CRI, see Greg Levesque, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on What Keeps Xi Up at Night: Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Levesque_USCC%20Testimony_Final_0.pdf.

33    “PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology,” U.S. National Security and the People’s Republic of China, GovInfo, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/html/ch1bod.html; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, “Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request,” February 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/FY2019-Budget-Request-Overview-Book.pdf.

34    On the Department of Energy, see Department of Justice, “Former Sandia Corporation Scientist Sentenced for Taking Government Property to China,” United States Attorney’s Office, District of New Mexico, November 24, 2014, https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/pr/former-sandia-corporation-scientist-sentenced-taking-government-property-china. On forced technology transfer, see Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy,” Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, January 2018, 19, https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf. On the Kuang-Chi Group, see Greg Levesque, “Testimony.”

35    On the African Union, see John Aglionby, Emily Feng, and Yuan Yang, “African Union Accuses China of Hacking Headquarters,” Financial Times, January 29, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5. For General Alexander quote, see Claudette Roulo, “Cybercom Chief: Culture, Commerce Changing Through Technology,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 12, 2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118201. The study was conducted by the Council of Economic Advisors, “The Cost of Malicious Cyber Activity to the U.S. Economy,” February 2018, 36, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/The-Cost-of-Malicious-Cyber-Activity-to-the-U.S.-Economy.pdf.

36    United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong, 2018 S.D.N.Y. (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1121706/download.

37    A partial list of confirmed transfers and attempts includes: radiation-hardened microchips and semiconductor devices, military technical data for navigation and precision strike capabilities, technical specifications for the B-2 Stealth Bomber and cruise missiles, electronics used in military radar, and military encryption technology. For more details, see “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” Department of Justice, February, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/file/347376/download.

38    China Power Team, “Is China at the Forefront of Drone Technology?” China Power, May 29, 2018, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-drones-unmanned-technology/.

39    On China recruiting spies, see Mike Giglio, “China’s Spies Are on the Offensive,” The Atlantic, August 26, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747. On Hong Kong protests, see Steven Myers and Paul Mozur, “China Is Waging a Disinformation War Against Hong Kong Protesters,” New York Times, August 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/13/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-china.html; and Tom Mitchell, Nicolle Liu, and Alice Woodhouse, “Cathay Pacific Crisis Ushers in Nervous New Era for Hong Kong Inc.,” Financial Times, August 28, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/cb6f5038-c7ac-11e9-a1f4-3669401ba76f.

40    On China’s influence campaigns, see Tara Francis Chan, “A Secret Government Report Uncovered China’s Attempts to Influence All Levels of Politics in Australia,” Business Insider, May 28, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/secret-australian-government-report-uncovered-china-influence-campaign-2018-5; David Shullman, “Protect the Party: China’s Growing Influence in the Developing World,” Brookings, October 4, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/.

41    More information on all quotes and claims in this section is taken from Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 20, 60 63–68, 146–51, and 169–73. For more on Chinese influence, see John Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia,” Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-09/how-china-interferes-australia.

42    Hardina Ohlendorf, “The Taiwan Dilemma in Chinese Nationalism,” Asian Survey 54 no. 3 (2014): 471–91.

43    On Taiwan’s exports, see Da-Nien Liu, “The Trading Relationship Between Taiwan and the United States: Current Trends and the Outlook for the Future,” Brookings Institution, November 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-trading-relationship-between-taiwan-and-the-united-states-current-trends-and-the-outlook-for-the-future/; and “TW’s Top 10 Export Destinations,” Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=94&pid=651991&dl_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt_Keyword=&Pageid=0.

44    Jason Li, “China’s Surreptitious Economic Influence on Taiwan’s Elections,” The Diplomat, April 12, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/chinas-surreptitious-economic-influence-on-taiwans-elections/.

45    Chris Horton, “China, an Eye on Elections, Suspends Some Travel Permits to Taiwan,” New York Times, July 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/31/world/asia/taiwan-china-tourist-visas.html.

46    For Wang Yi quote, see Thomas Wright, “Taiwan Stands Up to Xi,” The Atlantic, January 15, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/taiwans-new-president-is-no-friend-of-beijing/605020/.

47    For Xi quote, see “Xi Jinping Says Taiwan ‘Must and Will Be’ Reunited with China,” BBC, January 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174. On China’s military preparations, see the Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 15, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

48    Andreo Calonzo, “Duterte Will Ignore South China Sea Ruling for China Oil Deal,” Bloomberg, September 11, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-11/duterte-will-ignore-south-china-sea-ruling-for-china-oil-deal; Cliff Venzon, “Duterte Struggles to Sell His China Pivot at Home,” Nikkei Asian Review, October 9, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Duterte-struggles-to-sell-his-China-pivot-at-home.

49    Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, “Total Competition: China’s Challenge in the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, January 8, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/total-competition.

Chapter 4: Turning Weakness into Strength

1      Donovan Chau and Thomas Kane, China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st-Century Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2014), 64.

2      Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014).

3      On this point, see Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), and John Pomfret, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present (New York: Henry Holt, 2016), 570–71.

4      Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Document 12: Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d12.

5      As Joseph Riley observed in his study of post–Cold War United States–China relations, “the vast majority of U.S. policy makers from the George H. W. Bush administration through the Obama administration have believed that broad economic, political, and cultural exchange with China would encourage Beijing to liberalize its mercantilist economic policies and authoritarian political structure.” Joseph Riley, The Great Gamble: Washington’s Ill-Fated Attempt to Reform Beijing (manuscript).

6      See “CRACKDOWN IN BEIJING: Excerpts from Bush’s News Session,” New York Times, June 6, 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/06/world/crackdown-in-beijing-excerpts-from-bush-s-news-session.html.

7      “Clinton’s Words on China: Trade Is the Smart Thing,” New York Times, March 9, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/clinton-s-words-on-china-trade-is-the-smart-thing.html.

8      Yuka Koshino, “How Did Obama Embolden China? Comparative Analysis of ‘Engagement’ and ‘Containment’ in Post–Cold War Sino-American Relations,” U.S.-Japan Research Institute, 2015, 14, http://www.us-jpri.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/CSPC_Koshino_2015.pdf.

9      Susan Rice, “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, November 21, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice.

10    “China Already Violating U.S. Cyber Agreement, Group Says,” CBS News, October 19, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/crowdstrike-china-violating-cyberagreement-us-cyberespionage-intellectual-property/.

11    Del Quentin Wilber, “China ‘Has Taken the Gloves Off’ in Its Thefts of U.S. Technology Secrets,” Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2018.

12    Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.

13    On satellite imagery, see the database at CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, including Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “A Look at China’s SAM Shelters in the Spratlys,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 23, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-sam-shelters-spratlys/. On the further militarization of the South China Sea, see “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-3073; Jeremy Page, Carol E. Lee, and Gordon Lubold, “China’s President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818.

14    See Joseph Riley, The Great Gamble (manuscript).

15    Michael Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Michael Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” Remarks, The White House, October 4, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/.

16    United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans,” November 18, 2019, 31–32, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-18%20PSI%20Staff%20Report%20-%20China’s%20Talent%20Recruitment%20Plans.pdf.

17    Edward Wong, “Competing Against Chinese Loans, U.S. Companies Face Long Odds in Africa,” New York Times, January 13, 2019.

18    Pomfret, The Beautiful Country.

19    For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has helped safeguard sensitive technologies. In 2018, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act expanded CFIUS jurisdiction and blocked loopholes that the CCP had exploited.

20    Sui-Lee Wee, “China Uses DNA to Track Its People, with the Help of American Expertise,” New York Times, February 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html.

21    Roger Robinson Jr., “Why and How the U.S. Should Stop Financing China’s Bad Actors.” Imprimis 48, no. 10 (2019), https://imprimis.hillsdale.edu/roger-w-robinson-stop-financing-china/.

22    Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation,” Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental, January 15, 2018, https://admin.govexec.com/media/diux_chinatechnologytransferstudy_jan_2018_(1).pdf.

23    In 2018, the CCP dedicated a session of the Eighteenth Party Congress to the rule of law (fazhi), but its version of the concept is based on the absolute leadership of the party, not on the more universal understanding that the state itself is accountable to laws that are promulgated publicly, enforced equally, and adjudicated independently. Ronald Alcala, Eugene Gregory, and Shane Reeves, “China and the Rule of Law: A Cautionary Tale for the International Community,” Just Security, June 28, 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/58544/china-rule-law-cautionary-tale-international-community/.

24    The U.S. Department of Justice China Initiative, launched in 2018, raised awareness of threats from trade secret theft, such as nontraditional collectors of intelligence in labs, universities, and the defense industry as well as risks to supply chains in telecommunications and other sectors. Katharina Buchholz, “Which Countries Have Banned Huawei?” Statista, August 19, 2019, https://www.statista.com/chart/17528/countries-which-have-banned-huawei-products/.

25    Department of Justice, “Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” February 13, 2020.

26    For country-specific analyses, see Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018), 163–209.

27    U.S. Department of Justice, “Two Chinese Hackers Associated with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns,” U.S. Department of Justice Press Office, December 20, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-associated-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion.

28    Even the Cambodian dictator Han Sen could not avoid increased public scrutiny of wasteful and failed projects, such as the construction of a city-size casino resort with empty hotels and an unfinished casino that displaced thousands of people and caused severe environmental damage. And from 2018 to 2019, Australian lawmakers passed new laws to counter CCP influence by blocking foreign campaign contributions and restricting foreign investment in sensitive sectors of the economy. Yinka Adegoke, “Chinese Debt Doesn’t Have to Be a Problem for African Countries,” Quartz, May 13, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1276710/china-in-africa-chinese-debt-news-better-management-by-african-leaders/.

29    Regarding subsidies, see Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Pushes Hard for a Ban on Huawei in Europe, but the Firm’s 5G Prices Are Nearly Irresistible,” Washington Post, May 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-huawei-the-5g-play-is-in-europe--and-the-us-is-pushing-hard-for-a-ban-there/2019/05/28/582a8ff6-78d4-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_story.html. See also Huawei, “Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd. 2018 Annual Report,” Huawei.com, https://www.huawei.com/en/press-events/annual-report/2018.

           On Huawei’s expansion and role of the CCP, see Chuin-Wei Yap, “State Support Helped Fuel Huawei’s Global Rise,” Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-support-helped-fuel-huaweis-global-rise-11577280736. Huawei has repeatedly denied this. See Karl Song, “No, Huawei Isn’t Built on Chinese State Funding,” Huawei.com, February 25, 2020, https://www.huawei.com/ke/facts/voices-of-huawei/no-huawei-isnt-built-on-chinese-state-funding.

           On the campaign of cyber espionage, see the U.S. Department of Justice’s indictment, Department of Justice, “Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” February 13, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering. See also Andrew Grotto, “The Huawei Problem: A Risk Assessment,” Global Asia 14, no. 3 (2019): 13–15, http://www.globalasia.org/v14no3/cover/the-huawei-problem-a-risk-assessment_andrew-grotto; Klint Finley, “The U.S. Hits Huawei with New Charges of Trade Secret Theft,” Wired, February 13, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/us-hits-huawei-new-charges-trade-secret-theft/.

30    On the strategic benefits the CCP could gain from Huawei, see David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, Raymond Zhong, and Marc Santora, “In 5G Race with China, U.S. Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei,” New York Times, January 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huawei-china-us-5g-technology.html.

           On the inseparability of Huawei from CCP influence, see Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke, “Who Owns Huawei?” Social Science Research Network, April 17, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669; Raymond Zhong, “Who Owns Huawei? The Company Tried to Explain. It Got Complicated,” New York Times, April 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/technology/who-owns-huawei.html.

           Huawei has denied these allegations. See Associated Press, “Huawei Denies U.S. Violations, ‘Disappointed’ by Criminal Charges,” Associated Press, January 28, 2019, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/huawei-denies-us-violations-disappointed-by-criminal-charges-2019-01-28.

31    On the charges on circumvention of sanctions on Iran and North Korea, see Department of Justice, “Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” U.S. Department of Justice, February 13, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-charged-racketeering.

32    Chris Demchak and Yuval Shavitt, “China’s Maxim—Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking,” Military Cyber Affairs 3, no. 1 (2018): 5–7.

33    On the simultaneous employment of Huawei employees at China’s MOIS and the PLA, see Robert Mendick, “Huawei Staff CVs Reveal Alleged Links to Chinese Intelligence Agencies,” Telegraph, July 5, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/07/05/huawei-staff-cvs-reveal-alleged-links-chinese-intelligence-agencies/. Huawei has repeatedly denied similar allegations. See Isobel Asher Hamilton, “Huawei’s Security Boss Says the Company Would Sooner ‘Shut Down’ than Spy for China,” Business Insider, March 6, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/huawei-would-sooner-shut-down-than-spy-for-china-2019-3?rs=US&IR=T.

           For the report on how Huawei helped African autocrats use technology to spy on their political opponents, see Joe Parkinson, Nicholas Bariyo, and Josh Chin, “Huawei Technicians Helped African Governments Spy on Political Opponents,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017?mod=breakingnews. For Huawei’s denial of this report, see Huawei, “A Legal Demand Letter to The Wall Street Journal,” Huawei.com, August 16, 2019, https://www.huawei.com/ke/facts/voices-of-huawei/a_legal_demand_letter_to_the_wall_street_journal.

34    Sources on Huawei: Kate O’Keeffe and Dustin Volz, “Huawei Telecom Gear Much More Vulnerable to Hackers Than Rivals’ Equipment, Report Says,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-telecom-gear-much-more-vulnerable-to-hackers-than-rivals-equipment-report-says-11561501573; Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei Staff Share Deep Links with Chinese Military, New Study Finds,” CNBC, July 8, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/08/huawei-staff-and-chinese-military-have-deep-links-study-claims.html. Joe Parkinson and Nicholas Bariyo, “Huawei Technicians Helped African Governments Spy on Political Opponents,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/huawei-technicians-helped-african-governments-spy-on-political-opponents-11565793017; Akito Tanaka, “China in Pole Position for 5G Era with a Third of Key Patents,” Nikkei Asian Review, May 3, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/5G-networks/China-in-pole-position-for-5G-era-with-a-third-of-key-patents; Jeffrey Johnson, “Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on ‘Chinese Investment in the United States: Impacts and Issues for Policy Makers,’” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 26, 2017, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Johnson_USCC%20Hearing%20Testimony012617.pdf.

35    Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Melbourne, Australia:: Scribe Publications, 2019).

36    John Lee, “China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies,” Hoover Institute, December 16, 2019.

37    James Legge, Confucian Analects: The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1971), 263–64; Keegan Elmer, “U.S. Tells China: We Want Competition . . . but Also Cooperation.” South China Morning Post, October 1, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2166476/us-tells-china-we-want-competition-not-cooperation.

Chapter 5: A One-Year War Twenty Times Over: America’s South Asian Fantasy

1      Original Source: Abdullah Azzam, “Al-Qa’idah al-Sulbah,” Al-Jihad 41 (April 1988): 46. English source: Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Ideology,” Hudson Institute, May 19, 2005, https://www.hudson.org/research/9777-al-qaeda-s-ideology. A note on the translation: “The original text in Arabic was translated into English by Reuven Paz, Academic Director, International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, Israel.”

2      General Nicholson said that twenty groups were concentrated in Afghanistan-Pakistan in 2017. Brian Dodwell and Don Rassler, “A View from the CT Foxhole: General John W. Nicholson, Commander, Resolute Support and U.S. Forces—Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 2 (February 2017): 12–15, https://ctc.usmaedu/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-general-john-w-nicholson-commander-resolute-support-and-u-s-forces-afghanistan/.

3      St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (AD 1265–1274), n.p.

4      Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Leicester, UK: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000), https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf.

5      Kevin Sullivan, “Embassy in Kabul Reopened by U.S.” Washington Post, December 18, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/12/18/embassy-in-kabul-reopened-by-us/f89df7ec-a332-4156-98bc-81df3c951cfd/.

6      Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Caliber Books, 2006), 8.

7      Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 582; Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 20–21.

8      For a specific time line of Kabul, the CIA arrived on September 26, the Taliban fled Kabul on November 12, and Northern Alliance leaders alongside the CIA, entered Kabul on November 14. Coll, Directorate S, 80, 93. The quote originally attributed to Sun Tzu is “Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy,” Sun Tzu, The Art of War.

9      Estimate includes ISI personnel who fled. Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (New York: HarperCollins, 2005),132; On those who escaped from Tora Bora, see Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, 20–21.

10    Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 220–26.

11    CNN, “Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/05/01/afghan.combat/.

12    For more, see Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

13    Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

14    Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance, 223.

15    Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, 25, 50–51, 284–93.

16    Wright, The Looming Tower, 133.

17    For the statements themselves, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Leader Argues Taliban’s ‘Blessed Emirate’ a Core Part of New Caliphate,” FDD’s Long War Journal, August, 24, 2018, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/al-qaeda-leader-argues-talibans-blessed-emirate-a-core-part-of-new-caliphate.php; Thomas Joscelyn, “Ayman al Zawahiri Pledges Allegiance to the Taliban’s New Emir,” FDD’s Long War Journal, August 13, 2015, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/08/ayman-al-zawahiri-pledges-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-emir.php.

18    Coll, Directorate S, 311.

19    On NATO operations at the time, see NATO OTAN, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, February, 2017, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170209_2017-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf. Quote attributed to Winston Churchill at his residence at Chequers, UK, on April 1, 1945.

20    On the rise of ISIS, see Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 303.

21    Shaun Gregory, “The ISI and the War on Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Journal 30, no. 12 (March 2007): 1013–31, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701670862.

22    On the Peshawar school attack, see Declan Walsh, “Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead,” New York Times, December 16, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/world/asia/taliban-attack-pakistani-school.html. For more on the Pakistani Taliban, see Philip J. Crowley, “Designations of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Two Senior Leaders,” U.S. State Department press release, September 1, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/146545.htm. On Al-Qaeda operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, see UN Security Council, “Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2255 (2015) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” June 13, 2019, 22, https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/481.

23    Anahad O’Connor, “Weak Times Sq. Car Bomb Is Called Intentional,” New York Times, July 21, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/nyregion/21bomb.html. On Shahzad: Coll, Directorate S, 450–52; and on drones in northern Waziristan, Coll, Directorate S, 438.

24    Jibran Ahmed and Yeganeh Torbati, “U.S. Drone Kills Islamic State Leader for Afghanistan, Pakistan: Officials,” Reuters, August 12, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamicstate-idUSKCN10N21L.

25    Mujib Mashal and Fahim Abed, “After Deadly Attack on Kabul Hospital, ‘Everywhere Was Full of Blood,’” New York Times, March 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/asia/kabul-military-hospital-in-afghanistan-comes-under-attack.html.

26    Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Institution, September 29, 2017, 4, https://www.brookings.edu/afghanistan-index/.

27    “Clinton Extends Hand to the Taliban,” ABC News, July 15, 2009, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-07-16/clinton-extends-hand-to-taliban/1355022.

28    On Obama’s framing of the Taliban, see President Obama, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” The White House, October 15, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/statement-president-afghanistan. On specific limitations of U.S. military actions, see Rowan Scarborough, “Rules of Engagement Limit the Actions of U.S. Troops and Drones in Afghanistan,” Washington Times, November 16, 2013, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/26/rules-of-engagement-bind-us-troops-actions-in-afgh/. For a detailed account of the connections between the Taliban and ISI, see Coll, Directorate S.

29    On the number of Afghan soldiers wounded, see Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “January 30, 2017, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” January 30, 2017, 98, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-01-30qr.pdf; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “April 30, 2016 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” April 30, 2016, 94, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2016-04-30qr.pdf. On civilian casualties, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported 2,315 civilian deaths attributed to antigovernment elements in 2015 and 2,131 in 2016, for a total of 4,446. UNAMA, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2015,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, February 2016, 33, https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports; UNAMA, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, February 2017, 50, https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports.

30    Coll, Directorate S, 371; “ARG (Presidential Palace),” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, https://president.gov.af/en/history-of-arg-presidential-palace/nggallery/image/bg1o8456-1/.

31    Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, “C.I.A. and Pakistan Work Together, Warily,” New York Times, February 24, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/world/asia/25intel.html.

32    George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 206.

33    On the announcement of the end of major combat operations, see CNN World, “Rumsfeld: Major Combat Over in Afghanistan,” CNN, May 1, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/05/01/afghan.combat/.

34    On Bush’s decision to increase troop levels, see Bush, Decision Points, 207; Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2014, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.

35    Coll, Directorate S, 458–59. For example, after a Taliban attack on a peace Loya Jirga, Karzai summoned National Director of Security Amrullah Saleh and Minister of the Interior Hanif Atmar to his office. The president declared that the attack had been planned by the United States to undermine his peace initiative with the Taliban. Saleh and Atmar, two of the most talented men in Karzai’s cabinet, disagreed. Both men resigned at the end of the meeting.

36    For more on President Karzai and Ambassador Holbrooke’s relationship, see George Packer, Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2019), 4–6.

37    Alissa J. Rubin, “Karzai’s Antagonism Corners the West; Afghan President Is Seen as Only Viable Option, Even as He Alienates Allies,” New York Times International Edition, April 6, 2010, Nexis Uni.

38    Frud Bezhan, “Karzai to Move Up After Stepping Down,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 13, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/karzai-finances/25135480.html.

39    Coll, Directorate S, 409–10.

40    Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan War Debate Now Leans to Focus on Al Qaeda,” New York Times, October 7, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/world/asia/08prexy.html. Administration officials talking off the record in May 2010 stated that there were fewer than one hundred Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan. Joshua Partlow, “In Afghanistan, Taliban Leaving al-Qaeda Behind,” Washington Post, November 11, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/10/AR2009111019644.html.

41    On the start of the peace negotiations with the Taliban, see Rathnam Indurthy, “The Obama Administration’s Strategy in Afghanistan,” International Journal on World Peace 28, no. 3 (September 2011): 7–52, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266718?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. BBC, “How Qatar Came to Host the Taliban,” BBC News, June 22, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401; Karen DeYoung, “U.S. to Launch Peace Talks with Taliban,” Washington Post, June 18, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-relaunch-peace-talks-with-taliban/2013/06/18/bd8c7f38-d81e-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.

42    Rob Nordland, “For Swapped Taliban Prisoners from Guantánamo Bay, Few Doors to Exit Qatar,” New York Times, May 31, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/01/world/middleeast/us-presses-qatar-on-travel-ban-for-swapped-taliban-prisoners.html.

43    Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 105–14.

44    John F. Burns, “Afghan President, Pressured, Reshuffles Cabinet,” New York Times, October 11, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/world/asia/12afghan.html.

Chapter 6: Fighting for Peace

1      George Packer, “Afghanistan’s Theorist-in-Chief,” The New Yorker, July 9, 2019, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistans-theorist-in-chief.

2      Taraki was a leader in the Khalqi faction of the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. He was part of the Communist coup following the Saur Revolution, which resulted in the murder of Mohammed Daoud Khan and the rule of a Communist faction. Taraki was overthrown and assassinated shortly after he rose to power. These events set the stage for the Soviet Union.

3      Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

4      Politico Staff, “Full Text: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan,” Politico, August 22, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/21/trump-afghanistan-speech-text-241882; Central Intelligence Agency, “Field Listing: Terrorist Groups,” CIA, February 1, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/397.html)

5      Thomas Joscelyn, forthcoming chapter, “Chapter 9, Al Qaeda Survived the War in Afghanistan.” Modern-day Afghanistan had tremendous symbolic value to Al-Qaeda and other jihadist terrorists because it provided a cornerstone on which the caliphate could be built. Geographically, Afghanistan was an ideal place to organize and prepare for Al-Qaeda’s campaign of terror against its “near enemy,” Israel and the governments of Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East, and its “far enemy,” the United States, Europe, and the West.

6      Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity,” February 13, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees; World Population Review, “Kabul Population 2020,” http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/kabul-population/.

7      On the parliamentary elections, see Radio Free Afghanistan, “Voting Ends in Afghanistan’s Parliamentary Elections Marred by Violence, Delays,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 21, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghans-cast-ballots-for-second-day-in-chaotic-general-elections/29555274.html. On voter turnout in the presidential elections, see Mujib Mashal, Mohamed Fahim Abed, and Fatima Faizi, “Afghanistan Election Draws Low Turnout Amid Taliban Threats,” New York Times, September 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/28/world/asia/afghanistan-president-election-taliban.html.

8      On enrollment, see the following: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index,” Brookings Institution, September 29, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/afghanistan-index/; Afghan Ministry of Education, “About Us: 7 Million in 2010 with Goal of 10 Million by 2015 USAID,” Education—Afghanistan, USAID Afghanistan, July 22, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education.

9      According to an Asia Foundation survey of the Afghan people, access to the internet among respondents increased 400 percent from 2013 to 2018, and 40 percent of respondents say their area has access to the internet. Dinh Thi Kieu Nhung, “Afghanistan in 2018: A Survey of the Afghan People,” The Asia Foundation, https://asiafoundation.org/publication/afghanistan-in-2018-a-survey-of-the-afghan-people/, 156. For statistics on the media, see government statistics cited at TOLOnews, “Explosion Targets Media Workers in Kabul, Kills Two,” August 4, 2019, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/explosion-targets-media-workers-kabul-kills-two.

10    United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2018,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, February 24, 2019, 10, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2018_final_24_feb_2019.pdf.

11    Ashraf Ghani, interview by Nikhil Kumar, Time, May 18, 2017, https://time.com/4781885/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-president-interview/.

12    Civil service reform was a bright spot under a talented and principled leader, Nader Nadery.

13    For demographic statistics on Afghanistan, see “Afghanistan,” CIA World Factbook, CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. There are also many smaller minorities in Kabul, including Qizilbash (a Turkic people) and Nuristanis (also known as kafirs because they initially rejected Islam). Thomas J. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 53.

14    Steve Coll, Directorate S, 452–57.

15    Ray Rivera and Sangar Rahimi, “Afghan President Says His Country Would Back Pakistan in a Clash with the U.S.” New York Times, October 23, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/world/asia/karzai-says-afghanistan-would-back-pakistan-in-a-conflict-with-us.html; Frud Behzan, “The Eminently Quotable Karzai,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 29, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-karzai-quotes/26610215.html.

16    United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2010,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, March, 2011, 3–4, https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports.

17    Euan McKirdy and Ehsan Popalzai, “American University of Afghanistan Reopens After 2016 Attack,” CNN, March 28, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/28/asia/kabul-american-university-reopens/index.html; Mujib Mashal, Mohamed Fahim Abed, and Zahra Nader, “Attack at University in Kabul Shatters a Sense of Freedom,” New York Times, August 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/asia/afghanistan-kabul-american-university.html.

18    United States Department of State, “Deputy Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with Pakistan Intel Chief Mahmud: You’re Either with Us or You’re Not,” unclassified, September 12, 2001, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB358a/doc03-1.pdf.

19    World Bank Data, “Pakistan—Population, total,” World Bank, n.d., https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2018&locations=PK&name_desc=true&start=2003.

20    Peter L. Bergen, “September 11 Attacks,” Encyclopedia Britannica, June 21, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks.

21    Associated Press, “Pakistani Court Indicts Finance Minister on Graft Charges,” Associated Press, September 26, 2017, https://apnews.com/c96efe1cc2b24a1391860c3ebd31e223. On Sharif, see interview of Nadeem Akhtar, Shamil Shams, “Why Ousted Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif Turned Against the Powerful Military,” DW, March 13, 2018, https://p.dw.com/p/2uECV;REFL, “Pakistani Finance Minister Indicted on Corruption Charges,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 27, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-finance-minister-corruption-idictment/28759837.html.

22    Two years after my visit, a car bomb killed forty Indian security personnel. The Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility, but the Indian government believed that the Pakistan Army was responsible. The countries conducted limited airstrikes. India targeted a terrorist training camp in the mountains, but Pakistan denied the camp’s existence. In the process, Pakistan shot down an Indian plane and took the pilot prisoner for a period of days before he was returned to India as a “peace gesture.” M. Illyas Khan, “Abhinandan: Villagers Recount Dramatic Capture of Pilot,” BBC, March 1, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47397418; “Article 370: India Strips Disputed Kashmir of Special Status,” BBC, August 5, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49231619. The move drew strong resistance from many parliamentarians and raised fears that New Delhi would encourage Hindus to move to the region in order to weaken the voice of Muslims there.

23    For more on the Pakistan Army’s culture and role in society, see Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

24    Salman Masood, “More Bodies Pulled from Hotel Rubble in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 21, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/asia/22marriott.html; “Suicide Attack on Pakistani Hotel,” BBC News, June 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8092147.stm.

25    Rachel Roberts, “Pakistan: Three Years after 140 Died in the Peshawar School Massacre, What Has Changed?” The Independent, December 16, 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-shooting-massacre-what-has-changed-happened-three-years-a8113661.html; BBC News, “Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar School Attack Leaves 141 Dead,” BBC, December 16, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435.

26    Omar Waraich, “Pakistan Takes Fight to the Taliban,” The Independent, December 20, 2014.

27    Naveed Mukhtar, “Afghanistan: Alternative Futures and Their Implications” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 73, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547182.pdf.

28    Neta C. Crawford, “Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-2016,” Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, August 2016, 14, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf.

29    Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt, and Sharon Squassoni, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, May 24, 2005, 8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32745.pdf.

30    The U.S. special operations raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011 should have finally exposed the unreliability of America’s nominal allies in Pakistan. The terrorist leader’s compound was located near the Pakistani equivalent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. The Pakistan Army’s reaction, to feign ignorance and complain about U.S. violations of Pakistani sovereignty, was offensive.

31    Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

32    Brown and Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad.

33    Omar Noman, The Political Enemy of Pakistan, 1988 (New York: Routledge, 1988).

34    Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 22.

35    On India’s projected population growth, see Hannah Ritchie, “India Will Soon Overtake China to Become the Most Populous Country in the World,” Our World in Data, University of Oxford, https://ourworldindata.org/india-will-soon-overtake-china-to-become-the-most-populous-country-in-the-world. On poverty in India, see World Bank, “Supporting India’s Transformation,” Results Briefs, October 15, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2019/10/15/supporting-indias-transformation; “Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019: Illuminating Inequalities,” United Nations Development Programme, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/mpi_2019_publication.pdf. For more on India’s demographics, see CIA World Factbook, “India,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.

36    Shreeya Sinha and Mark Suppes, “Timeline of the Riots in Modi’s Gujarat,” New York Times, April 6, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/06/world/asia/modi-gujarat-riots-timeline.html#/. By 2016, Prime Minister Modi had visited the United States four times since he was elected in 2014. Rishi Iyengar, “As India’s Prime Minister Modi Visits President Obama, Both Leaders Look to Cement a Legacy,” Time, June 7, 2016, https://time.com/4359522/india-modi-obama-visit-us/.

37    House of Representatives: Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Bad Company: Lashkar e-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” March 11, 2010, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg55399/html/CHRG-111hhrg55399.htm. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Militant Leader Hafiz Saeed Is Released by Pakistani Court,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/world/asia/hafiz-saeed-pakistan-militant.html.

38    The White House, “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan,” Office of the Press Secretary, June 22, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.

39    The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, 46, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

40    U.S. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations, “Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Other Extremists [sic] Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67892/html/CHRG-112shrg67892.htm.

41    Clinton Thomas, “Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy Brief,” Congressional Research Service, January 31, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45122.pdf.

42    Thomas Joscelyn, “Disconnecting the Dots,” Washington Examiner, July 13, 2010, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/disconnecting-the-dots; Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Is Very Much Alive,” Washington Examiner, September 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/sept-11-anniversary-17-years-later-al-qaeda-is-alive.

43    Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why Pakistan Supports Terrorist Groups, and Why the US Finds It So Hard to Induce Change,” Brookings Institution, January 5, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/.

44    Amy Held, “Death Toll in Kabul Blast Surpasses 150, Afghan President Says,” NPR, June 6, 2017, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/06/531729176/death-toll-in-kabul-blast-surpasses-150-afghan-president-says; Laura Smith-Spark and Faith Karimi. “Afghanistan Explosion: Blast Kills 90 near Diplomatic Area,” CNN, June 1, 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/05/31/asia/kabul-explosion-hits-diplomatic-area/.

45    Quotes from the White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,” August 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/.

46    Michael D. Shear and Salman Masood, “Trump Tries Cooling Tensions with Pakistan to Speed Afghan Peace Talks,” New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/asia/trump-pakistan-afghanistan.html.

47    This number includes total deaths in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel as of February 2020. U.S. Department of Defense, “Casualty Status,” Department of Defense, February 3, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.

48    On the intelligence community’s Worldwide Threat Assessment, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Statement for the Record (Daniel R. Coates, Director of National Intelligence), January 29, 2019, 12, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. For analysis of the UN policy, see Thomas Joscelyn, “The Trump Administration’s Afghanistan Policy,” Congressional Testimony, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 19, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/09/19/the-trump-administrations-afghanistan-policy/.

49    On the attack in Ghazni city, see Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Talks with Taliban Reflect a Changed Nation,” New York Times, July 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/world/asia/afghanistan-peace-talks-taliban.html. Michael Crowley, Lara Jakes, and Mujib Mashal, “Trump Says He’s Called Off Negotiations with Taliban After Afghanistan Bombing,” New York Times, September 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/07/us/politics/trump-taliban-afghanistan.html. On President Trump’s quotes, see “Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure,” The White House, September 9, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-63/.

50    Bill Roggio, “U.S. Military Buries Press Release that Would Announce Killing of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent’s Emir,” FDD’s Long War Journal, January 15, 2020, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/01/u-s-military-buries-press-release-that-would-announce-killing-of-al-qaeda-in-the-indian-subcontinents-emir.php.

51    Statista Research Department, “Soldiers Killed in Action in Afghanistan 2001–2019,” Statista, August 22, 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/262894/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/; Matthew Pennington, “Pentagon: Afghan War Costing U.S. $45 Billion per Year,” Military Times, February 6, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2018/02/07/pentagon-afghan-war-costing-us-45-billion-per-year/.

52    Neta C. Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs of Post-9/11 Wars Through FY 2018,” Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, November 2017, 9, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/economic.

53    On the September 2019 presidential election, Pamela Constable, “Afghanistan’s Ghani Wins Slim Majority in Presidential Vote, Preliminary Results Show,” Washington Post, December 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghanistans-ghani-wins-slim-majority-in-presidential-vote/2019/12/22/73355178-2441-11ea-b034-de7dc2b5199b_story.html. On Afghan national mood toward the Taliban, see Nhung, “Afghanistan in 2018: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 43.

Chapter 7: Who Thought It Would Be Easy? From Optimism to Resignation in the Middle East

1      U.S. Department of State, “Casualty Status as of 10 a.m. EST Jan. 20, 2020,” https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf; Leith Aboufadel, “Over 26,000 Iraqi Soldiers Killed in 4 Year War with ISIS,” AMNNews, December 13, 2017, https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/26000-iraqi-soldiers-killed-4-year-war-isis/.

2      Garrett Nada and Mattisan Rowan, “Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq,” Wilson Center, April 27, 2018, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/part-2-pro-iran-militias-iraq.

3      George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, July 10, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/10/the-lesson-of-tal-afar. Confession of Abdul Ghafur Abdul Rahman Mustafa from August 28, 2008, in possession of author; Joseph L. Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers, “Regiment’s Rotation out of Tal Afar Raises Questions about U.S. Strategy,” McClatchy Washington Bureau, January 18, 2006, https://www.mcclatchydc.com/opinion/article24452989.html.

4      Joel Rayburn, Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2014), 74–75.

5      On how Jaafari changed the Ministry of Interior, see John F. Burns, “Torture Alleged at Ministry Site Outside Baghdad,” New York Times, November 16, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/16/world/middleeast/torture-alleged-at-ministry-site-outside-baghdad.html; see also Joel Rayburn, Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2014), 79.

6      For a report on the abuse of Sunni prisoners, see Ned Parker, “Torture by Iraqi Militias: The Report Washington Did Not Want You to See,” Reu–ters, December 14, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-militias/.

7      On Iranian influence in Iraqi government, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Iranian Influence in Iraq: Assessing Tehran’s Strategy,” Strategic Comments 13, no. 10 (December 2007):1–2, https://doi.org/10.1080/13567880701870027. See also Rayburn, Iraq After America, 80–81.

8      Rayburn, Iraq After America, 80.

9      Richard Spencer, “Isil Carried Out Massacres and Mass Sexual Enslavement of Yazidis, UN Confirms,” Telegraph, October 14, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11160906/Isil-carried-out-massacres-and-mass-sexual-enslavement-of-Yazidis-UN-confirms.html.

10    Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Mattis, General Dunford and Special Envoy McGurk on the Campaign to Defeat ISIS in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense Archives, May 19, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1188225/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-mattis-general-dunford-and-sp/.

11    Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 397–98.

12    Reuters, “Syria’s Alawites, a Secretive and Persecuted Sect,” Reuters, February 2, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-alawites-sect-idUSTRE8110Q720120202.

13    Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 242, doi:10.1017/CBO9781107449794.

14    Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq (New York: Scribner, 2008), 28.

15    Khomeini’s efforts were not unprecedented. The Safavid dynasty in the seventh century used Shia Islam to unify Persian society against the Sunni Ottoman Empire.

16    Central Intelligence Agency, “The Demographic Consequences of the Iran-Iraq War,” May 22, 1984, released April 4, 2011, CIA-RDP85T00 287R001301610001, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00287R001301610001-1.pdf.

17    Luke Harding, “Haider al-Abadi: From Exile in Britain to Iraq’s Next Prime Minister,” Guardian, August 11, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/haider-al-abadi-profile-iraqs-next-prime-minister.

18    Sam Dagher, Assad or We Burn the Country: How One Family’s Lust for Power Destroyed Syria (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019), 55–56.

19    Michael Knights, “Helping Iraq Take Charge of Its Command-and-Control Structure,” The Washington Institute, September 30, 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/helping-iraq-take-charge-of-its-command-and-control-structure.

20    The Al-Qaeda documents captured in the northern Iraqi border district of Sinjar in September 2007 (the infamous “Sinjar documents”) showed that the vast majority of the mujahideen who entered Iraq—more than one hundred a month at that time—did so by way of the Damascus airport and a well-established network of safe houses and friendly Syrian officials who led them across the Iraqi frontier into Anbar or Ninewa Provinces. In a police state like Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, the activity recorded in the Sinjar documents could never have taken place without the full knowledge and approval of the regime. See Brian Fishman and Joseph Felter, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2, 2007, https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaidas-foreign-fighters-in-iraq-a-first-look-at-the-sinjar-records/.

21    Fouad Ajami, “America and the Solitude of the Syrians,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2012, https://www.hoover.org/research/america-and-solitude-syrians; David Remnick, “Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama,” The New Yorker, January 20, 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-david-remnick.

22    On the Homs riots, see Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2016), 132; Warrick, Black Flags, 228. For examples of this repression, see Warrick, Black Flags, 266; Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, 132.

23    Murray and Woods, The Iran-Iraq War, 242.

24    H. R. McMaster, “Why the U.S. Was Right in Not Trying to Take Over All of Iraq,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 23, 1991.

25    Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1, 2003, 17, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=182.

26    Stephen D. Biddle and Peter Feaver, “Assessing Strategic Choices in the War on Terror,” in Beth Bailey and Richard Immerman, eds., Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (New York: NYU Press, 2015).

27    Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (London: Atlantic Books, 2013).

28    Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner,” FBIS translation of the newspaper Asharq-Al-awsat, 2001.

29    Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame, 302.

30    Kimberly Kagan, Surge: A Military History (New York: Encounter Books, 2009).

31    For more metrics on violence in Iraq, see Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iraq: Patterns of Violence, Casualty Trends, and Emerging Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 9, 2011, https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110209_Iraq-PattofViolence.pdf.

32    Peter Baker, “Relief over U.S. Exit from Iraq Fades as Reality Overtakes Hope,” New York Times, June 22, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/world/middleeast/relief-over-us-exit-from-iraq-fades-as-reality-overtakes-hope.html.

33    Baker, “Relief over U.S. Exit from Iraq Fades as Reality Overtakes Hope.”

34    On Hashemi’s death, see Jack Healy, “Arrest Order for Sunni Leader in Iraq Opens New Rift,” New York Times, December 19, 2011. On the alienation of Iraq’s Sunni populations, see Rayburn, Iraq After America; Emma Sky, The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), xii.

35    Beatrice Dupuy, “President Obama Did Not Free Islamic State Leader Al-Baghdadi from Prison,” Associated Press, October 30, 2019, https://apnews.com/afs:Content:8037620747.

36    Martin Chulov, “Gaddafi’s Last Moments: ‘I Saw the Hand Holding the Gun and I Saw It Fire,’” The Guardian, October 20, 2012.

37    Barrack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Ending the War in Iraq,” The White House, October 21, 2011, transcript, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-iraq.

Chapter 8: Breaking the Cycle

1      Kenneth Michael Pollack, A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 2008), xxxix.

2      On the Kenneth Pollack quote, see Kenneth M. Pollack, “Drowning in Riches,” New York Times, July 13, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/opinion/13pollack.html.

3      The population of Syria pre–civil war (2011) was 21 million. As of 2018, it was 16 million. The World Bank, “Syrian Arab Republic,” https://data.worldbank.org/country/syrian-arab-republic.

4      The Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Statistics of 2019,” SNHR, http://sn4hr.org/.

5      United Nations, “Libya Country Profile,” UN, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx/_Images/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Libya.

6      The success of Operation Provide Comfort could help stabilize Syria. Thomas E. Ricks, “Operation Provide Comfort: A Forgotten Mission with Possible Lessons for Syria,” Foreign Policy, February 6, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/operation-provide-comfort-a-forgotten-mission-with-possible-lessons-for-syria/.

7      Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Klor, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 22190, April 2016, 16, http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190.

8      Statistics on displacement based on Eurostat findings, Phillip Connor, “Most Displaced Syrians Are in the Middle East, and About a Million Are in Europe,” FactTank, Pew Research Center, January 29, 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/29/where-displaced-syrians-have-resettled/. The UNHCR count as of October 31, 2019, was 3,680,603, UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR, October 31, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113.

9      For more of the story of Omran Daqneesh, see Anne Bernard, “How Omran Daqneesh, 5, Became a Symbol of Aleppo’s Suffering,” New York Times, August 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/world/middleeast/omran-daqneesh-syria-aleppo.html. Tragically, 30,000 deaths in Syria were estimated between 2012 and 2016. Russian bombing in Syria began in late 2015; within that time frame, there were 7,800 deaths in Aleppo. Violations Documentation Center in Syria, “Aleppo Death Statistics: 2015/09/01–2016/12/30,” VDC, http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs/1/c29ydGJ5PWEua2lsbGVkX2RhdGV8c29ydGRpcj1ERVNDfGFwcHJvdmVkPXZpc2libGV8ZXh0cmFkaXNwbGF5PTB8cHJvdmluY2U9NnxzdGFydERhdGU9MjAxNS0wOS0wMXxlbmREYXRlPTIwMTYtMTItMzB8.

10    Steve Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, “Don’t Intervene in Syria,” New York Times, October 6, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/opinion/dont-intervene-in-syria.html. But there were concerns that the threat to U.S. interests would not stay contained to Syria. In January 2014, months before President Obama intervened against ISIS, former DNI James Clapper said that Syria was becoming “in some respects, a new FATA,” referring to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, a long-known Al-Qaeda base, saying that the country was attracting thousands of jihadist fighters who could one day create a potential base for terrorist attacks emanating from Syria to the West.

11    @realDonaldTrump: “. . . almost 3 years, but it is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home. WE WILL FIGHT WHERE IT IS TO OUR BENEFIT, AND ONLY FIGHT TO WIN. Turkey, Europe, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Russia and the Kurds will now have to . . .” Twitter, October 7, 2019, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181172465772482563. For the president’s remarks on Syria, see President Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting,” The White House, January 3, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-12/.

12    For a perspective supporting disengagement, see Steve Simon, “After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq,” Council Special Report No. 23, Council on Foreign Relations Press, February 2007, https://www.cfr.org/report/after-surge.

13    Candace Dunn and Tim Hess, “The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil Producer,” U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Independent Statistics and Analysis, EIA, September 12, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37053.

14    Michael Schwirtz, “U.N. Links North Korea to Syria’s Chemical Weapons Program,” New York Times, February 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-syria-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html. On IDF attribution, see IDF, “The Secret Operation Revealed a Decade Later,” IDF Press Center, March 21, 2018, https://www.idf.il/en/articles/operations/the-secret-operation-revealed-a-decade-later/.

15    On jihadist strategies and mission, see Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 36; Jonathan Randal, Osama: The Making of a Terrorist (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 86–87, 95. On world economic growth, see Office of the Historian, “Oil Embargo, 1973–1974,” U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo.

16    Colin Clarke, “Expanding the ISIS Brand,” RAND Corporation, February 19, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/expanding-the-isis-brand.html.

17    Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 161–239.

18    Anna Borshchevskaya, “Will Russian-Saudi Relations Continue to Improve? What Their Recent Summit Means for the Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2017-10-10/will-russian-saudi-relations-continue-improve.

19    Judah Ari Gross, “IDF Says It Has Bombed over 200 Iranian Targets in Syria Since 2017,” Times of Israel, September 4, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-says-it-has-carried-out-over-200-strikes-in-syria-since-2017/.

20    Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, “The Way Forward in Syria,” speech, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA, January 17, 2018, https://www.hoover.org/events/tillerson_11718.

21    On the “safe zone” decision, see Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Orders Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Northern Syria” New York Times, October 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/politics/mark-esper-syria-kurds-turkey.html.

22    Kareem Khadder, Jennifer Deaton, and Sharif Paget, “Kurdish Politician and 10 Others Killed by ‘Turkish-Backed Militia’ in Syria, SDF Claims,” CNN, October 13, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/13/middleeast/syria-turkey-kurdish-politician-intl/index.html.

23    Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraqis Rise Against a Reviled Occupier: Iran,” New York Times, November 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/world/middleeast/iraq-protests-iran.html.

24    Tim Arango and Neil MacFarquhar, “Grief and Fear in Sacramento over a Death That Set the World on Edge,” New York Times, January 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/us/contractor-killed-in-iraq-sacramento.html.

25    DeirezZor 24, “Al-Sha’itat Massacre in Deir Ezzor . . . the 5th Anniversary,” DeirezZor 24 News, September 8, 2019, https://en.deirezzor24.net/al-shaitat-massacre-in-deir-ezzor-the-5th-anniversary/.

26    Michael Shear, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” New York Times, October 9, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html; World Bulletin News Desk, “Syrian Opp Withdraw from U.S. ‘Train and Equip’ Program,” World Bulletin, June 23, 2015, https://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/syrian-opp-withdraw-from-us-train-and-equip-program-h161073.html;Ibrahim Hamidi, “Syrian Opposition Fighters Withdraw from U.S. ‘Train and Equip’ Program,” Syrian Observer, June 22, 2015, https://syrianobserver.com/EN/news/29743/syrian_opposition_fighters_withdraw_from_us_train_equip_program.html.

27    Marc Lynch, “Welcome to the Syrian Jihad,” Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/06/welcome-to-the-syrian-jihad/.

28    “Readout of the President’s Call with Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi of Iraq,” The White House (The United States Government), March 29, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/readout-presidents-call-prime-minister-haider-al-abadi-iraq-2/.

29    Gonul Tol and Omer Taspinar, “Erdogan’s Turn to the Kemalists,” Foreign Affairs, November 10, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-10-27/erdogans-turn-kemalists.

30    On Erdogan and the AKP, see Adam Withnall @adamwithnall, “Erdogan Just Made His Most Worrying Claim Yet over the Attempted Coup in Turkey,” Independent, August 2, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-coup-latest-news-blames-us-west-terrorism-gulen-a7168271.html; Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov, “The AKP After 15 Years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 9 (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371#_i9. On the hostage taking, see Karen DeYoung and Kareem Fahim, “U.S.-Turkey Tensions Boil over After Arrest of Consulate Employee,” Washington Post, October 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey-summons-another-us-consulate-employee-as-crisis-deepens/2017/10/09/5fbaecf6-ac7b-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_story.html.

31    On Turkey and Russia, see Kirişci Kemal, Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled Alliance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 175–78. On the 2020 refugee influx, see France 24, “Fighting Continues in Idlib as Turkey Talks End Inconclusively,” February 11, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200211-fighting-continues-in-idlib-as-turkey-russia-talks-end-inconclusively. Kareem Fahim and Robyn Dixon, "Turkey Vows to Escalate Military Action After 33 Soldiers Die in Syria," Washington Post, February 28, 2020.

32    Eric Schmitt, “Killing of Terrorist Leader in Yemen Is Latest Blow to Qaeda Affiliate,” New York Times, February 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/al-qaeda-yemen-qassim-al-rimi.html.

33    On the deaths of Baghdadi and al-Muhajir, see Ben Hubbard and Karam Shoumali, “Likely Successor to Dead ISIS Leader Also Reported Killed,” New York Times, October 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/world/middleeast/al-baghdadi-successor-reported-killed.html. On Assad’s release of jihadist terrorist prisoners, see Daniel Byman, “The Resurgence of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” Brookings, December 12, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-resurgence-of-al-qaeda-in-iraq/.

34    Wahhabism was named for an eighteenth-century Najdi cleric, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who developed an ideology foundational to twenty-first-century radicalization and terrorist recruitment. Wahhabism and Salafism, a related nineteenth-century radical theology, reject Islam’s tolerance for “people of the book”—Jews and Christians—who worship the same God based on the teachings of prophets who predated Mohammed. Wahhabism traditionally has opposed taqlid, or blind following of schools of law, instead asking followers to go directly to a puritanical and literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah itself. The Great Mosque in Mecca used to have four maqamat, or prayer stations, each one representing one of the four schools. In 1926, King Abdulaziz and the Wahhabis got rid of the maqamat representing the four different Sunni schools and this practice and imposed one prayer. MBS’s reference to the four schools was therefore of major significance for a Saudi leader. For a discussion of maqamat in Arabic, see Al Masjid al Haram, Makkawi, https://www.makkawi.com/Article/872/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AC%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85.

35    On the proliferation of Saudi religious textbooks, see David Andrew Weinberg, “Textbook Diplomacy,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 24, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2014/03/21/textbook-diplomacy/; David D. Kirkpatrick, “ISIS’ Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed,” New York Times, September 24, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/middleeast/isis-abubakr-baghdadi-caliph-wahhabi.html.

36    For more on the growth of Shia extremism, see chapters 9 and 10.

37    Donald J. Trump, “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit,” Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Statements and Releases, The White House, May 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/.

38    Julian E. Barnes, “C.I.A. Concludes that Saudi Crown Prince Ordered Khashoggi Killed,” New York Times, November 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/cia-saudi-crown-prince-khashoggi.html.

Chapter 9: A Bad Deal: Iran’s Forty-Year Proxy Wars and the Failure of Conciliation

1      “Nuclear,” Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. Department of State, July 14, 2015, 6–9, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf.

2      Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Iran,” Speech, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 14, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/statement-president-iran.

3      On inspections, see William Tobey and Judith Miller, “Are Iranian Military Bases Off-Limits to Inspection?” RealClearPolitics, September 8, 2015, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/09/08/are_iranian_military_bases_off-limits_to_inspection_128007.html; Olli Heinonen, “The IAEA’s Right and Obligation to Inspect Military Facilities in Iran,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 4, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/04/04/the-iaeas-right-and-obligation-to-inspect-military-facilities-in-iran/.

4      Glenn Kesler, “President Trump’s Claim That Democrats Gave Iran $150 Billion,” Washington Post, December 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/13/president-trumps-claim-that-democrats-gave-iran-billion/.

5      Matthew Levitt, “Iran’s Support for Terrorism Under the JCPOA,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 8, 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-support-for-terrorism-under-the-jcpoa.

6      Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Central Command Nominee Has ‘Concerns’ About Progress Against Isis,” Guardian, March 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/us-isis-syria-strategy-central-command-nomination-joseph-votel.

7      Lou Barletta, “H.R.1191—Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015: 114th Congress (2015–2016),” https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191/text.

8      Rex W. Tillerson, “Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Press Availability,” U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, April 19, 2017, https://ru.usembassy.gov/secretary-state-rex-tillerson-press-availability/.

9      President Donald J. Trump, “President Donald J. Trump Is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal,” Fact Sheets, The White House, May 8, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/.

10    See “Treasury Targets Persons Supporting Iranian Military and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” Press Center, U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 18, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0125.aspx; Jesse Chase-Lubitz, “Trump Slaps Sanctions on Iran While Keeping Nuclear Deal in Place—for Now,” July 18, 2017, Foreign Policy (blog), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/18/trump-slaps-sanctions-on-iran-while-keeping-nuclear-deal-in-place-for-now/.

11    “Excerpts: Donald Trump’s Interview with the Wall Street Journal,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2017, https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2017/07/25/donald-trumps-interview-with-the-wall-street-journal-edited-transcript/.

12    Donald J. Trump, “Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” speech, Washington, DC, Statements and Releases, The White House, January 12, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/.

13    Trump, “Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.”

14    Donald J. Trump, “Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Statements and Releases, The White House, April 8, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organi zation/.

15    Mullahs are scholars of Islamic teaching who wield considerable political and societal power in the Islamic Republic’s theocracy.

16    On the effects of the sanctions, see “How Renewed U.S. Sanctions Have Hit Iran Hard,” BBC News, May 2, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109. On Europe and the sanctions, see Kenneth Katzman, “Summary,” Iran Sanctions, Congressional Research Service, April 22, 2019, 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS20871/291.

17    On the Mr. Rouhani quote, see Alastair Gale, “Iran Presses Japan to Break with U.S. Sanctions on Tehran,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/japans-abe-looks-to-mediate-between-u-s-iran-11560340410. On the letter episode, see “I Don’t Consider Trump Worth Sending a Message to, We Won’t Negotiate with U.S.,” Khame nei.ir, June 13, 2019, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6844/I-don-t-consider-Trump-worth-sending-a-message-to-we-won-t-negotiate.

18    On the Kokuka Courageous incident, see “Gulf of Oman Tanker Attacks: What We Know,” BBC News, June 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48627014; Amanda Macias, “U.S. Military Releases New Images of Japanese Oil Tanker Attack,” CNBC, June 17, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/17/us-military-releases-new-images-of-japanese-oil-tanker-attack.html.

19    On President Trump’s decision to halt strikes, see Patrick Wintour and Julian Borger, “Trump Says He Stopped Airstrike on Iran Because 150 Would Have Died,” Guardian, June 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/21/donald-trump-retaliatory-iran-airstrike-cancelled-10-minutes-before; Luis Martinez, Elizabeth McLaughlin, and Meredith McGraw, “Trump Says Iranian Shootdown of U.S. Military Drone May Have Been a ‘Mistake,’” ABC News, June 20, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/iran-shoots-american-drone-international-airspace-us-official/story?id=63825990.

20    On the Obama quote, see Thomas L. Friedman, “Iran and the Obama Doctrine,” New York Times, April 5, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-interview.html. On the Rhodes quote, see Gardiner Harris, “Deeper Mideast Aspirations Seen in Nuclear Deal with Iran,” New York Times, July 31, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/middleeast/deeper-mideast-aspirations-seen-in-nuclear-deal-with-iran.html.

21    The Learning Network, “Jan. 20 1981: Iran Releases American Hostages as Reagan Takes Office,” New York Times, January 20, 2012, https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/jan-20-1981-iran-releases-american-hostages-as-reagan-takes-office/.

22    On the marine barracks attack, see Lynn Maalouf, Luc Cote, and Theo Boudruche, “Lebanon’s Legacy of Political Violence,” International Center for Transitional Justice, September 2013, 53. The scandal known as the Iran-Contra affair began with illegal arms sales to Iran to gain the freedom of hostages and expanded when the profits from those sales were used for another purpose: buying arms for the anticommunist rebels known as the Contras, who were fighting to topple a Marxist government in Nicaragua. On hostage releases, arms deal exposure, use of arms by Contras, see David Crist, Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran (New York: Penguin House, 2012), 197–98.

23    Richard N. Haass, “The George H. W. Bush Administration,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/george-hw-bush-administration.

24    Crist, Twilight War, 382–85.

25    On the murder of prominent Kurdish Iranians, see Claude Moniquet, “The Recent Iranian Terrorist Plots in Europe,” European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, February 2019, http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-recent-iranian-terrorist-plots-in-europe/IRAN%20-%20RECENT%20TERRORIST%20PLOTS%20IN%20EUROPE.pdf. On the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, see Patricia Bauer, Carola Campbell, and Gabrielle Mander, “The Satanic Verses: Novel by Rushdie,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Satanic-Verses.

26    “Iran,” Heritage Foundation, October 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-threats-us-vital-interests/iran.

27    “Transcript of interview with Iranian president Mohammad Khatami.” CNN Archive, January 7, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html. U.S. decision making in the immediate aftermath of the bombing was complicated due to Saudi Arabia’s position that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the bombing. The Saudis knew this to be false but did not want the United States to believe that a significant Saudi Hezbollah organization existed in Saudi Arabia.

28    Mir Sadat and James Hughes, “U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 35, https://mepc.org/us-iran-engagement-through-afghanistan.

29    On Khatami’s speech, see Michael Rubin, “Khatami and the Myth of Reform in Iran,” The Politic (Spring 2002), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/khatami-and-the-myth-of-reform-in-iran. On the Natanz facility, see Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Fact Sheets and Briefs, Arms Control Association, updated November 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran.

30    Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Cook, “Al-Qaeda Has Rebuilt Itself—with Iran’s Help,” The Atlantic, November 11, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/al-qaeda-iran-cia/545576/.

31    Crist, The Twilight War, 521, 529.

32    On the Bush administration’s reasoning, see Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: A Rogue Outfit,” Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Fall 2008), https://www.meforum.org/1990/irans-revolutionary-guards-a-rogue-outfit; George W. Bush, “Press Conference by the President,” The White House, February 14, 2007, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070214-2.html.

33    Kyle Rempfer, “Iran Killed More U.S. Troops in Iraq Than Previously Known, Pentagon Says,” MilitaryTimes, April 4, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/04/04/iran-killed-more-us-troops-in-iraq-than-previously-known-pentagon-says/.

34    On the Karbala attack, see Crist, Twilight War, 529. On the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador, see Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?_r=1. On U.S. law enforcement disrupting plot, see “Iranian Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador Thwarted, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, October 12, 2011, https://www.cnn.com/2011/10/11/justice/iran-saudi-plot/index.html. On two men charged in plot, see “Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States,” Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, October 11, 2011, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-men-charged-alleged-plot-assassinate-saudi-arabian-ambassador-united-states. On the British embassy attack, see Robert F. Worth and Rick Gladstone, “Iranian Protesters Attack British Embassy,” New York Times, November 29, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-british-embassy.html.

35    Crist, Twilight War, 530.

36    Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/04/17/the-iran-plans.

37    From 2012 to 2014, the Iranian economy contracted by 9 percent per year, crude oil exports dropped precipitously, and more than $120 billion in reserves abroad were inaccessible to the regime. The regime subsequently shifted assets to South Asia and the Noor Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates, but Noor suspended business with Iran, which precipitated a 30 percent fall in the rial. The regime could no longer conduct dollar transactions. On these statistics, see Jay Solomon, The Iran Wars (New York: Random House, 2016), 167.

38    Navid Hassibi, “Why Can’t Iran and Israel Be Friends?” Guardian, February 20, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/feb/20/why-cant-iran-and-israel-be-friends.

39    Jonathan Saul and Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Boosts Military Support in Syria to Bolster Assad,” Reuters, February 21, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-iran-insight/iran-boosts-military-support-in-syria-to-bolster-assad-idUSBREA1K0TV20140221; Hashmatallah Moslih, “Iran ‘Foreign Legion’ Leans on Afghan Shia in Syria War,” Aljazeera, January 22, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/iran-foreign-legion-leans-afghan-shia-syria-war-160122130355206.html; Margherita Stancati, “Iran Backs Taliban with Cash and Arms,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-backs-taliban-with-cash-and-arms-1434065528.

40    Michael Doran, “Obama’s Secret Iran Strategy,” Mosaic, February 2, 2015, https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/politics-current-affairs/2015/02/obamas-secret-iran-strategy/.

41    Katherine Bauer, “Iran on Notice,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 16, 2017, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-on-notice.

42    On Hezbollah funding, see Nathan Sales, “Countering Iran’s Global Terrorism,” U.S. State Department, November 13, 2018, https://www.state.gov/countering-irans-global-terrorism/. On Iranian troops in Syria, see Laila Bassam, “Assad Allies, Including Iranians, Prepare Ground Attack in Syria: Sources,” Reuters, October 1, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iranians-exclusi/assad-allies-including-iranians-prepare-ground-attack-in-syria-sources-idUSKCN0RV4DN20151001. On the ballistic missile tests, see Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Iranian Ballistic Missile Tests Since the Nuclear Deal,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, February 9, 2017, https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/defenddemocracy/uploads/documents/20917_Behnam_Ballistic_Missile.pdf; “Why Iran Targets ISIS Positions in Syria’s Deir Ezzor?” Iran’s View, June 9, 2017, http://www.iransview.com/why-iran-targets-isis-positions-in-syrias-deir-ezzur/1729/.

43    “نجهتس م لاناک ۱۵۷ مادهنا/یداصتقا داسف گرزب هکبش ۳ فشک,” Mehr News, February 23, 2017, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/3915666/%da%a9%d8%b4%d9%81-%db%b3-%d8%b4%d8%a8%da%a9%d9%87-%d8%a8%d8%b2%d8%b1%da%af-%d9%81%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af%db%8c-%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%87%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%85-%db%b1%db%b5%db%b7-%da%a9%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%84-%d9%85%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%86

44    “Victory for a Religious Hardliner in Iran,” The Economist, June 27, 2005, https://www.economist.com/news/2005/06/27/victory-for-a-religious-hardliner-in-iran.

45    Bill Chappell, “Iranians Vote in Parliamentary Election, After 1 Week of Campaigning,” NPR, February 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/02/21/807857001/iranians-vote-in-parliamentary-election-after-1-week-of-campaigning.

46    Hamid Dabashi, “What Happened to the Green Movement in Iran?” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351661225981675.html.

47    On the IRGC’s finances, see Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel, “Hold IRGC Accountable for Targeting U.S. Troops,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 12, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/04/12/hold-irgc-accountable-for-targeting-u-s-troops/. On state-controlled companies and the Iranian economy, see Yeganeh Torbati, Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “After Iran’s Nuclear Pact, State Firms Win Most Foreign Deals,” Reuters, January 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-contracts-insight/after-irans-nuclear-pact-state-firms-win-most-foreign-deals-idUSKBN15328S.

48    Wendy R. Sherman, Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power, and Persistence (New York: PublicAffairs, 2018), 13.

49    For the Mosaddeq documents, see James C. Van Hook, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954: Iran, 1951–1954, Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, June 15, 2017, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54Iran; Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson Longman, 2008), 164–67. On U.S. university narrative on the 1953 coup, see Gregory Brew, “The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953,” Texas National Security Review, August 2019, https://2llqix3cnhb21kcxpr2u9o1k-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Brew_TNSR-Vol-2-Issue-4.pdf. On the media narrative on the 1953 coup, see Lawrence Wu and Michelle Lanz, “How the CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy in 4 Days,” NPR, February 7, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days.

50    “CIA’s Role in 1953 Iran Coup Detailed,” Politico, August 20, 2013, https://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/cias-role-in-1953-iran-coup-detailed-095731.

51    Ray Takeyh, “What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-06-16/what-really-happened-iran.

52    On Ben Rhodes quotes, see Rhodes, The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House (New York: Random House, 2018), 329–30. On the dilemma of war or the JCPOA, see “Ben Rhodes on Iran: ‘You Either Have a Diplomatic Agreement with These Guys or There’s Something That Can Escalate into a War,” MSNBC, June 22, 2019, https://www.msnbc.com/saturday-night-politics/watch/ben-rhodes-on-iran-you-either-have-a-diplomatic-agreement-with-these-guys-or-there-s-something-that-can-escalate-this-into-a-war-62498885877.

53    Ali Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797: Reform and Revolution (New York: Routledge, 2019).

54    Rhodes, The World as It Is, 325.

Chapter 10: Forcing a Choice

1      On Obama quote, see Firouz Sedarat and Lin Noueihed, “Obama Says Ready to Talk to Iran,” Reuters, January 27, 2009, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-arabiya/obama-says-ready-to-talk-to-iran-idUSTRE50Q23220090127.

2      On tanker attacks, see “Gulf of Oman Tanker Attacks: What We Know,” BBC, June 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48627014. On the drone strike on an oil facility, see Ben Hubbard, Palko Karasz, and Stanley Reed, “Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran,” New York Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone-attack.html. On the drone shooting, see Helene Cooper, “What We Know About Iran Shooting Down a U.S. Drone,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/us/politics/drone-shot-down-iran-us.html.

3      “Iran During World War II,” United States Holocaust Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iran-During-World-War-II.pdf.

4      On France stay, see Elaine Ganley, “Khomeini Launched a Revolution from a Sleepy French Village,” AP News, February 1, 2019, https://apnews.com/d154664bcfed47e49b0ae0ff3648779c. On interviews, see Crist, Twilight War, 14. On Khomeini’s characterization of the Shah, see Suzanne Maloney, “1979: Iran and America,” Brookings, January 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/1979-iran-and-america/.

On Khomeini’s return, see “1979: Exiled Ayatollah Khomeini Returns to Iran,” On This Day, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/1/newsid_2521000/2521003.stm. On slogans, see Associated Press, “AP WAS THERE: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Returns to Iran,” U.S. News & World Report, February 1, 2019. https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2019-02-01/ap-was-there-ayatollah-ruhollah-khomeini-returns-to-iran.

           “The Iranian Hostage Crisis,” Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises.

5      On protests, see “Iran Petrol Price Hike: Protesters Warned that Security Forces May Intervene,” BBC, November 17, 2019, https://www.bbccom/news/world-middle-east-50444429. On price increase, see Peter Kenyon, “Higher Gasoline Prices in Iran Fuel Demonstrations,” NPR, November 19, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/19/780713507/higher-gasoline-prices-in-iran-fuel-demonstrations.

6      “IRGC Head Calls Iran Protests ‘World War,’” Al-Monitor, November 25, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/iran-protests-number-deaths-mp-irgc.html.

7      Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (Basic Books: New York, 2006), 153–54.

8      Farnaz Calafi, Ali Dadpay, and Pouyan Mashayekh, “Iran’s Yankee Hero,” New York Times, April 18, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/opinion/18calafi.html.

9      On demographics, see Bijan Dabell, “Iran Minorities 2: Ethnic Diversity,” United States Institute of Peace, September 3, 2013, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity.

10    “Iran: Targeting of Dual Citizens, Foreigners,” Human Rights Watch, September 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/26/iran-targeting-dual-citizens-foreigners.

11    Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797, 407–9.

12    Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797, 274.

13    On Khamenei quotes, see Ayatollah Ruhollah Khamenei, “The Election of Donald Trump Is a Clear Sign of the Political and Moral Decline of the U.S.,” Khamenei.ir, June 4, 2019, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/6834/The-election-of-Donald-Trump-is-a-clear-sign-of-the-political.

14    On Europe and the JCPOA, see Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran.”

15    On Salami quote, see “Tehran,” Flashpoint, International Crisis Group, November 28, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/tehran.

16    Editorial Board, “Justice Arrives for Soleimani,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-arrives-for-soleimani-11578085286?emailToken=e11bad7a48ad072ad8c3a7b409690538UNGHGeR+Gsa+R3fS5fT6VKBXwaoQHV/gUgQIC3GVRFNRnoUquqzK1B+0GtEll5XH8b2y5QxMjRIcJX3kI8UzLA%3D%3D&reflink=article_email_share.

17    On expenditure figures, see John E. Pike, “Iran—Military Spending,” Globalsecurity.org, updated July 20, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/budget.htm; “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

18    David Adesnik and Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Burning Bridge: The Iranian Land Corridor to the Mediterranean,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 18, 2019, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/06/18/burning-bridge/.

19    This funding includes up to $800 million for Hezbollah and $100 million combined for Hamas and Islamic Jihad annually. See Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, “Hezbollah Financial Assessment,” Terror Finance Briefing Book, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2017; David Adesnik, “Iran Spends $16 Billion Annually to Support Terrorists and Rogue Regimes,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 10, 2018, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/01/10/iran-spends-16-billion-annually-to-support-terrorists-and-rogue-regimes/; Daniel Levin, “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, July 9, 2018, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad. On missile strikes, see Shawn Snow, “Drone and Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia Underscore Need for More Robust Air Defenses,” Military Times, October 25, 2019, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/10/25/drone-and-missile-attacks-against-saudi-arabia-underscore-need-for-more-robust-air-defenses/. On ship attacks, see Michael Knights and Farzin Nadimi, “Curbing Houthi Attacks on Civilian Ships in the Bab Al-Mandab,” Washington Institute, July 27, 2018, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/curbing-houthi-attacks-on-civilian-ships-in-the-bab-al-mandab.

20    “Saudi Crown Prince Calls Iran Leader ‘New Hitler’: NYT,” Reuters, November 23, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-iran/saudi-crown-prince-calls-iran-leader-new-hitler-nyt-idUSKBN1DO0G3.

21    On the connection to PLO camps, see Tony Badran, “The Secret History of Hezbollah,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 18, 2013, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2013/11/18/the-secret-history-of-hezbollah/. On Hezbollah provision of social services, see Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3”, RAND Corporation, 2007, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178.html.

22    On Hezbollah fighting in Israel and against ISIL, see Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon: The Shiite Dimension,” Wilson Center, August 27, 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/lebanon-the-shiite-dimension. On Sunni attacks on Shia, see “Lebanon: Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project, November 1, 2019, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/lebanon. On Hezbollah protection of Shia sites, see Joseph Daher, “Hezbollah, the Lebanese Sectarian State, and Sectarianism,” Middle East Institute, April 13, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/hezbollah-lebanese-sectarian-state-and-sectarianism. For map of Hezbollah fighting, see “Hezbollah: A Recognized Terrorist Organization,” Israel Defense Forces, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/hezbollah/hezbollah/hezbollah-a-recognized-terrorist-organization/.

23    On recommendations, see Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, “Hezbollah Financial Assessment,” Terror Finance Briefing Book, Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2017.

24    On Hezbollah casualties, see Aryeh Savir, “Study: 1,139 Hezbollah Terrorists Killed While Fighting in Syria,” Jewish Press, March 28, 2019, https://www.jewishpress.com/news/us-news/study-1139-hezbollah-terrorists-killed-while-fighting-in-syria/2019/03/28/.

25    On protests, see Rebecca Collard, “Untouchable No More: Hezbollah’s Fading Reputation,” Foreign Policy, November 27, 2019 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/27/lebanon-protests-hezbollah-fading-reputation/.

26    On Hezbollah and the IDF, see William M. Arkin, “Divine Victory for Whom? Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 104–5. On the IRGC and Israel, see Daniel Levin, “Iran, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, July 9, 2018, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/jul/09/iran-hamas-and-palestinian-islamic-jihad; Michael Bachner and Toi Staff, “Iran Said Increasing Hamas Funding to $30m per Month, Wants Intel on Israel,” Times of Israel, August 5, 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-agrees-to-increase-hamas-funding-to-30-million-per-month-report/. On IRGC threat, see Ahmad Majidyar, “IRGC General: Any Future War Will Result in Israel’s Annihilation.” Middle East Institute, April 20, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/irgc-general-any-future-war-will-result-israels-annihilation.

27    For more on the ideology of the IRGC, see Ali Ansari and Kasra Aarabi, “Ideology and Iran’s Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World,” Tony Blair Institute, February 11, 2019, https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/ideology-and-irans-revolution-how-1979-changed-world. On losses in the Iran-Iraq War, see “Iran’s Networks of Influence in the Middle East,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2019, chap. 1: “Tehran’s Strategic Intent,” https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/iran-dossier/iran-19-03-ch-1-tehrans-strategic-intent.

28    On IDF strikes, see Joseph Hincks, “Israel Is Escalating Its Shadow War with Iran. Here’s What to Know,” Time, August 29, 2019, https://time.com/5664654/israel-iran-shadow-war/. For Israeli perspectives on this point, see TOI Staff, “Gantz Positive on Gaza Disengagement in First Interview, Drawing Right’s Ire,” Times of Israel, February 6, 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/gantz-positive-on-gaza-disengagement-in-first-interview-drawing-rights-ire/.

29    John Kifner, “400 Die as Iranian Marchers Battle Saudi Police in Mecca; Embassies Smashed in Tehran,” New York Times, August 2, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html?pagewanted=all.

30    On Sheikh’s execution, see Florence Gaub, “War of Words: Saudi Arabia v Iran,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, February 2016, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_2_Saudi_Arabia___Iran_01.pdf. On Sheikh’s charges, “Saudi Arabia Executes 47 on Terrorism Charges,” Al Jazeera, January 2, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/saudi-announces-execution-47-terrorists-160102072458873.html.

31    On U.S. efforts to mediate, see Jackie Northam, “Saudi Arabia Sought Dialogue with Iran. Then the U.S.-Iranian Conflict Escalated,” NPR, January 9, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/09/794519810/saudi-arabia-sought-dialogue-with-iran-then-the-u-s-iranian-conflict-escalated.

32    On the foiled 1987 attack, see John E. Pike, “Iran Ajr Class Landing Ship,” Globalsecurity.org, updated July 12, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/ajr.htm; Bradley Peniston, “Capturing the Iran Ajr,” Navybook.com, http://www.navybook.com/no-higher-honor/timeline/capturing-the-iran-ajr. On the Aramco cyber attack, see David E. Sanger, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age (New York: Crown, 2018), 51–52.

33    On Osama bin Laden, see Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Analysis: CIA Releases Massive Trove of Osama bin-Laden Files,” FDD’s Long War Journal, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 2017, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/11/analysis-cia-releases-massive-trove-of-osama-bin-ladens-files.php; Osama bin Laden, “Letter to Karim,” Files, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 18, 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/english/Letter%20to%20Karim.pdf. On the Chabahar attack, see “Deadly Bomb Attack in Iran City of Chabahar,” BBC News, December 15, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11997679. On the 2017 attacks, see “Islamic State Claims Stunning Attacks in Heart of Iran,” Associated Press, June 7, 2017, https://apnews.com/510f0af4615443c08ff7f52c2657bb76/Islamic-State-claims-attacks-on-Iran-parliament,-shrine. On the parade shooting, see Erin Cunningham and Bijan Sabbagh, “Gunmen Kill at Least 2 Dozen in Attack on Military Parade in Iran,” Washington Post, September 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/several-killed-at-least-20-injured-in-attack-on-military-parade-in-iran/2018/09/22/ec016b97-a889-4a7d-b402-479bd6858e0a_story.html.

34    For billboard quote, see Murray, The Iran-Iraq War, 263.

35    Kenneth D. Ward, “Statement by Ambassador Kenneth D. Ward,” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, November 2018, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/USA_0.pdf.

36    For more on the nuclear time line, see Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran”; Kelsey Davenport, “Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2003–2013,” Fact Sheets & Briefs, Arms Control Association, August 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.

37    For Bush quote, see Crist, Twilight War, 538.

38    Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say,” Washington Post, June 2, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html.

39    On the missile test explosion, see Crist, Twilight War, 552–53. On the nuclear scientist assassinations, see Sanger, The Perfect Weapon, 26.

40    On Khamenei’s vow of revenge, see “Qasem Soleimani: U.S. Kills Top Iranian General in Baghdad Air Strike,” BBC News, January 3, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-50979463. On the retaliatory rocket attack, see “Iraq,” International Crisis Group, January 12, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/iraq; Associated Press, “Military Contractor Slain in Iraq Buried in California,” New York Times, January 7, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/01/07/us/ap-us-iraq-attack-contractor.html.

41    Estimates range from 106 to 1,500. See Farnaz Fassihi and Rick Gladston, “With Brutal Crackdown, Iran Convulsed by Worst Unrest in 40 Years,” New York Times, December 3, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests-deaths.html; “Iran: Thousands Arbitrarily Detained and at Risk of Torture in Chilling Post-Protest Crackdown,” Amnesty International, December 16, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/iran-thousands-arbitrarily-detained-and-at-risk-of-torture-in-chilling-post-protest-crackdown/. On protest slogans, see Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Blocks Nearly All Internet Access,” New York Times, December 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/17/world/middleeast/iran-protest-rouhani.html; Lenah Hassaballah and Leen Alfaisal, “‘Death to the Dictator’: Iran Protests Intensify After Petrol Price Hike,” Al Arabiya English, November 16, 2019, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2019/11/16/-Severe-protests-erupt-in-Iran-after-petrol-price-hike-State-media.html.

42    Michael Safi, “Iran: Protests and Teargas as Public Anger Grows Over Aircraft Downing,” Guardian, January 13, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/12/iran-riot-police-anti-government-backlash-ukraine.

43    Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, “Seven Iranians Working for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Affiliated Entities Charged for Conducting Coordinated Campaign of Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sector,” Justice News, United States Department of Justice, March 24, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged.

44    On the Vincennes incident, see Crist, Twilight War, 369.

45    On the Iranian brain drain, see Ali Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1797, 407–9; Cincotta and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran in Transition: The Implications of the Islamic Republic’s Changing Demographics,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 18, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/18/iran-in-transition-implications-of-islamic-republic-s-changing-demographics-pub-75042. On Iranian military spending, see John E. Pike, “Iran—Military Spending,” Globalsecurity.org, updated July 20, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/budget.htm.

Chapter 11: The Definition of Insanity

1      On the 2002 visit, see James Kelly, “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” U.S. Department of State Archive, July 15, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm. On the light-water reactor, see International Atomic Energy Agency, “Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Information Circular, November 2, 1994, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1994/infcirc457.pdf.

2      Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Ecco, 2013), 292.

3      “Hyundai Chief Admits to N. Korean Summit Payoff—2003-02-16,” Voice of America, October 29, 2009, https://www.voanews.com/archive/hyundai-chief-admits-n-korean-summit-payoff-2003-02-16.

4      Adam Taylor, “Analysis: Why the Olympics Matter When It Comes to North Korea,” Washington Post, January 3, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/03/why-the-olympics-matter-when-it-comes-to-north-korea/.

5      Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 202–3. Lankov concludes that less than 35 percent of the salary went to the workers, and with an estimated annual revenue of up to 40 million, the KIZ was a major cash cow for the North Korean government.

6      International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA and DPRK: Chronology of Key Events,” July 25, 2014, www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/chronology-of-key-events.

7      Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test,” New York Times, May 25, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html.

8      On the submarine attack, see Victor Cha, “The Sinking of Cheonan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 22, 2010, https://www.csis.org/analysis/sinking-cheonan. On Yeonpyeong, see “North Korea Shells Southern Island, Two Fatalities Reported,” Korea JoongAng Daily, November 23, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11818005.

9      Siegfried Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” NAPSNet Special Report, Nautilus Institute, November 22, 2010, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-return-trip-to-north-koreas-yongbyon-nuclear-complex/.

10    Michael Rubin, Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes (New York: Encounter Books, 2014), 129–30.

11    Jimmy Carter, “Listen to North Korea,” Carter Center, November 23, 2010, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/editorials_speeches/jc-listen-to-north-korea.html.

12    Carter, “Listen to North Korea.” For President Obama’s remarks, see “Obama, Barack H., Public Papers,” Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama, 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2015), 2:1265.

13    Jong Kun Choi, “The Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 4 (2016): 57–72.

14    Gerald F. Seib, Jay Solomon, and Carol E. Lee, “Barack Obama Warns Donald Trump on North Korea Threat,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-faces-north-korean-challenge-1479855286.

15    Benjamin Haas, “South Korea: Former President Park Geun-Hye Sentenced to 24 Years in Jail,” Guardian, April 6, 2018, www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/06/former-south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-guilty-of-corruption.

16    Uri Friedman, “The ‘God Damn’ Tree that Nearly Brought America and North Korea to War,” The Atlantic, June 12, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/axe-murder-north-korea-1976/562028/.

17    See Anna Fifield, The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 16–19.

18    Central Intelligence Agency, “Consequences of U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949,” CIA, February 28, 1949, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000258388.pdf.

19    James Forrestal in his diary entry on April 25, 1947, as quoted in Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017). 178-179. In 1947, the Joint Chiefs had already assessed Korea as unworthy of a protracted American presence. See William Stueck and Boram Yi, “‘An Alliance Forged in Blood’: The American Occupation of Korea, the Korean War, and the U.S.–South Korean Alliance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 2 (2010), 177–209.

20    In one of Kim Il-sung’s appeals to Stalin for support of the North’s aggression toward the South the North Korean leader gave as a reason that the war would end rapidly before the United States could intervene. Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series (1993): 28–31.

21    CIA, “Consequences.”

22    John Quincy Adams, “An Address Delivered at the Request of a Commission of Citizens of Washington; on the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence” (Washington, DC: Davis and Force, 1821), 29. It reads: “Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”

23    United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, “Country Profile: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” and “Country Profile: Republic of Korea,” https://unstats.un.org/UNSD/snaama/CountryProfile?ccode=408 and https://unstats.un.org/UNSD/snaama/CountryProfile?ccode=408. South Korea held a GDP of $1.5 trillion in 2017, compared to the North’s $13 billion.

24    Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Country Profile: North Korea,” OEC, https://oec.world/en/profile/country/prk/

25    Summarized from Lankov, The Real North Korea, 32–33.

26    Andrei Lankov, “Fiasco of 386 Generation,” Korea Times, February 5, 2008, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2008/04/180_18529.html.

27    Fifield, The Great Successor, 88.

28    Julian Ryall, “Kim Jong Un Was Child Prodigy Who Could Drive at Age of Three, Claims North Korean School Curriculum.” Telegraph, April 10, 2015, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11526831/Kim-Jong-un-was-child-prodigy-who-could-drive-at-age-of-three-claims-North-Korean-school-curriculum.html.

29    Fifield, The Great Successor, 203–5.

30    Institute for National Security Strategy, “The Misgoverning of Kim Jong Un’s Five Years in Power (김정은 집권 5년 실정 백서),” December 2016, http://www.inss.re.kr/contents/publications_yc.htm

31    Choe Sang-Hun, “In Hail of Bullets and Fire, North Korea Killed Official Who Wanted Reform,” New York Times, March 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/world/asia/north-korea-executions-jang-song-thaek.html.

32    Justin McCurry, “North Korea Defence Chief Reportedly Executed with Anti-aircraft Gun,” Guardian, May 13, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/13/north-korean-defence-minister-executed-by-anti-aircaft-gun-report.

33    Lankov, The Real North Korea, 43–44.

34    Fifield, The Great Successor, 124–27.

35    Summary based on Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Fact Sheets & Briefs, Arms Control Association, November 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2016.

36    Ministry of Justice, “Immigration and Foreigner Policy Monthly Statistics (출입국·외국인정책 통계월보),” December 2018, http://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=38330&call_from=rsslink.

37    Later, China would extort concessions from South Korea in exchange for lifting those sanctions imposed over THAAD. See David Voldzko, “China Wins Its War Against South Korea’s U.S. THAAD Missile Shield—Without Firing a Shot,” South China Morning Post, November 18, 2017, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile.

38    Ankit Panda, “U.S. Intelligence: North Korea’s Sixth Test Was a 140 Kiloton ‘Advanced Nuclear’ Device,’” The Diplomat, September 6, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/us-intelligence-north-koreas-sixth-test-was-a-140-kiloton-advanced-nuclear-device/.

39    Donald Trump, @realDonaldTrump, “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man . . . Save your energy Rex, we’ll do what has to be done!” Twitter, October 1, 2017, 6:31 a.m. https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914497947517227008.

Chapter 12: Making Him Safer Without Them

1      Choe Sang-Hun, “Happy Birthday, Trump Tells Kim. Not Enough, North Korea Says,” New York Times, January 11, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-birthday.html.

2      For more on Japan’s rapid economic expansion, see Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number 1: Lessons for America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 9–10.

3      “Full Text of Abe’s Speech before U.S. Congress,” Japan Times. April 30, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/04/30/national/politics-diplomacy/full-text-abes-speech-u-s-congress/#.XhQ_P0dKiMo.

4      On the San Francisco system and the emergence of the post–World War II security architecture in Asia, see Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

5      Macrotrends, “South Korea GDP 1960–2020,” https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/gdp-gross-domestic-product. See also, Macrotrends, “South Korea Life Expectancy 1950–2020,” https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/KOR/south-korea/life-expectancy.

6      World Bank, “Access to Electricity (% of Population)—Korea, Dem. People’s Rep,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=KP. See also, Rick Newman, “Here’s How Lousy Life Is in North Korea,” U.S. News, April 12, 2013, https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-lousy-life-is-in-north-korea

7      Elizabeth Shim, “Stunted Growth, Acute Anemia Persists in North Korean Children, Says Report,” United Press International, September 18, 2015, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/09/18/Stunted-growth-acute-anemia-persists-in-North-Korean-children-says-report/4351442628108/.

8      As Xi Jinping confidant Liu Mingfu told Japanese reporter Kenji Minemura, “Now is the time for Japan to escape from an excessive dependence on the United States and ‘return to Asia.’ With China breaking through the efforts by the United States to contain it, Japan should move away from being controlled by the United States and cooperate with China to create a new order in East Asia,” Kenji Minemura, “Interview: Liu Mingfu: China Dreams of Overtaking U.S. in Thirty Years,” Asahi Shimbun, May 28, 2019, http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201905280016.html.

9      David Lai and Alyssa Blair, “How to Learn to Live with a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/how-to-learn-to-live-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/.

10    See Kim Jong-un, “Let Us March Forward Dynamically Towards Final Victory, Holding Higher the Banner of Songun,” April 15, 2012, 9, http://www.korean-books.com.kp/KBMbooks/ko/work/leader3/1202.pdf.

11    Chong Bong-uk, Uneasy, Shaky Kim Jong-il Regime (Seoul, South Korea: Naewoe Press, 1997), 17. See also Kim Tae-woon et al., “Analysis on the Practical Characteristics of Kim Jong-Il Era’s Major Ruling Narratives (김정일 시대 주요 통치담론의 실천상 특징에 관한 고찰), Unification Policy Studies (2006) 27-31, http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/1610/1/0001423170.pdf.

12    Jeffrey Lewis, “North Korea Is Practicing for Nuclear War,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/09/north-korea-is-practicing-for-nuclear-war/.

13    Cha, The Impossible State, 216.

14    United States Congress, “U.S. Congress Resolution Condemning North Korea for the Abductions and Continued Captivity of Citizens of the ROK and Japan as Acts of Terrorism and Gross Violations of Human Rights,” 109th Congress, 2005, https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/168.

15    See Robert S. Boynton, “North Korea’s Abduction Project,” The New Yorker, December 21, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-koreas-abduction-project.

16    See Cha, The Impossible State, 238–39.

17    More on North Korea’s nuclear blackmail: Tristan Volpe, “The Unraveling of North Korea’s Proliferation Blackmail Strategy,” Kim Sung Chull et al., eds. North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: Entering the New Era of Deterrence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 73–88. See also Patrick McEachern, “More than Regime Survival,” North Korean Review 14, no. 1 (2018): 115–18.

18    Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, “No Longer a Secret: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Nuclear Reactor,” Haaretz, March 23, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAGAZINE-no-longer-a-secret-how-israel-destroyed-syria-s-nuclear-reactor-1.5914407.

19    Toi Staff, “North Korea Offered Israel a Halt to Its Missile Sales to Iran for $1b—Report.” Times of Israel, July 9, 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/north-korea-offered-israel-a-halt-to-its-missile-sales-to-iran-for-1b-report/.

20    Michael Schwirtz, “U.N. Links North Korea to Syria’s Chemical Weapons Program,” New York Times, February 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-syria-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html; see also Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade: The Proliferation Threat from Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-06/north-koreas-illegal-weapons-trade.

21    On the smuggling of weapons, see United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” United Nations Security Council, 2019, 4, https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/171. For more on North Korea’s Iran and Syria connections, see Bruce Bechtol Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade.”

22    On Trump administration strategy on North Korea in 2017, see Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea—Seoul, Republic of Korea,” Remarks, The White House, November 7, 2017, whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national-assembly-republic-korea-seoul-republic-korea/; James Jeffrey, “What If H.R. McMaster Is Right About North Korea?” The Atlantic, January 18, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/hr-mcmaster-might-be-right-about-north-korea/550799/; Duane Patterson, “National Security Advisor General H. R. McMaster on MSNBC with Hugh,” HughHewitt.com, August 5, 2017, https://www.hughhewitt.com/national-security-advisor-general-h-r-mcmaster-msnbc-hugh/#.

23    “Kim Yong-chol: North Korea’s Controversial Olympics Delegate.” BBC News, February 23, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43169604.

24    A South Korean newspaper claimed that Kim Jong-un had stated his preference for Vietnam-style economic opening over the Chinese model during his summit with President Moon in 2018. See Park Ui-myung and Choi Mira, “North Korean Leader Envisions Vietnam-like Opening for North Korea: Source,” Pulse, May 4, 2018, https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2018&no=285653. See also John Reed and Bryan Harris, “North Korea Turns to Vietnam for Economic Ideas,” Financial Times, November 28, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/c8a4fc68-f2cd-11e8-ae55-df4bf40f9d0d.

25    On the masters of money and on Dennis Rodman, see Fifield, The Great Successor, 142–43 and 174–80.

26    Jeong Yong-soo et al., “Donju Are Princes of North Korean Economy,” Korea JoongAng Daily, October 18, 2019, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3054069.

27    See Trump’s tweet: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1160158591518674945?s=20.

28    White House, “Remarks by President Trump after Meeting with Vice Chairman Kim Yong Chol of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Remarks, The White House, June 1, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-vice-chairman-kim-yong-chol-democratic-peoples-republic-korea/.

29    See Trump tweet referring to North Korea’s potential to become an “economic powerhouse” and Kim as a “capable leader”: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1094035813820784640?s=20.

30    Roberta Rampton, “‘We Fell in Love’: Trump Swoons over Letters from North Korea’s Kim,” Reuters, September 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-trump/we-fell-in-love-trump-swoons-over-letters-from-north-koreas-kim-idUSKCN1MA03Q.

31    Jordan Fabian, “Trump Says Kim Not Responsible for Otto Warmbier’s Death: ‘I Will Take Him at His Word,’” The Hill, February 28, 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/431962-trump-says-kim-not-responsible-for-otto-warmbiers-death-i-will-take.

32    For the full speech, see “Address by President Moon Jae-in at May Day Stadium in Pyeongyang,” Chung Wa Dae, https://english1.president.go.kr/briefingspeeches/speeches/70.

33    Fifield, The Great Successor, 277.

34    Eric Beech, “N. Korea Wanted Most Sanctions Lifted in Exchange for Partial Yongbyon Closure—U.S. Official,” Reuters, February 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-usa-briefing/nkorea-wanted-most-sanctions-lifted-in-exchange-for-partial-yongbyon-closure-us-official-idUSL3N20O1I7.

35    Timothy Martin, “North Korea Fires Insults at U.S., Spares Trump,” Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-fires-insults-at-u-s-spares-trump-11560596401?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1.

36    KCNA Watch, “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” KNCA Watch, January 1, 2020, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1577829999-473709661/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk/.

37    The National Committee on North Korea, “Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year Address,” NCNK, January 1, 2019, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf/file_view.

38    Choe, “Happy Birthday, Trump Tells Kim,” New York Times [date] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/world/asia/trump-kim-jong-un-birthday.html.

39    See David Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Tests New Weapon,” New York Times, April 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/world/asia/north-korea-missile-weapons-test.html; and BBC News, “North Korea: Kim Jong-un Oversees ‘Strike Drill’ Missile Component Test,” BBC, May 5, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48165793.

40    Choe Sang-Hun, “New North Korean Missile Comes with Angry Message to South Korea’s President,” New York Times, July 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/world/asia/north-korea-missile-moon-jae-in.html.

41    Neil Connor and Nicola Smith, “Beijing Forced to Defend Trade with North Korea after Chinese-made Truck Used to Showcase Missiles,” Telegraph, April 18, 2017, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/china-made-truck-used-showcase-missiles-north-korea-parade/. Also, North Korean Economy Watch, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” NKEW, 4, http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/UN-Panel-of-Experts-NORK-Report-May-2011.pdf

42    On training of DPRK hackers in China, see Kong Ji Young et al., “The All-Purpose Sword: North Korea’s Cyber Operations and Strategies,” Eleventh International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2019, 14–15, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_08_The-All-Purpose-Sword.pdf. On the effect of sanctions, see Mathew Ha, “U.S. Sanctions North Korean Companies for Profiting from Overseas Slave Labor,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, January 15, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/01/15/us-sanctions-north-korean-companies-for-profiting-from-overseas-slave-labor/.

43    Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma,” Cornell International Law Journal 57 (2018): 51, https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/ILJ/upload/Bechtol-final.pdf.

44    “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th C.C. WPK,” KNCA Watch, January 1, 2020, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1577829999-473709661/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk/.

45    UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations Human Rights Council, 15, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx

46    Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), 76–81.

47    For more, see Ben Dooley and Choe Sang-Hun, “Japan Imposes Broad New Trade Restrictions on South Korea,” New York Times, August 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/business/japan-south-korea-trade.html.

48    Andy Greenberg, “Silicon Valley Has a Few Ideas for Undermining Kim Jong-un,” Wired, March 10, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/03/silicon-valley-ideas-undermining-kim-jong-un/.

49    Lankov, The Real North Korea, 252–54.

50    Lankov, The Real North Korea, 254–58.

Chapter 13: Entering the Arena

1      Damon Wilson and Maks Czuperski, Digital Resilience, Hybrid Threats, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Atlantic Council, December 20, 2017, in possession of author. This report details the sustained Twitter campaign #FireMcMaster, and concludes that the majority of participants in this campaign were bots coming from alt-right sources of disinformation.

2      William Clinton, “Speech on China Trade Bill,” Speech, Washington, DC, March 8, 2000, https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_China_Trade_Bi.htm.

3      Adrian Shahbaz, “Freedom on the Net 2018: The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism,” Freedomhouse.org, November 16, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2018/rise-digital-authoritarianism.

4      Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military,” New York Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html.

5      On technology’s effect on children, see Nicholas Kardaras, Glow Kids: How Screen Addiction Is Hijacking Our Kids—and How to Break the Trance (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2017). On the rise of addictive technology, see Adam L. Alter, Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked (New York: Penguin Books, 2018).

6      Emerson T. Brooking and Suzanne Kianpour, “Iranian Digital Influence Efforts: Guerrilla Broadcasting for the Twenty-First Century,” Atlantic Council, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/IRAN-DIGITAL.pdf.

7      Tae-jun Kang, “North Korea’s Influence Operations, Revealed,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/north-koreas-influence-operations-revealed/.

8      On Hong Kong, see Louise Matsakis, “China Attacks Hong Kong Protesters with Fake Social Posts,” Wired, October 19, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/china-twitter-facebook-hong-kong-protests-disinformation/. On Taiwan, see Raymond Zhong, “Awash in Disinformation Before Vote, Taiwan Points Finger at China,” New York Times, January 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/technology/taiwan-election-china-disinformation.html.

9      Madeleine Carlisle, “New Orleans Declared a State of Emergency and Took Down Servers After Cyber Attack,” Time, December 14, 2019, https://time.com/5750242/new-orleans-cyber-attack/.

10    James Clapper, “The Battle for Cybersecurity,” Keynote Presentation, ICF CyberSci Symposium 2017, Fairfax, VA, September 28, 2017.

11    Todd C. Lopez, “Cyber Command Expects Lessons from 2018 Midterms to Apply in 2020,” U.S. Department of Defense. February 14, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1758488/cyber-command-expects-lessons-from-2018-midterms-to-apply-in-2020/.

12    United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Armed Services Committee, “Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities,” 115th Congress, 75 (statement of Jason Healey, Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, 2017), https://govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24680/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg24680.pdf.

13    Mia Shuang Li, “Google’s Dragonfly Will Intensify Surveillance on Journalists in China,” Columbia Journalism Review, December 11, 2018, https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/dragonfly-censorship-google-china.php.

14    John Noble Wilford, “With Fear and Wonder in Its Wake, Sputnik Lifted Us into the Future,” New York Times, September 25, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/science/space/25sput.html; Larry Abramson, “Sputnik Left Legacy for U.S. Science Education,” NPR, September 30, 2007, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14829195.

15    Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, “Reflections on Post–Cold War Issues for International Space Cooperation,” Smithsonian, May 23, 2010, https://airandspace.si.edu/stories/editorial/reflections-post-cold-war-issues-international-space-cooperation.

16    “Challenges to Security in Space,” Defense Intelligence Agency, January 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.

17    On anti-satellite weapons, see “Counterspace Capabilities,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, August 6, 2018, https://www.unidir.org/files/medias/pdfs/counterspace-capabilities-backgrounder-eng-0-771.pdf.

18    Comments from the author at the National Space Council’s inaugural meeting, October 5, 2017.

19    Sean Kelly, “China Is Infiltrating U.S. Space Industry with Investments,” The Hill, Peter Greenberger, December 26, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/422870-chinese-is-infiltrating-us-space-industry-with-investments-and.

20    Yaakov Lappin, “Chinese Company Set to Manage Haifa’s Port, Testing U.S.-Israeli Alliance,” South Florida Sun Sentinel, January 29, 2019, https://www.sun-sentinel.com/florida-jewish-journal/fl-jj-chinese-company-set-manage-haifa-port-20190206-story.html.

21    Samm Sacks and Justin Sherman, “Global Data Governance: Concepts, Obstacles, and Prospects,” New America, https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/global-data-governance/.

22    Department of Defense, “Missile Defense Review,” 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.

23    “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord” Remarks, The White House, June 1, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.

24    Patrick Herhold and Emily Farnworth, “The Net-Zero Challenge: Global Climate Action at a Crossroads (Part 1),” World Economic Forum in collaboration with Boston Consulting Group, December 2019, https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-net-zero-challenge-global-climate-action-at-a-crossroads-part-1.

25    Richard Muller, Energy for Future Presidents: The Science Behind the Headlines (W. W. Norton and Company, 2012).

26    Steve Inskeep and Ashley Westerman Inskeep. “Why Is China Placing a Global Bet on Coal?” NPR, April 19, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/04/29/716347646/why-is-china-placing-a-global-bet-on-coal; author’s calculation based on a 1000 MWe coal plant. See Jordan Hanania et al., “Energy Education—Coal Fired Power Plant,” EnergyEducation.CA, February 14, 2019, https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Coal_fired_power_plant.

27    David Obura, “Kenya’s Most Polluting Coal Plant Could Poison Coastline,” Climate Change News, September 20, 2017, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2017/09/20/kenyas-polluting-coal-plant-poison-coastline/.

28    John Mandyck and Eric Schultz, Food Foolish: The Hidden Connection Between Food Waste, Hunger, and Climate Change (Carrier Corp., 2015).

29    Note: Migration is taking a psychological as well as a physical toll, encouraging a populist turn in the polities of those nations most effected.

30    Muller, Energy for Future Presidents, 260.

31    Note: NITI Aayog, a “prominent government think tank,” claimed that “More than 600 million Indians face ‘acute water shortages.’” Seventy percent of the nation’s water supply has been contaminated, which results in about 200,000 deaths every year. About two dozen cities could run out of groundwater entirely by next year, and about 40 percent of India will have “no access to drinking water” by 2030. James Temple. “India’s Water Crisis Is Already Here. Climate Change Will Compound It,” MIT Technology Review, April 24, 2019, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613344/indias-water-crisis-is-already-here-climate-change-will-compound-it/.

32    Muller, Energy for Future Presidents.

33    Mandyck and Schultz, Food Foolish.

34    Eliza Barclay and Brian Resnick, “How Big Was the Global Climate Strike? 4 Million People, Activists Estimate,” Vox, September 22, 2019, https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/9/20/20876143/climate-strike-2019-september-20-crowd-estimate.

35    “‘No Planet B’: Millions Take to Streets in Global Climate Strike,” Al Jazeera, September 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/planet-thousands-join-global-climate-strike-asia-190920040636503.html.

36    Elizabeth Weise, “On World Environment Day, Everything You Know About Energy in the U.S. Might Be Wrong,” USA Today, June 4, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/06/04/climate-change-coal-now-more-expensive-than-wind-solar-energy/1277637001/.

37    Alison St. John, “A Better Nuclear Power Plant?,” KPBS, May 21, 2012, https://www.kpbs.org/news/2012/may/21/better-nuclear-power-plant/.

38    World Nuclear Association, “Plans for New Reactors Worldwide,” updated January 2020, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx.

39    Bloomberg, “Made-in-China Reactor Gains Favor at Home as U.S. Nuclear Technology Falters,” Japan Times, April 2, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/02/business/corporate-business/made-china-reactor-gains-favor-home-u-s-nuclear-technology-falters/#.Xi6NWBNKiCW.

40    Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 85.

Conclusion

1      Paraphrased from H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: Harper Perennial, 1997), ix.

2      McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 180–96.

3      McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 260.

4      McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 156.

5      My belief was consistent with Professor Richard Betts’s definition of strategy as “the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable. It is the link between military means and political ends, the scheme for how to make one produce the other. Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure.” See Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security (Fall 2000), http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/strategy_betts.pdf.

6      Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & C., 1918).

7      Conrad Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).

8      Hew Strachan, “Strategy and the Limitation of War,” Survival 50, no. 1 (February/March 2008): 31–54, DOI: 10.1080/00396330801899470. See also Hew Strachan, The Direction of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 54–55.

9      On North Vietnam’s response, see Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 413.

10    Speech to the American Historical Association, December 28, 1939, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/speech-to-the-american-historical-association/.

11    E. J. Dionne Jr., “Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome,” Washington Post, March 4, 1991.

12    John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 121 and 41.

13    Kelsey Piper, “George Soros and Charles Koch Team Up for a Common Cause: An End to ‘Endless War,’” Vox, July 1, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/7/1/20677441/soros-koch-end-interventionist-wars-military; Nahal Toosi, “Koch Showers Millions on Think Tanks to Push a Restrained Foreign Policy,” Politico, February 13, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/13/charles-koch-grants-foreign-policy-think-tanks-114898; Beverly Gage, “The Koch Foundation Is Trying to Reshape Foreign Policy. With Liberal Allies,” New York Times Magazine, September 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/10/magazine/charles-koch-foundation-education.html.

14    Paul D. Miller, “H-Diplo/ISSF State of the Field Essay: On the Unreality of Realism in International Relations,” H-Diplo, October 2, 2019, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/4846080/h-diploissf-state-field-essay-unreality-realism-international. For another trenchant critique of this school of thought, see Hal Brands, “Retrenchment Chic: The Dangers of Offshore Balancing,” SSRN August 2015, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737594.

15    For an essay that contains all these arguments, by a director of research at the Soros-Koch–funded Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, see Stephen Wertheim, “The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, 19–29.

16    John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty” (London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1859).

17    The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

18    Both quotations are from Ronald Granieri, “What Is Geopolitics and Why Does It Matter?” Foreign Policy Research Institute (Fall 2015), 492, https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/10/what-is-geopolitics-and-why-does-it-matter/. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

19    For a succinct discussion of both forms of deterrence, see A. Wess Mitchell, “The Case for Deterrence by Denial,” The American Interest, August 12, 2015, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/12/the-case-for-deterrence-by-denial/.

20    For benefits of alliances, see Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier, 117–54.

21    Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 165–66.

22    Fukuyama, Identity, 170–71.

23    For the connection between income inequality and opportunity inequality and the importance of education, see Robert D. Putnam, Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015), esp. 227–61.

24    Paul Reynolds, “History’s Other Great Relief Effort,” BBC, January 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4164321.stm.

25    Zachary Shore, “The Spirit of Sputnik: Will America Ever Fund Education Again?” Medium, September 3, 2018, https://medium.com/@zshore/the-spirit-of-sputnik-881b8f720736.