33. Kirk Simone, Kansas Highway Patrol, EPIC Operation Pipeline: Passenger Vehicle Drug Interdiction, 2, 4, http://norml.org/pdf_files/brief_bank/Operation_Pipeline_Manual.pdf; Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2002): 670–77, 685 (quoting Cal. State Assembly Democratic Caucus Task Force on Gov’t Oversight, Operation Pipeline: California Joint Legislative Task Force Report (1999), 13, https://web.archive.org/web/20010127120300/www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html); see also Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2001):
Once a vehicle is stopped, he explained, [Operation] Valkyrie officers look for indicators of drug trafficking. These indicators are numerous—indeed there is a list of twenty-eight factors in the Operation Valkyrie training manual—and include such things as too little or too much luggage for the stated length of trip, maps from drug source cities or states, and air freshener. Officers are also trained to look for verbal and non-verbal signs of stress and deception, such as nervousness and an overly friendly demeanor. [Operation Valkyrie coordinator] Snyders testified that when Valkyrie officers observe these indicators, they are trained to request consent to search the vehicle. In 1992, Valkyrie officers requested permission to search in approximately fourteen percent of motorist stops, and when requested, over ninety-eight percent of motorists granted consent.
34. Mike German and Jay Stanley, Fusion Center Update (2008), 1–4, 6, www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 101–117, Gill v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 3:14-cv-03120-RS (KAW) (N.D. Cal. filed July 10, 2014), 2014 WL 3374708 (Boston); About the NSI, National SAR Initiative, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx.
35. Carter Letter to Bailey, ACLU.
36. See Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, supra note 25 (focusing in part on the problem of implicit bias in policing); Chris Mooney, “The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men,” Mother Jones, Dec. 1, 2014, www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/science-of-racism-prejudice (explaining the prevalence of implicit bias in policing); Jason Zengerle, “Michael Brown’s Death Was Shocking. So Are the Racial Profiling Stats We’ve Been Ignoring,” New Republic, Aug. 13, 2014, www.newrepublic.com/article/119071/michael-brown-shooting-we-know-about-racial-profiling-dont-act (noting incidence of racial profiling by Ferguson police in the wake of Michael Brown shooting); Friedersdorf, “Eyes Over Compton,” supra note 7; Reid, “Grounding Drones,” supra note 20; Bosman and Apuzzo, “In Wake of Clashes, Calls to Demilitarize Police,” supra note 8; Stillman, “Taken,” supra note 26, at 3 (highlighting abuses of civil forfeiture laws).
37. Nat’l Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., The 9/11 Commission Report, 400, 408 (2004) (using the phrase “connect the dots” to describe intelligence failure in the run-up to 9/11).
38. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 16, §§ 900–99; id. tit. 21 §§ 2205, 2207; Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 20; id. R.20-13,001,-32.006.
39. Florida’s law contains a few scattered provisions giving guidance regarding warrantless searches, e.g. Fla. Stat. § 901.151 (governing stop and frisk); id. § 901.21 (regarding strip searches), but many are explicit or implicit codifications of Supreme Court precedent, e.g., id. § 901.21 (regarding search of arrestees); id. § 933.19 (regarding vehicle searches). In California, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, S.B. 178, which creates a warrant requirement for digital searches. Otherwise, the state laws remain largely devoid of guidance or restraint, with few exceptions such as the constitutionally required suppression of evidence obtained unreasonably without a warrant, Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5, and a prohibition against warrantless “physical body cavity search[es]” for infraction or misdemeanor arrestees. Cal. Penal Code § 4030(h).
40. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 533(1); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484B.570 (West); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 837.310–65; N.Y.C. Law § 435.
41. Chi. Police Dep’t, Chicago Police Department Directives System, http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives; City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department Manual, www.seattle.gov/police-manual; The Function and Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. Police Dep’t, www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900.
42. Carol S. Steiker, “Second Thoughts About First Principles,” Harv. L. Rev. 107 (1994): 831, 834–35 (citing David R. Johnson, Policing the Urban Underworld: The Impact of Crime on the Development of the American Police, 1800–1887 (1979), 48); Edward L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th Century American South (1984), 88; Egon Bittner, Aspects of Police Work (1990), 117; Eric H. Monkkonen, Police in Urban America, 1860–1920 (2004), 42–44; Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform (1977), 25–28, 39, 55–56, 70–75; Jerome H. Skolnick and James H. Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force (1993), 175.
43. Samuel Walker, Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice (1998), 195–96; The Kerner Report: The 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968; repr. 1988), 206, 299; Skolnick and Fyfe, Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force, supra note 42, at 82–83; The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A Report by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), 99–102; Lee P. Brown, “Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials,” Perspectives on Policing, Sept. 1989, at 5, www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/118001.pdf.
44. Wesley G. Skogan, “Why Reform Fails,” Policing & Soc’y, 28–29 (2008): 26; Dan Baum, “Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs,” Harper’s, Apr. 2016, http://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/; Sandy Banks, “The Crack Epidemic’s Toxic Legacy,” L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/07/local/la-me-banks-20100807; Dennis Romero, “The Militarization of Police Started in Los Angeles,” L.A. Weekly, Aug. 15, 2014, 6:04 a.m., www.laweekly.com/news/the-militarization-of-police-started-in-los-angeles-5010287.
45. Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, “Democratic Policing,” N.Y.U. L. Rev. 90 (2015): 1871–73.
46. See, e.g., David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001); Friedman and Ponomarenko, “Democratic Policing,” supra note 45, at 1865–75; Reid, “Grounding Drones,” supra note 20, at 1, 8, 9; Milton J. Valencia, “Police Defend Use of Military-Style Equipment,” Bos. Globe, Aug. 16, 2014, at B1.
47. I am not alone in this, although my meaning is somewhat specific. For an excellent parallel approach to the question, see Christopher Stone and Heather H. Ward, “Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,” Policing & Soc’y 10 (2000): 11–45.
48. Office of the Federal Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.
49. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
50. Ta-Nehisi Coates makes this point, provocatively: “The problem with the police is not that they are fascist pigs, but that our country is ruled by majoritarian pigs.” Coates, Between the World and Me, supra note 29 at 78.
51. That is the theme of Larry Kramer’s book by this title. Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2005).
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
53. Daniel Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,” San Diego L. Rev. 44 (2007): 746, 748–53; Daniel Solove, “Why Privacy Matters Even if You Have ‘Nothing to Hide,’” The Chronicle, May 15, 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Privacy-Matters-Even-if/127461; CNBC Prime, “Inside the Mind of Google,” YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=u02h9LYYmuc.
54. Polly Sprenger, “Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’” Wired, Jan. 26, 1999, http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538; Natasha Singer, “Sharing Data, but Not Happily,” N.Y. Times, June 4, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/technology/consumers-conflicted-over-data-mining-policies-report-finds.html.
55. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
56. Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (2006); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J. dissenting); Ex Parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243 (1864); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810, in The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (1905), 11:146, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_3s8.html.
57. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (citing “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” as advantages of a unitary executive that promote “energy” in that position). For more on the importance of constitutional commitments, the works of Stephen Holmes are instructive. E.g., Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995); Stephen Holmes, “In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror,” Calif. L. Rev. 97 (2009): 301.
58. Holmes, “In Case of Emergency,” supra note 57, at 301–2. See generally Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right (2009).
59. Carl Matthies, Vera Institute of Justice, Advancing the Quality of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Justice Programs (2014), 1, www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/advancing-the-quality-of-cba.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Holmes, “In Case of Emergency,” supra note 57.
61. E.g., Rachel Blade, “Criminal Justice Reform Gains Bipartisan Momentum,” Politico, Jul. 15, 2015, 5:15 a.m., www.politico.com/story/2015/07/criminal-justice-reform-gains-bipartisan-momentum-120125.html.