2
Maslahah as a Political Concept
ASMA AFSARUDDIN
THE ARABIC TERM Maslahah is usually translated as “welfare,” “public interest or utility,” and “common good” in various contexts. A single, concise definition is not possible in English, but all the above meanings may be encompassed by the Arabic term. At the basic semantic level, maslahah connotes being the source of what is sound, beneficial, and conducive to peace (sulh).
In premodern Islamic thought, maslahah was considered primarily a juridical term. In the early centuries of Islam, the term istislah appears to have been more common than maslahah. Istislah was a procedure common among the Medinese jurists, including Malik b. Anas (d. 795), and among the Iraqi Hanafis of the eighth century. These jurists relied heavily on reasoning and discretionary opinion (ra’y) in order to devise legal rulings that promoted the public interest in the absence of specific scriptural injunctions (Hallaq 2005, 145). Early sources confirm widespread recourse to istislah to derive legal rulings in the second and third centuries of Islam. Thus Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Khwarazmi (d. after 997) lists istislah in his well-known work Mafatih al-ulum as one of the sources of law for the Maliki school (1895, 9). The gifted belletrist and secretary Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (d. ca. 757) recommends the use of istislah by jurists in the absence of specific textual prescriptions to derive legal rulings (1966, 360).
By the eleventh century, maslahah appears to have become the preferred term to connote public interest or good and became foregrounded as a juridical principle in relation to the “objectives of the law” (maqasid al-shari‘a). The impetus for this further development of the principle of maslahah was provided by the Shafi‘i jurist Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 1111) in his work al-Mustasfa min ilm al-usul. Al-Ghazali divides the objectives of the law into two types: religious (dini) and worldly (dunyawi). Both types of objectives are concerned with securing (tahsil) and preserving (ibqa’) the public interest or maslahah. Maslahah is thus ultimately what allows for the acquisition of benefit (manfa‘ah) and the avoidance of harm or injury (madarrah) (al-Ghazali 1877, 1:286).
The worldly objectives of the shari‘a are distilled by al-Ghazali into “five necessities” (al-daruriyat al-khamsah), which guarantee, for each individual, preservation of religion (din), life (nafs), progeny (nasl), intellect (aql), and property (mal). These primary objectives of the law are followed by supplementary objectives in descending order of importance: “needs” (hajat) and “ease” (tawassu‘ and taysir) (al-Ghazali 1877, 1:161–62). Al-Ghazali’s concept of maslahah and its link to the maqasid al-shari‘a proved to be seminal and was discussed by practically every major jurist afterward, especially al-Tufi (d. 1316) and al-Shatibi (d. 1388). These concepts have enjoyed a resurgence in the contemporary period as the notion of the shari‘a and its objectives are revisited, particularly by modernists and reformists.
Maslahah as a Political Concept in the Early Period
In comparison with its use as a juridical term, maslahah as a political concept per se receives scant discussion in the early literature. Its pervasiveness as a political concept has to be inferred from various genres of works that discuss the early caliphate as a historical phenomenon and conceptualize legitimate political leadership. The term maslahah or istislah need not be explicitly used for us to be able to assert that it was a principle broadly recognized in the early period in the sense that al-Ghazali had defined it in the legal context in the eleventh century, that is, as a principle that allowed for the acquisition of benefit (manfa‘ah) and the avoidance of harm or injury (madarrah).
Three primary types of literature have been consulted in this chapter to determine the importance of maslahah as a general political and social organizational principle in the premodern period: historical works, Qur’an exegetical works, and political treatises. Some of these works are now discussed in greater detail below.
Historical and Exegetical Works: Sunni Views
Most Sunni historical works present the institution of the office of the caliph as a pragmatic response to the special circumstances that ensued after the sudden death of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina in 632 CE. As the sources inform us, it was clear to a majority of the Companions that no successor had been explicitly designated by the Prophet. The Companions were confused as to how to proceed to select a leader and maintain political stability. A significant number of people converged at a portico in Medina to attend a hastily convened meeting in order to select a leader. The procedure, the sources tell us, entailed debating rather noisily and heatedly the merits of some of the obvious contenders for the office of the caliph, who included Abu Bakr, Umar, and Ali, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. The matter was resolved by Umar’s offering his allegiance to Abu Bakr, his older friend, and asking the crowd to follow suit. According to several sources, Umar prefaced his offer of allegiance by reciting before the gathered audience an impressive résumé of meritorious deeds that Abu Bakr had performed during Muhammad’s lifetime (al-Nasa’i 1984, 55–56). This résumé convinced the assembly of people to recognize Abu Bakr as the Prophet’s first successor, and they thronged toward him to offer their allegiance, which he accepted with some diffidence and considerable humility, as the various versions of his inaugural speech testify (al-Tabari 1987, 242–43). When asked later to reflect on the process of Abu Bakr’s election, some of the sources report that Umar described it as a faltah (al-Baladhuri 1960, 1:581–83; al-Tabari n.d., 2:242).
The Arabic word faltah in this context means a “happenstance” or an “unpremeditated event.” Umar was essentially describing the process of Abu Bakr’s election as something that had happened on the spot, in reaction to the exigencies of the situation. The situation, in fact, was quite serious. Believing that their fealty to the government had lapsed on the Prophet’s death, some Arab tribes had risen in revolt against the Medinan government, and they refused to pay the obligatory alms or taxes, known as the zakat. These tribes had to be brought back into the fold, and Abu Bakr’s skills as a master genealogist—predicated on expert knowledge of tribal relationships and the tribe-based alliances of pre-Islamic Arabia—were greatly in demand.
The broad circumstances of Abu Bakr’s election as depicted in the historical sources make it clear that, in these early political deliberations, the Companions resorted to human reasoning and interpretation of general Qur’anic notions such as “precedence” or “priority” in Islam (Ar. sabiqah) and “virtue/moral excellence” (Ar. fadl/fadilah), as well as the concept of “consultation” (shura). On the basis of such broad, general concepts, they devised the solution regarded as the most apt and in the best interests of the community after the somewhat unexpected death of the Prophet. Faltah in this context is a purely descriptive term and contains no moral valuation (at least in most Sunni sources) of Abu Bakr’s selection as the Prophet’s successor in such a spontaneous and unpremeditated manner.1
Sunni sources are practically in agreement that Abu Bakr’s superior and appropriate knowledge about genealogies and religious matters in general contributed to the greater welfare of the polity in this critical period and was, therefore, the most important consideration in his selection as the caliph. In his firaq work, the Andalusian jurist Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) states that although Abu Bakr lived a mere two and a half years after the Prophet’s death, he transmitted 142 hadiths from Muhammad and issued numerous fatwas. In contrast, Ali, who lived thirty years beyond the Prophet’s death, transmitted 586 hadiths, out of which only 50 are sahih. If their life spans after the advent of Islam and the number of hadiths related by each are compared, Ibn Hazm maintains, Abu Bakr was far more prolific in the transmission of traditions and in the issuance of fatwas. This comparison establishes beyond a doubt Abu Bakr’s greater excellence in this regard because “someone with any degree of knowledge knows that what Abu Bakr possessed of knowledge was several multiples more than what Ali possessed” (Ibn Hazm 1928, 4:108). Furthermore, Ibn Hazm remarks that the Prophet’s appointment of Abu Bakr as the prayer leader during his final illness proves that he was so appointed on account of his superior knowledge of the prayer rituals. Similarly, the Prophet appointed Abu Bakr to collect alms (al-sadaqat), to lead the hajj, and to conduct several military expeditions (al-bu‘uth), all of which testify to his greater knowledge regarding prayer, alms-giving, the pilgrimage, and jihad, which “are the support (umda) of religion” (1928, 4:108). Because of this unique constellation of virtues and aptitudes, Abu Bakr is presented as having been exceptionally qualified to come to the defense of the nascent Islamic polity during one of its most critical periods.
Abu Bakr’s success in quelling the riddah uprisings is lavishly praised by later authors, who see in it a testimonial to his greater mental acumen and political skills and, consequently, to his greater moral excellence visà-vis other Companions. Al-Tabari, for example, relates how Abu Bakr’s sound judgment prevailed during the riddah wars when he asserted the necessity of fighting those tribes that were resisting the Medinan government. He reports that Abu Bakr stated, “God will not assemble you in error and, by the One in whose hand is my soul, I do not see a matter more excellent with regard to myself than fighting those who withhold from us a camel’s hobble on which the Messenger of God, peace and blessings be upon him, used to take [what was due upon it].”
Al-Tabari continues, “The Muslims acceded to Abu Bakr’s opinion, for they saw that it was better than their opinion and thus Abu Bakr dispatched at that time Usamah b. Zayd” (1:119).
In a hadith recorded by al-Muttaqi al-Hindi (d. 1567), the Prophet states, “I am the sword of Islam and Abu Bakr is the sword of the riddah” (al-Hindi n.d., 6:2251), while another, recorded by Ibn Abd al-Barr in the eleventh century, states that Abu Bakr “undertook the fighting of the people of the riddah, and the excellence of his opinion became manifest in that, and his firmness along with his gentleness which was inestimable. Thus God proclaimed His religion through him and slew through his hands and His grace all those who had rebelled against the religion of God until the matter of God became manifest while they were resistant” (Ibn Abd al-Barr n.d., 3:977).
The exegete al-Khazin al-Baghdadi (d. 1341) relates a report from Abu Bakr b. Ayyash,2 to the effect that there was no one more excellent than Abu Bakr born after the Prophet and that in fighting the “people of rebellion” (ahl al-riddah), Abu Bakr had attained the position of “a prophet from among the prophets” (Al-Khazin al-Baghdadi 1961, 2:54).
Such generous praise by various authors highlights Abu Bakr’s specific attributes and skills, which were deemed to be the best suited to the times, resulting in maximum benefit for the people. Here the benefit is clearly construed in a pragmatic, political sense. During the two years of Abu Bakr’s caliphate, the unity of the polity was of overriding concern. Secession of the rebellious Arab tribes represented a threat primarily to the political well-being of the people. Even though the uprising was termed riddah and unfortunately translated consistently into English as “apostasy,” it had in fact only slight religious overtones. The rebellious tribes refused to pay taxes to the changed government in Medina not because they had “apostasized” from Islam but because they considered their allegiance to the Prophet to have lapsed upon his death. This practice was in accordance with the nature of tribal agreements in this period, which were usually considered to be personal in nature. The rebellious tribes were thus guilty of political disloyalty to the Medinan government. Political stability was held to be the necessary prerequisite for an ordered religious community and, at this juncture in history, restoring harmonious tribal relationships while attempting to replace narrow tribal assumptions of political fealty with allegiance to the supratribal umma was the highest priority. Abu Bakr with his intimate knowledge of tribal alliances was clearly the man of the hour.
Following Abu Bakr’s brief two-year tenure as caliph, Umar assumed the caliphate, having been designated as such by Abu Bakr. In the descriptions of Umar’s ten-year tenure as caliph we see maslahah deployed as a broad sociopolitical organizational principle that determined the overall orientation of the Muslim polity. The early literature does not, however, explicitly refer to maslahah or istislah in these sociopolitical contexts. Rather, it maintains that Umar was duly selected as the second caliph on account of his greater precedence in serving Islam in the early period (asbaq) and his greater moral excellence (afdal) compared to the other Companions.
During Umar’s longer tenure as caliph, the broad Qur’anic principles of sabiqah (precedence/priority) and fadilah (moral excellence/virtue) often found reflection in highly pragmatic measures, which reflected a deep concern for the public, political good. For example, Umar’s establishment of the diwan, the register of pensions, embodied both worldly savoir faire and Qur’anic ideals of religious merit (al-Baladhuri 1866, 448ff.; Yusuf Ya‘qub 1985, 140–44; Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 3:224; Abu Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam 1988, 266ff.). This institution borrowed from the Persians allowed Umar to recognize the exceptional contributions of the early Muslims to the community on the basis of sabiqah and fadilah and to arrange for an equitable, albeit merit-based, distribution of the revenues pouring into the Medinan coffers.
The establishment of the diwan and its organizational principle met with some initial resistance, but later historians applaud the shrewd intelligence and good sense apparent in Umar’s recognition of the religious and praxis-based merit of the earliest and most loyal Muslims in this manner. Abu Yusuf (d. 798) in his Kitab al-kharaj mentions that when Umar assumed the caliphate, he refused to place those who had fought against the Prophet on the same level as those who had fought with him and, therefore, awarded larger stipends to “the people of precedences and priority” (ahl al-sawabiq wa al-qadam) from among the Muhajirun and the Ansar who had witnessed Badr (Yusuf Ya‘qub 1985, 140; Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 3:225). Abu Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam (d. 838) states that both Abu Bakr and Ali believed in egalitarianism (al-taswiyah) in the disbursement of pensions, while Umar resorted to preferential treatment (al-tafdil) “based on precedences and indispensable service to Islam” (ala al-sawabiq wa al-ghina’ an al-islam) (Abu Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam 1988, 267–68; Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 3:225; Hinds 1971, 366). Abu Ubayd further reports that Abu Bakr declined to rank people in terms of their excellences, demurring that “their excellences were with [known to] God” (fada’iluhum inda Allah) and that the system of pensions (al-ma‘ash) was better served by the principle of al-taswiyah (Abu Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam 1988, 267; Yusuf Ya‘qub 1985, 140).3 Abu Bakr’s and Umar’s divergent views on how state pensions should be disbursed was then a function of their individual understanding of what was in the best interests of the community during their reign. It appears that differentiation on the basis of merit would have proved even more divisive during the riddah wars, prompting Abu Bakr to maintain equality in the disbursement of stipends. With internal unity more or less restored and perhaps even to boost the morale of the most pious Muslims, Umar felt that it redounded to the greater benefit of the community to institute a merit-based system of pensions.
The invocation of “excellence” and “precedence” as essential traits possessed not only by the caliph/imam but also by lesser rulers and administrators is ubiquitous throughout the literature that deals with these issues and establishes their perceived strong connection with effective, pragmatic leadership in various social and political contexts. It appears that in the early period, moral excellence as manifested particularly in mastery of the Qur’an sometimes led to positions of political and social leadership. A well-known hadith is related by the Companion Abu Mas‘ud al-Ansari in which Muhammad says, “The best reciter of them [specifically, the people] of the Book of God will lead the people. If they should be equal with regard to [proficiency in] reciting, then the most knowledgeable of them with regard to the sunna” (al-Fasawi 1976, 1:449–50; al-Razi 1994, 97ff.). It is not surprising that both Sunni and Shi‘i authors cite this report as evidence in favor of the superior qualifications of Abu Bakr and Ali respectively for the caliphate/imamate on account of each being the best reciter of the Qur’an.4
Other kinds of expertise in relation to the Qur’an conferred various kinds of authority on the individual. Thus the moral excellence and precedence of the famous Companion Abd Allah b. Mas‘ud derived not only from his acknowledged superior exegesis of the Qur’an but also from his status as the first Companion who had publicly propagated the Qur’an (afsha ’l-Qur’an) (Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 3:112). A broad recognition of his moral excellence and precedence in Islam led to several important political appointments for Ibn Mas‘ud. Sabiqah became in fact a highly emotive term in the early period, pregnant with sociopolitical implications for those who possessed it.
Particularly illustrative of this semantic and functional connection between sabiqah and sociopolitical status is a report recorded by the well-known exegete and scholar al-Razi in a work he composed on the excellences of the Qur’an. In the section significantly titled “Chapter regarding those who are the most deserving among the people of leadership on account of their memorization of the Qur’an,” we find the following report, according to which Nafi‘ b. Abd al-Harith5 met Umar b. al-Khattab, who asked the former, “Whom did you leave in charge of Mecca?” The answer was Ibn Abza. Umar asked, “[Is he] a mawla [non-Arab Muslim convert]?” Nafi‘ replied, “Yes, he is a reciter of the Book of God the Exalted.” Umar said, “God enhances [the status] of certain people by this Qur’an and diminishes [that of] others by it” (al-Razi 1994, 100; Ibn Majah 1983, 1:42). This well-attested report underscores unambiguously that a non-Arab could have precedence over an Arab on account of the former’s superior knowledge of the Qur’an, which established his greater moral excellence over others. In this report, Umar’s true intention in adhering to the principle of sabiqah becomes clear: in the case of a non-Muhajir Arab and a non-Arab, one had precedence over the other only on the basis of moral excellence, gauged by one’s superior religious knowledge of the Qur’an in this case. In both this incident and the report cited earlier concerning Ibn Mas‘ud, we discern a radical religious egalitarian attitude subversive of socially and culturally constructed superiorities based on ethnic and tribal considerations (Marlow 1997, esp. 114ff.). Such “subversive” appointments drove home in the early period the intimate connection between individual moral virtue and its worldly pragmatic consequences, particularly in the promotion of the public good.
The combination of sabiqah and fadilah was particularly important in the general discourse on legitimate leadership of the polity and in Sunni-Shi‘i dialectics on the caliphate/imamate. This leads us next to a consideration of whether the early Shi‘a also had similar conceptions of maslahah as a sociopolitical principle.
Shi`i Views
It is generally assumed that the Shi‘a have always subscribed to a legitimist view of religiopolitical leadership and have insisted that the ruler of the Muslim polity be a blood relative of the Prophet Muhammad. However, early Shi‘i sources sometimes offer a different perspective and suggest that we must be wary of retrojecting later assumptions back into the very early period.
For example, when comparing early and later Shi‘i sources, we notice a certain evolution in Shi‘i interpretation of the key Qur’anic term sabiqun, which has important implications for political thought. Early Shi‘i views appear to be similar to the general Sunni understanding of this term while later views (roughly after the tenth century) on the sabiqun became markedly different from the Sunni perspective. The typical (and expected) Shi‘i view is that the term sabiqun refers only to the Prophet and “his legatee” (wasiyyihi), in other words, Ali—and ipso facto excludes all the other Companions. However, in his commentary on Qur’an 46:10, the ninth century Shi‘i exegete al-Qummi says that, according to the Companion Hudhayfah b. al-Yaman, the Prophet referred only to himself as “one of those who preceded and who was the best among them” (al-Qummi 1966, 2:347). The tenth century Shi‘i scholar al-Kulayni says in exegesis of Qur’an 9:100 that the verse assigns the highest rank to the earliest Muhajirun, second place to the Ansar (thanna bi-al-ansar), and third place to the Successors (thallatha bi-al-tabi‘in), a view that is in complete accordance with the general Sunni perception of sabiqah (al-Kulayni 1990, 2:48). Chronology is, after all, the essence of sabiqah.
A well-known report, attributed to the sixth Shi‘i Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq and frequently cited in Sunni sources, quotes the Prophet as saying, “The best of people (khayr al-nas) are from my generation (qarni), then from the second [generation], then from the third; then will come a group of people in whom there will be no good” (al-Tabarani 1995, 3:339, #3336; for variants, see 2:27, #1122; 8:358, #8868). The people from the Prophet’s generation would, undoubtedly, include all his Companions.6 Another tenth century Shi‘i author, Abu al-Qasim Ali b. Ahmad al-Kufi (d. 963), comments that it is possible to interpret al-sabiqun in Qur’an 9:100 as a reference to the Aqabiyyun, the seventy people who came to Mecca one night and pledged their allegiance to the Prophet in the house of Abd al-Muttalib in Aqabah (al-Kufi 1980, 69). This view is also in accordance with that of a number of Sunni scholars, even though the lists of these men and women are sometimes different in the sources.
This early trend in Shi‘i political thought concerning the sabiqun has several significant ramifications. A number of early Shi‘i exegetical works state that the sabiqun referred to the pious Muslims of the first generation, which signifies that the proto-Shi‘a of the early period apparently made no distinction between those Companions who were blood relatives of the Prophet (notably Ali) and those who were not. This perception is further bolstered by the fact that a number of Shi‘i authors relate that some of the earliest pro-Alid supporters were vigorous participants in the debates regarding the qualifications of Abu Bakr and Ali for the caliphate/imamate. According to the pro-Alid Mu‘tazili scholar Ibn Abi al-Hadid (d. 1257), immediately after the death of the Prophet the partisans of Ali were the first to put into circulation reports that praised their preferred candidate’s unique virtues. In response, Abu Bakr’s partisans, the Bakriyah,7 are said to have come forth with traditions of their own, which espoused the merits of their candidate, thus creating this distinctive manaqib genre within the evolving hadith corpus (cited by Juynboll 1983, 12–13 and n10). Other sources, mainly Shi‘i, mention that when Abu Bakr entered the mosque at Medina after having been appointed the first caliph, twelve men from among the Muhajirun rose up one after the other to recite the excellences of Ali and proclaim his right to the imamate.8 Ibn Abi al-Hadid commented on this episode by maintaining that the events of the Saqifa could not have transpired if the Prophet had explicitly designated his successor. The fact, he says, that a debate centered around the key concepts of “precedences, excellences, and relationship [to the Prophet]” did ensue regarding a successor and that there was no mention of nass (explicit designation) in this debate logically leads one to conclude that there was no explicit designation either of Abu Bakr or of Ali as Muhammad’s successor (Ibn Abi al-Hadid 1963, 2:267).
The retrieval of this early pro-Alid discourse based on excellence and precedence in the context of political leadership makes it possible to remark that the proto-Shi‘a also stressed the public good of the polity as an important consideration in the selection of the first caliph/imam. They maintained, in tandem with the proto-Sunnis, that greater moral excellence and precedence as exemplified in Ali’s track record of vigorous service to the polity redounded to the greater sociopolitical benefit of its members. Ali’s priority in Islam and his exceptional moral attributes were unmatched by any other Companion, they asserted, and thus uniquely qualified him to be the first successor to the Prophet. An extensive literature developed in the subsequent centuries establishing Ali’s repertoire of singular moral excellences greater than those of any other Companion and thus his greater qualifications for the imamate. We see a similar development among the Sunnis in regard to Abu Bakr and Umar.
Among Ali’s moral excellences were his capacious learning, wisdom, and eloquence. Since pre-Islamic times, there has been an intimate connection between these attributes and effective leadership in the Arab cultural milieu. The leader of the tribe in the Jahiliyah was frequently selected for his dexterity with words and was often referred to as a khatib (orator) or za‘im (spokesman).9 Since the Arabic language as the vehicle of divine revelation became the sacralized medium of Islam (cf. al-Sayyid 1993, 126), mastery of Arabic became equated with moral excellence and indicated superior knowledge and, therefore, often superior qualifications for positions of leadership, as we saw earlier in the case of Ibn Abza.10 The word za‘im, in fact, remains to this day one of the Arabic words to refer to a leader in various situations.
Ali’s exceptional knowledge in fact established his claim nonpareil to the caliphate/imamate according to his supporters. Indeed, many Shi‘i scholars affirm that various branches of learning derive directly from Ali’s wide-ranging knowledge. Thus al-Allamah al-Hilli maintains that kalam originated with Ali as did Sufism, eloquent speech (fasahah), grammar, tafsir, and fiqh. Major schools of thought, including the four Sunni legal madhahib and Ash‘arism, are said to derive from al-Hilli (1986, 1:177–80). Al-Sharif al-Murtada states that the Mu‘tazili concepts of adl and tawhid had been borrowed from Ali b. Abi Talib himself, since Ali is the true founder of the discipline of kalam. This is so because the Mu‘tazilah belong to the school of Wasil b. Ata’, who was the student of Abu Hashim Abd Allah b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyah. Abu Hashim in turn was the student of his father, Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyah, who was a student of Ali. Al-Murtada, like al-Hilli above, similarly states that the learning of the four eponyms of the Sunni madhahib ultimately derives from Ali (al-Murtada 1967, 1:148), while Ibn Abi al-Hadid declared Ali to be the true founder of Ash‘arism and Zaydism (Ibn Abi al-Hadid 1963, 1:35–36).
In contrast to the early reports and exegeses that reference proto-Shi‘i discourses within the paradigm of sabiqah and fadilah, later Shi‘i understanding of certain relevant Qur’anic verses became markedly partisan. The twelfth century Shi‘i commentator al-Tabarsi reports that Muhammad himself in exegesis of Qur’an 9:100 and 56:10 commented that these verses referred to the prophets and their legatees; he added, “And I am the most excellent of the prophets and messengers of God and Ali b. Abi Talib, upon whom be peace, my legatee, is the most excellent of legatees.”11 One report quoted in later Shi‘i and Sunni manaqib works on Ali is attributed to Ibn Abbas, who states in exegesis of 56:10 that the sabiqun were only three: Yusha‘a b. Nun, who was the first to reach (sabaqa ila) Moses; the Companion (sahib) mentioned in Ya Sin, who was the first to reach Jesus; and Ali, who was the first to reach Muhammad.12 This kind of “preelection” of Ali as Muhammad’s successor, which these reports convey, became linked over time to the former’s blood kinship with the latter. Ali’s exceptional personal attributes also become a function of his lineal descent, and it is his genealogy (and that of the subsequent imams) that became subsequently advanced as an ontological moral excellence superior to other virtues.
The classic Imami (Twelver) Shi‘i belief that only the rightful imam of the age (sahib al-zaman) may legitimately rule the polity was challenged and successfully revised only in the twentieth century with the promulgation of the theory of the wilayat-i faqih (the guardianship of the jurist) by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989).13 This theory is clearly predicated on pragmatic considerations of the public good and political expediency. Because the rightful imam is still in occultation and the earth is, in the meantime, in need of righteous, just rulers, the jurists (fuqaha’) were the logical and legitimate representatives of the hidden imam. The jurists, after all, can claim to be the most knowledgeable among the faithful just as Ali was among the Companions; thus, they too “inherit” the right to legitimately rule the polity on behalf of the occulted imam.
A full-scale exposition and analysis of this innovative political doctrine is beyond the purview of this chapter. Suffice it to say that by formulating this theory, Khomeini may be regarded as having retrieved an earlier strand of pragmatism that had informed Shi‘i political thinking. Maslahah was the cornerstone of this bold new doctrine. In this sense, the doctrine of wilayat-i faqih harks back to proto-Shi‘i considerations of the public good, which, as we discerned, undergirded early debates about succession to the Prophet among the supporters of both Abu Bakr and Ali.
Political Treatises
The Arabic word fitnah is generally, and particularly in the political realm, understood to connote “disorder” and “chaos.”14 Disorder is to be prevented at all costs because it militates against the peaceful, just, and law-abiding society that the Qur’an envisions for humankind. Apart from espousing that disorder be contained and that believers must be continuously engaged in promoting what is right and forbidding what is wrong with a variety of means (cf. Qur’an 3:110; 3:114; 9:71; 22:41, etc.), the Qur’an or the sunna do not prescribe the establishment of any formal mechanism or a specific governing body to achieve this end.
Most of the historical sources inform us that the earliest Muslims perceived the need for a ruler or a ruling council in view of the rather dire circumstances immediately following the Prophet’s death, as we have already indicated. This view became encoded as political dictum in the eleventh century by the well-known Shafi‘i jurist and political theorist al-Mawardi (d. 1058) in his influential work al-Ahkam al-sultaniyah. In this work he described the imamate as necessary both for the “protection of religion” (hirasat al-din) and for the proper administration of the world (siyasat al-dunya) (al-Mawardi 1996, 13ff.). Considerations of maslahah, both in a religious and a sociopolitical sense, continued, therefore, to be uppermost in the selection and appointment of the imam. Al-Mawardi points to the existence of two camps in his day on the question of the imamate, one of which believed that the office was mandated rationally while the other subscribed to the position that the office was decreed by the revealed law (al-Shar‘). According to the first, rationalist, camp, all intelligent people conceded the importance of submitting to a leader who would prevent them from oppressing one another and keep them from disputing with one another. In the absence of rulers (al-wulat) in general, there would be disorder and general pandemonium. In this context, he cites a line of verse by the pre-Islamic poet al-Afwah al-Awdi, who wrote,
People without ruling notables will be beset by chaos,
And they will have no notables if the ignorant among them rule.
(Al-Mawardi 1996, 13)
The second camp consisted of people who insisted that the imamate was ordained by revelation alone because the imam undertook matters decreed by the religious law. However, even this camp conceded a major role to reason in matters that had to be decided by the imam. Thus, according to al-Mawardi, this second group, like the first group, maintained that human intelligence prevented individuals from wronging one another and helped to enforce the criterion of justice in relations with one another. The revealed law delegated these matters to the ruler according to Qur’anic verse 4:59, which states, “O those who believe, obey God and obey the messenger, and those possessing authority among you” (1996, 13).
Thus al-Mawardi subscribes to a position that emphasizes both religious and rational imperatives for selecting the caliph in order to safeguard the well-being of the community. It is clear from his appeal to pre-Islamic poetry as proof-text that ultimately he believed that there should be a ruler to contain chaos and regulate society on the basis of common sense, reason, and tradition. Once installed, the caliph is deserving of the obedience of his people, in support of which belief he adduces Qur’an 4:59 as proof-text.
Mu`tazili Thought
Al-Jahiz’s Views
A number of Muslims in the formative period remained unconvinced, however, that they needed a ruler or any form of government at all to contain disorder. This attitude would become most pronounced among the Mu‘tazilah, the rationalist theologians of the eighth and ninth centuries. Among this group of scholars and theologians were several individuals who thought that a caliph was unnecessary as long as the Muslims obeyed the religious law. Most prominent among them were Abu Bakr al-Asamm (d. 816) and Abu Ishaq al-Nazzam (d. ca. 835) (al-Ash‘ari 1929–33, 460).
An early Mu‘tazili political treatise, the Risalah al-Uthmaniyah of the celebrated belletrist Amr b. Bahr al-Jahiz (d. 869), embodies this utilitarian attitude toward the caliphate quite strongly. In this work, written to refute the Shi‘i notion of the divinely ordained imamate, the author compares the qualifications of Abu Bakr and Ali for the office of the caliph in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death. Al-Jahiz makes his case by emphasizing Abu Bakr’s moral virtues and pragmatic qualities, which uniquely qualified him for the caliphate. Among the constellation of virtues that distinguished Abu Bakr from the rest of the Companions were his greater maturity vis-à-vis Ali; his knowledge, both religious and practical; and his courage, both on and off the battlefield. Like the authors and historians mentioned earlier, al-Jahiz praises Abu Bakr’s exceptional knowledge of genealogy as well as his religious knowledge, which allowed him to act decisively during this crisis-ridden period.
Al-Jahiz records several other closely related events to drive home this point. For example, he relates that on the day Muhammad died, Uthman b. Affan and Umar b. al-Khattab stood by the door of A’isha’s room, loudly proclaiming their disbelief that the Prophet had passed away. The people who had gathered grew agitated, and Umar forbade them on threat of dire consequences to say that the Prophet had died. It was Abu Bakr who took control of the situation and affirmed that Muhammad was indeed dead, “for death spares no one” (al-Jahiz 1955, 80; cf. Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 2:205).
Another incident concerned those rebellious tribes who resolved after the Prophet’s death to offer the prayers but not the zakat. Abu Bakr responded firmly that were the hobble of a young camel (iqal ba‘ir) to be withheld in payment of zakat, he would fight those dissenters. The Muhajirun and the Ansar protested this decision, saying that Muhammad had declared that he had been commanded to fight people only until they said, “There is no god but God”; the utterance of the shahadah alone made their lives and property inviolate.15 Abu Bakr said, however, that the hadith continued with “illa bi-haqqiha” (except for what is due upon it).16 All then acknowledged that Abu Bakr had spoken the truth; al-Jahiz comments that he thus taught the people what they did not know and steered them toward the correct understanding of the Prophet’s statement (al-Jahiz 1955, 81). Furthermore, al-Jahiz continues, Abu Bakr’s sound judgment and wisdom are reflected in his appointment of Khalid b. al-Walid to lead the attack upon the false prophets, Musaylimah and Tulayhah, and to conduct the riddah wars, in all of which Khalid met with remarkable successes. These attributes are further affirmed in his selection of Umar, who as his successor subsequently went on to consolidate and expand the territories of Islam (1955, 86–87). All these incidents provide strong examples of Abu Bakr’s unique foresight and pragmatism, which stood the Muslims in good stead during his crisis-ridden caliphate.17
Like the overwhelming majority of Sunni scholars preceding and following him, al-Jahiz too lays great emphasis on the immediately beneficial consequences of Abu Bakr’s mature knowledge of worldly, political matters in the critical period that ensued after the Prophet’s death. In contrast, Ali’s youth at this time and, therefore, the assumed corresponding lack of political sophistication on his part were perceived by many to be serious impediments to his candidacy for the office of the caliph/imam. Sunni discourses on this topic generally emphasize Abu Bakr’s seniority over Ali and the inevitably positive consequences of this basic fact. Thus the well-known exegete Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) cites a hadith (“the soundness of which is agreed upon by the scholars”) in which the Prophet states that the best reader/reciter of the Qur’an should lead the people. Should there be several equally proficient readers of the Qur’an, one who was the most knowledgeable of them of the sunna should lead. If there are several candidates equally knowledgeable about the sunna, “then the older of them in age” (fa-akbaruhum sinnan) should assume leadership of the community (Ibn-Kathir 1966, 5:236). Umar b. al-Khattab is reported to have said, “Man has ten character traits, nine of which are good and one of which is bad and leads to evil.” Then he warned, “Beware of the folly of youthfulness!” (Muslim ibn Hajjaj 1995, 3:310) These reports establish that a very clear equation was thus drawn between mature age and effective political leadership, which ultimately had repercussions for the commonweal of Muslims.
Diversity of Views on the Necessity of the Caliphate
The diversity of opinions in the first three centuries of Islam regarding the office of the caliph/imam is attested to by the rationalist theologian Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1095), who identifies three broad trends of thought in his time on the issue of the caliphate. The first, a minority, held that the caliphate was not necessary; the second believed that it was required on the basis of reason; and the third maintained that it was necessary according to the religious law.18 This range of thought testifies to the active engagement of many thinkers with the critical issues of sound governance and sociopolitical administration, unfettered by an assumed religious mandate for a specific political institution. Their suggestions and solutions were clearly the product of rational deliberation and philosophical reflection, based on the perception of the public good in their own times and circumstances.
The early literature records these debates matter-of-factly and nonjudgmentally, in contradistinction to the later, particularly heresiographical, literature that tends to treat the Mu‘tazili as dissenters,19 given that a broad consensus (ijma‘) had developed among the later scholars about the necessity of a (preferably single) ruler for the polity. In fact, it is rather this consensus, which by the fourth century of Islam (tenth century CE) had evolved through natural and deliberative historical processes, that ultimately, and somewhat ironically, conferred on the office of the caliph the imprimatur of a divinely ordained institution. By this time, Muslims (or more accurately Muslim scholars) had developed the conviction that their consensus was reflective of the divine will. In other words, it was the rational and utilitarian necessity of providing for law and order, which in turn was held to ensure the moral and material welfare of the polity, that led to a consensus on the necessity of the caliphate. Once this consensus developed, an alternate situation seemed no longer politically viable or morally desirable, although dissenting voices continued to be heard through the premodern period. Thus the famous tenth-century Sunni theologian al-Ash‘ari (d. 935) formulated the doctrine that the caliphate (or the imamate as it was often called) was a requirement of the religious law, but the later scholar Adud al-Din al-Iji (d. 1355) maintained that popular consensus from the time of Abu Bakr onward and social utility, rather than religious doctrine, had established the necessity of this institution (al-Iji 1983, 396–97). Al-Ash‘ari’s position would, however, be accepted by most Sunni scholars as axiomatic.
Ibn Taymiyya’s Views
In the fourteenth century, the Hanbali theologian Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) in his well-known work al-Siyasah al-shar‘iyah explicitly invokes the concept of maslahah as a political concept undergirding the era of the Rashidun caliphs. Maslahah as political expediency and public interest is particularly evident in the political appointments made by both Abu Bakr and Umar b. al-Khattab, according to Ibn Taymiyya. The ideal, our author says, is to appoint the individual who is most qualified (al-aslah) for a particular position, but such qualifications have to be assessed in view of who would best serve the public interest. This discussion occurs in the context of debating the following question: who among the following two men should be appointed to a public office: the one who is the most trustworthy (ahaduhuma a‘zamu amanatan) or the one who is the strongest (a‘zamu quwwatan)? (Ibn Taymiyya n.d., 22). The answer, according to Ibn Taymiyya, is the individual from whose appointment the greatest benefit may be derived and the least harm may occur in a particular position. Thus, for the position of a military commander, the strongest and the most courageous man should be picked, even though he may have moral failings (wa in kana fihi fujur), over the weaker and less capable man, even though he may be more trustworthy. Here he cites the opinion of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who had been questioned regarding the appointment of a military commander from among two possible candidates. One was strong but morally deficient while the other was virtuous but weak—who should be selected in this case? Ibn Hanbal replied that the morally inferior individual should be chosen “for his physical strength was for [the benefit of] Muslims and his moral failings were to his discredit only. As for the virtuous but weak individual, his virtue was for the benefit of his soul and weakness to the disadvantage of the Muslims.” Thus Ibn Hanbal recommended that the strong but morally deficient man be selected as the military commander (22).
Ibn Taymiyya then goes on to cite a hadith in which the Prophet states, “Indeed God strengthens this religion with the morally deficient man.” This report serves as a proof-text validating Ibn Hanbal’s opinion. It is for this reason, Ibn Taymiyya affirms, that Muhammad appointed Khalid b. al-Walid as a military commander after his acceptance of Islam, even though the latter was guilty of a number of misdeeds and the Prophet clearly disapproved of them. In spite of this, the Prophet made use of Khalid’s martial skills because, Ibn Taymiyya comments, “he was more qualified (aslah) than others in this regard” (23). Thus, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, who was more trustworthy and truthful than Khalid, was not appointed by the Prophet to any position of leadership because he perceived him to be physically weak. Out of similar considerations for the greater public good (li-maslahah rajihah), Ibn Taymiyya affirms, Muhammad appointed Amr b. al-As and Usamah b. Zayd as military commanders, even though there were others who were more knowledgeable in religious matters and more pious than they (25).
After the Prophet, both Abu Bakr and Umar b. al-Khattab made political and military appointments on the basis of public interest as they perceived it in their own time. Thus, while Abu Bakr deemed it wise to retain Khalid in his leadership position, Umar did not and had him removed and replaced with Abu Ubaydah b. al-Jarrah. One of the reasons for this change was that the formidable Khalid was an appropriate counterfoil to the gentle Abu Bakr while the stern Umar was better counterbalanced by the more lenient Abu Ubaydah (26).
When the objectives of good governance in certain matters were better served through the selection of someone who was trustworthy and honest, such as in financial matters, then a person endowed with such qualities was to be preferred. Ibn Taymiyya also suggests that in military matters, if the ruler were to consult with learned religious scholars, then he would advance the public good even more. In other matters as well, he states, sometimes the public good was more effectively served through a council of administrators rather than through one individual alone (26).
It is in the al-Siyasah al-shar‘iyah of Ibn Taymiyya that we see the strongest and clearest articulation of maslahah as a political concept, according to which pragmatic, mundane considerations of public benefit and communal welfare take priority over idealized notions of moral leadership.
Modern Discourses
The views on good governance of twentieth-century exegete and scholar Rashid Rida (and of Muhammad Abduh as well)20 may be derived to a great extent from his treatment of Qur’an 4:59 in the exegetical work Tafsir al-Manar. Qur’an 4:59 states, “Obey God and His Messenger, and those possessing authority among you.” The early Qur’an commentator Mujahid b. Jabr (d. 720) had understood this phrase as referring primarily to an amorphous group of learned scholars, or more literally, “those possessing critical insight into religion and reason” (uli al-fiqh fi al-din wa al-aql) (Mujahid ibn Jabr 1977, 1:62). Rashid Rida expands on this idea and comments that the phrase uli al-amr refers to the political rulers (umara’), the judges (al-hukkam), the religious scholars (ulama), the chiefs of the army (ru’asa’ al-jund), and the rest of the rulers and leaders (sa’ir al-ru’asa’ wa al-zu‘ama’) among Muslims, to whom, he says, people resort in their need and for their general welfare (Rida 1999, 5:147). Rida warns, however, that Qur’an 4:59 does not call for obedience to the uli al-amr but only to God and His Messenger, the reason being that the verse continues with “And if you should differ with regard to a matter, then refer it to God and His Messenger.” If the uli al-amr rule according to the precepts of God and the sunna, then obedience is due to them; if they do not and in fact resort to tyranny and oppression (zulm), then obedience is no longer an obligatory duty (wajiba qat‘an), but is rather forbidden (muharramah) (1999, 5:150). He continues by saying that the actions of the temporal political rulers (al-umara’ wa al-salatin) are bound by the legal opinions (fatawa) of the scholars (ulama), for the ulama are in fact “the leaders of the leaders” (umara’ al-umara’).
In this interpretation, Rida is echoing in part the exegesis of the ninth-century commentator Muqatil b. Sulayman, who had similarly understood the verse as enjoining obedience to God and His Messenger only and not to the uli al-amr as well (al-Balkhi 1969, 1:246). The uli al-amr have primarily a consultative role; their counsel is to be solicited when the Qur’an and the sunna do not provide categorical answers in certain matters. Acting upon the uli al-amr’s recommendations is consequently a discretionary option rather than binding. These conclusions are implicit in Muqatil’s exegesis but more explicitly formulated in Rida’s.
Further on, Rida equates the uli al-amr with the “people who loosen and bind” (ahl al-hall wa al-aqd), thus broadening the description of this group of people in a modernist vein. The “people who loosen and bind” include all those in whom the Muslim community, the umma, have faith: they would include the scholars, the leaders of the army, and the leaders of various sectors of society who promote the general interests of the people (al-masalih al-ammah). Among these sectors are trade, industry, and agriculture. Therefore, labor union leaders, political party leaders, and members of the editorial boards of respectable newspapers and their chief editors are all included in the category of the people “who loosen and bind” (Rida 1999, 5:152). Thus Rida explicitly yokes the concept of maslahah/masalih to the Qur’anic phrase uli al-amr and includes within the latter phrase those groups of people with combined specialized expertise, most of which is not explicitly religious but contributes to the overall commonweal of the polity. We may say here that Rida secularizes the concept of uli al-amr to a considerable extent.
Contemporary Modernist Discourses
Muslim modernist political discourses today specifically focus on the issue of democracy and democratization in the Islamic heartlands. A number of modernist scholars and political thinkers today are advocating democratic reform in Muslim-majority countries by invoking the twin concepts of shura and maslahah. The word shura occurs in the Qur’an and means “consultation” in general. Two verses specifically refer to this concept: the first (3:158–59) states, “So pass over [their faults], and ask for [God’s] forgiveness and consult them in matters; then, when you have made a decision, put your trust in God.” The second verse (42:38) runs, “[The believers are] those who answer the call of their Lord and perform prayer, and who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation, and who spend of what We have bestowed upon them.” Consultation on various matters has been considered obligatory by many scholars through time while others have tended to regard it as a highly recommended practice. The predominant sentiment in the sources—theological, juridical, ethical, and administrative—is that shura as mutual consultation in various spheres (political, communal, social, military, familial) is the preferred and desirable method of resolving matters because it reflects the public will and results in greater public benefit. As dynastic rule became the norm after the death of Ali in 661, invocation of shura as a desirable and even mandated social and political practice became a way of registering disapproval of a political culture that had progressively grown more authoritarian by the Abbasid period (750–1258).
Qur’an commentaries and certain genres of ethical and humanistic literature (adab) continued to extol the merits of consultation in various spheres—particularly the bureaucratic, military, and political—throughout the premodern period. Representing a fairly common perspective on the concept of shura, the Qur’an commentator Muhammad al-Qurtubi (d. 1273), in his exegesis of Qur’an 3:158–59, records that “it is the obligation of the rulers to consult the scholars on matters unknown to them and in religious matters not clear to them. [They should] consult the leaders of the army in matters having to do with war, and leaders of the people in administrative issues, as well as teachers, ministers, and governors in matters that have to do with the welfare of the polity and its development” (al-Qurtubi 1967, 2:1491–92). In the twelfth century, the Andalusian scholar Ibn Atiyya (d. 1146) was of the opinion that consultation was one of the pillars of the religious law and of judicial activity and “whoever did not consult with the people of knowledge and religion should be subject to removal [specifically, from public office]” (1967, 2:1491). Nonconsultative, dynastic rule was regarded in most circles as un-Islamic and as a betrayal of the early Islamic ideal of collective decision-making that was deemed to have contributed to the greater welfare of the populace.
To this day, therefore, the concept of shura resonates strongly with a significant cross-section of Muslims, which they understand as leading the way to just and consultative power-sharing in accordance with Qur’anic precept in contrast to arbitrary despotism (Ar. istibdad). In the contemporary period, modernist and reform-minded Muslims have tended to conflate shura with modern notions of democracy.21 Thus the well-known modernist scholar Fazlur Rahman stated that “Muslim critics are . . . obviously wrong in rejecting democracy, which is positively and patently enjoined by the Qur’an as the moral foundation of the Community’s life” (Rahman 1983). A wide range of Muslim scholars and public intellectuals, such as the Tunisian political dissident and activist Rachid Ghannouchi (1993), Muhammad Imara (1979), Sa‘id al-Ashmawi,22 and Azizah al-Hibri (1992) have supported the compatibility of traditional notions of shura with modern democratic ones, emphasizing maslahah as one of the main reasons for doing so. For most reform-minded Muslim thinkers, democracy does not imply full-fledged secularism and a total evacuation of religious values from the public sphere. The prominent Iranian scholar Abdulkarim Soroush has in fact maintained that for a democracy to live up to its name in most Muslim majority societies, it has to be accommodating of religious values and sentiment, if this be reflective of the popular will. “Indeed, in such a society any purely secular government would be undemocratic,” he says, voicing the concern that a government that is not reflective of the popular will is not conducive to the public commonweal.
From a younger generation of contemporary modernist scholars, Khaled Abou el Fadl, Muqtedar Khan, and Tariq Ramadan have been among the most insistent in drawing parallels between shura and some form of a democratic system of government (procedural, constitutional, liberal, and so forth), which through recourse to consultative and collective political decision-making maximizes the sociopolitical well-being of Muslims. Abou el Fadl derives the basis, even the imperative, for democratic governance, not only from a historic and juristic understanding of shura but also from related concepts such as ijtihad (independent reasoning); the rights of people (huquq al-insan), which take precedence over the rights of God (huquq Allah); and the responsiveness of the shari‘a, contingent as it is upon human interpretation to changing circumstances (Abou el Fadl 2004, 3–36). Ramadan more forcefully establishes a link between good governance, which in the contemporary period means democratic governance, and al-masalih al-mursalah (public interest). He refers to the well-known legal maxim “maqasid al-ahkam masalih al-anam” (the objective of legal rulings is the welfare of humankind) and extrapolates from it a broad sociopolitical mandate for effecting reform in Muslim societies. Ramadan remarks, “Muslims have a duty to make an appropriate study of their society in order to determine the features of the common good (al-maslahah), the main achievements to be preserved, the injustices to be fought as a priority, and the means at their disposal and, at the same time, to identify the actors and the key points in the social and political dynamics of their society” (Ramadan 2004, 162).23 Similarly, Khan makes an explicit connection between shura and the possibility of democratic political reform and emphasizes the flexibility of the shari‘a. He states that “for the liberal Muslim theorists, Shura is paramount and Sharia too must be arrived at through consultative processes and not taken as given” (M. Khan 2006, 160). In my own writings, I have similarly pointed to the salience of the concept of shura in Muslim conceptualizations of good governance over time (Afsaruddin 2006, 153–73).
Conclusion
Even from this brief survey it is rather clear that maslahah as an implicit political and social organizational concept was already shaping the decisions of the early leaders of the Muslim community, even when this term was not explicitly invoked as such. In the early period, discourse regarding legitimate and beneficial leadership tended to be phrased in terms of two key Qur’anically inspired concepts: sabiqah and fadl/fadilah. However, when we look at the historical narratives that employ these terms in relation to the first generation of Muslims, it is clear that the authors of these narratives extol the possession of these attributes by the most prominent Companions precisely because the synergy of these two virtues led to the most beneficial consequences for the polity. Both the early Sunnis and the Shi‘a subscribed to common standards of moral excellence and precedence, which were invoked to gauge the superior qualifications of their respective candidates for the caliphate/imamate. In this early period, maslahah was not explicitly stated as the intended objective of the various sociopolitical measures adopted in the early period. Rather it was implicitly articulated within the context of describing and eulogizing the manifold beneficial consequences of appointing a specific caliph/imam and other lesser rulers. Even though later Shi‘i theological works foregrounded Ali’s blood-kinship to Muhammad (and the moral excellences thereby implied) as his supreme qualification for the caliphate/imamate, early Shi‘i works sometimes focused more on Ali’s personal moral attributes, such as courage and generosity, rather than on his kinship, in supporting his candidacy for the caliphate/imamate. This tendency suggests an early pragmatic emphasis on considerations of communal welfare rather than subscription to a legitimist perspective on political authority in the early period. It was suggested that this early proto-Shi‘i perspective on leadership finds amplification in the revolutionary concept of the wilayat-i faqih promulgated by Ayatollah Khomeini in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Among the authors of political treatises in the premodern period, the Mu‘tazili author al-Jahiz in the ninth century placed considerable stress on the practical and religious knowledge of Abu Bakr, which stood the community in good stead in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death. In the eleventh century, al-Mawardi referred to two early competing schools of thought, one of which believed that reason decreed that there be a ruler of the polity after the death of the Prophet while the other believed that this was so decreed through revelation. Both schools concurred that in either case social harmony and the public good were served by appointing a ruler who could contain chaos and adjudicate disputes. By Ibn Taymiyya’s time we see maslahah specifically cited as one of the main reasons, if not the main reason, for considering the rule of the Rightly-Guided caliphs as paradigmatic for later Muslims. In his usage, maslahah is both “public good/interest” and “political expediency,” judicious recourse to which enhanced the well-being of the early polity as was the case with the Rightly-Guided caliphs and their successors. In the early modern period, Rashid Rida regarded a wide range of people who possess expertise in traditional fields (such as jurisprudence) to modern sciences (such as horticulture) to share in a broadly defined notion of socio-political-intellectual authority. He maintained that to fail to consult the proper expert at the proper time is to fail in proper administration of the polity. Since the late twentieth century and continuing into the present one, modernist and reformist Muslim scholars, as we saw, have been emphasizing the concept of maslahah and, in conjunction with traditional concepts such as shura and ijtihad, are establishing a theoretical basis for the legitimation of representative and democratic governments.
Interpretations of what exactly constituted the public good/interest and how it was to be achieved remained diverse through time, but that the public good must be served has remained a central and stable concern of Islamic discourses on legitimate leadership and political ethics since the formative period.
1. See, however, al-Baladhuri 1968, 1:584 for a dissenting view.
2. See Ibn al-Jawzi 1986, 2:228, #3893, where he is identified as a Qur’an reciter and a mawla of Wasil b. Hayyan. His ism is listed variously as Shu‘ba, Muhammad, Salim, or Abu Bakr itself. Cf. also Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani 1995–96, 7:18, where the author admits ignorance of his true identity.
3. See also Ibn Sa‘d 1997, 3:144, where A’isha reports that in his first year as caliph, Abu Bakr distributed the fay’ equally, giving ten shares to every free man and woman, male and female slave. The following year everyone received twenty shares.
4. For example, Ibn Tawus 1990, 287.
5. For whom, see Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani 1995–96, 6:226, #8651.
6. Cf. van Ess 1977, 4, where he points to an early Shi‘i positive attitude toward Abu Bakr and Umar.
7. It should be pointed out that the appellation “Bakriyah” is used with some imprecision in our literature and appears to have been applied to two primary groups of different provenance. The first reference is to an earlier amorphous group from the seventh century and is said to have sprung up immediately after the Prophet’s death and proclaimed Abu Bakr’s greater precedence in claiming the caliphate, as already indicated. The Shi‘a in particular tended to use Bakriyah in this sense; see Watt 1973, 362n19. The same name was applied to a later group that emerged in the eighth century, followers of a man called Bakr b. Ukht Abd al-Wah.id b. Zayd (d. 793); for the Bakriyah in this usage, see al-Ash‘ari 1929–33, 273–74; al-Baghdadi 1970, 146; al-Mas‘udi 1893, 337; van Ess 1991–97, 2:108–18. See also my article “In Praise of the Caliphs: Recreating History from the Manaqib Literature,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999): 329–50.
8. See Razi 1952, 656–64; also cited by Mahdjoub 1988, 54. Ahmad b. Ali b. Abi Talib al-Tabarsi mentions in his Kitab al-ihtijaj (1965–67, 1:97), that twelve men divided equally between the Muhajirun and the Ansar repudiated Abu Bakr. Ya‘qubi in his Tarikh (1883, 2:137) briefly refers to this incident.
9. See, for example, Lammens 1914, 222; Cantarino 1975, 21–22; “Sha‘ir” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed., 9:226 (Leiden: E. J. Brill). Al-Razi in his Mafatih al-ghayb (1980–89) relates that the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun’s chief vizier counseled his sons to “learn how to speak well, for man’s superiority over all other beings is through speech; and the more skillful you are in speaking, the more worthy you are of humanity” (1980–89, 6:43-44).
10. Ibn Qutaybah, for example, relates an anecdote in which Ibn Hubayra the senior (al-akbar) declared that the pious man who spoke Arabic correctly possessed greater merit both in this world and the next than the pious man who did not; see al-Hamawi 1982, vol. 1, 23.
11. See al-Tabarsi 1965–67, 1:213. For Shi‘i invocation of these verses in support of the notion of sabq/sabiqah, see al-Kulayni 1990, 2:45–47.
12. See, for example, Ibn al-Maghazili 1974, 320.
13. For a discussion of this principle, see Khomeini 1981.
14. Among the other meanings assigned to this word are “temptation” and “polytheism.”
15. Cf. Ibn Abd al-Barr n.d., 2:85, 102; Abd al-Jabbar 1966, 227–28.
16. For this version of the tradition, see Muslim ibn Hajjaj 1995, 4:1491, #33; al-Nasa’i 1930, 6:6; al-Marwazi 1970, 145–46, 108.
17. Among modern historians who have emphasized the relevance of this aspect of Abu Bakr’s knowledge, especially his prominence as a genealogist, are Shaban 1971, 1:18–19; and Donner 1981, 84–85.
18. See Abd al-Jabbar n.d., 20:16. I owe this reference to Hayrettin Yucesoy’s unpublished paper “Is Political Leadership Necessary? Religious and Rational Morality in Islamic Political Thought,” delivered at the annual conference of the Middle East Studies Association, Anchorage, Alaska, Nov. 2003.
19. This attitude is quite evident in the later heresiographical works; see, for example, al-Shahrastani 1995, 1:56ff.
20. Muhammad Abduh, the brilliant rector of al-Azhar University, died in 1905 before the Tafsir al-Manar was completed.
21. Not all those described as Islamists reject the equation between shura and democracy; thus Yusuf al-Qaradawi sees little dissonance between a shura-based government and a democratic one; see his influential tract Min fiqh al-dawlah fi al-Islam (1997). For a fairly wide-ranging discussion of this topic, see the published volume of essays Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, edited by Khaled Abou el Fadl (2004).
22. His views are primarily expressed in the important work Al-Islam al-siyasi (al-Ashmawi 1987).
23. For a general, concise discussion of maslahah, see Ramadan 2004, 38–43.