Notes

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Abbreviations

ANDERSON Papers of Vice Admiral Walter S. Anderson, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

BLOCH Papers of Claude C. Bloch, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, LOC

DKN Dorothy Kimmel Newlin papers

FDR Franklin D. Roosevelt

FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY

GP Gordon Prange Papers, Special Collections, University of Maryland, College Park

HAAN Kilsoo Haan Papers, Special Collections and Archives, University of California at Santa Cruz

HANIFY Edward Hanify—Husband E. Kimmel Collection, Archives and Special Collections, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA

HART Papers of Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

HEK Papers of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (microfilm version of collection available at American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming), courtesy of Thomas K. Kimmel Jr. (papers cited by reel number, e.g., HEK R3)

HOWE Papers of Walter Bruce Howe (Roberts Commission recorder), Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI

KING Papers of Admiral Ernest J. King, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

KIRK Papers of Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, LOC

KNOX Papers of Frank Knox, Manuscript Division, LOC

LAYTON Papers of Admiral Edwin T. Layton, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI

LOC Library of Congress

MB The “Magic” Background of Pearl Harbor, ed. John Connorton et al., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, Volumes I–V and related Appendixes

MMK Papers of Manning M. Kimmel IV including family papers of Edward R. (Ned) Kimmel and Agatha Kimmel

MCCREA Papers of John L. McCrea, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, LOC

NARA U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

NHHC Naval History and Heritage Command, Navy Yard, Washington, DC

NIMITZ Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

NYT New York Times

NWC U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

OFSTIE Papers of Vice Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

PHA Pearl Harbor Attack, Report, Hearings and Exhibits, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S. Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946. Forty volumes, cited by volume and page number (e.g., PHA 3, p. 12)

   The volumes include Testimony, Exhibits, and Reports of the nine official Pearl Harbor Investigations and are broken down as follows:

PHA 1–11	Testimony before the Joint Committee 1946
PHA 12–21	Exhibits of the Joint Committee 1946
PHA 22–25	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission 1942
PHA 26	Proceedings of the Hart Inquiry 1944
PHA 27–31	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board 1944
PHA 32–33	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry 1944
PHA 34	Proceedings of the Clarke Investigation 1944
PHA 35	Proceedings of the Clausen Investigation 1945
PHA 36–38	Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry 1945
PHA 39	Reports of the Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry
PHA Report	Report of the Joint Committee 1946

POWELL Papers of Rear Admiral Paulus P. Powell, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

PRATT Papers of Admiral William V. Pratt, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

PRO Public Records Office, The National Archives [UK], Kew, Richmond, Surrey

RAMSEY Papers of Admiral Logan C. Ramsey, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

SIMPSON Papers of B. Mitchell Simpson, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

STARK Papers of Admiral Harold R. Stark, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

STIM Henry Lewis Stimson Papers (MS 465), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University

TKK Thomas Kinkaid Kimmel Jr.—includes Pearl Harbor papers of Edward R. Kimmel and Vincent Colan, and personal papers of Manning Marius Kimmel II

TOL John Toland papers, FDRL

TURNER Papers of Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, DC

WP Washington Post

Sources

Short citations of books (e.g., Stillwell, p. 211; Prange, Dawn) and of U.S. government publications refer to full citations in the Bibliography.

[Notes that appear within bold brackets are the sources for the information contained within that note.]

Prologue

   1  reminisce: Interview with Harriott Johnson Kimmel, 2013; “My Most Unforgettable Character,” by Harriott Kimmel, draft manuscript, 11/19/69.

   2  “dereliction of duty”: PHA 39, p. 21.

   2  “Please don’t”: Newsweek, 12/12/66.

   2  “every moment”: Ibid.

   3  “betrayed the officers”: Undated draft letter, 1944, HEK R35; 12/28/44 draft, HEK R27.

CHAPTER 1

   7  “We will not participate”: FDR speech, 10/23/40, www.presidency.ucsb .edu.

   7  “surplus”: FDR speech, 6/10/41, ibid.

   7  “a fight”: FDR radio address, 12/29/40, ibid.

   7  Churchill-FDR correspondence: “The Special Relationship,” and correspondence, FDRL; voluminous correspondence in PREM 3/469, PRO.

   7  Churchill implored: Dallek, p. 254.

   7  “more ships”/“an emergency”/“world control”: FDR radio address, 12/29/40, www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

   8  tension: Prange, Dawn, pp. 3ff; Ted Morgan, pp. 575ff.

CHAPTER 2

   9  The sound of church bells: Morison, pp. 98ff. Some descriptions rendered in the present tense in the quoted passages that follow—in this chapter only—are in the past tense in the original. The authors have altered tenses for consistency and compressed some quotes—but never changed the sense.

   9  At 7:54/“dots in the sky”: Boston Globe, 12/7/91.

   9  line of planes: Stillwell, p. 211.

   9  Furlong: Prange, Dawn, pp. 505ff.

   9  “flathatting”: PHA 32, p. 444.

 10  “Airraid on Pearlharbor”: Ramsey was to testify that he ordered this memorable broadcast. Other testimony, by Commander Vincent Murphy—Admiral Kimmel’s duty officer that morning—indicates that he sent a virtually identical message. The record indicates that as many as three similar messages were transmitted within eleven minutes. The first, Ramsey’s, appears to have been transmitted at 7:58 a.m. Pearl Harbor time—as a voice message (PHA 32, pp. 444, 458; PHA 26, pp. 209ff, 135; PHA 24, p. 1365, but see pp. 11, 535).

 10  “war planes”/call to arms: Stillwell, p. 211.

 10  “stumbling”/“mackerel”: Proceedings, 12/68.

 10  “Rock of Ages”: Interview with Robert Dunlop, Series V.2, Box 13, GP.

 10  exercise: La Forte and Marcello, p. xvi; Lord, pp. 66, 82.

 10  “Christ”: Ted Morgan, p. 615.

 10  war games: Weintraub, p. 270.

 10  wife slumbers: Interview with Robert Dunlop. Series V.2, Box 13, GP.

 10  “good imitation”: Stillwell, p. 264.

 11  Kimmel awake: Kimmel, pp. 7ff, 76; PHA 23, pp. 1125, 1193; PHA 26, pp. 209ff.

 11  submarine: The destroyer, USS Ward, had first been alerted to a possible submarine at 3:58 a.m., but at that time had been unable to locate one. At about 6:30 a.m., having sighted a sub in plain view—and in line with Kimmel’s standing order—both the Ward and the patrol plane had attacked it. There had been numerous previous submarine sighting reports that had turned out to be baseless, and—though Kimmel said he would head for his office anyway—he wanted verification (PHA 26, pp.209ff; Kimmel, p. 7; Gannon, pp. 225ff; Prange, Dawn, pp. 495ff).

 11  “stricken”: Brownlow, p. 133.

 11  “something terrible”: Ibid., p. 507.

 11  tally: Fact sheets, National WWII Museum and Pearl Harbor History Associates.

  11  devastation of fleet: “Report of Action 7 Dec. 1941,” 12/21/41, HEK R4; Naval History, Winter 1991.

 11  “Rising Sun markings”: John Burrill to John Toland, 7/29/79, TKK.

 11  Ten-Ten dock/Utah: PHA 1, p. 34; Gannon, pp. 1ff, 4.

 12  Oglala: Commanding Officer to CINCPAC, 12/11/41, www.ibiblio.org.

 12  Pennsylvania: Commanding Officer to CINCPAC, 12/16/41, ibid.; Prange, Dawn, p. 537.

 12  “tapping”: Newsweek, 12/12/66.

 12  Nevada: Prange, Dawn, p. 536; Gannon, p. 245.

 13  “fireworks”: Evansville Courier, 12/1/91.

 13  Arizona: Gannon, pp. 8ff; Prange, Dawn, pp. 513ff.

 13  “legs, arms”/“agony”/“hell”: Weintraub, pp. 244, 266.

 13  “no panic”: Landis and Gunn, p. 13.

 13  “shocked”: Interview with Edwin Layton, Series V.2, Box 58, GP.

 13  “cool and collected”: Crosley to Toland, 1/13/79, TKK.

 13  “very effectively executed”: Interview with William “Poco” Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

 14  “Goddamn”: Interview with Edwin Layton, Box 30, Folder 1, LAYTON.

 14  “exultant”: Brownlow, p. 134.

 14  “ping”: Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, History and Museums Division, USMC, Washington, DC.

 14  “Too bad”: Brownlow, p. 134; and see PHA 23, p. 899.

 14  “Sailors jumping”: La Forte and Marcello, p. 123.

 14  “The oil”: Ibid., p. 55.

 14  “glob-like”: Ibid., p. 20.

 14  “Guys are screaming”: Evansville Courier, 12/1/91.

 14  “man crawling”: Newsweek, 12/12/66.

 15  “ashes blowing”: PoliticsDaily.com, 12/7/10.

 15  Valkenburgh: Interview with Admiral William Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

 15  “disintegrate”: Newsweek, 12/12/66.

 15  “Two or three”: Weintraub, p. 285.

 15  “injured men”: La Forte and Marcello, p. 248.

 16  “We work”: Boston Globe, 12/7/91.

 16  Leary: Fairfax Leary Jr. to Edward Kimmel, 2/2/90, MMK.

 16  whores: Naval History, Winter 1991.

 16  “sterile”/“Limbs”: Weintraub, pp. 607ff.

 16  “hold the hand”: Stillwell, p. 241.

  16  “I take care”: “A Priest’s Memories of Pearl Harbor” www.susangaddis .net.

 17  “A young man, filthy”: Naval History, Winter 1991; interview with Admiral Logan Ramsey, Series V.2, Box 68, GP.

 17  “identification tags”: Interview with General Robert Dunlop, Series V. 2, GP.

 17  also suffered: Dr. Richard Kelley, “PH Attack Killed Lots of Civilians, Too,” 12/11/10; Weintraub, p. 264.

 17  “jump rope”: Interview with Elizabeth McIntosh, undated, Veterans History Project.

 17  invade/rumors: PHA 20, pp. 4523ff; Weintraub, pp. 270, 589ff.

 17  radio stations: KGMB entry, www.ospreypearlharbor.com.

 17  Martial law/underground shelter: Major General Thomas Green, “Martial Law in Hawaii,” Green Papers, LOC; interview with General Robert Dunlop, Series V.2, GP.

 18  window painted/further attack: PHA 20, pp. 4523ff; interview with Poco Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, GP; interview with Walter DeLany, Series V2, Box 12, GP.

 18  buses: Interview with Walter DeLany, Series V.2, Box 12, GP.

 18  evacuating: Roy Lynd to John Toland, 2/13/79, Box 118, TOL; Naval History, Winter 1991.

 18  “guards shoot”/“slit our wrists”: La Forte and Marcello, pp. 248ff.

 18  “moonbow”: Weintraub, pp. 534ff.

 18  2,403: Prange, Dawn, p. 539.

 18  “Charred remains”: Weintraub, p. 629; “Navy Medical Dept. Preparedness,” 1941, www.ibiblio.org.

 19  DNA: Guardian [London], 4/14/15.

CHAPTER 3

 20  The news had reached: PHA 12, pp. 3828ff. Sources differ on exactly when the message reached Knox and Stark. Our estimate is based on the known time of transmission of the initial signal from Pearl Harbor, and the rough time of Knox and Stark’s meeting. Knox was the first high U.S. government official to learn of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In 1941, Pearl Harbor was designated a time five and a half hours behind Washington, DC, time. Tokyo (across the international date line) was fourteen hours ahead of Washington and nineteen and a half hours ahead of Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred at 7:55 a.m. local, 1:25 p.m. in Washington, and 3:25 a.m. on December 8th in Tokyo. (PHA 26, p. 135; PHA 8, pp. 3828, 3835; but see PHA 11, p. 535).

 20  “My God!”: PHA 8, p. 3829.

 20  Hopkins and FDR “out of my hands”: Sherwood, pp. 430ff.

  20  FDR calls Hull and Stimson: Ibid., p. 431; Stimson diary, 12/7/41, cited in PHA 11, pp. 5437ff.

 20  Marshall: PHA 14, p. 1411.

 21  “URGENT”: PHA 11, p. 5351; SECNAV to ALLNAV, 12/7/41, TKK; Simpson, p. 114.

 21  “HOSTILITIES”: PHA 24, pp. 1365, 1581.

 21  “flash”: Weintraub, pp. 268, 277; WP, 12/6/11.

 21  guard/machine guns: Reilly, p. 5.

 21  knots: WP, 12/6/11.

 21  crammed: Correspondents of Time, Life, and Fortune, pp. 12ff.

 21  Tully/“anguish”: Tully, pp. 252ff.

 22  “visibly shaken”: Moreel to Barnes, 12/17/61, HEK R32.

 22  Churchill/“It’s quite true”: Churchill, pp. 537ff.

 22  “tired and depressed”: Anthony Cave Brown, C: The Secret Life, p. 382.

 22  “So we had won”: Churchill, pp. 539ff.

 23  “My God”: Fields, p. 80.

 23  “I’m going”: Tully, pp. 256ff.

 23  updates: Stillwell, p. 104.

 23  Bloch: PHA 36, p. 371.

 23  “It’s bad”: Newsweek, 12/12/66.

 23  Perkins: Frances Perkins Oral History, Columbia University, 1955.

 23  cabinet meeting/FDR opens/“awfully serious”/“dead silence”: Stimson diary entry at PHA 11, p. 5439; PHA 19, p. 3502.

 24  Though news of: Japan’s bombing attacks in the Philippines, begun before the cabinet met at the White House, would continue after the meeting ended. During the night (Washington time), Japan also attacked the U.S. base on the island of Midway (Prange, Verdict, pp. 467ff).

 25  “Why did you”: Connally, p. 459. There had, in fact, been no “log chain” barrier. There was an antisubmarine net, but it was open at the time the attack began. No ships, however, left harbor during the attack (PHA 13, p. 494).

 25  Assumptions were already: The assumptions about the whereabouts of officers and their activities were inaccurate: 70 percent of the officers and 90 percent of the men were on board their ships in the early morning of December 7th. Admiral Kimmel had ordered that an adequate complement of officers and men be on board ships at all times—including enough to man the antiaircraft batteries (PHA 32, p. 255; PHA 22, p. 537; “Air Raid Dec. 7 1941,” memo prepared for Vice Admiral Pye, Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet, HEK 4; and Gannon, pp. 27ff).

  25  Perkins: Perkins Oral History, supra.

 26  Knox would fly: Ibid., p. 118.

 26  demand in Congress: AP, 12/9/41.

CHAPTER 4

 28  “no dukes”: Honolulu Star-Advertiser, 2/1/41.

 28  first Kimmels/Husband family/flatboats: “The Ancestors and Descendants of Husband Edward Kimmel,” 1956; unpublished notes by Sibella Kimmel, 4/15/29; interviews with Thomas K. Kimmel Jr. and Manning M. Kimmel IV.

 28  Marius: Evansville Sunday Courier and Press, 1/19/41; “Battle of Crooked Creek,” Kansas State Historical Society, Vol. XII, pp. 312ff, TKK; Lee to Kimmel, 8/12/1866, MMK; Ashe, Weeks, and Van Noppen, pp. 185ff.

 29  “Hubbie” or “Kim”: E.g., Report card, Henderson Public Schools, 1/24/1892, TKK; family correspondence, MMK; genealogical records, DKN.

 29  North Green Street: Evansville Courier-Press, 1/19/41.

 29  siblings not especially close: Ibid.; interview with Thomas K. Kimmel Jr.

 30  Singleton/valedictorian/honesty: Evansville Courier-Press, 1/19/41; “28th Annual Henderson High School Commencement,” program, 6/15/1899,TKK.

 30  boating: Gleaner [Henderson, KY], 4/23/39.

 30  So it was: Annapolis officers in training were not styled “midshipmen” until 1904, the year Kimmel graduated (Gannon, p. 56).

 30  “Controlled”: Gannon, p. 56.

 31  Kimmel emerged from: The Naval Academy began awarding the bachelor of science degree in 1933. By authority of Congress in 1937, however, all living Annapolis graduates became entitled to it (A Brief History of USNA, www.usna.edu).

 31  yearbook/“greaser”: Lucky Bag, Class of 1904.

 31  photograph: TKK.

 31  “The Class the Stars Fell On”: Gannon, p. 57; Sunday News [Newark, NJ], 10/11/64; TKK.

 31  sword: Interviews with Thomas K. Kimmel Jr., Manning M. Kimmel IV.

 32  Halsey’s wedding: Halsey and Bryan, p. 16.

 32  “balloon”: Gleaner [Henderson, KY], 4/23/39.

 32  “Proceed”: Chief, Bureau of Navigation (Nav.) to Kimmel, 6/14/04, TKK.

 32  gunnery: Gannon, p. 58.

  32  Hart: Brownlow, p. 26ff; Chief, Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 12/20/05, TKK.

 32  ensign: Chief, Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 3/3/06, TKK.

 32  Cuba: Brownlow, p. 27.

 32  white fleet/journal: Kimmel diary 1908–1909, TKK.

 34  “one of the best turret officers”: Brownlow, pp. 27ff.

 34  The bride, twenty-one-year-old: Wedding announcement, 1/31/12, MMK; marriage license, 1/18/12, TKK. Dorothy’s father, Thomas W. Kinkaid, became a rear admiral in 1917.

 34  “never looked”: Brownlow, p. 169.

 34  called him “Kimmel”: Interviews with Ginger Kimmel Herrick, William Kimmel.

CHAPTER 5

 35  “This picture”: Postcard and photo, 8/19/14, TKK.

 35  Kimmel, now an aide: The commander was Álvaro Obregón, who later became President of Mexico.

 35  commendation/medal: Acting Sec. Navy to Kimmel, 9/11/14, TKK.

 36  lieutenant commander: Chief, Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 1/8/17, TKK.

 36  “plotting”: CNO to Kimmel, 10/6/17.

 36  British adopted: Brownlow, p. 30.

 36  German surrender: HEK to Mother. 11/18, TKK.

 36  commander: Bureau of Navigation to Kimmel, 6/4/21, TKK.

 36  captain: CNO to Kimmel, 7/16/26, Chief, Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 8/4/26, TKK.

 36  Philippines: CINC Asiatic to Comdt. 16th Naval District, 8/13/23, Cmdt. to Kimmel, 8/22/23, CINC Asiatic to Kimmel, 8/13/23 and 12/3/23, TKK.

 36  command of a destroyer division: CINC Asiatic to Kimmel, 12/17/23 and 3/16/25, TKK.

 36  Army War College: Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 3/19/26; Ely to Kimmel, 4/19/26, TKK.

 36  “humdinger”: Brownlow, p. 35.

 37  One young pilot: The pilot was then–Lieutenant Logan Ramsey, who on December 7th, 1941, would be first to report that Japanese planes were attacking Pearl Harbor.

 37  radioman: Hurst to Thomas K. Kimmel Sr., 12/8/89, TKK.

 37  family background: Interview with Thomas K. Kimmel Jr., Harriott Johnson Kimmel.

 37  “Yesterday we reported”: Manning M. Kimmel III to Kimmel, 6/16/31, MMK.

  38  “wonderful promotion”: Gleaner [Henderson, KY], 4/23/39.

 38  final assignments: Chief, Bureau of Nav. to Kimmel, 3/19/34; Commander, Battle Ships, Battle Force to Kimmel, 5/28/35; appointment certificate, 11/1/37, TKK.

 38  “goodwill” tour: South American Cruise of Cruiser Division Seven, 1939; Dept. of Navy, “History of the USS San Francisco,” 3/4/45.

 39  storms/Hull: Brownlow, pp. 40ff, Gleaner [Henderson, KY], 1/19/41.

 39  commander, Cruisers Battle Force: Gleaner, 6/24/60.

 39  fitness reports: HEK R17.

 39  temporary aide: CINC Pacific to Kimmel, 3/9/15, TKK.

 39  met FDR again: PHA 6, pp. 2498ff.

 39  “My dear Mrs. Kimmel”: FDR to Delia Kimmel, 9/12/39, TKK.

CHAPTER 6

 41  The proclamation made: The number most often given is forty-six, but forty-seven is the figure used by Kimmel in a 1945 letter to Admiral Harry Yarnell. Being promoted over so many others, he wrote, was “not such an unusual procedure.” He declared himself puzzled that the press made much of the matter. [forty-six: E.g., World War II magazine, 1/2003. forty-seven: HEK to Yarnell, 8/13/45, TKK.]

 42  summoned: Interview with Walter DeLany, Series V.2, Box 12, GP.

 42  “perfectly stunned”: PHA 6, p. 2498.

 42  “faint”: PHA 23, pp. 1227ff.

 42  Knox: Interview with Husband Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, and interview with William Poco Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

 42  final decision: PHA 16, p. 2144.

 42  “Of course”: Brownlow, p. 70.

 42  “one of the greatest”: Military, 11/98.

 42  Kimmel’s peers wholeheartedly: Nimitz, who at the time headed the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation, had himself been the initial choice for the job, according to the historian Michael Gannon (Gannon, p. 62).

 42  Halsey: Halsey and Bryan, p. 70.

 42  “entire Navy”: PHA 15, p. 1601.

 42  one reason: PHA 16, pp. 2144ff.

 43  Stark described: Simpson, pp. 1ff; Prange, Dawn, p. 41.

 43  “honesty” and “integrity”: E.g., Oral History interview by John T. Mason for US Naval Institute, 1975–1977. Courtesy of Naval Historical Collection, NWC; interview with John McCrea, Box 11, Folder 18, SIMPSON.

 43  Pratt: Pratt quoted by Nomura, diary, Series V.2, Box 64, GP.

 43  Shoemaker: Interview with James Shoemaker, Series V.2, Box 73, GP.

  43  Smedberg: Smedberg Oral History, NWC.

 43  Stark and Knox: E.g., Stark to FDR, 4/29/44, and Knox to Stark, 3/21/42, Box 2, STARK.

 43  Stark and FDR: E.g., Stark to FDR, 11/25/41, Box 2, and FDR Memorial Foundation to Stark, 3/5/48, Box 4, STARK; FDR to Stark, 3/25/33, President’s Personal Papers, Folder 166, FDRL.

 43  Stimson: Diary, 11/27/41, 11/30/41, STIM.

 43  Like many of his peers: The eighteenth-century general John Stark was said to be one of CNO Stark’s forebears. Before a battle in 1777, according to one account, Stark rallied his troops with the cry: “[The Redcoats] are ours, or this night Molly Stark sleeps a widow!” General Stark’s wife Molly was actually named “Elizabeth” (www.mollystark byway.com).

 43  great ceremony/“forthright”/“5 feet 10”/“as modern”: Honolulu Star-Advertiser, 2/1/41.

 44  conferring: Kimmel to Stark, 1/21/41, HEK R5; Stillwell, pp. 101ff.

 44  Richardson unhappy: PHA 14, pp. 935ff; Simpson, p. 58.

 45  shamrock-shaped anchorage: Prange, Dawn, p. 63.

 45  “Gibraltar”: E.g., National Geographic, 4/08; Gannon, p. 13.

 45  repairs/submarine base: Proceedings, 12/71.

 45  San Pedro/dispatched: Prange, Dawn, pp. 37ff.

 45  “training”/“double talk”: Proceedings, undated; TKK.

 45  support systems: Morison, pp. 46ff; Brownlow, p. 66.

 45  “phony”/“nitwit”: Simpson, pp. 55ff.

 45  Richardson demurred/took concerns: PHA 1, pp. 263ff.

 45  “Get rid”: Interview with George Dyer, Series V.2, Box 13, GP.

 46  did not bleat: Kimmel, p. 7.

 46  “arbitrary power”/“loyally pull”: McCrea to Richardson, 12/30/41, Box 2, MCCREA.

 46  McCrea/“At night”/discussions: Stillwell, pp. 98ff; McCrea notes and statement to Hart, 4/6/44 and 4/8/44, Box 3, MCCREA.

 46  most important strategy document: U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54; Simpson, pp. 65ff; Morton, The U.S. Army in WWII: The War in the Pacific, p. 81.

 47  “severely handicapped”/“immediate measures”: PHA 33, pp. 1349ff.

 48  “told the Gang”: PHA 16, pp. 2144ff.

 48  “paramount importance”: PHA 16, pp. 2225ff.

 48  The lamentable situation: Prange, Verdict, pp. 384ff. Bloch had himself previously—from 1938 to 1940—served, with the temporary rank of full admiral, as commander in chief, U.S. Fleet. In his new position as commandant of the 14th Naval District, he had reverted to his permanent rank of rear admiral. Aside from his own command, Bloch also served Kimmel as both base defense officer and commander of Task Force 4. Thus, somewhat confusingly, Bloch answered both to Kimmel and—in his role as commandant of the 14th District—to CNO Stark (PHA 28, p. 911).

 48  “any semblance”: PHA 33, pp. 1194ff.

 48  “almost any length”: PHA 16, pp. 1196ff.

 48  “The fullest protection”: Marshall to Short, 2/7/41, Records of the War Plans Division, 4449-1, RG 65, NARA.

 49  Knox to Stimson/copied to Kimmel/Stark’s note: PHA 14, pp. 1000ff; PHA 5, p. 2127.

 49  The Navy had: Toland, Infamy, pp. 260ff; Brownlow, pp. 60ff; Gannon, p. 304.

 49  A senior officer: This was Commander (later Admiral) Arthur Radford.

CHAPTER 7

 50  Mitchell/“knows war”: Davis, pp. 79ff, 89; Roger Miller, pp. 37ff, 53; correspondence Professor Mark Clodfelter.

 50  “Bombardment”: Mitchell fact sheet, National Museum of the U.S. Air Force.

 50  His details were wrong: Also, Mitchell expected the attack on Pearl Harbor to be carried out by planes launched not from carriers but from islands, such as Midway, that Japan would first seize.

 51  “pernicious”: Hurley, p. 47.

 51  posthumous promotion: The promotion finally went through in 2005. Long before, in 1946, Congress had honored Mitchell with the noncombatant equivalent of the Medal of Honor for his long effort to “achieve greater recognition of airpower as the major force in national defense.” He is reportedly the only person after whom a U.S. military aircraft—the B-25 Mitchell—has been named.

 51  Bywater: Bywater, author’s biography and pp. 37ff, 44ff, 98ff, 118ff, 216ff, 262; Insight, 10/28/91; “Reporter Predicted Japanese Attack,” www.lindseywilliams.org.

 51  Yamamoto: Chronology 1920–1929, U.S. Naval War College; Prange, Dawn, pp. 9, 16; Gannon, pp. 38ff.

 52  Nichi-Bei: Sunday Morning Star [Wilmington, DE], 4/7/40.

 52  “penny thrillers”: Wall Street Journal, 12/5/91.

 52  stereotyped: Toland, The Rising Sun, pp. 54ff; Madison, pp. 94ff.

 52  “The problem”: Arthur McCollum Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, 1971, NHHC.

 53  Haan to FDR/“war plan” book: Cited in Asst. Secretary Sherwood to Haan, 2/7/41, Haan to Gephardt, 4/26/74, Box 133, TOL.

  53  Triple Alliance/“new order”/“only the most trusted”: Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the U.S., pp. 1737ff; Matsuo, pp. 156ff, 190ff; Argus [Melbourne, Australia], 11/27/42; “Memorandum,” Kilsoo K. Haan with aliases,” 7/1/43, FBI 65–569, Box 133, TOL.

 54  Eleven months before: Asst. Sec. Sherwood to Haan, 2/7/41, Box 133, TOL. Haan’s papers show that the assistant secretary of the National Defense Council, Sidney Sherwood, went one better than merely sending a letter—he also met with Haan. The sizable file on Haan at FDRL indicates that most of his communications were forwarded to the State Department (2/7/41 letter Sherwood to Haan with handwritten note by Haan dated 7/16/66, TOL Box 133, Fldr. 2, President’s Official Files, OF 3342).

 54  fire off letters: E.g., Haan file, President’s Official Files, OF 3342, FDRL.

 54  “Some of your facts”: Koster, p. 146.

 54  Haan biography/shady/real estate: PHA 30, pp. 2861ff; Haan to Dodd, 11/8/54, Series, V.2, Box 22, GP; “Memorandum, Kilsoo K. Haan and aliases,” undated, 1942, FBI 65-569-67, Box 133, TOL; Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, 2104.

 55  “smooth talker”/shooting off mouth/“brushed off”: Hood to Ladd, 3/4/42, FBI 65-569-57, Ladd to Director, 4/15/42, FBI 65-569-70, Box 133, TOL.

 55  “impersonating”: “Memorandum, Kilsoo K. Haan and aliases,” undated, 1942, FBI 65-569-67, Box 133, TOL.

 55  “persona non grata”: Ladd to Director, 4/15/42, FBI 65-569-70, Box 133, TOL.

 55  Meurlott/Haan: Meurlott to Haan, 9/24/38, www.cia.gov; Haan to Dodd, 11/8/54, Series V.2, Box 22, GP.

 55  Meurlott background: PHA 29, pp. 1999ff.

 55  looked into the “war plan” book: PHA 35, pp. 109ff, 121ff, 348.

 55  Gillette/“understood”/“could not continue”: Spencer to Ladd, 4/16/42, FBI 62-60950-8-171, Box 133, TOL; “Predicted Pearl Harbor, Will U.S. Listen Now,” undated clipping, HEK R15.

 56  “placed”: Kimmel to Haan and attachments, 6/8/44, HEK R26.

 56  “blueprints”: “Memorandum, Kilsoo K. Haan with aliases,” 3/16/50, FBI 65-569-968, Hottel to Hoover, 10/7/43, FBI 65-569-622; AP, 2/19/42; FBI 65-569-35, Box 133, TOL.

 56  “stole”/Endo/“at risk”: Hood to Hoover, 3/4/42, FBI 65-569-45, McKee to Hoover, 2/24/42, FBI 65-569-37, Hoover to SAC, Washington, DC, 2/26/42; “Memorandum, Kilsoo K. Haan and aliases,” undated, 1942, FBI 65-569-67, Box 133, TOL; Milwaukee [WI] Journal, 12/28/41.

 56  His overall operation: According to FBI reports after the Pearl Harbor attack, Triple Alliance was not in bookstores in Hawaii as of June 1941, though a Japanese-language edition became available at some point. Matsuo’s book was published in English only after the attack on Pearl Harbor, as How Japan Plans to Win (Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the U.S., p. 1737; memo re Kilsoo Haan, 4.30/42, FBI 65-569-67; PHA 35, p. 348; Tillman memo, 6/21/43, FBI 65-569-541).

 56  “the possibility”/“not translated”: Hood to Ladd, 4/16/42, FBI 62-60950-8-171, Box 133, TOL.

 56  contact the State Department repeatedly: “Memorandum, Kilsoo K. Haan and aliases,” undated, 1942, FBI 65-569-67, Box 133, TOL.

 56  Hull/Stimson/“agent”/optimum date: Haan to Stimson, 10/28/41, Series V.2, Box 22, GP.

 56  Hornbeck: Robert Thompson, p. 371, citing Hornbeck memo, Folder 197, Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

 57  Sevareid: “Between the Wars,” Part 16, Alan Landsburg Productions, 1978, PBS.

 57  In early October: Prange, Dawn, pp. 255ff. On similar grounds—that relations with Japan were “extremely delicate”—Hull had earlier urged Martin Dies, chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee, not to make public information that Haan had supplied. Long afterward, Dies would recall having told Hull that “it was a grave responsibility to withhold such information from the public. The Secretary assured me that he and Roosevelt considered it essential to national defense . . . I have never been able to understand why our government did not take the necessary precautions to protect our fleet from destruction after our Committee had furnished such precise information on the proposed attack.” See further coverage in Chapter 16 (American Opinion, 4/64; Dies, p. 165).

 57  According to Gillette’s nephew: Toland, Infamy, pp. 349ff. By coincidence, Thomas Gillette was the son of Captain—later Admiral—Claude Gillette, who managed the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard at the time of the Japanese attack. Thomas himself served in the U.S. Navy in the 1950s.

 57  There is no record: Raymond Teichmann to Anthony Summers, 6/16/92.

CHAPTER 8

 58  On January 27th, 1941: PHA 14, p. 1042. Because of the international dateline, which runs through the central Pacific west of Hawaii, Tokyo time is often (though not always) a day ahead of the U.S. calendar. January 27, referenced in Grew’s telegram, was the date of transmission by the Tokyo calendar. Where dates west of the date line are referenced in this book, however, the authors have by and large used the related U.S. date.

 58  “There is a lot of talk”: In his book Ten Years in Japan, Grew used the sentence: “Of course, I informed our Government.” He did not use that sentence in his later book Turbulent Era, but inserted: “I rather guess that the boys in Hawaii are not precisely asleep.”

The “talk around town” to which he referred in his diary, Grew would testify to Congress’ Joint Committee, had come from various sources. What they were, he claimed, he had since forgotten. The Embassy’s Third Secretary, Max Bishop, was to say in a 1993 interview that he heard about plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor from sources other than the Peruvian diplomat, “mostly American . . . the United Press correspondent in Tokyo . . . Harold O. Thompson . . . was one of my best sources.” [testify: PHA 2, p. 561. Bishop: Interview with Ambassador Max Bishop, Oval History Project, Association of Diplomatic Studies, 2/26/93.]

 59  “a rumor”: PHA 32, p. 630.

 59  “Peruvian Minister”/“personal friend”: PHA 29, pp. 2145ff.

 59  “utmost”: PHA 32, p. 634.

 59  secondhand/Bishop: Interview with Ambassador Max Bishop, Oral History Project, Association of Diplomatic Studies, 2/26/93; Toland, Infamy, p. 26.

 59  He had detractors: A former specialist on Japan in the State Department’s Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Frank Schuler, and his wife Olive, who had been a secretary in that division, were to claim that Bishop fabricated his supposed role. The Schulers said Bishop had been reassigned to Washington by late January 1941—and that his initials on a relevant document established this (correspondence and documents, Olive Schuler, 1993, in files of authors and James Lesar).

 59  Crocker: Toland, Rising Sun, p. 151; Prange, Dawn, p. 31.

 59  Schreiber biography: Rodriguez del Campo, refs.; interview with Teresa Kroll de Rivera Schreiber by Giovanni Volpi, TKK.

 59  postwar account: El Comercio [Lima, Peru], 2/5/49.

 59  affidavit: Affidavit of Teresa K. de Rivera Schreiber, 5/83, supplied to authors by Olive Schuler.

 59  “I explained to him”: As Rivera Schreiber recalled it, Grew followed up by sending a telegram “to President Roosevelt.” This seems improbable—normal procedure would have been to report to the Secretary of State, and the record indicates that this is what Grew did (El Comercio, Lima, 2/5/49).

 60  did not “recollect”: PHA 2, pp. 570ff.

 60  Bishop did not ask: Interview with Bishop, Association of Diplomatic Studies, supra.

 60  Bohlen: Brownlow, pp. 100ff.

 60  Fearey: Foreign Service Journal, 12/91.

 60  Rivera Schreiber’s account: El Comercio, 2/5/49; and see affidavit of Teresa K. de Rivera Schreiber, supra; Rodriguez del Campo, refs.

 61  It was apparently common: A claim that there was a dispatch about the Rivera Schreiber–Grew information, a dispatch never made public, came from the disaffected former Far Eastern Division staffers Frank and Olive Schuler.

 61  Claims that government: Others assigned to the project, according to the memo, were Far Eastern Division head Maxwell Hamilton, and Alger Hiss, then a top aide in that division. Supervising the project was State Department historian Wilder Spaulding (Hornbeck to Secretary, 12/15/41).

 61  some reason to think: Hamilton, Ballantine, and their colleague Stanley Hornbeck were described by Ladislas Farago, who wrote an early, insightful book about Pearl Harbor, as “sincere men of lofty principles whose patriotism and integrity were beyond a shadow of a doubt” (Farago, Broken Seal, p. 180).

 61  December 16th memo: SKH to Secretary, 12/16/41, Department of State, supplied to authors by Olive Schuler.

 61  The State Department: About the FRUS Series, www.history.state.gov.

 62  Asked by Thomas: In the 1994 affidavit, both correspondent Thomas and former Far Eastern Division secretary Olive Schuler swore to having heard Shaffer make these allegations (correspondence and documents, Olive Schuler, files of authors and attorney James Lesar).

 62  “personal memoranda”: Bishop to Grew, 10/14/55, HEK R32.

 62  McCollum/“Japanese cook”: PHA 14, p. 973.

 63  The nascent plan: That others on the Japanese navy’s general staff were becoming aware of the plan at this time was reported by Ladislas Farago, who served in U.S. Naval Intelligence during the war. Farago cites a letter Admiral Yamamoto sent on February 1st, 1941, to Rear Admiral Takijiro Ohnishi, chief of staff of the 11th Air Fleet; he also cites Ohnishi’s resulting consultation with Commander Minoru Genda (who went on to be a key planner of the operation). According to Farago, claims that the general staff was not made privy to the plan at this stage are less than convincing—these claims were made at a time after the war when it was in the interest of Yamamoto’s surviving colleagues to avoid being seen to bear responsibility (Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 137, 404).

 63  timing of planning: E.g., Prange, Dawn, p. 30; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 136ff.

 63  “The Division”: PHA 33, p. 1390; McCollum Oral History, supra.

CHAPTER 9

 65  11 percent/70 percent: Simpson, pp. 32, 39ff.

 65  titular authority: PHA 33, pp. 924ff.

 65  three hundred ships: Westcott, p. 343.

 65  “clatter”: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 2/1/41.

 65  The Pacific Fleet: These figures are for October 1941. The numbers fluctuated (PHA 17, pp. 2534ff).

  65  100,000: Brownlow, p. 90.

 65  move to shore/office: Interview with Poco Smith, Series V.2, Box 56, GP; Proceedings, 12/71; Prange, Dawn, p. 135.

 65  DeLany: Interview with Walter DeLany, Series V.2, Box 12, GP.

 65  Veterans of Pearl Harbor: DeLany and Christie went on to become vice admirals, Pullen to be a rear admiral.

 66  Christie: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5/15/68.

 66  Pullen: Prange, Verdict, p. 420.

 66  Pfeiffer: Brownlow, p. 93.

 66  Fielder: Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5/15/68.

 66  Theobald: Affidavit of Admiral Robert Theobald, 3/20/44, HEK R4.

 66  The pressure was: Brownlow, p. 91. The Admiral’s feeling that he should not enjoy the comfort of family while his men went without was cited by his neighbor at Pearl Harbor, Grace Earle. His aide Captain William “Poco” Smith, however, quoted him as saying: “I feel I could not do my job with my family present” (Earle letter, cited in Brownlow, p. 91; Smith interview, Series V.2, Box 74, GP).

 67  Dorothy/Long Beach/“can make herself at home”: Undated clippings, scrapbooks, courtesy of Harriott Johnson Kimmel; WP, 8/17/41; Kimmel to Edward “Ned” Kimmel, 5/8/41, Dorothy Kimmel to Ned Kimmel, 1/7/41, MMK; interview with Harold Train, Series V.2, GP; Kimmel, p. 185.

 67  “My first day”: Alfred Sidebottom to Gail Kimmel, 8/17/2002, courtesy of Gail Kimmel.

 67  Manning/letters: Service Record of Lieutenant Commander Manning Marius Kimmel, U.S. Navy, Deceased, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 3/7/46; Manning Kimmel to Agatha and Oscar Swinford (in-laws), 6/18/39, 5/12/40, 9/11/40, 11/21/40, 12/25/40, 8/16/41, HEK to Manning M. Kimmel II (brother), 6/15/40, MMK; Manchester [NH] Union, 11/6/41.

 68  Tom: Interview with Thomas K. Kimmel Sr., Box 120, TOL; interview with Thomas K. Kimmel Jr.; Husband Kimmel, “Adventures of Tom and Nancy Kimmel in the Early Days of the Japanese War,” unpublished manuscript, TKK.

 68  Ned: Biographical note by Vincent Colan, TKK; HEK to Ned K., 10/5/39, 6/16/40, 11/8/40, MMK.

 68  “No information”: Manning K. to Agatha and Oscar Swinford, 9/6/41, MMK.

 69  “I was greatly”: HEK to Ned K., 7/14/40, MMK.

 69  Grace Earle: Brownlow, p. 91.

 69  “Sitting out here”: HEK to Edward Kimmel, 5/8/41, MMK.

 69  The Navy’s “clear cut” job/WPL-46: Morton, The U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, pp. 80ff; Edward S. Miller, pp. 267ff, 280ff, 286ff; U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54; PHA 33, pp. 927ff, 956ff; Kimmel, p. 24; Gannon, pp. 86ff.

 70  “to perfect”: PHA 33, pp. 1357ff.

 70  Kimmel’s plan/approval/task forces: U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54; Edward S. Miller, p. 274; draft, Kimmel Statement to Joint Congressional Cttee., TKK; Prange, Verdict, p. 423; PHA 39, p. 296; PHA 17, p. 2476ff.

 70  Halsey: Halsey and Bryan, p. 72.

 70  Hewitt: Brownlow, p. 76.

 70  Kitts: Gannon, p. 37.

 70  FTP 155: “Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,” Joint Board, 1927, revised 1935, J.B. 350, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1936; Kimmel, pp. 11ff.

 70  Bloch: Prange, Verdict, pp. 384ff; Gannon, pp. 17ff.

 71  43,000: PHA Report, p. 491.

 71  “I am either”: Stillwell, p. 102.

 71  at odds: Brownlow, p. 89.

 71  no unity of command/major flaw/Navy allotted: Prange, Verdict, pp. 543ff; NYT, 1/29/42; Clausen and Lee, pp. 229ff, 292; Marshall to Emmons, 12/20/41, HEK R25.

 71  “very direct”: Marshall to Short, 2/7/41, HEK R8.

 71  “I immediately”: Brownlow, p. 89.

 71  “highly cooperative”: U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54.

 71  same words: Ibid.; Short to Marshall, 2/19/41, HEK R8.

 72  golf: Interview with Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP; Lau to Kimmel, 12/7/64, TKK; Prange, Verdict, p. 376.

 72  cordial relationship: Interview with Robert Dunlop, Series V.2, Box 13, GP; Theobald affidavit, 3/20/44, HEK R4; Marshall to Short, 5/5/41, HEK R8; Brownlow, pp. 88ff.

 72  Truman: Collier’s, 8/26/44; AP, 8/22/44.

 72  Both man-to-man: It was the body that first investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, the Roberts Commission, that initially suggested Kimmel and Short “failed to confer” properly in light of warnings they had received. This started a spate of rumors that the two commanders had been at odds; and the nature of their working relationship remained an issue during subsequent investigations. The Army Pearl Harbor Board found that they “did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary,” while the Congress’ Joint Committee found that they had failed to “command by mutual cooperation.”

The Navy Court of Inquiry, by contrast, reported that there had been “no failure to cooperate on the part of either.” Substantial testimony, much of it from close aides, supports that assertion.

Another claim had it that Kimmel should not have established as close a relationship with Short as he did—on the theory that doing so interfered with the liaison role that was more properly Admiral Bloch’s. If so, the fault was that of Chief of Naval Operations Stark and Army Chief of Staff Marshall, who from the outset emphasized the importance of Kimmel and Short forging a good relationship. [Roberts: PHA 39, pp. 20ff; draft paper on Kimmel-Short relations by Robert Lavender (HEK lawyer), HEK 3. rumors: Chicago Tribune, 3/21/42. Army Board: PHA 39, 127, 175ff. JCI: PHA Report, p. 252. Navy Court: PHA 39, pp. 319ff. testimony: E.g., second endorsement to NCI by Adm. King, 11/6/44, HEK1; interview with Walter DeLany, GP V.2, Box 12; Gannon, pp. 285ff, n16. interfered: Prange, Verdict, pp. 390ff. Stark/Marshall: E.g., Marshall to Short, 2/7/41, HEK 8.]

 72  Kimmel thought the General: This book does not attempt a detailed assessment of General Short’s performance. Its focus is on Admiral Kimmel.

 72  security directive: PHA 22, pp. 335ff.

 72  Two months after: PHA 15, pp. 1429ff; PHA Report, pp. 81ff.

 72  Defense Plan: More properly, the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, covering not only Hawaii but Midway, Wake, and other islands.

 72  CNO Stark: U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54.

 72  serious flaw: PHA 26, p. 484; Prange, Verdict, pp. 301ff, 403.

 72  air forces/“It appears that”: PHA 33, pp. 1182ff.

 73  They would long plead: PHA 36, pp. 286ff; interview with Poco Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, and “Interview with the President,” 6/9/41, Series V.2, Box 56, GP; “Statement of Interested Party, Claude Bloch,” Box 5, BLOCH.

CHAPTER 10

 74  eight thousand/six months/sixteen thousand/sixteen months/“urgently necessary”/“I always”/priority to the Atlantic/“the Navy Department viewed”/“After taking”/“flying fifty”: Richardson, pp. 190, 351, 353; PHA 9, p. 4289; PHA 37, pp. 961ff; PHA 26, p. 542; PHA 14, p. 1025.

 75  He had only sixty-odd: In a report in August 1941, the Army air commander in Hawaii, Major Gen Frederick Martin, came up with a somewhat different estimate. He figured that a thorough search would require seventy-two planes every day (PHA 14, p. 1025).

 75  In the later months: PHA 1, pp. 271ff; Gannon, p. 156. Richardson had initiated the reconnaissance in June 1940, after the Army in Hawaii received a perplexing message from Chief of Staff George Marshall that had the appearance of being an “alert” to counter a “trans-Pacific raid.” There was no such raid, and whether this had been a real alert or a training exercise was never established for sure. The doubt about the message exemplifies the failure of coordination that tended to afflict the Army and Navy high commands in Washington (Richardson, pp. 342ff; PHA 15, p. 1594; PHA 1, pp. 271ff).

 75  “token”: PHA 1, p. 273.

 75  Moorer: Thomas Moorer Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, NHHC.

 75  “fly boys”: George Dyer Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, 1973.

 76  “continued to accentuate”/“first priority”: Richardson, p. 353.

 76  “would give only”: PHA 32, p. 571.

 76  “It was a question”: PHA 26, p. 207.

 76  “the requirement”: PHA 39, p. 338; Richardson, pp. 359ff.

 76  “the force left”: PHA 16, p. 2149.

 76  As Stark’s key aide: Smedberg Oral History, NWC. (Later Vice Admiral Smedberg.)

 76  Not one of the hundred . . . patrol planes: Kimmel, pp. 14ff; PHA 36, p. 550.

 77  Anderson: Introduction to Brownlow, p. 18.

 77  “The Fleet’s most desperate”: Halsey and Bryan, p. 71.

 77  “Radar was not trusted”: Interview with David Richardson, 2014.

 77  MacArthur: Prange, Verdict, p. 466 citing Admiral Hart memo.

 77  “The possibilities”: Halsey and Bryan, pp. 69, 72.

 77  “wizard”: “Churchill’s Scientists,” www.sciencemuseum.org.uk.

 78  reciprocal exchange: Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 251ff; “Briefcase,” BBC, 2/5/07.

 78  “airplane detector”: Terrett, p. 192; Farago, Broken Seal, p. 251.

 78  Opie background/mission: O’Connor, pp. 46ff; correspondence Christopher O’Connor, 2015.

 78  December/“Aircraft Warning Service”: PHA 33, p. 1195; PHA 37, pp. 941ff; PHA 16, p. 1939; Theobald affidavit, 3/20/44, HEK R4.

 79  February/“in June”: PHA 5, p. 2128; Short to Marshall, 3/6/41, HEK R8.

 79  National Park Service: Bryden to Short, 3/15/41, HEK R8.

 79  “struggling with radar”: Harvey Bundy Oral History, 10/7/59, George C. Marshall Foundation.

 79  in May/“accelerated”: PHA22, pp. 360ff.

 79  “terribly disturbed”: PHA 16, pp. 2175ff.

 79  By late September: PHA 24, p. 1788.

 79  Martin: PHA 28, p. 981.

 79  problem/equipment poached: PHA 27, pp. 156ff; PHA 7, pp.2941, 3033ff.

  79  “I was very conscious”: PHA 26, pp. 149ff.

 80  Davis: PHA 26, p. 107.

 80  On the day: PHA 32, pp. 341ff; George Thompson et al., pp. 3ff; Gannon, pp. 230ff. The operators who spotted the incoming enemy planes were privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott, manning the Army’s Opana radar station. The unfortunate lieutenant who believed the planes were American was Kermit Tyler. This episode is well documented. The authors also noted claims made years later by a former Army private, Frank Tassinari, who served with one of the mobile radar units, that his team also picked up the incoming enemy planes. The details of Tassinari’s accounts, however, are contradictory, and he acknowledged that he himself had been off duty, asleep, at the time. [Opana: PHA 32, pp. 341ff; Lord, pp. 41ff; Gannon, pp. 231ff. Tassinari: Townsman [Wellesley, MA], 12/4/86; World War II magazine, 1/98.]

 80  Kimmel grilled: PHA 6, p. 2743.

 80  radar in Philippines: George Thompson et al., pp. 10ff; Morton, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Fall of the Philippines, pt. 2, ch. 5.

 81  “certainly should have”: Ferrell, p. 43.

CHAPTER 11

 82  “Aerial Attacks”/Ramsey: Proceedings, 8/37, pp. 1126ff.

 82  It was to be: John F. De Virgilio, Pearl Harbor History Associates, “Japanese Thunderfish,” Naval History, Winter 1991; and see Richardson, pp. 361ff. USS Arizona, on which 1,177 men died, was hit not by a torpedo but by a bomb. The authors have relied on De Virgilio’s authoritative article.

 82  Torpedoes launched from aircraft: Eleven torpedoes missed, failed to detonate, or became buried in the mud.

 82  Forrestal: PHA 39, p. 377.

 83  Love/“took account”: Love, p. 664.

 83  “this torpedo business”: PHA 6, p. 2593.

 83  Mers el-Kébir/Dunkerque/Dakar: Marder, refs.; David Brown, p. 33; Richardson, p. 363; Tute, p. 162; “Statement of Evidence,” Box 5, RG 80, NARA.

 83  The truly big development: In July 1941, the Conte di Cavour would be refloated and towed to Trieste—but it was never fully repaired (O’Connor, pp. 66ff, 68).

 84  These successes were: NYT, 11/14/40. A 1938 British Admiralty chart, received by the U.S. Bureau of Navigation in April 1941, shows that the water in the Taranto harbor area ranged from 1–2 fathoms (6–12 feet) to 16 or more fathoms (96 feet or more). In planning for the Taranto raid, the British reportedly based their plans on ships anchored in about 7 fathoms (40 feet) of water. Sources citing that figure include a 2006 article in the Naval War College Review and a 2014 article by Britain’s Fleet Air Arm Officers Association. The historian Michael Gannon wrote that the British attacks were “generally” made at depths of “84 to 90” feet. The chart sent by Opie (the CNO’s observer there) places targeted ships in depths of between 39 and 96 feet, most of them in depths ranging from 66 to 96 feet. [Chart: Emergency Reproductions of British Admiralty Charts (Italy), Stack Area 430, BA 1643, RG 37, NARA. 40 feet: “On This Day,” 11/11/14, www.fleetairarmoa. org; Lieutenant Colonel Angelo Caravaggio, “The Attack at Taranto,” Naval War College Review, Summer, 2006; but see Lowry and Welham, p. 68; O’Connor, p. 33. “generally”: Gannon, p. 174, but see p. 307n13.]

 84  Navies worldwide: O’Connor, pp. 71, 73ff, 81; Prange, Dawn, p. 320.

 84  Months later, a Japanese: A planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor, former Japanese staff officer Minoru Genda, was to claim years later that the Taranto raid had no influence on Japanese tactics. Whether or not that was the case, the raid was clearly of great interest to Japan—as a later chapter on Japanese espionage efforts will show (Gannon, p. 174; Stillwell, p. 74).

 84  Richardson/stop using: Richardson, p. 361.

 84  “My concern”: PHA 1, p. 275.

 85  nets/“baffles”: Gannon, pp. 173ff.

 85  “neither necessary”: PHA 14, p. 975.

 85  McCrea: Stillwell, p. 102.

 85  Opie: “British Attack on Taranto,” 11/14/40, Intelligence Division Secret Reports of Naval Attachés, 194–1946, File A-1-z, Entry 98B, Box 75, RG 38, NARA.

 85  Two torpedoes, marked: ONI’s British Empire section summarized Opie’s report for distribution. Dated February 14, 1941, the summary contains no mention of the chart Opie sent. It does, however, state, “The British Navy has definitely given up high-level bombing attacks against ships. They believe that torpedoes are the best attack weapons.” Although the summary is marked for distribution to multiple offices within the Navy Department—including those of both the CNO and CINCUS—there is no evidence that it reached the addressees. The summary did not surface during postattack inquiries (ONI, F-1—British Empire)—to multiple addressees, “Subject: Great Britain Navy Operations,” 2/14/41; Intelligence Division Secret Reports of Naval Attachés, 1940–1946, Entry 98B, Box 75, RG 38).

 86  “I honestly feel”: O’Connor, p. 61.

 86  “reports from abroad”: PHA 14, p. 1000; PHA 5, p. 2127.

 86  “A minimum depth”: PHA 17, p. 2472.

 86  nine members: “Narrative Statement of Evidence of the Navy, re Pearl Harbor Investigation,” 1945, Box 5, RG 80, NARA.

  86  Kitts: PHA 32, p. 391.

 87  “I don’t think”: “Narrative Statement,” supra.

 87  In view of Stark’s letter: PHA 26, p. 525. In 1944, Stark’s successor as CNO, Admiral King, would comment in writing: “The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department” (PHA 39, p. 338).

 87  “no minimum”: PHA 33, p. 1318.

 88  “negligible”: PHA 6, p. 2509.

 88  “7 fathoms”/“no indication”: “Narrative Statement,” supra.

 88  Morehouse/“as shallow”: Intelligence Report, “Aviation Air Currents Vicinity Gibraltar” and attachments, 7/15/41, Entry 98B, Box 75, RG 38, NARA.

 88  A routing slip: The routing slip also indicates that the report was to go to Op-10 (Stark), Op-11 (Stark’s deputy), Op-12 (War Plans), Op-22 (Fleet Training), HO (Hydrographic Office), C&R (Bureau of Construction and Repair), Aero (Bureau of Aeronautics), Ord (Bureau of Ordnance), Eng (Engineering), and M&S (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery). To establish the above, the authors consulted the U.S. Navy’s Naval History and Heritage Command (correspondence, Dr. Ryan Peeks, NHHC).

 88  Nor, though the existence: Christopher O’Connor, author of the Taranto study, has theorized: “The reason why Morehouse’s report disappeared may be typographical . . . Page 1 of the report listed the contents in four numbered items. The comment about depth of water was item #5 on page 3: it had been left out of the ‘Contents’ list. Busy staff officers may have just missed it.” The report was not circulated to ONI’s Far East Section, with its special interest in the Taranto raid—on account of the shallow water at Pearl Harbor—an odd omission that may add weight to O’Connor’s theory (O’Connor, pp. 87ff; correspondence O’Connor).

 89  “Shortly after 7 December”: PHA 26, p. 108. The Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance handled the development of aerial weapons.

 89  Ansel: Walter Ansel Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, 1970, NHHC.

CHAPTER 12

 90  began bleeding: PHA 33, p. 1357; OPNAV to CINCPAC, 4/15/41, HEK R4; Gannon, pp. 31ff; Simpson, pp. 83ff.

 90  “obviously critical”: PHA 16, p. 2161.

 90  numerically superior: PHA 39, pp. 302ff; Kimmel, pp. 22, 202ff.

 90  “I am telling you”: PHA 16, p. 2164.

 90  deterrent weakened: Ibid.; PHA 6, p. 2566.

 90  “kiss of death”: Interview with Poco Smith, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

 90  “taxicabs”: Interview with Edwin Layton, Series V.2, Box 58, GP.

  91  Stark-FDR relations: Brownlow, p. 95, citing interview with Stark; Stark-FDR correspondence, e.g. PPF, Folder 166, FDRL; Box 2, STARK.

 91  direct line/weekends: Interview with Charles Wellborn, Box 11, Folder 16, SIMPSON; Hoehling, p. 45.

 91  “wax cylinder”/“Now Betty”: Smedberg Oral History, NWC; Smedberg to Prange, 6/26/77, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

 91  “Did you ever keep”: PHA 32, p. 86.

 92  Surprisingly, given what: Smedberg kept secret the recording of the President’s conversations until 1975, when he revealed it in the course of an oral history for the Naval Institute. Two years later, he wrote about it in detail in a letter to the historian Gordon Prange, but the recordings are not mentioned in either of Prange’s books about Pearl Harbor. Excerpts from the Naval Institute oral history were published in 1981. One of the recordings, on which President Roosevelt could be heard ranting (about a naval matter unrelated to Pearl Harbor), may at least for a time have survived the initial destruction (interview with Vice Admiral Smedberg by John T. Mason, 10/2/75, Naval War College; Stillwell, pp. 88ff, 287; Smedberg to Prange, 6/26/77, GP, V.2, Box 74).

 92  “popping up”: PHA 16, p. 2163.

 92  “‘lunger’”: Interview with Charles Wellborn, Box 11, Folder 16, SIMPSON.

 92  “does not easily follow”: Andrew, p. 86.

 92  “send a carrier”/“we couldn’t”/“I wouldn’t”: PHA 16, pp. 2174, 2242; interview with Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP.

 93  “Keep cheerful”: E.g., PHA 16, p. 2163.

 93  “I have recently”: PHA 16, p. 2229.

 93  “officer fresh from Washington”: Kimmel would write in his 1954 book that this was Vice Admiral Wilson Brown (Kimmel, p. 79).

 93  “fully aware”: PHA 16, p. 2160.

 93  “getting the complete”: Interview with Walter DeLany, Series V.2, Box 12, GP.

 94  letter/“largely uninformed”/“in a very difficult”: PHA 16, p. 2233; PHA 32, p. 99; Kimmel, pp. 80ff; Prange, Dawn, pp. 136ff; Simpson, pp. 103ff.

 94  hand-carried: Interview with Husband Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP.

 94  He made the journey: Interview with Husband Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP. Kimmel told historian Gordon Prange, Prange’s notes show, that he was “certain” he “initiated” the visit back to the United States. In his book, however, Prange wrote that Stark “summoned” Kimmel to Washington. The present authors find no evidence for that statement, or for the suggestion—in a study of U.S. military and political developments in 1941, previously seen as authoritative—that Kimmel arrived accompanied by more than one colleague. The study’s author, Captain Tracy Kittredge, a former aide of Stark’s, claimed no one had been “asked to approve” its text. Correspondence found by the present authors, however, shows that Kittredge consulted extensively with Stark and Stark’s attorney. [“initiated”/“summoned”: Interviews with Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP; Prange, Dawn, p. 138; Kittredge, U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54; David Richmond to Stark and Kittredge, 7/29/54, to Stark, 8/5/54, Stark to Kittridge, 7/5/54, et al., ST, Boxes 2 and 29.]

 95  met with Stark: Stark appointments book, 1941, Box 4, STARK.

 95  “doing the best”: Interview with Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP.

 95  “They didn’t give”/Turner: McCollum to Prange, 1/17/72, Series V/2, Box 60, GP.

 95  “complex on secrecy”: McCollum Oral History, supra.

 95  their brief encounters: President’s appointments diary, June 9, FDRL. See Chapter 5 supra.

 95  impressed/“tried to equate”/“very engaging”/“loved”: Brownlow, p. 83.

 95  The surviving record: See Chapter 6 supra on the end of Admiral J. O. Richardson’s time as CINCUS.

 96  memorandum/“for a hundred years”/“considerable”/“taking it”: “Interview with the President,” 6/9/41, Operational Archives, File A3–1/NNA3–2/QM, Navy History and Heritage Command; PHA 33, pp. 692, 696ff.

 96  big stick/freezing assets/oil: U.S. Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 87ff; Minohari, Han, and Dawley, p. 99; Prange, Verdict, pp. 158ff, 166.

 96  malevolently: Mauch, chs. 6–8; Prange, Verdict, p. 168.

 96  glimpse/battleships/“raiding”/“explode”/“crazy”/“silly”/“return”/”fanciful”: “Interview with the President,” 6/9/41, File A3–1/NN-A3–2/QM, Navy History Heritage Command PHA 33, pp. 692, 696ff.

 97  The President relieved: During his stay in Washington, Kimmel was to say, it was suggested a further three battleships might be moved to the Atlantic, along with another aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and two squadrons of destroyers (PHA 33, p. 696; Kimmel, p. 22).

 97  “Don’t worry”/visit Japanese embassy/“banalities”: Brownlow, pp. 83ff.

 98  “The Fleet needs”: Proceedings, 6/95.

 98  “strongest fortress”/“impracticable”: PHA 3, pp. 1092ff.

 98  “grand conclusion”: McCollum Oral History, supra.

 98  In early spring: Layton with Pineau and Costello, pp. 18, 70ff; “Translation of Japanese ‘War-Novel’” (1932), Box 36, Folder 16, LAYTON; Edwin Layton Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute, 1970, NWC. (The book, Warrera Moshi Tatakawaba, had been published in Tokyo in 1933. It is discussed in more detail, with slight differences, in Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 70; and Stillwell, pp. 278ff. For a reference to relevant U.S. war games, see Chapter 6, supra.)

 99  “if they thought”: Weintraub, p. 231.

 99  McMorris: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 74; PHA 36, p. 193; interview with Kimmel, Series V.2, Box 56, GP.

CHAPTER 13

100  Tachibana/Kono/“Keeno” episode: NYT, 6/10/41; PHA 10, pp. 4880ff; Layton with Pineau and Costello, pp. 106ff; Time, 6/23/41; Prange, Dawn, pp. 149ff, 248; PHA 1, pp. 234ff; PHA 13, pp. 424ff; Pedro Loureiro, “The Imperial Japanese Navy and Espionage: The Itaru Tachibana Case,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 3, No. 1; “Japanese Espionage and American Countermeasures in Pre–Pearl Harbor California,” draft manuscript in authors’ collection; WP, 12/6/81.

100  It had been there: See Chapter 7.

102  Caught red-handed: Investigators had to close down the sting operation, Kimmel’s intelligence officer Layton was to recall, because Blake blew his own cover—he drunkenly bragged to a woman that he was working for U.S. intelligence (Loureiro, “Imperial Japanese Navy and Espionage,” supra; Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 108).

102  Hull/“our conversations”: Hull, pp. 1011ff.

102  Tachibana running: E.g., Memorandum re Frederick Joseph Rutland, 7/2/43; interview of Rutland, 7/23/43, KV 2/336, PRO.

102  Rutland on payroll: Case summary, KV 2/337, PRO.

102  information on the movements: Advisory Committee to Consider Appeals Against Orders of Detention, Appellant—Frederick Joseph Rutland, Interview 1/15/42, KV 2/333, PRO.

102  Hawaii/whiskey business: Biographical summary, Frederick Joseph Rutland, copy found in PF 37966, KV 2/332, PRO.

102  “consolidate”: DNI Tokyo to Japanese Naval Attaché, London, 7/4/35, KV2/339.

102  What exactly Rutland: Thurston to Gibbs, 7/10/43, and Memorandum re Frederick Joseph Rutland, 7/2/43, KV2/336; biographical summary, Frederick Joseph Rutland, copy found in PF 37966, KV 2/332, PRO. Having agreed with their British counterparts to send Rutland back to Britain, U.S. Intelligence officers lost the opportunity to interrogate him on his years of working for the Japanese. He was interned by the British after the Pearl Harbor attack but was never tried. Released late in the war, he died—an apparent suicide—in 1949.

102  “except vicinity”: Loureiro, “Imperial Japanese Navy and Espionage,” supra.

103  “The role played”: PHA Report, p. 150.

103  The FBI and Naval Intelligence: On wider espionage matters, Army Intelligence—G-2—was also involved (PHA 31, pp. 3176ff).

103  Japanese interest: PHA 35, p. 554.

104  160,000: “Japanese Intelligence and Propaganda in the U.S. During 1941,” 12/4/41, Office of Naval Intelligence, supplied to the authors by Lee Allen; www.internmentarchives.com; PHA 35, pp. 559ff; Farago, Broken Seal, p. 406.

104  joho kyoku: Farago, Broken Seal, p. 141.

104  The arrangement had: Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 83ff; “Japanese Intelligence and Propaganda in the U.S. During 1941,” 12/4/41, Office of Naval Intelligence, supra.

104  naval attaché: The attaché was Colonel Hiroshi Oshima.

104  Kühn background: Re Bernard Julius Otto Kühn, Hoover O&C File 164, FBI; Press Release, Office of War Information, 6/4/43; FBI 65– 1574–130, Affidavit of Otto Kühn, 1/1/42; Doc. 6256A, Series V.2, Box 58, GP.

105  Bund: Shivers to Director, 4/10/41, FBI 65–1574–23.

105  entertained/Army officers/“espionage agents”: Hoover to [name redacted], 2/11/39, and Tamm to Director, 2/11/39, FBI 65–1574.

105  $70,000: Re. Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, Hoover O&C File 164, FBI.

105  “considered for”: Shivers to Director, 4/10/41, FBI 65–1574–23.

105  “It is not conceivable”/“eliminated”: Ladd to Director and attached report of Sterling Adams, 10/19/45, citing Shivers report of 3/11/41. The recommendation that the offending passage be omitted was of a piece with the notorious FBI mantra of the day: “Don’t embarrass the Bureau.” In an obsequious letter to Director Hoover, reporting that he might be called to testify during the first investigation into the attack, Hawaii agent-in-charge Robert Shivers made clear where his priorities lay. “I want you to know,” he wrote, “that I have upheld the Bureau in all its interests since the beginning of the attack on December 7, 1941 . . . My first loyalty, thought and obligation is to and for you—next comes the Bureau and after that the general welfare.” [mantra: Summers, Official and Confidential, p. 71; “I want”: Shivers to Director, 12/30/41, FBI 65–42502–21, TKK.]

105  new report/citizenship: Title: Friedel Barta Augusta Kuehn, with aliases, etc., 11/24/41, FBI 65–1574–27.

105  Not until after: In February 1942, a military court would find Kühn guilty of espionage. He received the death sentence, though this was later commuted to fifty years in prison. He was deported after the war. The role he and his wife played prior to Pearl Harbor is described in Chapter 22 (“Re Bernard Julius Otto Kühn,” FBI O&C file, Vol. 164; Press Release Office of War Information, 6/14/43; FBI 65–1574–130).

CHAPTER 14

107  Gardner/special attention/solved puzzle/shared with FBI: Memorandum, FBI to Stott, 5/5/44, KV2/2632, PRO; Hyde, Room 3603, pp. 79ff; “Joe K,” undated, #14A, and Security Officer, Bermuda to Asst. Director Postal and Telegram Censorship, undated, KV2/2630, PRO.

108  “closest possible marriage”: Hyde, Secret Intelligence Agent, foreword by Sir William Stephenson, p. xvi.

108  Von der Osten killed: FBI to Stott, 5/5/44, KV2/2632 and “Most Secret” transcription B.466, 3/20/41, KV2/2630, PRO; Hyde, Room 3603, p. 83.

108  experienced/Shanghai: Zacharias, pp. 159ff; Farago, Foxes, pp. 493ff; Summary of Joe K and Sawyer Trials, 5/21/42, KV2/2632, PRO; UP 2/7/42, 2/10/42, 2/12/42.

108  duplicates: Security Officer, Bermuda, to Asst. Director Postal and Telegram Censorship, undated, 14A, KV2/2630, PRO.

108  Himmler: Farago, Foxes, p. 470; AP 3/7/41.

108  arrest of Ludwig: UP 9/4/41.

109  “Pacific insular”: AP 2/19/42.

109  sending his letter: PHA 30, pp. 3082ff.

110  The postmark on: PHA 31, Item no. 60. The letter appears, obscurely, only as an exhibit in a volume of Congress’ Joint Committee’s inquiry into the Pearl Harbor attack. Many reports have suggested it was written in 1941, but the envelope in which it was contained—reproduced as an exhibit in the record of the Committee’s probe—shows clearly that it was mailed in February 1940. So does the fact that Von der Osten’s Hawaii report refers to the presence of the USS Saratoga—the Saratoga was not at Pearl Harbor as of early January 1941, but in dry dock on the U.S. West Coast. The letter had been obtained by the U.S. naval attaché in Shanghai, and passed to the FBI. [letter appears: PHA 30, pp. 3082ff. suggested: E.g., Foxes. pp. 494ff; UPI, in San Bernardino County Sun, 2/9/42. envelope: PHA 31, Exhibit 53, Items 60 and 61. Saratoga: Ship’s history, www.uscarriers.net. obtained: FBI to Stott, 5/5/44, PRO KV 2/2632.]

110  map: UP 2/7/42.

110  Godfrey/“expressed himself”/“fortnight”/no collaboration: Godfrey, pp. 132ff.

111  In an effort: The coordinator was Colonel William Donovan, whom President Roosevelt had earlier assigned to make informal contacts with British leaders, including Churchill, and his intelligence chiefs. Because of territorial rivalries, Donovan’s first year as U.S. coordinator of information was to see only limited success. He was close to BSC’s William Stephenson, however, and was to flourish once America joined the war. In 1942, he would head the Office of Strategic Services—OSS—the forerunner of the CIA. (Thomas Troy, “Donovan’s Original Marching Orders,” and Arthur B. Darling, “Origins of Central Intelligence,” both at www.cia.gov; Ranelagh, pp. 37ff. On BSC and Hoover-Donovan relations see Stephenson, refs.: authors’ citations draw from the unpublished draft, shared privately in 1989. See also Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, pp. 22ff; Summers, pp. 117ff; Andrew, pp. 85ff, 93ff; PHA 4, p. 2016.)

111  “Roosevelt’s folly”: Ranelagh, p. 52; and see Chalou, p. 80; Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, pp. 133ff.

111  “always conditioned”: Stephenson, “BSC History,” unpublished manuscript, p. 8.

CHAPTER 15

112  “presently of assistance”: Memorandum for the Director, 6/5/41, FBI 65–36994–1, RG 65, NARA. The Popov episode has been a subject of lasting controversy in the forty years since elements of the story first surfaced. The authors’ analysis here is informed principally by contemporary records released only since the millennium. The British Intelligence file “Dusko Popov, Codename Tricycle” was released into London’s Public Record Office in 2002. FBI documents, previously available only in heavily redacted form, were released to the National Archives in 2007.

112  “chief”/“leading”: Masterman, pp. 79, 55; interview with T. A. “Tar” Robertson, 1990.

112  Double-Cross Committee: See Macintyre, refs.; Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, pp. 43ff.

112  godfather: Interview with Marco Popov, 2015.

112  D-Day: Numerous references to Popov in British security files, KV 2/856, KV2/858-859, KV 2/864, KV 2/867, PRO; Macintyre, pp. 174– 231ff; Russell Miller, pp. 207ff.

112  rank/decorations: Interview with Marco Popov, 2015; Russell Miller, pp. 246ff.

112  The businessman son/satisfied British: Summary of Tricycle Case 7/28/41, KV2/849, PRO; Masterman, pp. 55ff, 79ff. The Abwehr officer’s real name was Kremer von Auenrode (Der Spiegel, 8/18/75).

113  list of questions: Summary of Tricycle Case, supra; and, e.g., Traffic Summary, KV2/849, PRO.

113  decided to send/August: Tricycle, Revised Summary up to departure from Lisbon to USA, 8/11/41, KV2/852; Guy Liddell diary, 3/15/41, KV4/187, PRO; Masterman, p. 95.

113  As on previous missions/questionnaire/“microdots”/plain text: Tricycle to T. A. Robertson, undated, August 1941, and translation and Cowgill to Robertson, 8/19/41, KV2/849, PRO; To Director, re. Dusan M. Popov, Confidential Informant, 8/26/41, FBI 65–36994–17; and Laboratory Report, 9/3/41, FBI 65–36994–7, RG 65, NARA.

When he left Portugal by air on August 10th, Popov apparently had with him both a typewritten copy of the questionnaire and the hidden text in the form of microdots. Then, following a stopover in Bermuda, he passed the material to a British agent assigned to escort him on the final leg of the journey to New York. The British agent, in turn, passed the material on to the FBI. It may seem odd that Popov carried the German transcript in clear as well as in microdot form, for that would appear to negate the secrecy of the microdot version. FBI documents, however, mesh with Popov’s account in the book he was to write in 1974. They establish, moreover, that the FBI had the questionnaire by the 14th, two days after Popov’s arrival, rather than—as another FBI document suggests—not until five days later.

The questionnaire may initially have reached the British earlier. Popov had passed it to an MI6 agent in Lisbon—probably Major Ralph Jarvis, who was assigned to handle double agents. British records show that it was certainly in London, being passed to Popov’s handler, Major T. A. Robertson, by August 19th. [Popov: Popov, pp. 132ff. FBI: Memo for the Director, 8/1/4/41, FBI 65–36994–19, Connelly to Director, 8/21/41, FBI 65–36994–5, RG 65, NARA. Jarvis: White to Cowgill, 8/2/41, Dusko Popov file, KV 2/849, PRO; Jeffrey, refs. reached British: Popov, supra; Cowgill to Robertson, 8/19/41, Dusko Popov file, KV 2/849, PRO.]

115  FBI laboratory’s random assembly: Laboratory Report, 9/3/41, FBI 65– 36694–7, RG 65 NARA.

115  Popov himself/Jebsen/Taranto: Popov, pp. 126ff, 141. As described in Chapter 11, British aircraft flying off carriers had months earlier sunk one Italian battleship and disabled two others at Taranto. The British planes had achieved this using aerial torpedoes—the weapon that was soon to cause havoc at Pearl Harbor.

115  “specific instructions”: Popov, p. 132.

115  “first thing”: Ibid., p. 144.

115  Three decades later: The FBI was riled, too, by Popov’s claim in the book that he had seen Director Hoover during his visit to the United States, that Hoover had called him a “bogus spy” and had virtually thrown him out of the office. In his complaint to Popov’s publisher, Kelley maintained that Popov never did see Hoover. In interviews for Anthony Summers’ 1993 biography of Hoover, Official and Confidential, however, Popov’s principal British Intelligence handler, Major T. A. Robertson, and Chloe McMillan, who worked for Intelligence in Portugal, both recalled Popov’s mentioning his encounter with Hoover when he returned to Europe. In a 1978 book, Commander Ewen Montagu of British Naval Intelligence, who handled aspects of the Popov case, referred to the encounter as fact. [“bogus”: Popov, p. 149. Kelley: Washington Post, 4/29/74; and Kelley to Dunn, 10/1/73, FBI 65–36994, NARA. interviews: Summers interviews, 1990. Montagu: Montagu, p. 75.]

116  Did Popov embroider: Likewise, the British written record does not show that Popov shared these additional details with his British associates. In his 1978 memoir, however Commander Montagu recalled a “verbal report” from Popov on what he had learned of the Japanese naval mission to Taranto. The report may have come through MI6’s Major Jarvis (see note, supra, for present chapter, “As on previous missions”; Montagu, p. 74; “Tricycle,” doc. 456B, Dusko Popov file, KV 2/852, PRO).

116  Various facts support: Popov’s explanation of why his contact Jebsen had been assigned to liaise with the Japanese mission—because German military intelligence used his family’s companies in the Far East as cover—is plausible. The family shipping firm, Jebsen and Jebsen, had indeed long traded in the Far East. There is doubt, however, about a statement by Popov, quoting Jebsen, that the German air attaché in Tokyo, Baron Wolfgang von Gronau, joined the Japanese mission to Taranto. In a postwar memoir, the former air attaché mentioned no travel to Europe in 1941. It does seem possible, however, that Jebsen and von Gronau knew each other. The attaché’s daughter was to become romantically involved with Jebsen. She told U.S. interrogators after the war that she was aware of secret meetings between Jebsen and Popov. [explanation: Popov, pp. 126ff. traded: “Dramatis Personae,” Dusko Popov file, KV 2/849, PRO; MacIntyre, pp. 8ff. Gronau: Ibid.; Gronau; and “Wartime Activities of the German Diplomatic and Military Services,” U.S. Army European Command, www.foia .cia.gov; “Tricycle Recycled,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1992. interview with Gronau’s granddaughter Marlise Karlin. daughter: Interrogation of Marie Luise von Gronau, 9/19/46, in FBI 65–36994, RG 65, NARA.]

116  Japanese naval mission Fioravanzo: Proceedings, 1/56; Prange, Dawn, p. 320; Naito Takeshi (Japanese naval attaché, Berlin) visits Taranto, cited in “A General Handbook on Japanese Army and Navy,” www.axishis toryforum.com.

116  “enthusiastic”: Connelly to Director, 8/19/41, FBI 65–36994–4, RG 65, NARA.

116  “satisfied”: Signature illegible to Robertson, 8/18/41, KV2/849, PRO.

116  He “did not believe”: Foxworth to Director, 9/8/41, FBI 65–36994–24, RG 65, NARA.

116  “unhesitatingly”: Hoover to Connelly, 8/21/41, FBI 65–36994–1, RG 65, NARA.

116  agents bugged: Connelly to Director, 9/5/41, FBI 65–36994–49, RG 65, NARA; Tricycle in America, August 1941–October 1942, #457a, KV2/852.

117  listened to his phone calls: Connelly to Director, 8/20/41, FBI 65– 36994–3, and 9/2/41, FBI 65–36994–21, RG 65, NARA.

117  watched: Memo for Foxworth, 9/18/41, FBI 65–36994–36, RG 65, NARA.

117  high on the hog/playboy: Connelly to Director, 8/19.41, FBI 65–36994– 4, 9/27/41, FBI 65–36994–30, 8/25/41, FBI 65–36994–29 and 9/2/41, FBI 65–36994–21, Memo for Foxworth, 8/21/41, FBI 65–36694–18, RG 65, NARA; Tricycle, Revised Summary up to departure from Lisbon to US, 8/11/41, KV2/852.

117  former colleague: Interview with Chloe McMillan, 1990.

117  puritanical: Summers, pp. 47ff.

117  “serious doubt”: Connelly to Director, 9/9/41, FBI 65–36994–25, RG 65, NARA.

117  more than a year: Report on the Eastbound Atlantic Clipper, Bermuda Travellers Censorship, 10/12/42, KV2/850.

117  “Revelations”: Guy Liddell diary, 9/19/41, KV4/186, PRO.

117  Liddell: Liddell headed MI5’s “B,” or counterespionage, section in 1941.

117  “get their double agent”: Tricycle in America, #457a, KV2/852, PRO.

117  “meddling”: Carson to Foxworth, 8/23/41, FBI 65–36994–22, RG 65, NARA.

117  FBI set up transmitter ineptly: Tricycle in America, #467a, KV2/852, PRO.

117  “not been taken”: Memorandum for Mr. Tamm, 3/25/42, FBI 65– 36994–276; memo #457K, KV2/852, PRO.

118  Florida: Connelly to Director, 9/27/41, FBI 65–36994–30.

118  did not go to Hawaii: Popov, 144ff.

118  “there were indications”: Tricycle in America, #457a, KV2/852, PRO.

118  risk/“cold-blooded”: Montagu, pp. 80ff.

118  Naval/Army Intelligence/pumping/call off: Sharp to Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 8/15/41; authors’ files, obtained under FOIA, 1988; Tamm to Director, 8/16/41, FBI 65–36994–12, Carson to Foxworth, 8/15/41, FBI 65–36994–15 and Connelly to Director, 8/20/41, FBI 65–36994– 3, RG 65, NARA; Tricycle in America (further information), 4/10/44, KV2/852, PRO.

118  Some weeks later/Army began to oblige/Naval Intelligence/armored netting: Thurston to Ladd, 9/20/41, FBI 65–36994–33, Carson to Connelly, 9/13/41, FBI 65–36994–47, Fletcher to Foxworth, 9/12/41, FBI 65–36994–48 and 9/18/41, FBI 65–36994–36, Little to Foxworth, 9/25/41, FBI 65–36994–49x2 and 49x3, Connelly to Director, 9/26/42, FBI 65–36994–41 and 9/27/41, FBI 65–36994-30, Fletcher to Director, 9/30/41, FBI 65–36994-27, Thurston to Ladd, 10/1/41, FBI 65–36994-49x1, Fletcher to Ladd, 10/5/41, FBI 65–36994-42, 10/13/41, FBI 65–36994-50 and 11/8/41, FBI 65–36994-77, Hoover to Connelly, 10/3/41, FBI 65–36994-45, Foxworth to Director, 10/13/41 and attachments, FBI 65–36994-54, Burton to Ladd, 10/31/41, FBI 65–36994-75 and 11/8/41, FBI 65–36994-76, Hoover to Lanman, 11/8/41, FBI 65– 36994-77, RG 65, NARA.

119  Clearly, each of: In 1972, when former British spymaster John Masterman made elements of the Popov episode public, a newspaper report quoted “FBI sources” as claiming that—in 1941—“the importance of [Popov’s] information was clearly seen and processed through domestic intelligence channels to military officials in Hawaii.” The FBI record contains nothing to indicate that this was so, and the claim has not been repeated (International Herald Tribune, 1/3/72).

119  paraphrased summaries: Fletcher to Ladd, 10/20/41 and attachment, FBI 65–36994-74, Thurston to Ladd, 10/1/41 and attachments, FBI 65–36994-45.

119  “We ought”: Masterman, p. 80.

120  Robertson/“not to take”: Interview with T. A. Robertson, 1990.

120  brag: Summers, pp. 99ff.

120  “I thought”/wrote again/more minuscule: Hoover to Watson, 9/3/41 and attachments, FBI reports,#906 and 10/1/41, #2372, Box 28, OF 10B, FDRL. After the war, moreover, in a 1946 article for Reader’s Digest, Hoover would claim the FBI had discovered the microdots—not been handed them on a plate. The article was factually misleading in other ways (Reader’s Digest, 4/46).

120  There was, though: Hoover would yet again remind Roosevelt, the month after the attack on Hawaii, of his September 1941 message about the microdots. That third message, too, would make no mention of the questionnaire’s Pearl Harbor content (Hoover to General Watson, 1/13/42, FBI 65–36994-103, RG 65, NARA).

121  Future CIA Director: William Casey, pp. 10ff. For all Casey’s biting comment about Hoover’s personal competence as of mid-1941, the FBI was to have major successes—especially in counterintelligence—during World War II (Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War).

121  “another American fumble”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 105.

121  It was an unforgivably: Neither Popov’s name nor his operational codename “Tricycle” appear in the volumes of the Joint Committee’s investigation of Pearl Harbor, which include the records of other probes. There is, too, only a passing reference to the Von der Osten case (see Chapter 14). Asked whether he had been aware of the case, Lieutenant Colonel Kendall Fielder of G-2 in Hawaii said he had not. The record suggests that neither military intelligence in Hawaii nor the FBI’s Honolulu office was ever told of the Von der Osten case (PHA 28, p. 1562; Honolulu to Director, 9/10/44, FBI 100–97–1–213).

CHAPTER 16

122  “one of the most”: Gordon Prange, “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” Draft mss., Series V.2, Box 68, GP.

122  “goldfish bowl”: Prange, Dawn, p. 156.

122  “go up in the hills”: PHA 6, p. 2575.

122  “common knowledge”: Prange, Dawn, p. 70.

122  The consulate . . . was: Brief history, www.honolulus.us.emb-japan. go; Thurston Clarke, “The Ghosts of Pearl Harbor” Los Angeles Times, 10/20/91.

123  media coverage: Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 148ff; Prange, “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” supra.

123  Seki: PHA 35, pp. 353ff; Farago, Broken Seal, 147ff.

123  vice consul: Analysis of the Japanese Espionage Problem in the Hawaiian Islands, 4/20/43, Box 2, Entry UD-11W 41, RG 38, NARA.

123  March arrivals: PHA 355, p. 355; Report on Honolulu, TH, 5/10/41, attached to Hoover to Berle, 5/23/41, Box 1949, RG 59, NARA.

123  “chancellor”: Prange, “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” supra.

123  “expatriation matters”: PHA 35, p. 363.

123  Yoshikawa’s background: Takeo Yoshikawa, “Top Secret Assignment,” Proceedings, 12/60; Report on Honolulu, TH, 9/7/42, Doc. 40; www .internmentarchive.com; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 156ff, 239ff; Prange, “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” supra.

124  Such claims are ludicrous: Yoshikawa’s less than credible versions of his story appeared between 1960 and 1991. The authors have followed the more believable record of interviews conducted in 1950 and 1955 by the historian Gordon Prange. [less than credible: Proceedings, Vol. 86, 1960; WP, 12/10/1978; “Intrigue in the Islands,” American History Illustrated, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1991. Prange interviews: “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” 12/1978; Prange, Dawn, citing interviews, 1950, 1955.]

124  opportunity to work: Proceedings, 12/60.

124  desk/accommodations: Prange, Dawn, p. 75.

124  “indulge only”: PHA 35, p. 555.

124  cruise around: PHA 35, pp. 355ff; Prange, Dawn, 75ff.

124  carried a camera: PHA 35, pp. 362, 366.

124  “not to get caught”: Ibid., p. 366.

124  sugarcane fields/Shuncho-ro: Prange, Dawn, p. 76.

125  womanizer: Ibid.; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 235ff.

125  “frequently drunk”/“mystery man”: PHA 35, p. 363.

125  soda stand: America History, July–August, 1991.

125  seamen/kendo: Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 235, 238.

125  “The key information”: Proceedings, 12/60.

126  Shivers-Kita meeting: Prange, Dawn, p. 155.

126  “outside man”: Report on Japanese Consulate, Hawaii, T.H., 7/15/41, attached to Hoover to Berle, 8/7/41, Box 1949, Department of State Decimal files 1940–1944, 702.9411A/35, RG 59, NARA.

126  Apparently, however: Records made available during the inquiries suggest that Yoshikawa aka Morimura was identified as having been an espionage agent for the first time only a month after the attack. That the FBI had been told he was an “outside man” was evidently forgotten or, perhaps, suppressed. It was not until 1953 that Yoshikawa was linked under his real name to his intelligence work—in a Japanese newspaper article. With other staff, he was interned after the Pearl Harbor attack, and later repatriated. He died in 1993.

Robert Stinnett, author of the book Day of Deceit, claimed that FBI and ONI agents in Hawaii had identified Yoshikawa as a spy months before the Pearl Harbor attack. According to Day of Deceit, the FBI both surveilled him and placed a wiretap on a phone he used. In support of these claims, Stinnett cited an interview he said he had conducted with former FBI agent Frederick Tillman, and supporting documentation. During several months of correspondence, the present authors asked to see a transcript or notes of that interview but Stinnett—mentioning pressure of work—did not comply. Some documents related to the Japanese consulate’s activity and cited by Stinnett could not be found by the present authors. A cited entry in the diary of Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, which we did locate, turned out to be on another subject. The FBI has still not fully released all files relevant to Pearl Harbor into the National Archives. One of the items not in the archives is file 65-414, which contains intelligence the FBI gathered on the Honolulu consulate in 1941. It was in one document from that file, located by the authors in State Department records, that consular spy Yoshikawa was identified as “an outside man.” Other documents in file 65-414 may be equally relevant to understanding the nature of the FBI’s pre-attack intelligence. There can be no reasonable excuse for continuing to withhold this material seventy-five years after the event. The authors’ Freedom of Information Act request for file 65-414 was still pending at the time of this writing. [Records made available: Shivers to Mayfield, 1/4/42; “Investigative Report,” 6/15/42; PHA 35, pp. 336, 506ff. real name linked: Farago, Broken Seal, p. 240. interned/died: Proceedings, Vol. 86, 1960; Hastedt, p. 831. Stinnett claimed: Stinnett, pp. 85ff, 89ff, 95ff. Stinnett did not comply: Correspondence, 7/24, 7/29, 8/25, 9/8/15. documents not found/ another subject: E.g., Stinnett, p. 97n42, citing “Adolf Berle entry, p. 196, 6/3/41, FDRL.” The referenced citation does not appear on that page. Nor has the quotation been located elsewhere in the diary for 1941, author correspondence FDRL archivist Sarah Malcolm, 8/21/15.]

126  Shivers/Mayfield/Bicknell: PHA 23, p. 914.

126  tapping phones: PHA 35, p. 84.

126  tap of Consul’s home/not much more: Farago, Broken Seal, p. 239.

126  Federal law: Affidavit of J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Director, 8/25/44; PHA 31, pp. 3189ff; PHA 36, p.331.

126  “consular staffers”: PHA 23, pp. 859ff; PHA 31, pp. 3180ff).

127  The Navy’s view: PHA 6, p. 2575; PHA 31, p. 3185.

127  Putting the consular agents “in the jug”: This was Kimmel’s casual way, years later, of referring to the recommendation by Admiral Bloch, his defense officer, that consular agents who were committing offenses should be prosecuted.

127  “unduly alarm”: PHA 31, p. 3184.

127  In Washington: Prange, Dawn, p. 255; and see Chapter 7, regarding Gillette and Haan.

127  “The Japanese consulate here”: Honolulu Star Bulletin, 10/3/41.

127  to conduct: PHA 23, p. 862; PHA 31, p. 3185.

128  shikyu: Laurance Safford, “The Kita Message, No Longer a Mystery,” unpublished manuscript, TKK; PHA 35, p. 475.

129  This message, expressed: PHA 12, p. 261. In books and articles about Pearl Harbor, it is often referred to as the “bomb plot” message, a somewhat confusing description that is not used in this book. The request to Hawaii to divide the harbor into specific segments had been initiated by none other than Itaru Tachibana, who had earlier been deported from the United States because of his espionage activity and was now back in Tokyo working for the intelligence section of the naval general staff (Prange, “The Truth About Japan’s Pearl Harbor Spy,” supra; Prange, Dawn, p. 248).

129  new way/segments/three weeks/calling into question: PHA Report, p. 516.

129  collected basic information: Ibid., pp. 186ff; Farago, Broken Seal, p. 230.

129  Nowhere else, moreover: A 1942 Navy Department study lists sixtyeight ship movement reports from Hawaii, fifty-five from Manila, eighteen from Panama, and six from Seattle. As will be fully reported in Chapter 44, the list was not made available to Admiral Kimmel or his legal team during postattack investigations. Other sources, citing versions of the intercepts published by Congress’ Joint Committee, suggest more ship movement requests were made for information about Manila than about Pearl Harbor. Sources agree, though, that only the Japanese mission in Honolulu was required to divide the harbor into sections in its reports, or to indicate where ships were moored (“SRH 012: The Role of Radio Intelligence in the Japanese-American Naval War, Aug. 1941—June 1942,” Vol. I, aka “RIP 87Z,” RG 457, entry A1 9002, Boxes 6 and 7, NARA; and, e.g., Greaves, p. 109; PHA 2, pp. 794ff).

130  Kimmel/Short not told: PHA Report, pp. 184ff, 188ff, 516ff; PHA 7, pp. 2956ff.

130  “pointed to an attack”/“I was entitled”: PHA 6, p. 2543. See Chapter 8 for an analysis of the January 27th report sent to Washington by Ambassador Joseph Grew.

CHAPTER 17

131  “Gentlemen”: Stimson’s “Gentlemen” quote is from his 1948 memoir, but this had already been his view in 1929. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 made it illegal to intercept radio or cable traffic between the United States and other nations (Stimson and Bundy, p. 188).

131  law: Federal Communications Act, 1934, Section 605, www.fcc.gov.

131  codebreakers worked on: David Kahn, pp. 5ff, 11ff.

131  rivalry: Budiansky, pp. 82ff, 87; Parker, pp. 12ff, 16ff.

131  “Most of the time”: Kahn, p. 21.

131  OP-20-G: Ibid., p. 10.

131  able to read naval operating code: Parker, pp. 16ff; Budiansky, p. 88; Carlson, pp. 103ff.

131  foreign ministry codes/basic groups: History of OP-20-3-GYP, Box 116, RG 38, NARA; Kahn, pp. 14ff.

132  Darkness fell: William Friedman, “Preliminary Historical Report on the Solution of the ‘B’ Machine,” top-secret unpublished manuscript, 10/14/40, NSA; Parker, pp. 18ff; Budiansky, p. 88.

Foreign ministry messages of high importance other than PURPLE—like the espionage messages to and from the Honolulu consulate—were usually sent in code U.S. cryptanalysts called the “J series.” It remained readable, as did other lower-level foreign ministry codes, used mainly for administrative messages.

Following the naval code changes, the Japanese Navy’s main operating code was its Fleet General Purpose Code—which would eventually be known as JN-25. Over time, as the Japanese instituted changes to the code, Americans renamed it to mark the changes—JN-25b, JN-25c, and so on. In the months before Pearl Harbor, the General Purpose Code carried almost half of the Japanese navy’s messages. Revisionists have long suggested that JN-25b (the derivation of the code in use in the months before the attack) had been broken—thus giving the U.S. authorities foreknowledge of the impending Japanese moves. The best evidence, however, indicates that such claims are ill founded, that—in the period before the attack—at most 10 percent of any message in JN-25b could be understood. An internal history of naval codebreaking, released in the 1990s, states that “JN-25 played no part in the Radio Intelligence story of Pearl Harbor.” Would that it had. (See Chapter 24.)

Evidence suggests that British codebreakers, with whom from early 1941 the Americans were sharing information, also failed to break JN-25b in such a way as to yield usable intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor. A history of Britain’s Far East codebreaking unit states that work on JN-25 did not produce “operational intelligence” until early 1942. Another British internal history of naval intelligence, not declassified until 1994, states firmly that the British “had not penetrated the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor.” The report makes clear that in the weeks prior to the attack, like their U.S. counterparts, they relied on other forms of intelligence to track the movements of the Japanese Fleet, and had not been able in the final weeks to accurately locate the position of many of the Japanese ships. [foreign ministry codes: Kahn, pp. 14ff; Parker, pp. 21ff. JN-25b/best evidence: PHA 10, pp. 4674, 4678; Gannon, p. 206; History of OP-20-3-GYP, Box 116 and The Activities and Accomplishments of GY-1 During 1941, 1942, and 1943, Box 115, RG 38, NARA; and see analysis of JN-25, Cryptologia, April 2000; Crytolog, Winter 2000; Hanyok and Mowry (cited as Hanyok), p. 9; Budiansky, pp. 7ff, 12ff, 21ff, 364n8; Naval War College Review, Autumn 2008; Parker, pp. 35, 43. Revisionists: E.g., Stinnett, refs.; Timothy Wilford, “Decoding Pearl Harbor: USN Cryptanalysts and the Challenge of JN-25b in 1941,” Northern Mariner, Vol. 12, 1/02. British: “History of HMS Anderson,” HW4/25, PRO; “Pearl Harbor and the Loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse,” ADM 223/494; Michael Smith, pp. 106ff, 125; Hanyok, pp. 13ff.]

132  would remain impenetrable: Carlson, pp. 121ff; Kahn, pp. 562ff; Budiansky, pp. 8ff.

132  for many months: Friedman manuscript, supra.

132  “Alphabetical Typewriter 97”: Kahn, pp. 18ff.

132  Munitions Building: World War II magazine, “Pearl Harbor” commemorative edition, 2001.

132  thought the code was unbreakable: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 80; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 198ff.

132  brutal toll/nervous collapse: “The U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” draft mss, Box 116, TOL, p. 769; Kahn, p. 23; Budiansky, p. 175.

132  Hurt/“the psychological”: John Hurt, “A Version of the Japanese Problem in the Signal Intelligence Agency,” Washington, DC: Army Security Agency, 9/48, SRH-252, NARA, p. 10.

132  “A cryptanalyst, brooding”: Kahn, p. 22.

133  build a machine: Parker, pp. 21ff; “Pearl Harbor Review—Red and Purple,” www.nsa.gov; Kahn, p. 22.

133  “rat’s nest”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 81.

133  “whizzing”: Dundas Tucker, “Rhapsody in Purple,” Cryptologia, 7 and 10/82.

133  “Solving the secret”: World War II magazine, supra.

133  “boogie-woogie”: Clausen and Lee, p. 64.

133  “magicians”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 81.

133  Soon, insiders: MAGIC would become the common usage. More formally, cryptographic intelligence was styled, as in Britain, ULTRASECRET or ULTRA (“U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” draft manuscript, Box 116, TOL; Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 81).

133  valuable intelligence: E.g., Kahn, pp. 31ff; Farago, Broken Seal, p. 211.

133  Marshall sought: Farago, Broken Seal, p. 101.

133  “horrendous”: Clarke to Prange, 9/4/76, Series V.2, Box 11, GP; Ober to Barnes, 1/19/62, Series V.2, Box 75, GP; Lavender to Kimmel, 8/1/61, HEK R32; and see, regarding oath, PHA 5, p. 2468; Smedberg Oral History, NWC; Stark to Barnes, 8/62, TKK.

133  “TOP SECRET”: Interview with David Richmond, Box 14, Folder 1, SIMPSON.

133  “solemnly swear”: E.g., oath of Malcolm Johnson, 11/14/45, Box 85, STARK.

134  basic list/Hopkins: Kahn, p. 24; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 100ff, 194ff.

134  Numerous others, however: An odd omission at a senior level was William Donovan, appointed in June 1941 to coordinate the efforts of intelligence agencies (Anthony Cave Brown, Last Hero, pp. 192ff).

134  copies destroyed: PHA 4, p. 1601; Wohlstetter, p. 180.

134  To handle the PURPLE: Sources differ on how many machines went where, and when. The authors here rely on figures cited by Laurance Safford, the head of the Navy’s cryptanalytic section. In July 1941, he wrote later, there had been a possibility that a machine might go to Hawaii. Because this would have been “at the expense of Washington,” however, there was no follow-through. [differ: E.g., Prange, Dawn, p. 81; Kahn, pp. 23, 25; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 102ff. Safford: Laurance Safford, “Rhapsody in Purple,” draft manuscript, TKK.]

134  FBI: PHA Report, p. 261; PHA 31, p. 3189; Ladd to Director, 5/17/46, FBI 100–97–1–458, TKK; Prange, Verdict, pp. 270ff.

134  Like the vast majority: “The U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” draft mss, Box 116, TOL; Kahn, p. 24. For just over two weeks in July, inexplicably, Washington shared a jumble of either paraphrased or verbatim versions of intercepts of diplomatic traffic. See Chapter 19 (PHA 14, pp. 1397ff).

135  Because of their proximity: PHA 36, p. 46; Wohlstetter, pp. 180ff. There are contradictory claims regarding how much and what diplomatic traffic was available in the Philippines. Laurance Safford, the head of the Navy’s codebreaking unit, wrote later that though Navy codebreakers there had a PURPLE machine, their instructions for using it were to concentrate on locally relevant information—as opposed to the Washington-Tokyo traffic.

General MacArthur, when shown some significant PURPLE and other decoded intercepts during a later Pearl Harbor investigation, would deny ever having seen them before. Two of his senior aides, however, while denying having seen those particular intercepts, acknowledged having seen other MAGIC traffic, including some produced by PURPLE. An officer with the Army intercept team who delivered MAGIC messages to MacArthur’s headquarters, for his part, recalled that certain intercepts were selected “to take . . . in to the General.” [locally relevant: Safford to Hiles, 1/17/64, TKK; and see Lavender to Kimmel, 12/28/44 HEK R27. MacArthur: PHA 35, pp. 41, 84ff; “SRH 045, Reminiscences of LTC Howard W. Brown,” Washington, DC: Signal Intelligence Agency, 8/4/45, Entry A1 9002, Container 16, RG 047, NARA; Costello, pp. 260ff; Willoughby and Chamberlain, pp. 22ff.]

135  “The U.S. authorities”: William Friedman, “Certain Aspects of Magic in the Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Attack on Pearl Harbor,” 5/8/57, Folder 199, www.nsa.gov, p. 46.

135  The Director of Naval Intelligence: PHA 24, p. 1361; PHA 4, pp. 1844ff.

135  Turner was to assert: PHA 33, p. 806; PHA 32, pp. 619ff; Hanify draft memoir, p. 12, HANIFY; Edward Hanify, Memorandum for the Director of Naval History, 12/23/87, TKK. Knox’s aide was Captain Frank Beatty (Frank E. Beatty, “Another Version of What Started War with Japan,” U.S. News and World Report, 5/28/54; interview with Beatty, Series V.2, Box 6, GP).

136  “that goddamned Kimmel”: Interview with Edwin Layton, Box 30, Folder 1, LAYTON.

136  Stark “inquired”: PHA 5, pp. 2175ff.

136  “On three occasions”: PHA 4, pp. 1975ff, 2019, 2040.

136  “Noyes” was Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes: Wohlstetter, p. 172. Turner’s biographer, Vice Admiral George Dyer, would say Noyes “lied” about the exchange with Turner. According to Dyer, Noyes had not known whether the Navy at Pearl had MAGIC or not. By twice responding “Yes” to Turner’s question, he misled him (interview with Dyer, Series V.2, Box 13, GP).

136  “No”/“not intentionally”: PHA 33, pp. 897ff.

136  “to the best”/“confused”: PHA 10, pp. 4714ff.

136  Safford: PHA 8, pp. 3715, 3858ff; Kimmel to Clarke, 3/20/60, TKK; Brownlow, p. 152.

137  Kramer: PHA 9, pp. 4195ff.

137  “evasive”: Russell, article in U.S. News and World Report, 5/7/54.

137  possible/“unwise”: PHA 29, p. 2328; and see PHA 9, pp. 4594ff.

137  affidavit: PHA 35, p. 104; and see PHA 33, p. 824.

137  He had not: Wohlstetter, pp. 183ff.

137  Miles: PHA 35, p. 102.

CHAPTER 18

138  barely a thousand/far-flung stations: Parker, p. 30; Kahn, pp. 10ff; Wohlstetter, pp. 174, 171.

138  static: Safford to Hiles, 1/8/64, Series V.2, Box 6, GP.

138  PURPLE had priority/not radioed/by mail: Ibid.; Kahn, pp. 12ff.

138  delays/eight weeks: Laurance Safford, “The Kita Message: No Longer a Mystery,” TKK; Wohlstetter, pp. 173ff; “U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” supra, pp. 773ff.

138  Telegraphic Japanese/“Any two”: Kahn, p. 29; Safford to Hiles, 1/8/64, Series V.2, Box 6, GP.

138  “the whole matter”/“opportunity”: PHA 37, pp. 998ff; Baecher to Correa, 10/17/45, Box 15, RG 80, NARA.

139  total of six: Kahn, p. 29.

139  Army found fewer: John Hurt, “A Version of the Japanese Problem,” supra; Wohlstetter, p. 174.

139  unprecedented traffic: Parker, p. 30.

139  little time off: PHA 9, p. 4168.

139  odd and even days: “U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” p. 772; Wohlstetter, pp. 174ff; Parker, pp. 16ff.

139  named officer/delivered/odd-numbered months/folder/locked pouch: PHA 33, pp. 850ff; PHA 11, p. 5475; PHA 3, pp. 1195ff, 1324ff, 1575ff; PHA 8, p. 3681; PHA 9, p. 4584; PHA 34, p. 94; Kahn, p. 30; Wohlstetter, pp. 176ff; “U.S. Army in World War II: The Signal Corps,” supra, pp. 776ff.

139  summaries: PHA 33, pp. 848ff; PHA 9, p. 4584; Kahn, p. 30.

139  red-pencil/paper clips: PHA 33, pp. 851ff; PHA 4, pp. 1735, 1927; PHA 5, p. 2173; PHA 9, p. 4582.

139  asterisks: PHA 33, pp. 848ff, 861ff; PHA Report, p. 184.

139  not required to sign: PHA 26, p. 391; Edward Morgan, p. 266, but see dissenting recollection by Wilkinson, Statement of Theodore Wilkinson, 2/19/45, TKK.

140  look rapidly/retrieve: PHA 4, p. 1601; Wohlstetter, p. 180.

140  more than a hundred: PHA 33, p. 848.

140  “put the pieces”: Friedman, “Certain Aspects of Magic,” supra, p. 59.

140  Joint Army-Navy committee: PHA 2, pp. 529ff, 909ff; PHA 4, pp. 2020ff; PHA 34, p. 44; Prange, Dawn, p. 293.

140  As it was, the system: Sources differ on exactly what the security breaches were, and who was to blame (e.g., PHA 11, pp. 5475ff; Kahn, p. 26; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 195, 200; Clausen and Lee, pp. 45ff).

140  nightmare/“Though I do not”: Kahn, pp. 26ff; Farago, Broken Seal, p. 189; and see Pacific Historical Review, 2/81.

141  It looked as though: Even after Japan’s defeat in 1945, Tokyo would continue to believe the PURPLE code was secure, and continue using it. For that reason, the fact that the United States could read it remained top-secret (Clausen and Lee, p. 48; Lee, pp. 545ff).

141  In light of: PHA 11, pp. 5268ff, 5475; Kahn, p. 30; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 200ff, 276. The general was Sherman Miles. He felt that intercepted diplomatic messages were principally the concern of the State Department, which continued to see MAGIC and could decide what MAGIC content should be broached with the President.

CHAPTER 19

142  He let slip nothing: The February exchange is reported in full in Chapter 12.

142  “He repeatedly”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 91.

142  Layton’s background/McCollum: Ibid., pp. 57ff, 495ff.

143  “I told him”: Layton Oral History, supra.

143  “Dear Eddie”: PHA 10, pp. 4845ff.

144  “interdepartmental warfare”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 95.

144  “had grown up”/Turner: McCollum Oral History, supra.

144  “one of the best”: Prange, Verdict, p. 214.

144  “brilliant”: Interview with Harold Stark by James Leutze, Box 41, STARK; and see Stark to McCrea, 2/27/61, Box 9, MCCREA.

144  “not enough superlatives”: Prange, Verdict, p. 214.

144  “mental power”: Hart diary, 4/7/44, Box 9, HART.

144  “aggressive”: Wellborn to Prange, 5/1/69, Series V.2, Box 85, GP; interview with Charles Wellborn, Box 11, Folder 16, SIMPSON.

144  “irascible”: Oral History of Walter Ansel, Naval Institute, 1970, NHHC.

144  “stubborn”: Interview with Claude Bloch, Series V.2, Box 8, GP.

144  “bull”/“intolerant”: Prange, Verdict, p. 294; interview with Joseph Rochefort, Series V.2, Box 70, GP; Hoehling, p. 53.

144  “amazingly ignorant”: Interview with Frank Beatty, Series V.2, Box 6, GP.

144  “although Admiral Stark”: Smedberg to Prange, 7/29/77, Series V.2, Box 74, GP.

144  “always spoke”/“abjectly”: Interview with Frank Beatty, Series V.2, Box 6, GP.

145  Turner had seized: PHA 4, pp. 1913ff; Wellborn to Prange, 5/1/69, Series V.2, Box 85, GP; Statement of VADM Theodore Wilkinson, 4/19/45, HEK R12; Wohlstetter, pp. 315ff; Prange, Verdict, pp. 290ff; Dyer, pp. 181ff; Kirk to Wilkinson, 12/19/45, Wilkinson to Ingersoll, 12/20/45, TKK; and see PHA 15, p. 1864.

145  “should interpret”: PHA 4, pp. 1925ff.

145  “a complex on secrecy”/“hand on the gullet”: McCollum Oral History, U.S. Naval Institute 1973, NHHC.

145  In June, when Admiral Kimmel/Eight dispatches/“Top Secret”: PHA 14, pp. 1397ff; Edward Hanify, Draft Report for the Minority, TKK; interview with Edwin Layton, Series V.2, Box 58, GP. The Admiral’s visit to Washington is reported at length in Chapter 12. Two of the Japanese messages shared with Kimmel in July included the word “PURPLE,” revealing the code in which they had been obtained by U.S. codebreakers. Kimmel and his staff, however, had no knowledge of what PURPLE was—and seemed at that stage not to notice the word (copy of 7/19/41 message from OPNAV, PHA 14, p. 1399).

145  “Conversations with the Japanese”: PHA 16, pp. 2212ff.

146  intercepted message to Hawaii/delays/Clipper: Interview with Husband Kimmel, Series V.2, Box, 56, GP; Farago, Broken Seal, pp. 227ff, 166ff.

146  Bratton/“I felt”: PHA 9, pp. 4534, 4526.

147  Miles would not recall: PHA 2, pp. 826ff.

147  Stimson/Marshall/“had no recollection”: PHA 2, p. 1102; PHA 9, p. 4526; Gannon, pp. 193ff; Prange Dawn, pp. 249ff. Harvey Bundy, who was an assistant to Stimson in the fall of 1941, would say eighteen years later: “I read the MAGIC about where the Japanese were counting the ships and where they were located in Pearl Harbor, and my recollection is that I mentioned this to G-2—the MAGIC man in G-2—and his reply was, ‘Oh, the Japs are doing that all over the world.’” Colonel Bratton, who handled MAGIC for Army Intelligence, could well have said—accurately—that Japan collected information on U.S. ships in many ports. Bratton, though, had been alerted by what was unique about the September 24th intercept—that Tokyo wanted Pearl Harbor information divided into specified sections, and detail on moored ships (Bundy oral history, 10/7/59; George C. Marshall Foundation).

147  “My consideration”: PHA 9, p. 4177.

147  “gist”/“Tokyo directs”/asterisk: Ibid., pp. 4176ff, 4195ff.

147  Stark/“We did not see”/“In the light of”: PHA 5, pp. 2173ff.

148  Turner/“As a matter of fact”/brought to the attention of ONI: PHA 4, pp. 1921ff.

148  “it did not make”: PHA 8, p. 3391.

148  replacement phasing in/“to one or more officers”: PHA 4, pp. 1746– 1939ff.

149  Safford/“more violent”/“was fully appreciated”/Kirk “demanded”: Safford himself, he claimed in his unfinished manuscript, tried to get word of the intercept to Kimmel but was blocked by his boss Admiral Noyes. If Safford’s account is accurate, in the authors’ view it may indicate that some of the principals later covered up their failure to see the significance of the September 24th intercept—and of related messages. Alternatively, the episode may be a further example of the turf wars in the Navy Department. Conspiracy theorists, however, later seized on Safford’s account as evidence of a plot within the Roosevelt administration to withhold vital information. Though Safford himself came to subscribe to that view, there is no reason to doubt the essence of his account. Our assessment comports with that of Pearl Harbor historian Professor Gordon Prange. “One can understand,” Prange wrote on this issue, “why some individuals have cried ‘Villain!’ instead of ‘Fool!’” (Laurance Safford, “The Kita Message: No Longer a Mystery,” TKK; Prange, Verdict, pp. 278ff).

149  Stark/“full authority”: PHA 5, p. 2174.

150  DeLany: Interview with Walter DeLany, Series V.2, Box 12, GP.

150  “malarkey”: Interview with Edwin Layton, Box 39, Folder 1, LAYTON.

150  “should certainly”: PHA 7, p. 3364.

150  Admiral Kimmel himself: PHA 6, p. 2610. It seems that no maps of Pearl Harbor divided into zones were recovered from downed Japanese aircraft after the attack—a fact that some have contended indicates that the information requested on September 24th was not intended for use by strike force pilots. That conclusion, however, appears to be at odds with other evidence. Very detailed maps showing where Fleet warships were moored, though without actual reference to the zones, were indeed recovered from Japanese airplanes after the attack. Japanese officers involved in the attack, moreover, would later credit the information supplied by the spy Yoshikawa as having been valuable. [contended: Carlson, citing Hanyok, p. 491; Kittredge in U.S. News and World Report, 12/3/54. detailed maps: “U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas,” Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 22, 12/8/44; A-1 Entry 167F, Box 40, RG 80, NARA; PHA 16, p. 2257. Japanese officers: E.g., Fuchida in Proceedings, 9/52; Tomioka and Chigusa, cited in Prange, Dawn, pp. 453ff, 479, 774, 776.]

150  Yamamoto had gathered/“I like games”: Prange, Dawn, pp. 180ff, 223ff 258ff.

150  Hawai Sakusen: Proceedings, 12/55; Ken Kotani, Japanese Intelligence in World War II, Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2009.

CHAPTER 20

151  Mountbatten’s background: Hough; Adrian Smith.

151  feted: FDR diary, 8/25/41, FDRL, re White House dinner; Adrian Smith, p. 167.

151  Churchill wanted: Adrian Smith, p. 165.

151  There had been/“special relationship”: Colman, p. 2; Ted Morgan, p. 579. Churchill would first use the term in 1944, then again in 1945, and—most famously—in 1946, in his landmark speech at Fulton, Missouri.

151  Roosevelt’s conviction: Roosevelt and Churchill exchanged 1,700 letters and telegrams between 1939 and 1945. They met nine times during the war. It may be relevant that they were distantly related, and that Churchill’s mother had been American (Churchill, eulogy on Roosevelt’s death, 4/17/45).

152  “deputy President”: Ted Morgan, p. 578.

152  “On January 10th”: Churchill, pp. 20ff; Colville, p. 346.

152  “whatever you are able”: Churchill to FDR, 2/14/41, PREM 3/469, PRO.

152  Lend-Lease: Ted Morgan, pp. 579ff; Gannon, p. 76.

153  “If we do not watch”: Ted Morgan, p. 581.

153  ABC-1 Staff Report: Matloff and Snell, ch. 3, pp. 32ff; PHA 3, pp. 993ff; Prange, Verdict, pp. 69ff; Simpson, pp. 74ff; Wohlstetter, p. 111.

153  Japanese forces moved/economic sanctions/oil: Prange, Dawn, p. 165; Gannon, p. 92; Morison, pp. 63ff.

153  “slip the noose”: Layton with Pineau and Costello, p. 121.

153  “Our Empire”: Tokyo to Washington, 7/31/41, MB, Vol. III, Appendix, pp. 9ff.

154  Roosevelt made a show/meeting with Churchill/“Onward, Christian Soldiers”/Joint Declaration: Memorandum of Trip to Meet Winston Churchill, 8/23/41, PSF, Box 1, FDRL; Stark to Katie, 8/21/41, Box 8, Folder 2, SIMPSON; Press Release, 8/14/41, PSF Safe Files, FDRL; AP, 8/14/41; Freidel, pp. 384ff; “The Atlantic Conference and Charter,” www.state.gov; Simpson, pp. 92ff; Ted Morgan, pp. 597ff.

154  “Atlantic Charter”: E.g., Bakersfield Californian, 8/25/41.

154  “The Americans,” The aide was Colonel Ian Jacob, the Military Assistant Secretary to the war cabinet (Rose, p. 342).

155  The German submarine/“The American people”: Fireside Chat 18, 9/11/41, www.millercenter.org; PHA 5, pp. 2295ff. The submarine, U-652, did fire torpedoes at the Greer. The story of the action, however, also involved two British Royal Air Force bombers, which had earlier attacked the submarine with depth charges. Having been torpedoed, the Greer in turn dropped depth charges, thus becoming the first U.S. ship to engage the Germans (“A Brief History of U.S. Navy Destroyers,” www.navy.mil; “USS Greer,” http://destroyerhistory.org).

155  made welcome/Halsey/Kimmel asked/views: Mountbatten to Pott, 10/9/41; Remarks by Capt. Mountbatten Armoured or Un-Armoured Carriers, undated, Papers of Earl Mountbatten of Burma, with permission of the Hartley Library, University of Southampton, UK.

156  “appalled”: Terraine, ch. 5 [Kindle edition].

156  “In repeated”: PHA 16, p. 2253.

156  “With constantly changing”: PHA 6, p. 2500.

156  begging bowl/severe shortage: PHA 16, pp. 2181, 2242ff; PHA 16, pp. 2206, 2241; PHA 33, pp. 1280ff; Kimmel, pp. 15ff.

156  In late 1941: See Chapter 10.

156  B-17s: PHA 3, pp. 1119ff; Costello, pp. 86ff, 90ff.

157  “The picture”: Interview with William Furlong, Series V.2, Box 56, GP.

157  “I have frequently”: PHA 16, p. 2254.

157  “inexcusable”: PHA Report, p. 549.

157  “a permanent radar”: Mountbatten to Simpson, 9/14/78, Mountbatten papers, supra.

157  Kimmel alert to importance: CINCPAC to Fleet, 11/17/41, Entry P91, Container 40, RG 313, NARA. On November 17, 1941, Kimmel issued an order to the Fleet in anticipation of what he hoped would soon be a large number of radars being installed aboard his ships. “It is imperative,” he wrote, “that each man trained either as an operator or maintenance man, be employed in connection with the subject equipment and that his wherabouts be known at all times.”

157  Kimmel assigned/“inferior”/Bloch/offered to help/exercises: Statement of Claude Bloch, Box 5, BLOCH; PHA 23, pp. 1195ff; PHA 27, pp. 360ff; PHA 26, pp. 379ff; PHA 29, pp. 1983ff; PHA 36, pp. 270ff; PHA 39, pp. 109ff, 309ff; PHA 22, pp. 367ff; Kimmel, p. 9; and see Prange, Verdict, pp. 367ff, 393ff.

158  Calhoun: PHA 22, p. 593.

158  “was inclined”: PHA 26, p. 247.

158  When Mountbatten left: Mountbatten to Potts, 10/9/41, Mountbatten papers, supra.

158  condolences: Mountbatten to Kimmel, 12/9/41, HEK R25.

158  track down/“I have never wavered”: Mountbatten to Kimmel, 9/18/45, 11/1/45, 11/19/45, Kimmel to Mountbatten, 9/4/45, Mountbatten papers, supra.

158  “The Jap situation”: FDR to Churchill, 10/15/41, PSF Box 34, FDRL.

CHAPTER 21

159  “one of the main points”: AP, 8/14/41.

159  “We propose”: MB, Vol. III, Appendix, p. A-8.

159  duplicitous: E.g., ibid., pp. A-97ff, A-106ff; Ted Morgan, p. 607; Mauch, pp. 190ff.

159  “a pure blind”: Stimson diary, 8/8/41, STIM.

159  “the U.S. government”: Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government, PSF Box 1, FDRL.

160  “any and all steps”: U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating . . . Vol. II, pp. 556ff.