I xiii
(1259b18–1260b24)
MORALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE HOUSEHOLD

The three relationships internal to the household (master/slave, husband/wife, parent/child) are for

Aristotle, as a moralist, of greater importance than economics. It is clearly essential that all members of the household should possess fitness for the performance of their various functions; and this fitness is described by the very general term aretē, ‘virtue’. This can include physical strength or technical skill; but the burden of this chapter is to distinguish between these qualities and moral virtue, which Aristotle regards as equally part of fitness for a task. Moral virtue is in fact not merely a spiritual or mental state: it is related to activity and function. And since a slave has no function but to serve his master, the virtue of a slave need reach no more than a minimal level required to enable him to perform his tasks. Moral virtue also requires the faculty of reasoning, which is possessed by the master rather than the slave; the master must therefore impart to his slaves, by instruction and habituation, such moral virtue as he judges necessary. Free craftsmen, by the nature of their occupation, approximate to slaves. Much modern sentiment would of course distinguish between technical efficiency and moral virtue in a quite different spirit, and wish to say that a man of humble occupation may nevertheless be very ‘virtuous’ indeed. Aristotle would find this difficult, since his notion of moral virtue is conditioned by his assumption that it is for particular purposes – which in the case of slaves are lowly and limited.

The chapter is particularly rich in suggestion, and in his comparative treatment of the moral virtues and capacities of men, women, children and slaves Aristotle diverges from Plato in several interesting and thoughtful ways, which have been discussed by Fortenbaugh (in the third collection of essays in the Select Bibliographies).

The discussion of households in Book I has been largely concerned with property and its acquisition, and with slaves. Personal family relationships are analysed in this chapter to the extent that Aristotle treats the male head of household as the source of virtue in his wife and children (and slaves), but he does not go into practical detail, and in the last two paragraphs he postpones further discussion until later (though something is said of marriage relationships in VII xvi). The final sentence announces a transition to the topic of Book II, ideal states.

1259b18 It is clear then that in household-management the people are of greater importance than the inanimate property, and their virtue1 of more account than that of the property which we call their wealth; and also that the free men are of more account than slaves. About slaves the first question to be asked is whether in addition to their virtue as tools and servants they have another and more valuable one. Can they possess restraint, courage, justice, and every other condition of that kind, or have they in fact nothing but the serviceable quality of their persons?

1259b26 The question may be answered in either of two ways, but both present a difficulty. If we say that slaves have these virtues, how then will they differ from free men? If we say that they have not, the position is anomalous, since they are human beings and share in reason. Roughly the same question can be put in relation to wife and child. Have not these also virtues? Ought a woman to be ‘restrained’, ‘brave’, and ‘just’, and is a child sometimes ‘intemperate’, sometimes ‘restrained’, or not?

1259b32 All these questions might be regarded as parts of our wider inquiry into the natural ruler and ruled, and in particular whether or not the virtue of the one is the same as the virtue of the other. For if the highest excellence is required of both, why should one rule unqualifiedly, and the other unqualifiedly obey? (A distinction of more or less will not do here; the difference between ruling and obeying is one of kind, and quantitative difference is simply not that at all.) If on the other hand the one is to have virtues, and the other not, we have a surprising state of affairs. For if he that rules is not to be restrained and just, how shall he rule well? And if the ruled lacks these virtues, how shall he be ruled well? For if he is intemperate and feckless, he will perform none of his duties. Thus it becomes clear that both ruler and ruled must have a share in virtue, but that there are differences in virtue in each case, as there are also among those who by nature rule. An immediate indication of this is afforded by the soul, where we find natural ruler and natural subject, whose virtues we regard as different – one being that of the rational element, the other of the non-rational. It is therefore clear that the same feature will be found in the other cases too, so that most instances of ruling and being ruled are natural. For rule of free over slave, male over female, man over boy, are all different, because, while parts of the soul are present in each case, the distribution is different. Thus the deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a slave; in a female it is present but ineffective, in a child present but undeveloped.

1260a14 We should therefore take it that the same conditions inevitably prevail in regard to the moral virtues also, namely that all must participate in them but not all in the same way, but only as may be required by each for his proper function. The ruler then must have moral virtue in its entirety; for his function is in its fullest sense that of a master-craftsman, and reason is a master-craftsman.2 And the other members must have such amount as is appropriate to each. So it is evident that each of the classes spoken of must have moral virtue, and that restraint is not the same in a man as in a woman, nor justice or courage either, as Socrates thought;3 the one is the courage of a ruler, the other the courage of a servant, and likewise with the other virtues.

1260a24 If we look at the matter case by case it will become clearer. For those who talk in generalities and say that virtue is ‘a good condition of the soul’, or that it is ‘right conduct’ or the like, delude themselves. Better than those who look for definitions in that manner are those who, like Gorgias,4 enumerale the different virtues. For instance, the poet5 singles out ‘silence’ as ‘bringing credit to a woman’; but that is not so for a man. This is the method of assessment that we should always follow. Take the child: he is not yet fully developed, so we cannot speak of his virtue as belonging to him in relation to himself; it exists only in relation to the progress of his development towards adulthood, and to whoever is his guide. So too with slave and master: we laid it down that a slave is useful for necessary tasks, so the amount of virtue required will not be very great, but only enough to ensure that he does not neglect his work through intemperance or fecklessness.

1260a36 If this is true, one will naturally ask whether skilled workers too will not need virtue to keep them from the intemperance which often interferes with their work. But the parallel is far from exact, because the slave shares his master’s life, whereas the craftsman lives away from his employer and participates in virtue in the same measure as he participates in slavery;6 for the skilled mechanic is in a restricted sense in a condition of slavery. There is also this difference, that the slave is one of a group that are slaves by nature, which cannot be said of a shoemaker or other skilled worker. It is clear therefore that it is the master who ought to be the cause of such virtue in his slave, not the man who instructs the slave in his tasks. Hence they are wrong who would deny all reason to slaves and say that a master has nothing to do but issue orders;7 suggestion and advice are even more appropriately given to slaves than to children.

1260b8 So much then for our discussion of these matters. As for man and wife, children and father, and the virtue that appertains to each and their intercourse one with another, what is right in that connection and what is not, and the proper pursuit of the good therein and the avoidance of the bad – all such matters it will be necessary to discuss in connection with the constitutions. For these relationships are part of the household, and every household is part of a state; and the virtue of the part ought to be examined in relation to the virtue of the whole. This means that both children and women must be educated with an eye to the constitution – at least if it is true that it makes a difference to the soundness of a state that its children should be sound, and its women too. And it must make a difference; for women make up half the adult free population, and from children come those who will participate in the constitution.

1260b20 So now that we have finished with these matters, and decided to discuss the rest in another place, we will regard the present topic as concluded, and make a fresh beginning. And let our first topic be those who have pronounced an opinion on the best constitution.