The expression ‘Cretan constitution’ is not to be taken as referring to that of any one state: Crete had many city-states, many of which appear to have had a common pattern of constitution. Aristotle begins by discussing and accepting the tradition that the Spartan constitution was derived from the Cretan, and much of the chapter is devoted to a detailed comparison of the two. (For a discussion, see K. M. T. Chrimes, Ancient Sparta (Manchester, 1949), p. 209 ff., and R. F. Willetts, Ancient Crete, a Social History (London, 1965), p. 60 ff.) However, there are conspicuous omissions: property-ownership, inheritance, heiresses and the influence of women. Aristotle had found fault with Sparta on all these counts, but he ignores them in dealing with Crete, though from his point of view conditions were in general worse there. His criticisms of the Cretan constitution centre on its aristocratic bias, and its lack of any machinery to ensure that the constitution continues to function when the leading families fall out among themselves. On the other hand he thinks the Cretan common meals better organized than the Spartan; and he notes, as many writers in antiquity did, the special advantages of Crete’s geographical position. But perhaps the most important theme in this chapter and the preceding one is that the various political forces in the state should all desire to keep the constitution as it is, for this makes for stability. There is here the germ of a theory’ of political consent, of which Rousseau’s ‘social contract’ is the most celebrated example; cf. IV xi–xiii.
For ‘peripheral populations’, ‘Ephors’ and other technical terms in this chapter, see introduction to II ix.
1271b20 The Cretan constitution is similar to the Lacedaemonian; in some few particulars it is certainly no worse, but in general it is less finished. It is said, and it appears to be true, that to a very great extent the Cretan constitution was taken as a model by the Lacedaemonian. (Generally, later forms of constitution are more fully developed than earlier.) They say that Lycurgus, after laying down his guardianship of King Charillus,1 went abroad and on that occasion spent most of his time in Crete. He chose Crete because the two peoples were akin, the Lyctians being colonists2 from Sparta; and when the colonists came, they found the inhabitants at that time living under a legal system which they then adopted. Hence to this day the peripheral populations use those laws unchanged, believing Minos3 to have established the legal system in the first place.
1271b32 The island of Crete appears to be both very well placed and naturally suited to dominate the Hellenic world. It lies right across our sea, on whose coasts all around most of the Greeks are settled. At one end the Peloponnese is not far away, and at the Asiatic end the districts round Triopium and Rhodes are close at hand. This enabled Minos to build up his maritime empire too: he made some of the islands subject to himself, to others he sent settlers; in the end he attacked Sicily, where he met his death near Camicus.
1271b40 The Cretan system resembles the Laconian. The helots farm for the Spartans, the peripheral populations for the Cretans. Both countries have common meals, for which in ancient times the Spartans used not their present name ‘phiditia’, but the same name as the Cretans: ‘andria’.4 This is a plain indication of its Cretan origin. Similarly as regards the arrangement of the constitution: the Cretans have ‘Cosmoi’, whose power the Spartan Ephors have also; but there are ten of them, while the Ephors number five. The Elders, who in Crete are known as the Council, correspond. The Cretans used to have a kingship, but they did away with it and the Cosmoi exercise leadership in war. And all Cretans are members of the Assembly, but this body has no power to do anything except vote assent to measures decided upon by the Elders and the Cosmoi.
1272a12 The arrangements for the common meals are better among the Cretans than among the Spartans. At Sparta each man contributes a specified per capita amount; failure to pay excludes one from the constitution, as has been said earlier.5 In Crete the basis is more communal: out of the entire agricultural produce, whether stock or crop, yielded by public land, and the tributes paid by the peripheral populations, one part is set aside for the gods and for the communal public services,6 and another sum for the common meals. In this way all – men, women, and children alike – are maintained at the public expense.7 The Cretan lawgiver regarded abstemiousness as beneficial and devoted much ingenuity to securing it, as also to keeping down the birth-rate by keeping men and women apart and by instituting sexual relations between males; whether he acted wisely or not will be discussed on another occasion.8 It is clear then that better arrangements for communal meals have been made among the Cretans than among the Laconians.
1272a27 On the other hand their Cosmoi are an even worse arrangement than the Ephors: the chief defect of the Board of Ephors, its indiscriminate composition, is there too, but the constitutional advantage is absent. For at Sparta the people, because the Ephors are elected from among all, have a share in the most powerful office and are therefore disposed to keep the constitution as it is. But in Crete they choose the Cosmoi not from among everyone, but from certain families only; and they elect the Elders from among those who have held the office of Cosmos. And about them one might make the same comments as about the Spartan Elders:9 their exemption from scrutiny and their life-tenure are privileges in excess of their merits; and their power to take decisions on their own judgement, and not govern in accordance with written rules, is dangerous. The fact that the people are content not to have any share in the office of Cosmos is no evidence of a sound arrangement. For there is no profit to be made out of the office of Cosmos, as there is out of the Ephorate; and Crete being an island, they live farther away from those who would corrupt them.
1272b1 The methods employed to cure the defects of this institution are outlandish, and more to be expected in a power-group than in a constitution.10 It often happens that Cosmoi are turned out of office by a conspiracy, which may be engineered partly by some of their fellow-rulers or by private persons. It is actually possible for Cosmoi to resign office during their tenure; but all such matters are better regulated by law and not left to the personal decision of individuals, which is an unreliable criterion. But worst of all is the condition where there are no Cosmoi at all; and this often occurs, being brought about by the action of powerful people who want to escape justice. All this makes it pretty clear that the Cretan system, while it possesses a certain constitutional element, is not really a constitution, but more of a power-group.10 The powerful men are wont to make up bands of their friends and from among the people, and to cause suspension of all government and form factions and fight each other. And that, surely, means nothing less than that for the time being such a state is a state no longer, but its political association11 is breaking up. A state in this condition is indeed in danger, since those who wish to attack it are also those who have the power.
1272b16 However, as we have already remarked, Crete is kept stable by its geographical situation; its distance has kept foreigners out.12 One result is that the Cretan peripheral populations remain settled, while the Lacedaemonian helots are often in rebellion. And the Cretans do not participate in any dominion overseas. But recently13 a foreign war has reached the island, and the weakness of its laws has become apparent. So much for the Cretan constitution.