Little detail is given, and that very obscurely, about the constitution of Carthage, the only non-Greek state here examined. Aristotle compares it with the Spartan, and therefore thinks he can describe it using Greek terms – Kings, Elders, Generals (for technical terms, see introduction to II ix). (The Romans, on the other hand, used the native word for the supreme Carthaginian officials, the ‘Kings’, latinizing it as Suffetes.) Aristotle treats the Carthaginian constitution as an example of the kind of aristocracy he calls a ‘polity’ (see introduction to II vi), but with ‘deviations’ (parekbaseis) towards oligarchy on the one hand and democracy on the other. He is well aware that ‘the characteristic and vital force in Carthaginian politics was before all things money’ (W. E. Heitland), and this constitutes for him a serious ‘deviation’ in the direction of oligarchy from the standards of excellence and ability demanded by the aristocratic principle. As democratic, he mentions the powers of decision enjoyed by the popular assembly in opposition to the wishes of the Kings and Elders. What counted in favour of the Carthaginian constitution was that it was generally acceptable and continued to work.
Two further points of interest are: (a) In this and in other chapters (cf. II ix, first paragraph) Aristotle speaks of the ‘principle’ or ‘aim’ of a constitution, which its founders had in mind. This is very much in accord with the Greek habit of regarding a constitution or code of laws as set up once and for all by a legislator, and its various features as either conforming with or departing from that model. We should today be more inclined to stress the role of historical accident and conflicting religious, economic or political pressures, not only in the growth and development of the constitution, but also, and especially, as they affected the original legislators (if any) themselves, e.g. the Founding Fathers of America. Aristotle obviously appreciates such historical influences, but his language is some indication of a way of thought rather different from ours. (b) Aristotle sharply attacks the view of public office as something to be bought and sold as a source of profit (cf. IV vi and V viii). One is tempted to moralize: in some parts of the world today Aristotle’s words still need to be taken to heart.
1272b24 The Carthaginians also are regarded as managing their constitution successfully, and in many respects in a distinctive manner, though in some particulars closely resembling the Lacedaemonians. Indeed these three constitutions, Cretan, Laconian, and Carthaginian, present a number of resemblances to each other and many differences from the rest. Many of the Carthaginian arrangements are good; and it is an indication that a constitution is well arranged when the people are content to abide by the constitutional system, and no faction worth mentioning has appeared, and no tyrant.
1272b33 Here are the resemblances to the Spartan constitution. The common meals of the clubs are like the phiditia, and the board of 104 members corresponds to the Ephors, but is better: its members are chosen on merit and not from all indiscriminately. Their Kings and Board of Elders are the counterpart of the Spartan Kings and Elders; and it is an advantage that the Kings are not drawn from one family alone, nor from any and every family. Election depends more on the eminence of one’s family than on one’s age, for worthless persons appointed to have supreme control of weighty affairs do a lot of damage, as they have already done to the Lacedaemonian state.1
1273a2 Most of the objections brought on the grounds that there are deviations2 are applicable in common to all the three constitutions here mentioned. In relation to the principle of aristocracy, or ‘polity’, some features are objectionable because they deviate into oligarchy, others because they deviate into democracy. An example of the latter is the fact that at Carthage the Kings, acting in conjunction with the Elders, have sovereign power to refer or not to refer a matter to the people, provided they are unanimous; failing that, here too the people have power of decision.3 Moreover, when a matter agreed upon by Kings and Elders is so referred, the people are not merely allowed by them to listen to the proposals of the officials, but they have sovereign power to make decisions on them; and it is open to all and sundry to oppose and speak against the proposals that have been referred to them. This feature does not exist in the other constitutions.
1273a13 Then there are oligarchical features. The Boards of Five,4 which have supreme control over many important matters, not only fill up vacancies on their own by co-option but appoint members of the Hundred, the highest authority; moreover they enjoy a longer tenure of office than the rest: they begin to rule before they become members, and continue to do so after they have ceased to belong. On the other hand we must allow as aristocratic the fact that they receive no pay and are not chosen by lot, and one or two other features of that kind; for example all law-suits are decided by the committees, not, as at Sparta, some by one set of persons, others by another.
1273a21 The most conspicuous deviation of the Carthaginian system from the aristocratic towards the oligarchical is one which is quite in accord with the popular notion that rulers should be chosen not merely on merit but also on grounds of wealth. It is impossible, they argue, for a man without ample means to be a good ruler – that is, to have the leisure to be one. Now if election according to wealth is oligarchic, and on grounds of virtue aristocratic, a third system will be this one which underlies the constitutional arrangements of the Carthaginians, who have both these points in mind when they elect, and particularly when they elect the highest officials, i.e. the Kings and Generals.
1273a31 But this deviation from aristocracy must be regarded as an error on the part of the Carthaginian law-giver. For it is most essential that from the very start provision be made for the best people to have leisure and not to depart in any way from standards of propriety, not only while in office but even as private citizens. But while we must look to wealth too,5 for the sake of the leisure it gives, it is a bad thing that the highest offices, of King and General, should be for sale. Where this practice is legal, wealth becomes of more esteem than virtue and causes the whole state to become bent on making money. Whatever is most valued by the highest authority inevitably makes the opinion of the rest of the citizens follow suit. And wherever virtue is not the most highly esteemed thing, there a securely aristocratic constitution is an impossibility. People who lay out sums of money in order to secure office get into the habit of looking, not unreasonably, for some return. Even the poor but reasonable man will want his profit, so it could hardly be expected that the not-so-honest, who has already put his hand in his pocket, should not want his profit too. Therefore it should be those who are best able to find spare time that should hold office. And even if the lawgiver has abandoned the idea of making those reasonable men wealthy, he ought to secure leisure for them, at least during their term of office. 1273b8 Another feature, which would seem objectionable, though the Carthaginians think highly of it, is plurality of office, the same man holding more than one. Surely work is best done when one task is performed by one man. The legislator ought to ensure this, and not require one and the same man to be player on the pipes and a shoemaker. So, too, where the state is not too small to allow of it, it is more statesmanlike,6 as well as more democratic, that a number of people should share in the offices. For, as we have said,7 in this way the work is more widely distributed and each individual task is performed more efficiently and more expeditiously. This can be illustrated from the sphere of the army and the navy; for in both these one might say that commanding and being commanded run right through all personnel.
1273b18 But although their constitution is an oligarchy,8 they are very successful in escaping faction, because from time to time a section of the people grows rich on being removed to the states. That is the way in which they cure the trouble and keep their constitution stable. But all that is Fortune’s business, whereas it ought to be thanks to the legislator that they avoid faction. As it is, if any mischance were to occur and the mass of the ruled population were to rebel, the laws provide no remedy for restoring peace.
So much for my account of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, all of which justly earn our respect.