Aristotle devotes this single chapter to the Laws, the last and longest of Plato’s works, in which he depicts in considerable detail a practical utopia, second-best to that of the Republic. It is by no means certain that the version of the Laws Aristotle consulted coincided with the Laws as we have it today: certainly he ignores large parts of it, and sometimes seems unaware of certain passages that would go some way towards meeting his criticisms. The main speaker in the Laws is an elderly ‘Athenian Stranger’; Aristotle, however, apparently thinks, though he does not quite say this, that it is ‘Socrates’, a celebrated slip presumably induced by reading many other Platonic dialogues, in which Socrates is indeed usually the central character. (Or is it an ironic joke, the ponderous lecturing of the Stranger being a poor replacement for the scintillating conversation of Socrates? Compare Aristotle’s wry remark that ‘the greater part of it (the Laws) is… laws’.)
But ‘Socrates’ is not the only eyebrow-raising feature of this chapter. As in the case of the Republic, Aristotle’s criticisms seem, at least at first sight, notably out of sympathy with Plato; yet in his own sketch of the ideal state in Books VII and VIII he pays Plato the compliment of adopting many of the institutions of the Laws (see Barker, cited on page 34 above). It is perhaps fairer to say that in accordance with his philosophical method of trying to sift what is of value in the ideas of others (see for example his procedure in Nicomachean Ethics VII i and ii), he subjects Plato’s views to critical examination rather than rejects them root and branch. (The justice of his criticisms of the Laws is a tangled and contentious subject, and here I can only refer to the discussions of Bornemann and Morrow to be found in the Select Bibliographies.)
Aristotle is chiefly interested in the economic and constitutional arrangements of the Laws. In discussing the latter he refers to the use of the word politeia, ‘constitution’, to describe a particular type, as it were a ‘constitutional constitution’. In order to avoid confusion, the Greek term itself, transliterated as ‘polity’, is generally used to translate politeia in this restricted sense. It was generally accepted in the fourth century that ‘polity’ was a good thing, because it did not denote anything extreme; all else was a matter of debate. In Book IV Aristotle describes his own particular brand of middle-class, middle-of-the-road polity. He is not in this chapter rejecting the notion of polity: he merely argues that as conceived in the Laws it fails to do what Plato wanted it to do – be a good second-best to the ideal state of the Republic.
1264b26 The case of Plato’s Laws, which was written later, is somewhat similar; it would therefore be advisable to glance also at the constitution there depicted. We have seen that in the Republic Socrates came to definite conclusions only about very few matters – (a) arrangements necessary for the common possession of wives and children, (b) property, and (c) the general organization of the constitution, the bulk of the inhabitants being divided into two parts, a farming class and a defensive fighting class, while out of the fighters a third group is formed which deliberates and is in sovereign charge of the state.1 But there are many things which Socrates left undetermined: are farmers and skilled workers to have a share in some office, or in none? Are they too to possess arms and join the rest in fighting, or not? He certainly thinks women ought to join in fighting and receive the same education as the Guardians;2 but for the rest he has filled up his account with extraneous matter, and with a description of the style of education which the Guardians are to receive.
1265a1 Turning then to the Laws, we find that the greater part of it is in fact ‘laws’, and he has said very little about the constitution, which in spite of his wish to make it more generally acceptable3 to actual states, he gradually brings back round again to the earlier one. For, apart from the sharing of wives and property, he constructs the two constitutions on very much the same pattern: the same kind of education, the same life of freedom from essential tasks, and the same arrangements for common meals – except that in the Laws women also are to have common meals, and the number of those bearing arms is 5,000, not 1,000.4
1265a10 Now all the Socratic dialogues are marked by a certain exaggeration and brilliance, by originality, and by an urge to investigate; but they can hardly be expected to be always right. For example, these 5,000 citizens just mentioned – we must not forget that it will require the territory of a Babylon or some other huge country to support so many men in idleness, to say nothing of further numbers, many times as great, of women and servants who would be attached to them. We can in our speculations postulate any ideal conditions we like, but they should at least be within the limits of possibility.
1265a18 It is further stated that in framing the laws a legislator ought to have regard both to the territory and to the population;5 but surely we should add that he ought to take note of the neighbouring territories too. This is obvious if the state is to live the life of a state and not that of a hermit; for in that case it must provide itself with such arms for warfare as are serviceable not merely internally but also against the territories beyond its borders. And if one rejects such a life,6 both for individuals and for the state at large,7 the need is just as great to be formidable to enemies, both on their invasion and on their retreat.
1265a28 Then there is the amount of property to be possessed: this ought to be looked at to see whether there is not room for some clarification of the proposals. He says that a man ought to have enough to live on ‘moderately’.8 There are two objections to this: he uses ‘live moderately’ as if it meant the same as ‘live the good life’, which is a far more comprehensive expression; also it is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable. I suggest that a better formula would be ‘moderate and liberal’; for taken separately, the one style leads to luxury, the other to too hard a life. And these are the only desirable dispositions that bear on the use of possessions: a man cannot use his possessions gently or bravely, but he can use them moderately and liberally. These then must be the dispositions that affect one’s use of possessions.
1265a38 Furthermore, there is no point in equalizing property, if we do nothing to regulate the number of citizens, but allow births to go on unhindered in the belief that, as appears to happen in present-day states, the population would be kept sufficiently constant, however high the birth-rate, merely by the number of childless couples. But in this state the balance would need to be maintained much more accurately.9 At present, with the practice of dividing the stock of possessions among all the children, however numerous, nobody is in actual want. Under the arrangement proposed the property becomes indivisible and all excess children have to go without, whether there be few or many of them. Indeed it may well be thought that we ought to limit the production of children more than the stock of possessions, ensuring that no more than a certain number are born. In fixing this number regard should be had to chance factors such as the non-survival of some infants and the childlessness of some couples. To leave the number of births unrestricted, as is done in most states, inevitably causes poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces faction and crime. Pheidon of Corinth, one of the earliest of the lawgivers, held that the number of houses and the number of citizens should be kept equal, even if to begin with they all had estates of varying magnitude. In the Laws it is the other way round.
1265b16 Our own view as to how these matters would be best regulated will have to be stated later.10 Here we add a further deficiency in the Laws. It concerns the rulers and how they are to differ from the ruled. He merely says11 that the warp is made of different wool from the weft, and that is what the relation between ruler and ruled ought to be.
1265b21 Again, when he allows a man’s total possessions to be increased up to five times a basic amount,12 why should there not be a stated limit up to which landed property may be increased? Consider also his separation of one homestead into two:13 I doubt if it is advantageous for household-management. He was for giving two separate homesteads to each man; but it is awkward to run two houses.
1265b26 The whole set-up is intended to be neither democracy nor oligarchy but midway between the two – what is called ‘polity’, because it consists of those who bear arms. If he is framing his constitution on these lines because such constitutions are far more acceptable3 to states than any other type, we may perhaps approve his proposal. But we cannot do so if he means it to be second-best to the primary constitution. For in that case one might well prefer the Lacedaemonian, or some other constitution with a more aristocratic basis. There are indeed some who say that the best constitution is one composed of a mixure of all types, and who therefore praise the Lacedaemonian. Some of these say that it is made up out of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy: its kingship is monarchy, the authority of its Elders is oligarchy, and yet it is also run democratically through the authority exercised by the Ephors, who come from the people. Others say that the Ephorate is a tyranny, and that the democratic element is to be found in the common meals and the other features of daily life. But in the Laws it is stated that the best constitution ought to be composed of democracy and tyranny;14 yet surely one would regard these two either as not constitutions at all, or as the worst of all. There is therefore a better case for including a large number of constitutions, because that makes a mixed constitution better.
1266a5 Next, we find that the constitution of the Laws proves to have nothing monarchical about it at all, only oligarchy and democracy with a bias towards oligarchy. This is shown in the method of appointment of office-bearers.15 The practice of selection by lot from a number chosen by election is common both to oligarchy and democracy; but to impose upon the richer citizens, and upon them only, the obligation to be members of the Assembly,16 to vote for office-bearers and do any other duty that falls upon a citizen – that is oligarchical. So also is the attempt to secure that a majority of the officeholders should come from among the wealthy, and that the highest offices should be filled by those from the highest property-classes.17 Oligarchical also is the manner of election which he proposes for members of the Council.18 It is true that all have to take part in the election; but they have to elect first some from the highest property-class, then an equal number from the second class, then from the third class; there was, however, to be no obligation on everyone to elect members from the third class or the fourth class, and only the first two classes were to be obliged to elect from the fourth class. And from these nominees he says that from each property-class an equal number is to be appointed to the Council. The result will be that those who elect from the highest property-classes will be more numerous and of better quality, because some of the common people, not being obliged to vote, will refrain from doing so.
1266a22 These considerations show that such a constitution ought not to be compounded out of monarchy and democracy; and this conclusion will be strengthened by what will be said hereafter when we come round to consider this kind of constitution.19 And with regard to elections of officials too, this idea of electing from the elected is a dangerous one.20 For if a number of persons, not necessarily a large number, are resolved to stand firmly by each other, the elections will always go according to their wishes. So much for the constitution of the Laws.