Hippodamus evidently had flamboyance and a flair for publicity; and Aristotle, who was himself said to have taken pains over dress (Diogenes Laertius V I), is obviously fascinated by his sartorial eccentricities. Like Phaleas and a good many other ‘Utopian’ thinkers, Hippodamus likes to simplify and schematize: he proposes three classes, three divisions of the land to correspond, and three categories of laws. On the other hand he has a not unreasonable dissatisfaction with the simple ‘yes or no’ verdicts demanded in Athenian courts. Once again Aristotle’s criticisms centre on a lack of clarity and detailed precision; and once again it is impossible for us to know now whether they are fair or captious. His central political concern in this chapter is with the question of who should ‘share in the constitution’, i.e. be a citizen and enjoy the appropriate privileges, such as eligibility for office. Underlying his comments is the assumption that possession of arms is a prerequisite for full citizenship and eligibility for office; and he criticizes Hippodamus for extending the citizenship too widely. In Greek political theory the quotation ‘What makes a citizen?’ is crucial, and it is taken up at length in Book III.
In a long and splendid essay at the end of the chapter (1268b31 ff.) Aristotle devotes close attention to the implications of Hippodamus’ proposal to give honours to those who discover some benefit to the state. This does indeed seem to be the most radical and far-reaching of Hippodamus’ proposals, for it assumes, to some extent at least, that society is or should be in constant change. Aristotle is, of course, not thinking of technological discoveries, but if he had known of any, he would probably have been suspicious of them; certainly the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have shown how inventions very soon alter the whole politeia. He is thinking rather of new social and political ideas; and these in a settled regime of any type are always suspect. To mention such a topic is to raise one of the most important and difficult questions of politics. So long as constitutionalism and adherence to tradition act as safeguards against arbitrary and tyrannical government, so long must they be respected; and the political memory of the Greeks helped to make this conservative attitude very general. Aristotle admits that there have been improvements in the past and that there may be need for improvement at any time; but he does after all believe that all or most good innovations have already been made (cf. II v and VII x), and counsels extreme caution and reluctance. Plato would have agreed with him (Laws 797a–e). At bottom, both Plato and Aristotle believed – though for somewhat different metaphysical reasons – that it was in principle meaningful to talk of such a thing as a ‘best’ state, and that it should be possible with effort to achieve in practice a more or less close approximation to it. This done, change could only be for the worse. A proposal like Hippodamus’, which actually encouraged change, would therefore be highly unwelcome to them.
1267b22 Hippodamus, son of Euryphon, came from Miletus. It was he who invented the division of cities into precincts, and he also laid out the street-plan of the Piraeus. His ambition always to be different from other people made his life also peculiar in a variety of ways; and some thought that he was carrying his oddities too far with his long hair and expensive ornaments, wearing at the same time clothing that was cheap but warm, in summer and winter alike. He wished to be considered expert in the whole range of natural science too; and he was the first person not actually taking part in the workings of a constitution to attempt some description of the ideal one.
1267b30 Hippodamus planned a state with a population of 10,000, divided into three parts, one of skilled workers, one of farmers, and a third to bear arms and secure defence. The territory also was to be divided into three parts, a sacred, a public, and a private; the worship of the gods would be maintained out of the produce of the sacred land, the defenders out of the common land, and the private land would belong to the farmers.
1267b37 He also held the view that there were only three kinds of law, corresponding to the three grounds for lawsuits – outrage,1 damage and homicide. He also wanted to legislate for a single supreme court, to which were to be referred all cases that appeared prima facie to have been badly judged; this court was to consist of selected elder persons. Verdicts in law-courts he thought ought to be given not by simply voting for or against, but each member of the court was to present a tablet, on which he was to state in writing the penalty, if it was a simple verdict of condemnation; but he was to leave the tablet blank if he was for a plain acquittal; and if it was partly the one and partly the other, he was to specify that. He thought present legislation bad in this respect, that by compelling jurymen to give a verdict either one way or the other, it made them false to their oath.
1268a6 He next set about enacting a law to the effect that all who made discoveries advantageous to their country should receive honours, and second, that the children of those who fell in war should be maintained at the expense of the state. (He was under the impression that this latter legislation was something entirely new; but it certainly obtains today at Athens and elsewhere.) The officials were all to be elected by the people, which was to consist of the three sections of the state just mentioned. Those elected would look after common interests and those of foreigners and of orphans.
1268a14 Such are the main features of Hippodamus’ scheme, and those most deserving of comment. One’s first point of criticism would be the division of the whole body of the citizens. For they all, skilled craftsmen, farmers, and those who carry arms, share in the constitution;2 but the farmers have no arms, the craftsmen have neither land nor arms, and this makes them virtually the slaves of those who do possess arms. In these circumstances the sharing of all honours becomes an impossibility. For it is an absolute essential that Generals, and Guardians of Citizens, and in general those who hold the supreme offices, should be appointed from the ranks of those who possess arms. On the other hand, if they do not share in the constitution,2 how can they be expected to be well disposed towards it? ‘But’, it may be said, ‘those who possess arms must be superior in power to both the other sections.’ But that is not easy unless they are numerous; and if they are numerous, what need is there for the rest to share in the constitution2 and be in sovereign control of the appointment of officials?
1268a29 Again, what use are the farmers to the state? Skilled workers of course are essential; every state needs them, and they can support themselves from their skills, as in other states. But as for the farmers, if they were expected to provide maintenance for those possessing arms, then it would have been reasonable for them to be a part of the state. But actually that is not so: the land they work is their own and they work it for their own benefit.
1268a36 And as for the common land which will support the defenders, if they are to till it themselves, there will be no difference, as the legislator3 intended there should be, between fighting men and farmers. And if there are to be certain others,4 different from the fighters and from those farmers working their own property, that means that there will be a fourth section of the state, one with no share in anything but quite extraneous to the constitution. Or again, if one makes the same people cultivate the private and the common land, there will not be enough produce to enable each man to maintain two5 households by farming. Why should they not both get their own maintenance and provide for the warriors directly from the same land and the same estates? There is much confusion here.
1268b4 His law relating to verdicts is no good either. He requires that even where the suit is written in simple terms,6 the jurymen should make qualifications. But this is to turn juryman into arbitrator. Certainly that is what is practicable in arbitrations, even if there are several arbitrators, because they discuss their verdict among themselves. But it is not possible in a court of law, and most legislators go to the other extreme and make a point of preventing jurymen from having any opportunity to confer with each other.
1268b11 Again, confusion in the verdict will surely arise, because it may be the opinion of a juryman that a sum ought to be paid, but a lesser amount than the plaintiff demands. Suppose he demands twenty minae (or more): one juryman will say ten (or less), another five, another four (obviously this is the kind of division they will resort to), and some will award the full amount claimed, others nothing. How then are the votes to be counted?
1268b17 Again, nothing forces a juryman to be false to his oath by giving a simple verdict for or against, provided that the indictment is written in simple terms,6 and he gives his decision justly. For he who acquits does not say that nothing at all is due, but just that it is not twenty minae. The only person who would be false to his oath would be one who condemned the defendant while believing the twenty minae not to be due from him.
1268b22 And now for his suggestion that there should be some honours for those who discover something advantageous to the state. This sort of law looks well and sounds well, but it is very risky. It would encourage informers and in some cases lead to alterations to the constitution. This being so, we cannot separate it from another and wider question. Some people debate whether it is harmful or advantageous if states alter their ancestral law whenever a better one is found. If the answer to this question is that alteration is bad, then one can hardly give ready assent to Hippodamus’ proposals. It is possible for people to bring in proposals for abrogating the laws or the constitution on the ground that such proposals are for the public good.
1268b31 Now that we have touched upon this matter it may be as well to say a little more about it, especially as there is, as I have said, debate on the point and a case could be made out also in favour of change. At any rate, if we look at the other sciences, it has definitely been beneficial – witness the changes in traditional methods of medicine and physical training, and generally in every skill and faculty. Now since we must regard statesmanship as one of these, clearly something similar ought to apply there too. And so indeed we could claim to find some indication of that, if we look at the facts and observe how uncivilized, how rough-and-ready, the old laws were.
Greeks used to go about carrying arms; they used to buy their brides from each other; and traces survive of other practices once doubtless customary, which merely make us smile today, such as the law relating to homicide at Cyme, by which, if the prosecutor can produce a certain number of witnesses, members of his own kin, then the defendant is guilty of murder.
1269a3 Generally, of course, it is the good, and not simply the traditional, that is aimed at. It would be foolish to adhere to the notions of primitive men, whether they were born from the earth or were survivors of some great catastrophe: we may reasonably suppose that they were on a level with ordinary, not very intelligent, people today, and lack of intelligence was said to be one of the marks of the earth-born.7 We might go further and say that even those laws which have been written down are best regarded as not unchangeable. On the analogy of other skills, to set down in writing the whole organization of the state, down to the last detail, would be quite impossible; the general principle must be stated in writing, the action taken depends upon the particular case.8
1269a12 From these considerations it is clear that there are some occasions that call for change and that there are some laws which need to be changed. But looking at it in another way we must say that there will be need of the very greatest caution. In a particular case we may have to weigh a very small improvement against the danger of getting accustomed to casual abrogation of the laws; in such a case, obviously, we must tolerate a few errors on the part of lawmakers and rulers. A man will receive less benefit from changing the law than damage from becoming accustomed to disobey authority. For the example of the crafts is false; there is a difference between altering a craft and altering a law. The law has no power to secure obedience save the power of habit, and that takes a long time to become effective. Hence easy change from established laws to new laws means weakening the power of the law. Again, if changes in laws are to be permitted, it will have to be decided whether they may all be changed, and in every type of constitution, or not. And who is to make the changes? Anybody or only certain persons? That will make a considerable difference. We will now give up this discussion; it will be better resumed on other occasions.