Having finished examining the proposals of the theorists (Plato, Phaleas, Hippodamus), Aristotle now turns to constitutions that are or have been actually in operation, Lacedaemonian, Cretan, Carthaginian – choosing these, he tells us at the end, because they are rightly admired.
A glance at the following notes on certain names and technical terms will help the reader to understand the points Aristotle makes in this long and important chapter.
Lycurgus, to whom Aristotle seems usually to be referring when he speaks of ‘the lawgiver’, was the traditional founder of the Spartan constitution. His date (and indeed his very existence) is uncertain, and the precise nature and extent of his work are matters of controversy.
Helots (literal meaning probably ‘captives’) were a class of state serfs (a convenient but anachronistic term), the descendants of originally independent peoples in Laconia and Messenia conquered by the Spartans at various times between perhaps the tenth and seventh centuries. They differed from ordinary slaves in various respects, and formed a class intermediate between them and the free Spartans proper. Their broad counterpart in Thessaly were the penestai (translated ‘serfs’).
Peripheral populations (perioikoi, ‘dwellers round’) were small communities under Spartan control roughly encircling the Spartan territory. They paid Spartan taxes and were required to supply contingents of soldiers to fight in Sparta’s wars; but they enjoyed only local administrative autonomy.
The two Kings were hereditary and belonged to two entirely separate royal houses; their functions and influence were not only political but military (as commanders-in-chief).
The Ephors were five officials who in addition to wide executive and judicial powers exercised close control over the conduct of the kings. They were elected annually by the citizens.
The Board of Elders (gerousia) had twenty-eight members over sixty years old, plus the kings. It was elected probably from a limited number of aristocratic families, and possessed extensive judicial and administrative functions, notably the preparation of business for the assembly of citizens. Its political influence and powers were great.
The Spartiatae were the full Spartan citizens.
The Spartan constitution was widely praised in antiquity for its combination of these mutually checking and restraining components (see e.g. Plato, Laws 691–2), which was thought to ensure the stability of the state. Aristotle himself, though he has much fault to find with Sparta, notes in IV ix (cf. Thucydides I xviii) that in its balance between different principles her constitution resembles his own brand of ‘polity’. Much, however, is obscure about Spartan constitutional history: for a good discussion, see W. G. Forrest, A History of Sparta, 950–192 BC (London, 1968, 2nd ed. 1980).
About the standards of value which Aristotle now applies to constitutions two points should be noted, because they are characteristic of his whole approach: first, the very best or ideal constitution may well differ from the type best suited to a particular place or time; and second, it is taken for granted that a citizen, if he is to develop the qualities worthy of a citizen, must not do work that is felt to be degrading. But it is recognized that if the citizens are not going to do their own dirty work, there must be a subordinate class to do it for them; and this class is bound to be a source of trouble. It is surprising that Aristotle has not more to say about this problem: he can think of no answer except repressive legislation; see however I vi for the ‘friendship’ he believes can exist between master and slave.
1269a29 About the constitution of the Lacedaemonians, and about that of the Cretans and generally about others, there are two questions to be asked. First, are its enactments good or bad, judged by the standard of the absolutely best system? Second, does it contain anything that is not in keeping with the principles and style of the constitution which they have set out to achieve?
1269a34 Now it is agreed that a necessity for any state which is to operate a good constitution is freedom from essential1 tasks; but how that condition is to be secured is not easy to see. For example, in Thessaly the serfs often attacked the Thessalians, just as the helots attacked the Spartans, always on the look-out for any mischance that may befall their masters. But nothing of the kind has so far occurred among the Cretans. The reason for this is perhaps that the neighbouring states, though they might well be at war with each other, never join up with the rebels; it is not in their interest to do so, since they too possess peripheral populations. Sparta’s neighbours on the other hand, Argives, Messenians, Arcadians, were all hostile to her. Similarly there were from the start rebellions against the Thessalians, because they were still constantly at war with their neighbours, Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. And even if there is no other source of trouble, there is still the effort of management, of finding the right way to live with a subject population. If they are allowed too much licence, they become arrogant and begin to claim equal rights with their masters; if they are badly treated, they become resentful and rebellious. It is clear therefore that those who find themselves in such relations with their helotry have not yet found the best way.2
1269b12 Again, the lack of control over Spartan women is detrimental both to the attainment of the aims of the constitution and to the happiness of the state. For just as man and wife are each part of a household, so we should regard a state also as divided into two parts approximately equal numerically, one of men, one of women. So, in all constitutions in which the position of women is ill-regulated, one half of the state must be regarded as not properly legislated for. And that is what has happened at Sparta. For there the lawgiver,3 whose intention it was that the whole state should be tough, has obviously shown toughness himself as far as the men are concerned, but has been negligent over the women. For at Sparta women live in temperately, enjoying every licence and indulging in every luxury.
1269b23 An inevitable result under such a constitution is that esteem is given to wealth, particularly in cases when the men are dominated by the women; and this is a common state of affairs in military and warlike races, though not among the Celts and any others among whom male homosexuality is openly esteemed. Indeed it seems as if the first person to relate the myth of a union between Ares and Aphrodite did not lack some rational basis for it: certainly all such people seem compulsively attracted by sexual relations, either with males or with females. This is why that state of affairs prevailed among the Spartans, where in the days of their supremacy a great deal was managed by women. And what is the difference between women ruling and rulers ruled by women? The result is the same. Boldness is not a quality useful in any of the affairs of daily life, but only, if at all, in war. Yet even here the influence of the Spartans’ women has been very harmful. This was demonstrated when Laconia was invaded by the Thebans:4 instead of playing a useful part, like women in other states, they caused more confusion than the enemy.
1269b39 Now it is not surprising that from the earliest times lack of control over women was a feature of Laconian society: there were long periods when the Spartan men were absent from their own land on military service, fighting against Argives, or again against Arcadians or Messenians. When they resumed their leisure, then predisposed to obedience by military life, which offers scope for many kinds5 of virtue, they readily submitted themselves to their lawgiver. But not so the women. It is said that Lycurgus endeavoured to bring them under the control of his laws, but that when they resisted he gave up the attempt.6 These then are the causes of what took place, and clearly therefore also the causes of the defect which we have been discussing. But our present inquiry is about what is right or wrong, not an attempt to decide what ought to be excused and what ought not.
1270a11 If, as has been said earlier,7 the position of women is wrong, not only does it look like a blot on the constitution in itself, but it seems to contribute something to the greed for money; for one might next go on to attack the Spartan inequality of property-ownership. For we find that some Spartans have come to have far too many possessions, others very few indeed; hence the land has fallen into the hands of a small number. Here there have been errors in the legal provisions too. For their lawgiver, while he quite rightly made it a disgrace to buy and sell land in someone’s possession, left it open to anyone to transfer it to other ownership by gift or bequest – and yet this inevitably leads to the same result. Moreover, something like two-fifths of all the land is possessed by women. There are two reasons for this: heiresses are numerous and dowries are large. It would have been better to have regulated dowries, prohibiting them altogether or making them small or at any rate moderate in size. But8 as it is an heiress may be given in marriage to any person whatever. And if a man dies intestate, the person he leaves as heir9 gives her to whom he likes. So although the land was sufficient to support 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 heavy infantry, the number fell to below 1,000. The sheer facts have shown that these arrangements were bad: one single blow10 was too much for Sparta, and she succumbed owing to the shortage of men.
1270a34 It is said that in the time of their early kings the Spartans gave others a share in their constitution, so that in spite of long continuing wars there was not then any shortage of men. It is also said that at one time the Spartiatae had as many as 10,000. However, whether these statements are true or false, it is far better to keep up the numbers of males in a state by a levelling out of property. But the law on the begetting of children tends to militate against this reform. For the lawgiver, intending that the Spartiatae should be as numerous as possible, encourages the citizens to beget many children. For they have a law by which the father of three sons is exempt from military service, and the father of four from all taxes. But it is obvious that if many are born and the land distributed accordingly, many must inevitably become poor.
1270b6 Another defect in the Lacedaemonian constitution is seen in connection with the office of Ephor. The Ephorate independently controls the most important business. Its members come from among all the people, with the result that often men who are very poor find themselves on this board, and their lack of means used to make them open to bribery. (There have been many demonstrations of this in the past; and in our own day we have the affair of the Andrians, in which certain Ephors have been so corrupted by gifts of money that it is no thanks to them if their state was not utterly ruined.) And just because the power of the Ephors is excessive and virtually that of a tyrant, even the Spartan Kings were forced to curry favour with them.11 And this has caused further damage to the constitution, for an aristocracy turned into a democracy.
1270b17 The Board of Ephors certainly keeps the constitution together: the people are kept quiet because it gives them a share in the highest office. So whether this is due to the lawgiver12 or to good fortune, it suits the circumstances very well. The point is that if a constitution is to have a good prospect of stability, it must be such that all sections of the state accept it and want it to go on in the same way as before. The Kings have this feeling about the constitution because it confers dignity on themselves; the men of quality have it because of their membership of the Board of Elders (for this office is their reward for virtue), the people because of the universal basis of the Ephorate. But while it was necessary to elect Ephors from among all the citizens the present method of election is quite childish.13
1270b28 The Ephors also have supreme powers of jurisdiction in cases of importance; but considering that anybody at all may hold the office, it would be better that they should not have power to give verdicts on their own judgement, but only in accordance with written rules, i.e. as the laws direct. Nor does the way in which the Ephors live conform to the aims of the state. They live a life of undue ease, while the rest have a very high degree of austerity in living, so high indeed that they really cannot endure it but secretly get round the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body.
1270b35 There are drawbacks also to the authority exercised by the Elders. One might suppose that, so long as it consists of respectable men adequately trained with a view to every excellence, this institution is a good thing for the state. But the mind grows old no less than the body, so it is questionable whether they ought to have their lifelong supreme power to decide important cases. And when we find that their education has been of such a kind that even the lawgiver himself has no confidence in them as good men, the situation becomes dangerous. It is known that those who have taken on a share in this office conduct much public business by taking bribes and showing favouritism. For this reason it would be better that their proceedings should not be, as they are at present, exempt from any scrutiny.14 It may be thought that the office of Ephor provides a scrutiny of all other authorities; but that is to give far too much to the Ephorate, and is not what we mean by requiring an authority to submit to scrutiny of its proceedings.
1271a9 And as for election of the Elders, the way in which the choice is made is childish,15 and it is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of the office should himself solicit it. Whether he wants to or not, the man to hold office is the man who is fit for it. But the lawgiver, in a way that is clearly typical of his whole approach to the constitution, begins by making the citizens ambitious and then uses their ambition as a means of getting the Elders elected; for no one who is not ambitious would ask to hold office. Yet the truth is that men’s ambition and their desire to make money are among the most frequent causes of deliberate acts of injustice.
1271a18 As to kingship, we may postpone16 considering whether states are better with or without it; at any rate they would do better not to have Kings after the present Spartan fashion.17 We say that in every case a King should be chosen in the light of his personal life. It is clear that even the Spartan lawgiver himself does not believe it possible to produce Kings of first quality; at all events, he has no confidence that they are good enough. This explains why they used to send their personal enemies18 to accompany them as ambassadors, and why they regarded disagreement between the two Kings as making for stability in the state.
1271a26 Unsatisfactory also are the rules made by the person who first established the system of common meals,19 called by the Lacedaemonians ‘phiditia’. The gathering ought rather to be run at public expense, as in Crete. But at Sparta every individual has to contribute, though some of them are quite poor and unable to meet this expenditure, so that the result is the opposite of what the legislator intended. For common meals are intended to be a democratic practice, but under the regulations such as those laid down at Sparta it becomes anything but democratic. For it is not easy for those who cannot afford it to join in, yet this is their traditional way of delimiting the constitution – to exclude from it anyone who is unable to pay this particular due.
1271a37 (i) Some others too have objected to the law about Naval Commanders. The objections are well founded, for the arrangement is a cause of faction. This is because over and above the Kings, who are perpetual commanders of the forces, the naval command is set up, which is almost another Kingship, (ii) The principles of the lawgiver are open to a further criticism, which Plato has in fact made in his Laws:20 their whole system of laws is directed to securing only a part of virtue, military prowess, as being valuable for conquering. Hence the Spartans were stable enough while at war but began to decline once they reached a position of supremacy; they did not understand how to be at leisure, and never engaged in any kind of training higher than training for war. (iii) Another, and equally serious, error is that while they rightly hold that the good things which men fight to get are to be won more by virtue than by vice, they wrongly suppose that these good things are superior to the virtue, (iv) Public finance is another thing that is badly managed by the Spartiatae. They are obliged to undertake large wars, but there is never any money in the public treasury. Also they are very bad at paying taxes, for as most of the land is the property of the Spartiatae themselves, they do not inquire too closely into each other’s contributions. And so a state of affairs has come about which is just the opposite of the happy conditions envisaged by the lawgiver: he has produced a state which has no money, but is full of individuals eager to make money for themselves.21
These are the main defects of the constitution of the Lacedaemonians; so let that suffice for the topic.