This chapter, being reminiscent of I i ad init. and of the opening chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics, looks like something of a fresh start; but it turns out to raise much the same problem as was discussed in III ix, and to treat it in much the same way (see introduction to that chapter, and cf. V i). On the notion of ‘proportionate’ equality (i.e. greater shares for greater merit, as distinct from identical shares irrespective of merit), useful background reading would be Plato, Laws 756e–758a.
1282b14 In every kind of knowledge and skill the end which is aimed at is a good. 1 his good is gieatesl, and is a ‘good’ in the highest sense, when that knowledge or skill is the most sovereign one, i.e. the faculty of statecraft.1 In the state, the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the benefit of the whole community. Now all men believe that justice means equality in some sense, and they are in limited agreement with the philosophy of justice which I explained in my Ethics:2 they hold that justice is some entity which is relative to persons, and that equality must be equal for equals. The question we must keep in mind is, equality or inequality in what sort of thing? For this is a problem, and one for which we need political philosophy.3
1282b23 It is possible to argue that superiority in any good whatever justifies unequal distribution of offices, given that in all other respects than this the persons are not different but similar – for differences in them would mean different justice and different deserts. But surely, if that be granted, we shall have to allow that superiority in height or complexion or any other good thing will confer an advantage in political rights.4 Is not the fallacy here pretty obvious? A comparison with other kinds of knowledge and faculties shows that it is. For if, say, pipe-players are equal in skill, we must not give an advantage in instruments to those of better birth, for that would not enable them to play any better. The use of the better instrument ought to belong to the better performer.
1282b34 If this is not sufficiently clear, it will become so if we sharpen the example. If one man is outstandingly superior in pipe-playing. but far inferior in birth or good looks (even supposing that birth and good looks are each a greater good than the skill of pipe-playing, and its superiority to them is greater in proportion than the superiority of this player’s ability to that of the rest), even then, I say, he should still get the best pipes. For superiority both in wealth and in birth ought to contribute to the quality of the performance – to which these qualities in fact contribute nothing at all.
1283a3 Moreover, according to that way of reasoning, every good thing would be commensurable with every other good thing. For if marks are given for a particular degree of tallness, then tallness in general would be in competition with both wealth and freedom. So if we say that X has greater superiority in height than Y has in virtue, then even if in general virtue is of greater importance than height, we are making everything commensurable with everything; since if one amount is greater than some other, clearly there is another which is equal.5 But such mensuration is quite impossible here, so it is clear that in matters relating to the state men are quite right not to take any and every kind of inequality into account in competing for offices, and only those differences which contribute to making up the state as a whole should be urged in the competition. Such qualities as superior swiftness of foot, however important that may be in winning honour in athletic contests, should not entitle one to take more than the next man.
1283a16 Hence those of noble birth or who are free or have wealth are quite right to lay claim to honours, since the members of the state must be free and must have taxable property (you could no more make a state out of paupers than out of slaves). But obviously something more is needed besides: I mean justice, and the virtue that is proper to citizens.6 For without these additions it is not possible for the state to be managed. More exactly, whereas without free population and wealth there cannot be a state at all, without justice and virtue it cannot be managed well.