Aristotle has discussed, but has not really finished discussing, citizen and state in relation to constitution. He has had difficulty in defining citizen in such a way as to be applicable to all forms of constitution. This same difficulty now reappears in another form: in attempting to find out what a good citizen is, he discovers that here too the answer depends largely on the politeia, constitution, in which the citizenship is held. Perhaps this is our cue to remind ourselves of the inadequacy of ‘constitution’ as a translation of politeia, which embraces the whole social, political and economic organization of the state; and also that ‘virtue’ (aretē, ‘excellence’, ‘efficiency’) is often conceived in terms of civic function rather than of character or mental or spiritual state: ‘what I can do’ as well as ‘what I inwardly am’. What follows now, about the good man, ‘sound’ citizen, and good ruler or official, will be clearer if these points are borne in mind. (In this chapter, spoudaios, ‘sound’, usually of the citizen, is distinguished in translation from agathos, ‘good’, usually of the individual man – though what if anything hinges on this point of vocabulary is by no means clear; indeed, in this chapter the two terms are commonly interpreted as virtual synonyms – but see R. Develin, ‘The good man and the good citizen in Aristotle’s Politics’, Phronesis, 18 (1973), pp. 71–9.)
Aristotle argues that the good citizen can be a good man only in the ‘best’ state, and only then when he is performing the function of ruling, not when he is being ruled. Such a doctrine sounds to us arid and unhelpful. Why does Aristotle hold it?
The first four paragraphs argue that what makes a good citizen is the contribution his ‘virtue’ makes to the stability and well-being of the constitution; but of constitutions there are many different kinds, so the ‘virtue’ of a good citizen will vary according to the constitution under which he lives. It cannot, therefore, be the same as the invariable ‘perfect’ virtue of the good man. Even in the ‘best’ state, the inevitable differentiation of function among the citizens prevents the virtue of the good citizen from being identical with that of the good man, which is single, and the same in all good men.
The next two paragraphs concede that the two virtues may coincide in particular cases, i.e. when the good man is, in his capacity as good citizen, ruling well – for that entails the exercise of wisdom (phronesis) which is an essential part of the perfect’ virtue of a good man. But part of the virtue of a good citizen is to be ruled well also, which does not require wisdom, and is less praiseworthy. Only when the good citizen is ruling is his virtue identical with that of the good man. Two more paragraphs then distinguish the citizen’s alternation of ruling and being ruled from the permanent relationship of ruler and ruled seen in slavery. A final paragraph points out that the particular virtues, e.g. wisdom, differ according as to whether they are exercised by ruler or ruled. This consideration too militates against the view that the virtue of the good citizen and the good man are identical, for the virtue of the latter is exercised only when ruling.
The last paragraph of the chapter perhaps suggests that Aristotle found these conclusions somewhat unpalatable. His dilemma arises, as so often, from his belief in natural teleology. Man has certain faculties to use, including the noblest, the intellectual. A man cannot be ‘good’ if he is not using his faculties: there is a kind of moral imperative to use them (cf. introduction to III vi). Now a man who is ruled has to hold his reasoning faculty in abeyance, to the extent that he must do as he is told and not exercise judgement or take a decision of his own or direct other people. He cannot, therefore, be a ‘good’ man. He may be a good citizen, of a particular constitution; but unless he is ruling well over fellow-citizens, having first learned to do so by being ruled, he is not exercising his human faculties to the full, and is not ‘good’. The ‘good man’ looks as though he will be a rather rare phenomenon (cf. the exacting criteria and apparent rarity of phronēsis, practical wisdom, in Nicomachean Ethics, VI xiii); and at the end of the present chapter we learn that men who are being ruled will need mere ‘right opinion’, not phronēsis (cf. Plato, Republic IV). Aristotle is thinking in terms of an intellectual and political élite.
Aristotle could have escaped his dilemma simply by challenging his own assumption that ‘goodness’ or ‘virtue’ (aretē) cannot be complete without the exercise of certain functions. In so far as ‘good’ is a term of moral approbation, why should it depend on the exercise of the ‘noble’ faculty of reason for the purpose of ruling? Could not an unintelligent person, who never rules, be ‘good’? Back would come Aristotle’s answer: ‘As a citizen, yes; as a man, no’. We may think this queer; but at least his very acute discussion does have the considerable merit of focusing our attention on the question, ‘What do we mean when we say a man is “good”?’.
These seem to be the central issues of the chapter, but there is much else of interest: for a full discussion, see the commentaries, especially Newman I 234 ff. Some sentences are very difficult, partly because of textual cruces.
1276b16 Connected with the matters just discussed is the question whether we ought to regard the virtue of a good man and that of a sound citizen as the same virtue, or not. If this is a point to be investigated, we really must try to form some rough conception of the virtue of a citizen.
1276b20 So then: we say a citizen is a member of an association, just as a sailor is; and each member of the crew has his different function and a name to fit it – rower, helmsman, look-out, and the rest. Clearly the most exact description of each individual will be a special description of his virtue; but equally there will also be a general description that will fit them all, because there is a task in which they all play a part – the safe conduct1 of the voyage; for each member of the crew aims at securing that. Similarly the task of all the citizens, however different they may be, is the stability1 of the association, that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue of the citizen must be in relation to the constitution; and as there are more kinds of constitution than one, there cannot be just one single and perfect virtue of the sound citizen. On the other hand we do say that the good man is good because of one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Clearly then it is possible to be a sound citizen without having that virtue which makes a sound man.
1276b35 Look now at the problem from another angle and consider the same point in relation to the best constitution. That is to say, if it is impossible for a state to consist entirely of sound men, still each of them must do, and do well, his proper work; and doing it well depends on his virtue. But since it is impossible for all the citizens to be alike, there cannot be one virtue of citizen and good man alike. For the virtue of the sound citizen must be possessed by all (and if it is, then that state is necessarily best). But if it is inevitable that not all the citizens in a sound state are good,2 it is impossible for all to have the virtue of the good man.
1277a5 Again, a state is made up of unlike parts. As an animate creature consists of body and soul, and soul consists of reasoning and desiring, and a household consists of husband and wife, and property consists of master and slave, so also a state is made up of these and many other sorts of people besides, all different. The virtue of all the citizens cannot, therefore, be one, any more than in a troupe of dancers the goodness of the leader and that of the followers are one.
1277a12 Now while all this shows clearly that they are not the same in general, the question may be asked whether it is not possible in a particular case for the same virtue to belong both to the sound citizen and the sound man. We would answer that there is such a case, since we maintain that a sound ruler is both good and wise,3 where as wisdom is not essential for a citizen. Some say that from the very start there is a different kind of education for rulers. They instance (a) the obvious training of the sons of royalty in horsemanship and war, and (b) a saying of Euripides, which is supposed to refer to the education of a ruler: ‘No frills in education, please… only what the state doth need.’4 But though we may say that the virtue of good ruler and good man is the same, yet, since he too that is ruled is a citizen, we cannot say in general that the virtue of citizen and man are one, but only that they may be in the case of a particular citizen.5 For certainly the virtue of ruler and citizen are not the same. And that doubtless is the reason why Jason of Pherae said that he went hungry whenever he ceased to be tyrant, not knowing how to live as a private person.
1277a25 But surely men praise the ability to rule and to be ruled, and the virtue of a citizen of repute seems to be just this – to be able to rule and be ruled well. If then we say that the virtue of the good man is to do with ruling, and that of the citizen to do with both ruling and being ruled, the two things cannot be praiseworthy to the same degree.
1277a29 So since on occasions they seem different, and ruler and ruled ought not to learn the same things, where as the citizen ought to know both and share in both, one could see from the following.6
1277a33 For there is such a thing as rule by a master, which we say is concerned with necessary tasks; but the master has no necessity to know more than how to use such labour. Anything else, I mean to be able actually to be a servant and do the chores, is simply slave-like. (We speak of several kinds of slave, corresponding to the several varieties of operation. One variety is performed by manual workers, who, as the term itself indicates, live by their hands; among these are the skilled mechanics.) Hence, in some places, only with the arrival of extreme democracies have workmen attained to participation in office. The work then of those who are subject to rule is not work which either the good statesman or the good citizen ought to learn, except occasionally for the personal use he may require to make of it. For then the distinction between master and slave just ceases to apply.
1277b7 But there is another kind of rule – that exercised over men who are free, and similar in birth. This we call rule by a statesman.7 It is this that a ruler must first learn through being ruled, just as one learns to command cavalry by serving under a cavalry-commander and to be a general by serving under a general, and by commanding a battalion and a company. This too is a healthy saying, namely that it is not possible to be a good ruler without first having been ruled. Not that good ruling and good obedience are the same virtue – only that the good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to rule and be ruled. That is what we mean by the virtue of a citizen – understanding the governing of free men from both points of view.
1277b16 Returning now to the good man, we find the same two qualities. And this is true even though the self-control and justice exercised in ruling are not the same in kind.8 For clearly the virtue of the good man, who is free but governed, for example his justice, will not be always one and the same: it will take different forms according to whether he is to rule or be ruled, just as self-control and courage vary as between men and women. A man would seem a coward if he had only the courage of a woman, a woman a chatterbox if she were only as discreet as a good man. Men and women have different parts to play in managing the household: his to win, hers to preserve. But the only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom; all the others must be possessed, so it seems, both by rulers and by ruled. The virtue of a person being ruled is not practical wisdom but correct opinion; he is rather like a person who makes the pipes, while the ruler is the one who can play them.
These considerations have made clear whether the virtue of the good man and that of the sound citizen are the same or different, and the sense in which they are the same and the sense in which they are different.