In this chapter Aristotle first briefly classifies constitutions according to the ‘sovereign’ or ruling element in each; then, in the light of his teleological view of the state as existing to serve the common good, pronounces judgement on them according to whether the ‘sovereign’ element serves its own interests only or those of all the citizens.
His contrast between political rule and the rule of master over slave is revealing: whereas political authority should be exercised in the interests of the ruled, a master’s authority is primarily for his own benefit, and only incidentally for that of the slave. The crucial difference, evidently, is that citizens are equal, and those in power are not essentially superior to the ruled; but a slave is inferior to his master (in point of rationality and hence capacity for natural ‘political’ life as a citizen), so that his master’s interests are paramount. Not that Aristotle means to license ill-treatment or unscrupulous exploitation of slaves: as he remarks, authority over slaves in bad condition is a poor thing, and slaves in fact benefit, in virtue of their natural capacities and functions, from their relationship with their masters; in this sense master and slave have the ‘same’ interest in maintaining the relationship. Obviously Aristotle’s argument from inferiority of interests is bound to be repugnant to anyone with egalitarian views about the rights of man. It does however make sense within the framework of a belief that the ‘political’ life lived by a citizen of a polis is supremely ‘natural’ and ‘best’, for ‘natural’ interests are the highest interests of all. ‘Nature’ seems to carry strong social and political imperatives.
1278b6 Having settled these questions, we must proceed to our next and ask whether we are to posit only one constitution or more than one; and if more than one, what they are and how many, and what the differences are between them. The ‘constitution’ of a state is the organization of the offices,1 and in particular of the one that is sovereign over all the others. Now in every case the citizen-body of a state is sovereign; the citizen-body is the constitution. Thus in democracies the people are sovereign, in oligarchies the few. That, we say, is what makes the one constitution differ from the other; and the same criterion can be applied to the others also.
1278b15 We ought at the outset to state the purpose for which the state has come to be, as well as the number of kinds of authority controlling men and their life as members of an association. At the beginning of this work, when we drew a distinction between household-management and mastership, we also stated that by nature man is a political animal.2 Hence men have a desire for life together, even when they have no need to seek each other’s help. Nevertheless, common interest too is a factor in bringing them together, in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually; but they form and continue to maintain a political association3 for the sake of life itself. Perhaps we may say that there is an element of good even in mere living, provided that life is not excessively beset with troubles. Certainly most men, in their desire to keep alive, are prepared to face a great deal of suffering, as if finding in life itself a certain well-being and a natural sweetness.
1278b30 But to return to authority: it is not difficult to distinguish its recognized styles (I often speak about their definition in my public lectures).4 First, although the natural slave and the natural master really have the same interest, rule of master over slave is exercised primarily for the benefit of the master and only incidentally for the benefit of the slave, because if the slave deteriorates the master’s rule over him is inevitably impaired.
1278b37 Then there is the authority of a man over his wife, his children, and his whole household, to which we give the name ‘household-management’. This is exercised either for the benefit of those subject to the authority, or for some benefit common to both parties. In itself it is for the benefit of the subjects, as we see by the analogy of the other skills, such as that of a doctor or of an athlete’s trainer, who would only incidentally be concerned with their own interests. (For of course there is nothing to prevent a trainer on occasion being himself a member of the team in training, as the man who steers the ship is always one of the members of the ship’s company. The trainer or pilot looks to the good of those under his authority, but when he himself is one of them he gets the same benefit out of it incidentally as they do, in that the pilot is a member of the ship’s company, and the trainer becomes one of those in training, while yet remaining their trainer.)
1279a8 That is why,5 whenever authority in the state is constituted on a basis of equality and similarly between citizens, they expect to take turns in exercising it. This principle is very old but in earlier times it was applied in a natural and proper manner: men expected each to take a turn at public service,6 and during tenure of office to look after the interests of someone else, who then did the same for him. But nowadays there is more to be gained out of public affairs and offices, so men want to be in office continuously. They could hardly be more zealous in their place-hunting if they were ill and their recovery depended on securing office.
1279a16 It is clear then that those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice; while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are wrong. They are all deviations from the right constitutions. They are like the rule of master over slave, whereas the state is an association of free men.